《道德情操论》
Part II
Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment
Consisting of Three Parts
Section I
Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
Introduction
第二卷 论优缺点，或奖惩对象
第一篇 论优缺点意识
引言
1．
There is another set of qualities ascribed to the actions and
conduct of mankind, distinct from their propriety or impropriety,
their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a
distinct species of approbation and disapprobation. These are
Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deserving reward, and of
deserving punishment.
有别于是否得体，是否体面，源于行为举止的还有另外一系列品质，即是否成为被认可的对象。亦即值得奖赏还是应该惩罚的优缺点。
2．
It has already been observed, that the sentiment or affection
of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its
whole virtue or vice depends, may be considered under two
different aspects, or in two different relations: first, in
relation to the cause or object which excites it; and, secondly,
in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which
it tends to produce: that upon the suitableness or
unsuitableness, upon the proportion or disproportion, which the
affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it,
depends the propriety or impropriety, the decency or
ungracefulness of the consequent action; and that upon the
beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection proposes or
tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill
desert of the action to which it gives occasion. Wherein consists
our sense of the propriety or impropriety of actions, has been
explained in the former part of this discourse. We come now to
consider, wherein consists that of their good or ill desert.
如前所述，发自内心的情感，即，行为的出发点，以及善恶的决定因素，可以从两个不同的方面，或两种不同的关系加以认识：第一，与激发情感的原因或表达情感的对象之关系；第二，与情感抒发的对象，或说是与情感势必产生的效果之间的关系：即情感是否合适，是否相称，亦即是否与产生的原因和抒发的对象相互协调，将决定随后的行为是否得体，是否体面；这种情感所具有的或势必产生的有利或不利效果，将决定激发情感的行为之优缺点，亦即应得好报还是受罚。对行为产生是否得体感的原因，已经在这篇论文的前面部分解释过。现在来考察的是关于好报还是惩罚的问题。
Chap. 1
That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude,
appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever
appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve
punishment
第一章 看似值得感谢，似乎就值得报答；同样，看似令人怨恨，似乎就应该受罚。
1．
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of that
sentiment, which most immediately and directly prompts us to
reward, or to do good to another. And in the same manner, that
action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the
proper and approved object of that sentiment which most
immediately and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil
upon another.
因此对于我们来讲，看起来必须值得报答的行动才是那种情感适当的抒发对象，才能使我们对另外一方采取立即的直接的报答行动，或给予好处。同样，看起来应该受罚的行动，才是我们情感抒发的适当对象，从而使我们对另一方采取立即的直接的惩罚，或使其遭受打击。
2．
The sentiment which most immediately and directly prompts us
to reward, is gratitude; that which most immediately and directly
prompts us to punish, is resentment.
那种促使我们立即直接采取报答行动的情感就是感激；而促使我们立即直接采取惩罚行动的情感是怨恨。
3．
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude;
as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deserve
punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of
resentment.
因此对于我们来说，我们的行动必须表现出与报答相称，而对感激对象的选择则必须表现出洽当无误和令人满意；正如另一方面那样，我们的行动必须表现出与惩罚相称，而对怨恨对象的选择也必须表现出恰如其分和无可指摘。
4．
To reward, is to recompense, to remunerate, to return good
for good received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to
remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil
for evil that has been done.
报答就是酬劳、回报、以善报善。而惩罚，虽然形式不同，但也是酬劳、回报；那是以恶报恶。
5．
There are some other passions, besides gratitude and
resentment, which interest us in the happiness or misery of
others; but there are none which so directly excite us to be the
instruments of either. The love and esteem which grow upon
acquaintance and habitual approbation, necessarily lead us to be
pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of
such agreeable emotions, and consequently, to be willing to lend
a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully satisfied,
though his good fortune should be brought about without our
assistance. All that this passion desires is to see him happy,
without regarding who was the author of his prosperity. But
gratitude is not to be satisfied in this manner. If the person to
whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our
assistance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our
gratitude. Till we have recompensed him, till we ourselves have
been instrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves
still loaded with that debt which his past services have laid
upon us.
