[新闻评论] I am a retired engineer/scientist and university professor who specializes in research, development and design of advanced military systems for over 30 years . In the research and development stage I had to read, evaluate and analyze various battle field maneuvers, strategic planning and combat tactics. The reading materials covered past and current war tactics from guerilla warfare to modern high tech weapon systems. I have a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Toronto in 1951, Master and Doctorate degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. I believe that I am highly qualified to judge what historical fact in war and peace was and what was not.
Upon my retirement I have been reading a number of unclassified books published by various publishers. Recently I came upon a book written by Mrs. Halliday (Ms. Jung Chang) and Mr. Halliday, entitled “Mao, The Unknown Story”. While looking at the photographs in that book, I noticed pictures embedded in Chapter 29 and reasons why Chiang Kai Shek lost the civil war to Mao Tse Tung. It stated that the main reason was due to “four top sleepers” planted in Chiang’s government. General Hu Tsung Nan was mentioned among the four sleepers. So I reviewed the entire section of Chapter 29 and discovered that there was nothing to base your allegation that Hu Tsung Nan was a communist spy in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp.
In my experience, there is nothing that could verify that allegation in classified or unclassified documents, telegrams, and staff reports in General George Marshall’s Missions to China (to mediate a peace agreement between Chiang’s and Mao’s camps). Needless to say I cannot use classified, because I’m not certain that General Marshall’s reports, telegrams, and notes written in that era have all been declassified or not. There were a lot of other reports about Chinese participation in World War II and Civil War written by various US and UK generals and reporters also. Not a single indication to that effect.
The writer’s allegation that Hu was a mole planted by Mao in Chiang’s camp was based on hearsay and rumors and should not be treated as historical facts
Here is my analysis to counter the writer’s conviction that General Hu Tsung Nan was a mole in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp planted by Mao. To begin with there was not a single person mentioned in Chapter 29 who suspected General Hu was a mole planted by Mao. As a historian Mr. Jon Halliday should not use his own hunch based on some comments made by unnamed Mao’s radio man to convict an honorable national hero of Nationalist China as a traitor to his country and his leader. The oath of ethics of Historians Association to report true historical facts without imposing his or her own opinions let alone to convict someone with intentions. To put untrue stories as fact in a chapter and highlight the false accusation must be utterly beyond your and/or any true dedicated historian’s apprehensions.
Among the persons mentioned in the section relating to General Hu in Chapter 29, the only believable statement can be attributed to Major General David Goodwin Barr. General Barr, the Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in China observed that Hu “prevailed on” Chiang to reinforce his Xian garrison to an extent which was later to prove disastrous to the Nationalists in East Central China; key losses there were “a direct result of a shift of forces to the west,” where, Barr noted, they were either useless or destroyed. General Barr never said anything that General Hu could be a mole planted by Mao. To move troops from one theater to another theater happens all the time during a war . General Barr was a talented staff officer but not a strong combat troop commander. Less than two years later while he was in Korea as Commander of U.S. 7th Infantry Division under Major General Edward M. “Ned” Almond, Commander of X Corps, directly under General Douglas MacArthur. He himself was a “yes” man to his superiors. It was his troop who spearheaded to the Manchurian border town, Hyesanjin-on-the-Yalu on November 20, 1950. When his soldiers reached the Yalu River, General MacArthur told General Almond, “Heartiest congratulations, Ned, please tell David Barr that the 7th Division hit the jackpot.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff has given MacArthur specific orders to stay far away from Yalu River, but MacArthur ignores the orders. A couple days later, on November 24, the X Corp under General Almond including the 7th Infantry Division were encircled by the Chinese Communist Army. Thousands and thousands of U.S. soldiers were either killed or captured by the Chinese Communists. Exactly the same fate encountered by General Hu Tsung Nan’s army in 1948. General Hu occupied the Red Capital at Yenan for a whole year before they were forced to abandon the city. The U.S. Army only reached the Yalu River for four days and was forced to retreat all the way back to South Korea and even the capital of South Korea, Seoul, was reoccupied by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Nobody would say that General Douglas McArthur was a traitor who deliberately sacrificed his soldiers and officers.