除感激和怨恨之外，还有其它一些令我们关注他人快乐与痛苦的情感；但其中并没有任何一种能如此直接激发我们去分享他人的快乐与痛苦。因为相识与惯常的融洽而形成的爱与敬意一定会导致我们对这样一个人的好运感到高兴，此人正是这种令人愉快的情感之抒发对象，从而使我们乐于伸出援手，以使其好运锦上添花。虽然没有我们的帮助他照样能交好运，但我们对他的爱依然能够得到满足。这种激情所要达到的目的就是看到他快乐，根本不考虑他的幸运究竟源于何人。然而感激之情却不是通过这种方式得以满足的。如果一个被我们欠很多人情的人，其快乐无需我们的帮助，这虽然令我们的爱心得以满足，但我们的感激之情却并未如愿以偿。直到我们报答了他，直到我们自己在促进其幸福方面也发挥了作用，我们才对以往因受惠于他而欠下的人情债如释重负。
6．
The hatred and dislike, in the same manner, which grow upon
habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious
pleasure in the misfortune of the man whose conduct and character
excite so painful a passion. But though dislike and hatred harden
us against all sympathy, and sometimes dispose us even to rejoice
at the distress of another, yet, if there is no resentment in the
case, if neither we nor our friends have received any great
personal provocation, these passions would not naturally lead us
to wish to be instrumental in bringing it about. Though we could
fear no punishment in consequence of our having had some hand in
it, we would rather that it should happen by other means. To one
under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable,
perhaps, to hear, that the person whom he abhorred and detested
was killed by some accident. But if he had the least spark of
justice, which, though this passion is not very favourable to
virtue, he might still have, it would hurt him excessively to
have been himself, even without design, the occasion of this
misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily
contributing to it shock him beyond all measure. He would reject
with horror even the imagination of so execrable a design; and if
he could imagine himself capable of such an enormity, he would
begin to regard himself in the same odious light in which he had
considered the person who was the object of his dislike. But it
is quite otherwise with resentment: if the person who had done us
some great injury, who had murdered our father or our brother,
for example, should soon afterwards die of a fever, or even be
brought to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though
it might sooth our hatred, it would not fully gratify our
resentment. Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that
he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our
means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had
done to us. Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the
offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve
for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He
must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action, that
others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified
from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification
of this passion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the
political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and
the example to the public.
同样，如果一个人的行为和性格经常为我们制造痛苦，我们就会因为习以为常的不快而心生仇恨与厌恶，进而对他的痛苦幸灾乐祸。不过，虽然厌恶与仇恨妨碍我们产生怜悯之情，有时甚至使我们有意对他人的困苦感到高兴，但如果在这种情况下没有发展到怨恨的地步，如果我们和我们的朋友都没有受到严重的挑衅，这些激情自然不会使我们希望为催生他的痛苦而推波助澜。虽然我们并不惧怕因染指他人痛苦引起的后果遭惩罚，但我们宁愿看到这种情况通过其它方式而发生。对于一个心怀深仇大恨的人来说，听到他所憎恶与仇恨的人因遭遇不幸而身亡，这也许是件乐事。然而，如果他的公正之心尚未完全泯灭，虽然这种激情并非与美德相行不悖，他本人如果正是造成他痛苦的原因，虽然并无故意，但这也会令他痛心疾首。而如果是故意而为之，对其打击的程度则会无以复加。如此图谋不轨，他恐惧得甚至连想都不敢；如果他能够想象到自己居然可以做出如此伤天害理的事情，那他怎么看待自己所厌恶的人，就怎么看待自己。但是怨恨之情则当别论：如果一个人对我们造成极大的伤害，比如说谋杀了我们的父兄，随后不久竟然死于热病，或因其它罪名被推上断头台，虽然这样会平抚我们的心头之恨，但是这并不能完全令人满意地解除怨恨之情。怨恨会激发我们产生一种欲望，即：他不仅应该受到惩罚，而且因为他对我造成了特殊的伤害而渴望亲手处置他。引发怨恨者不仅应该按照轮回的顺序而悲痛至极，而且应该是因为我们从他那里所受到的特殊伤害而致使其悲痛欲绝，否则怨恨之情难以彻底消除。他必须为自己的这一行径感到悔恨和难过，以使他人会因惧怕同样的惩罚而害怕因同样的罪行而获罪。这种激情的自然满足，会自动地以政治结局为归宿；既惩罚罪犯，又儆戒公众。
7．
Gratitude and resentment, therefore, are the sentiments which
most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To
us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to
be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve
punishment, who appears to be that of resentment.
感激与怨恨因此就是最迅速最直接催生报答与惩罚行动的情感。所以，对于我们来讲，谁表现得应该被感激，谁就应该被报答；谁表现得应该遭怨恨，谁就应该遭惩罚。
Chap. II
Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
第二章 论感激与怨恨的适当对象
To be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or
resentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that
gratitude, and of that resentment, which naturally seems proper,
and is approved of.
作为感激或者怨恨的适当与公认的对象，这仅仅意味着成为感激或怨恨的一种看上去自然而被公认的对象。
But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature,
seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every
impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every
indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with
them.
不过和人性中其它激情一样，只有当每一位公允不阿的旁观者都充分同情他时，当每一位不偏不倚的旁观者完全赞成他的时候，这些激情才显得适当而被公认。
He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to some person
or persons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every
human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby applaud: and
he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who in the
same manner is to some person or persons the natural object of a
resentment which the breast of every reasonable man is ready to
adopt and sympathize with. To us, surely, that action must appear
to deserve reward, which every body who knows of it would wish to
reward, and therefore delights to see rewarded: and that action
must as surely appear to deserve punishment, which every body who
hears of it is angry with, and upon that account rejoices to see
punished.
因此，如果对于某个人或者某些人来讲，一个人是自然而然的感激对象，他显然就应该得到报答，而这种感激由于引发每个人的共鸣，因此会获得赞同；反之，如果对某个人或者某些人来讲，一个人是自然而然的怨恨对象，他显然就应该受到惩罚，而这种怨恨之情，是每一个理智的人都会持有的，因此会得以体谅。当然，如果一种行为，每个了解它的人显然都希望它得到报答，并乐见其成，对于我们来说，这种行为显然就应该得到报答；反之，如果一种行为，每个人听到之后都会气愤填膺，因而乐见其得到惩罚，它在我们看来，显然就应该得到惩罚。
1. As we sympathize with the joy of our companions when in
prosperity, so we join with them in the complacency and
satisfaction with which they naturally regard whatever is the
cause of their good fortune. We enter into the love and affection
which they conceive for it, and begin to love it too. We should
be sorry for their sakes if it was destroyed, or even if it was
placed at too great a distance from them, and out of the reach of
their care and protection, though they should lose nothing by its
absence except the pleasure of seeing it. If it is man who has
thus been the fortunate instrument of the happiness of his
brethren, this is still more peculiarly the case. When we see one
man assisted, protected, relieved by another, our sympathy with
the joy of the person who receives the benefit serves only to
animate our fellow-feeling with his gratitude towards him who
bestows it. When we look upon the person who is the cause of his
pleasure with the eyes with which we imagine he must look upon
him, his benefactor seems to stand before us in the most engaging
and amiable light. We readily therefore sympathize with the
grateful affection which he conceives for a person to whom he has
been so much obliged; and consequently applaud the returns which
he is disposed to make for the good offices conferred upon him.
As we entirely enter into the affection from which these returns
proceed, they necessarily seem every way proper and suitable to
their object.
1．因为同伴春风得意交好运之际，我们能体会他的快乐，因此，无论他们将交好运归结于何种原因，我们都能与他们共同分享那种踌躇满志，得意洋洋之情感。我们不仅能体会他们因此而感受到的爱与激情，而且就连我们自己也开始感受到爱意融融。如果同伴的好运毁于一旦，抑或离他太远，或者难以关注及保全的时候，虽然他除了无缘享受那份见到好运的快乐之外别无损失，我们依然会因此不无遗憾。如果他兄弟的幸福源于某人，奇怪的是，情况越发如此。我们看到一个人获得帮助、保护或安慰时，我们就会体谅到他因受惠他人而高兴，而这种体谅的效果，只是激发我们进一步体会此人对施惠者产生的感激之情。当他的快乐起源于一个人的时候，如果我们用一种受惠者看待施惠者的眼光来看待此人，他的施惠者似乎就会在一种非常迷人的温馨之光下，赫然站立在我们面前。于是，我们就会体会到他对一位心怀谢意者的感激之情；从而赞成他为获得助益而投桃报李。我们完全能体会到作为采取报答行为出发点的那种情感，因此，这些报答对于报答对象而言，就必然显得恰如其分。
2. In the same manner, as we sympathize with the sorrow of
our fellow-creature whenever we see his distress, so we likewise
enter into his abhorrence and aversion for whatever has given
occasion to it. Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his
grief, so is it likewise animated with that spirit by which he
endeavours to drive away or destroy the cause of it. The indolent
and passive fellow-feeling, by which we accompany him in his
sufferings, readily gives way to that more vigorous and active
sentiment by which we go along with him in the effort he makes,
either to repel them, or to gratify his aversion to what has
given occasion to them. This is still more peculiarly the case,
when it is man who has caused them. When we see one man oppressed
or injured by another, the sympathy which we feel with the
distress of the sufferer seems to serve only to animate our
fellow-feeling with his resentment against the offender. We are
rejoiced to see him attack his adversary in his turn, and are
eager and ready to assist him whenever he exerts himself for
defence, or even for vengeance within a certain degree. If the
injured should perish in the quarrel, we not only sympathize with
the real resentment of his friends and relations, but with the
imaginary resentment which in fancy we lend to the dead, who is
no longer capable of feeling that or any other human sentiment.