Chang and Holliday mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan struck up a friendship with Chiang’s intelligence chief, Tai Li. The fact is General Hu did not strike up a friendship with Tai Li when Tai was Chiang’s Intelligence Chief. They were friends when General Hu was still a school teacher in his home town Shao Fong way before he went to Wampoa Military Academy in 1924. Tai Li went to the Wampoa Military Academy in 1926. By 1927 General Hu was already a National hero in China. During that time, Mao was not even a leader or prominent member of the Communist Party. During the Second Northern Expedition the National Army took over Shanghai on March 21, 1927. On the afternoon of March 22, Hu Tsung Nan assembled regiment and battalion officers and armed soldiers rode captured vehicles for a tour of the city, intruded onto British and French Extra- territories and drove by the Racing Course and through Nanking Road. The British and French were daunted by the National Army’s valor and Shanghai citizens fervor dared not stop the parade in spite of the fact during the battle for Shanghai they had 23,000 soldiers in Shanghai and dispatched over ninety warships toward Nanking. It just to show who was more famous between Hu and Mao during that time.
During the so-called Long March of the Chinese Communists, General Hu’s army was one of the groups of the Nationalists Forces to pursue the Communists. The Communists were driven out of their so-called Soviet Territory. They had about 100,000 men but by the time they reached Yenan, there were only about 10,000 men left. 40,000 to 50,000 of Communists army were either killed or captured by Hu Tsung Nan’s Army. When they were facing extinction by the Nationalists, Mao managed to persuade General Chang Hsueh Liang to detain Chiang Kai Shek in Xian during their military meeting and demanded that Chiang Kai Shek to stop fighting the Communists and form a united front to resist the Japanese aggression. The Communists army was officially designated as the 8th National Corp during the Sino-Japanese War. During that period both Chinese Communists and the Nationalists armies were under the same Commander, Chiang Kai Shek.
The writers mentioned that “a man named Hu Kung Mien was appointed by Hu Tsung Nan as his representative to Mao. That man, Hu K’ung Mien, was commonly assumed to be a communist during that time. “Because of this relationship between General Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien,” you declared that General Hu Tsung Nan must be a mole planted by Mao. This statement is utterly without merit. When General Hu was at Wampoa Military Academy, a number of instructors and cadets had dual Nationalist and Communist party memberships. That was because Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of Whampoa Academy, allowed them to have dual party memberships in order to appease the Soviet Union as it was funded by the Soviet Union. Chou En-Lai was political director and Hu K’ung Mien was head of the security guide of the academy. A lot of students knew both of them and had contacts with them. That was the only relationship between Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien which we could say so for sure. We could not say that they have a close friendship as suggested by you.
The authors stated that Mao was able to move around Yanan freely when Yenan was occupied by General Hu’s army without being captured by Hu therefore General Hu must be Mao’s mole. This assumption was utterly without foundation. The territories around Yenan were like today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan’s border full of caves and rocks. The whole area was still under Communists control. Besides, any knowledgeable military analyst would know that deception during the war is simply part of military technique and the leader such as Mao must show his subordinates that he is strong and confident when they are facing military setbacks. When his cook said that Mao was doing business as usual, it was only his observation. Neither the cook nor the radio man ever mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan was a mole there. You said that Hu did not capture Mao when Mao was only 150 Km away from Yenan was because he was a “Sleeper” of Mao is totally wrong. Four years after we occupied Afghanistan we still have not captured Osama Bin Laden, or his assistant Ayman al-Zawahiri. We could not even capture Abu Musab al-Zarquawi in Iraq. No one ever allege that our Military Commander of Middle East, General John P. Abizaid, must be a “Sleeper” planted by Osama Bin Laden.
Based on the above analysis, I proposed to the Random House Publisher, Mr. Dan Franklin, to remove the statement on Hu Tsung Nan, since the section related to General Hu Tsung Nan being a mole or sleeper, in Chapter 29, is definitely untrue it should be deleted from Chapter 29.