But as we put ourselves in his situation, as we enter, as it
were, into his body, and in our imaginations, in some measure,
animate anew the deformed and mangled carcass of the slain, when
we bring home in this manner his case to our own bosoms, we feel
upon this, as upon many other occasions, an emotion which the
person principally concerned is incapable of feeling, and which
yet we feel by an illusive sympathy with him. The sympathetic
tears which we shed for that immense and irretrievable loss,
which in our fancy he appears to have sustained, seem to be but a
small part of the duty which we owe him. The injury which he has
suffered demands, we think, a principal part of our attention. We
feel that resentment which we imagine he ought to feel, and which
he would feel, if in his cold and lifeless body there remained
any consciousness of what passes upon earth. His blood, we think,
calls aloud for vengeance. The very ashes of the dead seem to be
disturbed at the thought that his injuries are to pass
unrevenged. The horrors which are supposed to haunt the bed of
the murderer, the ghosts which, superstition imagines, rise from
their graves to demand vengeance upon those who brought them to
an untimely end, all take their origin from this natural sympathy
with the imaginary resentment of the slain. And with regard, at
least, to this most dreadful of all crimes, Nature, antecedent to
all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this
manner stamped upon the human heart, in the strongest and most
indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of
the sacred and necessary law of retaliation.
同样，因为我们看到朋友遭受不幸时我们能体谅他的痛苦，因此我们同样能体谅他对导致不幸的事情所怀有的憎恨与厌恶之情。因为我们发自内心地同情他的悲伤，因此就会激发一种竭尽全力去铲除导致不幸根源的精神。朋友遭受不幸时，我们对他怀有的怠惰消极的同情心，很容易让位于一种更充满活力的情感，具备这种情感我们就会赞同他为消除痛苦所作的努力，以及对产生痛苦的原因所怀有的憎恶之情。如果导致他遭受痛苦的是人，情况就越发如此。当我们看到一个人遭受他人压制或伤害时，我们对受害者的同情心，似乎仅仅能够促使我们去体谅他对压制者的怨恨之情。我们乐于见到他对自己的敌手发起攻击，而且渴望并准备在他为自卫做出努力时，即便在一定程度上采取报复手段时，也能提供帮助。如果被伤害者竟然在争斗中丧生，我们不仅能体谅其亲朋的怨恨之情，而且也能体会到我们自己也因这名已经无法感受怨怒以及人类其他情感的死者而产生的怨恨之情。因为我们将自己置身于他的处境，因为我们自然地与其融于一体，我们就可以通过想象在某种程度上使那具在屠杀中被砍得血肉模糊的残尸得以复活，当我们以这种方式真心体谅他的情况时，我们就会像对待其他情况那样，为此感到有一种情感油然而生，虽然我们通过对他抱有的虚幻同情心可以体会到这种情感，但当事者已经无法感受到。我们为这种无法弥补的巨大损失而落下同情之泪，在我们的想象当中他显然已经体察到我们的这种表现，但这似乎只是我们对他应付的一小部分责任而已。我们认为，他所遭受的伤害需要我们将自己的关切之情主要集中在他的身上。如果在他那冰冷的了无生机的尸体内部，依然残留可感知过去究竟发生何事的意识，在我们想象当中他就应该感受到，也会感受到一种怨恨，而这种怨恨，我们已经感觉到。我们认为他的血液在大声呼唤复仇。死者的骨灰似乎因为想到深仇大恨尚未得报而不得安息。光顾凶手睡床的恐怖，以及迷信中爬出坟墓要对导致他们死于非命的人报仇雪恨的鬼魂，所有这些都起源于对杀戮引发的怨恨所抱有的同情心。对于这种最可怕的罪行，神祗在考虑到惩罚效力之前，就已经以这种方式，将神圣而必要的复仇法则，不可磨灭地、特性鲜明地烙在人们的心上。
Chap. III
That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person
who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the
gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary,
where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who
does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the
resentment of him who suffers it
第三章 对施惠者的行为缺乏赞许的地方，对受惠者感激之情就缺少体会；相反，对作恶者动机缺乏责难的地方，对受害者的怨恨之情就缺乏体谅
（注：本章顺序号是原有的，请保留）
It is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial soever on
the one hand, or how hurtful soever on the other, the actions or
intentions of the person who acts may have been to the person who
is, if I may say so, acted upon, yet if in the one case there
appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if
we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his conduct,
we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the person who
receives the benefit: or if, in the other case, there appears to
have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the
contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are such as
we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy
with the resentment of the person who suffers. Little gratitude
seems due in the one case, and all sort of resentment seems
unjust in the other. The one action seems to merit little reward,
the other to deserve no punishment.
然而，必须加以说明的是，行为者的行动或动机，有益也好，有害也罢，如果我可以这样说的话，可能已经对他产生作用，即：行为者的动机不当，或如果我们不能体会到影响其行为的情感，我们对受惠者的感激之情就都无法体会；或者换成另外一种情况，行为者的动机并无不当之处，或如果相反，影响其行为的情感已经得到我们当然的体谅，受害者此时此刻的怨恨之情就无法得到我们的体谅。前一种情况，少许感激之情无可指摘，后一种情况，全盘加以怨恨则有失公允。前一种行为似乎应该获得少许报答，但后一种情况则完全不该遭到惩罚。
1. First, I say, That wherever we cannot sympathize with the
affections of the agent, wherever there seems to be no propriety
in the motives which influenced his conduct, we are less disposed
to enter into the gratitude of the person who received the
benefit of his actions. A very small return seems due to that
foolish and profuse generosity which confers the greatest
benefits from the most trivial motives, and gives an estate to a
man merely because his name and sirname happen to be the same
with those of the giver. Such services do not seem to demand any
proportionable recompense. Our contempt for the folly of the
agent hinders us from thoroughly entering into the gratitude of
the person to whom the good office has been done. His benefactor
seems unworthy of it. As when we place ourselves in the situation
of the person obliged, we feel that we could conceive no great
reverence for such a benefactor, we easily absolve him from a
great deal of that submissive veneration and esteem which we
should think due to a more respectable character; and provided he
always treats his weak friend with kindness and humanity, we are
willing to excuse him from many attentions and regards which we
should demand to a worthier patron. Those Princes, who have
heaped, with the greatest profusion, wealth, power, and honours,
upon their favourites, have seldom excited that degree of
attachment to their persons which has often been experienced by
those who were more frugal of their favours. The well-natured,
but injudicious prodigality of James the First of Great Britain
seems to have attached nobody to his person; and that Prince,
notwithstanding his social and harmless disposition, appears to
have lived and died without a friend. The whole gentry and
nobility of
of his more frugal and distinguishing son, notwithstanding the
coldness and distant severity of his ordinary deportment.
1．首先我要说明，我们对当事者情感无法体谅的地方，影响其行为的动机似乎不当，因而对受惠于其行为者的感激之情也不会加以体谅。把一座房产拱手相送给另一个人，仅仅是因为那人的姓名恰好与自己相同，其动机显然并没有好到哪里去，但却令人获益匪浅，对这种愚蠢的慷慨之举稍加报答显然恰如其分。这种奉献似乎并不需要成比例的回报。我们对当事者蠢行的蔑视妨碍我们充分体谅获益者的感激之情。他这位恩人并不值得感激。我们将自己置身于受惠者的境况时，就会感到根本想象不出会对这样一位恩人心存任何敬意，我们很容易将其排除在应该获得至高无上的尊崇者的行列之外，而这种至高无上的尊崇我们认为应该给予一位更值得敬重的人物；只要他对弱势朋友以善相待，以仁相处，我们就会出于关爱而乐于原谅他，而这些关爱，我们本应奉献给更值得尊敬的人。有些君主，虽然慷慨至极，将大量财产、权势和荣耀堆积在宠儿身上，但却很少能激发那些人对其产生依附之情，而那些慎于施恩者反而能够感受到这种依附之情。那位脾气好，但却慷慨无度的大不列颠詹姆士一世，似乎就从来没有吸附任何人；作为堂堂的君主陛下，虽然他善于交际，和蔼可亲，然而他似乎生前死后皆是孤家寡人。但是为了他那位节俭且杰出的儿子的功业，英国全部的王公贵族丝毫不顾及他那冷漠严肃的脾气，不惜抛财舍命，毫不迟疑。
2. Secondly, I say, That wherever the conduct of the agent
appears to have been entirely directed by motives and affections
which we thoroughly enter into and approve of, we can have no
sort of sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer, how great
soever the mischief which may have been done to him. When two
people quarrel, if we take part with, and entirely adopt the
resentment of one of them, it is impossible that we should enter
into that of the other. Our sympathy with the person whose
motives we go along with, and whom therefore we look upon as in
the right, cannot but harden us against all fellow-feeling with
the other, whom we necessarily regard as in the wrong. Whatever
this last, therefore, may have suffered, while it is no more than
what we ourselves should have wished him to suffer, while it is
no more than what our own sympathetic indignation would have
prompted us to inflict upon him, it cannot either displease or
provoke us. When an inhuman murderer is brought to the scaffold,
though we have some compassion for his misery, we can have no
sort of fellow-feeling with his resentment, if he should be so
absurd as to express any against either his prosecutor or his
judge. The natural tendency of their just indignation against so
vile a criminal is indeed the most fatal and ruinous to him. But
it is impossible that we should be displeased with the tendency
of a sentiment, which, when we bring the case home to ourselves,
we feel that we cannot avoid adopting.
2．其次我要说明，由于当事者的动机和情感得到我们的谅解，因此，无论他们的行动受这种动机和情感所驱使而向哪个方向发展，我们都不会体谅受害者的怨恨之情，不管别人对他做出多么大的伤害。当两个人发生争斗时，如果我们参与其中，充分体谅其中一方的怨恨之情，我们就不可能再体谅另一方。如果一个人的动机为我们所体谅，我们就会认为他是正确的一方，因而会同情他，而这种同情只能使认为他是错误的一方，因而很难同情他。因此，无论后者可能会受到什么样的伤害，也不可能超过我们希望他们所遭受的伤害，更不可能超过我们为自己颇具同情心的义愤所驱使而施加给他的痛苦，这既不可能令我们心生不快，也不能令我们怒火中烧。当一名毫无人性的凶手被推上断头台时，虽然我们为他们的痛苦而生恻隐之心，但如果他竟然会荒唐到与原告和法官作对，我们就不会体谅他的怨恨之情。人们对一名如此卑鄙凶恶的罪犯心怀义愤的自然倾向，对他来讲的确是最致命的毁灭性打击。但是，当我们设身处地地思考问题，并因此而不可避免地表现某种情感的倾向时，却竟然对这种倾向心生不快，这是不可能的。
Chap. IV
Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters
第四章 前章扼要重述
（注：本章顺序号是原有的，请保留）
1. We do not, therefore, thoroughly and heartily sympathize
with the gratitude of one man towards another, merely because
this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has
been the cause of it from motives which we entirely go along
with. Our heart must adopt the principles of the agent, and go
along with all the affections which influenced his conduct,
before it can entirely sympathize with, and beat time to, the
gratitude of the person who has been benefited by his actions. If
in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no
propriety, how beneficial soever its effects, it does not seem to
demand, or necessarily to require, any proportionable recompense.
1． 如果一个人交好运是因为另外一个人，这个人就会对他心生感激，但是仅仅因为这一点，我们还无法体谅前者的感激之情，除非后者成为他交好运的原因出于我们能够完全体谅的动机。我们必须真心地接受施惠者的原则，只有先体谅影响施惠者行为的所有情感，才能完全体谅从其行为中获益的受惠者对其产生的感激之情。如果施惠者行为中显出不妥之处，无论这种行为多么有益，也似乎并不需要，或者说一定需要任何相应的回报。
But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined
the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we
entirely sympathize and go along with the motives of the agent,
the love which we conceive for him upon his own account, enhances
and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who
owe their prosperity to his good conduct. His actions seem then
to demand, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for aproportionable recompense. We then entirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to bestow it. The benefactor seems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and approve of, that sentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard the person towards whom it is directed, as
its proper and suitable object.
但是，当作为行为出发点的适当情感与行为的慈善倾向一致的时候，当我们完全体谅和赞同作为动因的施惠者的动机时，我们对他怀有的爱，就会提升和加强对那个将好运归因于施惠者善行的人的感激之情。如果我可以这样说的话，他的行为似乎需要为适当的回报而大声疾呼。当我们完全体谅和赞同那种促成报答行为的情感时，施惠者似乎就成了适当的报答对象。当我们赞同和体谅促成行为的情感时，我们就必然会赞同他的行为，并将这种行为的接受者看成是被恰如其分的感激对象。
2. In the same manner, we cannot at all sympathize with the
resentment of one man against another, merely because this other
has been the cause of his misfortune, unless he has been the
cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into. Before we
can adopt the resentment of the sufferer, we must disapprove of
the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all
sympathy with the affections which influenced his conduct. If
there appears to have been no impropriety in these, how fatal
soever the tendency of the action which proceeds from them to
those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve
any punishment, or to be the proper object of any resentment.
2．同样，我们也不能仅仅因为一个人是另一个人不幸的原因，就完全体谅后者对前者的怨恨之情，除非令他遭遇不幸是出于我们所不能体谅的动机。我们能够理解受害者怨恨之情的前提是，我们必须不赞成作为动因的当事者的行为动机，必须感觉到我们从内心中拒绝对影响他行为的情感表示同情。如果这些情感显然并无不妥，那么出于这些情感而对受害者采取的行动无论有多么致命的倾向，也不应该受到任何惩罚，或者成为发泄怨恨的适当目标。
But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the
impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our
heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives
of the agent, we then heartily and entirely sympathize with the
resentment of the sufferer. Such actions seem then to deserve,
and, if I may say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable
punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of,
that resentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender
necessarily seems then to be the proper object of punishment,
when we thus entirely sympathize with, and thereby approve of,
that sentiment which prompts to punish. In this case too, when we
approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action
proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard
the person against whom it is directed, as its proper and
suitable object.
但是，当不恰当的情感和有害的行为达成一致的时候，当我们对作为动因的当事者的动机从内心厌恶地拒绝表示谅解时，我们就会充分地体谅受害者的怨恨之情。如果我可以这样说的话，这样的行动似乎就在为相应的惩罚而大声疾呼；我们就会充分体谅，进而赞同那种促成惩罚的怨恨。当我们充分体谅，因而赞同促成惩罚行动的那种情感时，罪犯因而就显然是惩罚的适当对象。也是在这种情况下，当我们赞同，并体谅促成行为的情感时，我们也就必然会赞同其行为，并把那个惩罚行为的接受者看成是惩罚的适当对象。
Chap. V
The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit
第五章 对优缺点感觉的分析
（注：本章顺序号是原有的，请保留）
1. As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct
arises from what I shall call a direct sympathy with the
affections and motives of the person who acts, so our sense of
its merit arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy with
the gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon.
1．
因为我们对行为适当性的感觉，起源于我称之为的一种对行为者情感和动机的直接体谅，因此，如果我可以这样说的话，我们对其优点的感觉，就起源于被我称之为的一种对受惠者感激之情所表现的非直接体谅。
As we cannot indeed enter thoroughly into the gratitude of
the person who receives the benefit, unless we beforehand approve
of the motives of the benefactor, so, upon this account, the
sense of merit seems to be a compounded sentiment, and to be made
up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the
sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the
gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions.
因为如果我们事先不能赞同施惠者的动机，我们就的确不能充分体谅受惠者的感激之情。所以正是因为这个原因，对优点的感觉似乎就是一种由两类独特情绪构成的复杂情感：对行为者情感的直接体谅，和对受惠者感激之情的非直接体谅。
We may, upon many different occasions, plainly distinguish
those two different emotions combining and uniting together in
our sense of the good desert of a particular character or action.
When we read in history concerning actions of proper and
beneficent greatness of mind, how eagerly do we enter into such
designs? How much are we animated by that high-spirited
generosity which directs them? How keen are we for their success?
How grieved at their disappointment? In imagination we become the
very person whose actions are represented to us: we transport
ourselves in fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten
adventures, and imagine ourselves acting the part of a Scipio or
a Camillus, a Timoleon or an Aristides. So far our sentiments are
founded upon the direct sympathy with the person who acts. Nor is
the indirect sympathy with those who receive the benefit of such
actions less sensibly felt. Whenever we place ourselves in the
situation of these last, with what warm and affectionate
fellow-feeling do we enter into their gratitude towards those who
served them so essentially? We embrace, as it were, their
benefactor along with them. Our heart readily sympathizes with
the highest transports of their grateful affection. No honours,
no rewards, we think, can be too great for them to bestow upon
him. When they make this proper return for his services, we
heartily applaud and go along with them; but are shocked beyond
all measure, if by their conduct they appear to have little sense
of the obligations conferred upon them. Our whole sense, in
short, of the merit and good desert of such actions, of the
propriety and fitness of recompensing them, and making the person
who performed them rejoice in his turn, arises from the
sympathetic emotions of gratitude and love, with which, when we
bring home to our own breast the situation of those principally
concerned, we feel ourselves naturally transported towards the
man who could act with such proper and noble beneficence.
我们对一种特定性格或行动的优劣都会有感觉，在许多不同的情况下，我们都能一清二楚地分辨出那两种与我们这一感觉互相交织融合的情感。当我们阅读有关仁慈高尚的思想行动史料时，我们是多么迫切地想理解编纂史料的意图！而其中那些慷慨至极的高尚美德又是多么深深地感染我们！对他们的成功我们是多么渴望！对他们的失望又是多么地悲伤！在想象中，我们已经成为那个行为完全针对我们的人：在幻想中，我们将自己转而置身于那些久远的、已被忘却的冒险经历的场景中，想象着我们自己扮演着一位西庇阿或卡米卢斯，一位提莫莱昂或阿里斯提德思式的人物。我们的情感正是如此这般地建立在直接体谅行为者的基础上。当然对于受惠于这些行为的人，我们所表现的间接体谅也并非不能敏感地感觉到。每当我们设身处地地思考受惠者的境况时，我们都会以何等的热情去体会他们对给予施惠者感激之情。我们也都会像他们一样去拥抱他们的恩人。我们就会由衷地体会到他们那种极其强烈的感激之情。我们认为，他对施惠者无论给予多么巨大的荣誉，多么丰厚的回报都不为过。当他们对施惠者的好处给予这种恰当的回报时，我们就会由衷地赞成他们支持他们；然而，如果他们对施惠者缺乏感恩的举动，我们就会感到震惊不已。简而言之，我们对这种行为表现出的美德，对施惠者给予适当的报答，对施惠者感到的快乐，对所有这些的感觉，都来自对感激和爱的认同感，有了这种认同，我们就会在设身处地思考当事者的境况时，体会到我们自己对那位乐善好施的人也会油然而激情迸发。
2. In the same manner as our sense of the impropriety of
conduct arises from a want of sympathy, or from a direct
antipathy to the affections and motives of the agent, so our
sense of its demerit arises from what I shall here too call an
indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.
2．同样，因为我们感觉某种行为不当，是由于缺乏体谅，或者说由于对当事者的情感和动机缺乏直接反感，所以我们对其缺点的感觉，正如我在这里要说的，是来源于对受害者怨恨之情的间接体谅。
As we cannot indeed enter into the resentment of the
sufferer, unless our heart beforehand disapproves the motives of
the agent, and renounces all fellow-feeling with them; so upon
this account the sense of demerit, as well as that of merit,
seems to be a compounded sentiment, and to be made up of two
distinct emotions; a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the
agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the
sufferer.
因为，除非我们从内心中原本就不赞成当事者的动机，并拒绝加以体谅，我们就的确不能体谅受害者的怨恨之情；所以正是由于这个原因，对缺点的感觉，以及对优点的感觉，似乎就是一种复合型的情感，有两种不同的情感构成：一是对当事者情感的直接反感，二是对受害者怨恨之情的间接体谅。
We may here too, upon many different occasions, plainly
distinguish those two different emotions combining and uniting
together in our sense of the ill desert of a particular character
or action. When we read in history concerning the perfidy and
cruelty of a Borgia or a Nero, our heart rises up against the
detestable sentiments which influenced their conduct, and
renounces with horror and abomination all fellow-feeling with
such execrable motives. So far our sentiments are founded upon
the direct antipathy to the affections of the agent: and the
indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferers is still
more sensibly felt. When we bring home to ourselves the situation
of the persons whom those scourges of mankind insulted, murdered,
or betrayed, what indignation do we not feel against such
insolent and inhuman oppressors of the earth? Our sympathy with
the unavoidable distress of the innocent sufferers is not more
real nor more lively, than our fellow-feeling with their just and
natural resentment: The former sentiment only heightens the
latter, and the idea of their distress serves only to inflame and
blow up our animosity against those who occasioned it. When we
think of the anguish of the sufferers, we take part with them
more earnestly against their oppressors; we enter with more
eagerness into all their schemes of vengeance, and feel ourselves
every moment wreaking, in imagination, upon such violators of the
laws of society, that punishment which our sympathetic
indignation tells us is due to their crimes. Our sense of the
horror and dreadful atrocity of such conduct, the delight which
we take in hearing that it was properly punished, the indignation
which we feel when it escapes this due retaliation, our whole
sense and feeling, in short, of its ill desert, of the propriety
and fitness of inflicting evil upon the person who is guilty of
it, and of making him grieve in his turn, arises from the
sympathetic indignation which naturally boils up in the breast of
the spectator, whenever he thoroughly brings home to himself the
case of the sufferer.(1*)
我们也可以在这里，针对许多不同的情况，一清二楚地将上述两种不同的情感加以区分，而那两种情感则是与我们对某种品质或行为所遭恶报所产生的情感相互交融混杂的。当我们阅读与博尔吉亚或尼路背信弃义及残酷暴戾相关的史料时，就会对那些影响他们行为的可恶情感心生厌恶，并因恐惧与憎恶而对这种卑鄙的动机拒不体谅。就此说来，我们的情感就是建立在对当事者情感的直接反感之上：对受害者怨恨的间接体谅会更加明显地被感觉到。当我们深切地体会到遭恶人污辱、谋杀或背叛者的境况时，我们对世间这种目空一切、毫无人性的压迫者还有什么义愤感觉不到呢？我们对无辜受害者难免的悲伤表示出的同情，与对他们公正自然的怨恨的体谅相比，二者同样真诚与鲜明：前一种情感只会加剧后一种情感，想到他们的困境，只会激起我们对造成这种困境者的憎恶。当我们想到受害者的痛苦时，我们就会更加迫切地想同他们一起反对他们的压迫者；就会更加热切的赞同到他们的复仇意愿，通过想象，我们感到自己每时每刻都在对这些违背社会法规的人加以惩罚，我们颇具同情心的义愤告诉我们自己，这些惩罚对他们来说是罪有应得。我们对那种可怕的卑鄙行径的感觉，我们听到这种行径遭到应有惩罚时的快乐，以及听到这种行径逃避了报复时感到的义愤，简而言之，我们对其全部罪行的感觉，对罪行遭到恰如其分报复的感觉，对依次轮到他悲伤的感觉，所有这些感觉，都来源于饱含同情的义愤，而这种义愤是在旁观者认识到受害者具体情况时自然而然地引起的。
