【诸葛亮前出师表】（《后汉文》）
臣亮言：先帝创业未半而中道崩殂，今天下三分，益州疲弊，此诚危急存亡
之秋也。然侍卫之臣不懈於内，忠志之士忘身於外者，盖追先帝之殊遇，欲报之
於陛下也。诚宜开张圣听，以光先帝遗德，恢弘志士之气，不宜妄自菲薄，引喻
失义，以塞忠谏之路也。宫中府中俱为一体，陟罚臧否，不宜异同。若有作奸犯
科及为忠善者，宜付有司论其刑赏，以昭陛下平明之治，不宜偏私，使内外异法
也。
“侍中、侍郎郭攸之、费祎、董允等，此皆良实，志虑忠纯，是以先帝简拔
以遗陛下。愚以为宫中之事，事无大小，悉以咨之，然后施行，必能裨补阙漏，
有所广益。将军向宠，性行淑均，晓畅军事，试用於昔日，先帝称之曰能，是以
众议举宠以为督。愚以为营中之事，事无大小，悉以咨之，必能使行阵和穆，优
劣得所也。亲贤臣，远小人，此先汉所以兴隆也；亲小人，远贤臣，此后汉所以
倾颓也。先帝在时，每与臣论此事，未尝不叹息痛恨於桓、灵也。侍中、尚书、
长史、参军，此悉贞亮死节之臣也，愿陛下亲之信之，则汉室之隆，可计日而待
也。
臣本布衣，躬耕於南阳，苟全性命於乱世，不求闻达於诸侯。先帝不以臣卑
鄙，猥自枉屈，三顾臣於草庐之中，谘臣以当世之事，由是感激，遂许先帝以驱
驰。后值倾覆，受任於败军之际，奉命於危难之间，尔来二十有一年矣。先帝知
臣谨慎，故临崩寄臣以大事也。受命以来，夙夜忧叹，恐托付不效，以伤先帝之
明。故五月渡泸，深入不毛。今南方已定，兵甲已足，当奖率三军，北定中原，
庶竭驽钝，攘除奸凶，兴复汉室，还於旧都。此臣所以报先帝而忠陛下之职分也。
至於斟酌损益，进尽忠言，则攸之、祎、允之任也。愿陛下托臣以讨贼兴复
之效；不效，则治臣之罪，以告先帝之灵。若无兴德之言，则责攸之、祎、允之
咎，以彰其慢。陛下亦宜自谋，以咨诹善道，察纳雅言，深追先帝遗诏，臣不胜
受恩感激。今当远离，临表涕零，不知所云。
【诸葛亮后出师表】（《后汉文》）
先帝虑汉、贼不两立，王业不偏安，故托臣以讨贼也。以先帝之明，量臣之
才，固知臣伐贼，才弱敌强也；然不伐贼，王业亦亡，惟坐而待亡，孰与伐之？
是故托臣而弗疑也。
臣受命之日，寝不安席，食不甘味。思惟北征，宜先入南，故五月渡泸，深
入不毛，并日而食。臣非不自惜也，顾王业不可偏安於蜀都，故冒危难，以奉先
帝之遗意，而议者谓为非计。今贼适疲於西，又务於东，兵法乘劳，此进趋之时
也。谨陈其事如左：
高帝明并日月，谋臣渊深，然涉险被创，危然后安。今陛下未及高帝，谋臣
不如良、平，而欲以长策取胜，坐定天下，此臣之未解一也。刘繇、王朗，各据
州郡，论安言计，动引圣人，群疑满腹，众难塞胸，今岁不战，明年不征，使孙
策坐大，遂并江东，此臣之未解二也。曹操智计，殊绝於人，其用兵也，仿拂孙、
吴，然困於南阳，险於乌巢，危於祁连，逼於黎阳，几败北山，殆死潼关，然后
伪定一时尔。况臣才弱，而欲以不危而定之，此臣之未解三也。
曹操五攻昌霸不下，四越巢湖不成。任用李服，而李服图之。委任夏侯，而
夏侯败亡。先帝每称操为能，犹有此失，况臣驽下，何能必胜？此臣之未解四也。
自臣到汉中，中间期年耳，然丧赵云、阳群、马玉、阎芝、丁立、白寿、刘
郃、邓铜等及曲长、屯将七十馀人，突将无前；賨叟、青羌散骑、武骑一千馀人。
此皆数十年之内所纠合四方之精锐，非一州之所有。若复数年，则损三分之二也。
当何以图敌？此臣之未解五也。
今民穷兵疲，而事不可息。事不可息，则住与行，劳费正等。而不及早图之，
欲以一州之地，与贼持久，此臣之未解六也。
夫难平者，事也。昔先帝败军於楚，当此时，曹操拊手，谓天下已定。然后
先帝东连吴、越，西取巴、蜀，举兵北征，夏侯授首。此操之失计，而汉事将成
也。然后吴更违盟，关羽毁败，秭归蹉跌，曹丕称帝。凡事如是，难可逆料。臣
鞠躬尽，死而后已，至於成败利钝，非臣之明所能逆睹也。
翻译：臣诸葛亮上言：先帝创立帝业还没有完成一半，就中途去世了。现在，天下已分成魏、蜀、吴三国，我们蜀国人力疲惫，物力又很缺乏，这确实是国家危急存亡的关键时刻。然而，侍卫大臣们在宫廷内毫不懈怠，忠诚有志的将士在疆场上舍身作战，这都是因为追念先帝在世时对他们的特殊待遇，想报效给陛下啊。陛下确实应该广泛地听取群臣的意见，发扬光大先帝留下的美德，弘扬志士们的气概；不应该随随便便地看轻自己，言谈中称引譬喻不合大义（说话不恰当），以致堵塞忠臣进谏劝告的道路。
皇宫的侍臣和丞相府的宫吏都是一个整体，对他们的提升、处分、表扬、批评，不应该因人而有什么差别。如果有营私舞弊、违犯法律和尽忠行害的人，陛下应交给主管的官吏，由他们评定应得的处罚或奖赏，用来表明陛下公正严明的治理方针。不应偏袒徇私，使得宫内和宫外有不同的法则。侍中郭攸之、费祎、侍郎董允等人，他们都是忠良诚实的人，他们的志向和心思忠诚无二，因此先帝把他们选拔出来留给陛下。我认为宫中的事情，无论大小，陛下都应征询他们，然后再去实施，这样一定能补求欠缺疏漏的地方，获得更好的效果。将军向宠，性格和善，品德公正，精通军事，从前经过试用，先帝称赞他有才能，因此大家商议推举他做中部督。我认为军营中的事务，都应与他商量，这样一定能使军队团结协作，将士才干高的差的、队伍强的，都能够得到合理的安排。亲近贤臣，疏远小人，这是前汉兴隆昌盛的原因；亲近小人，疏远贤臣，这是后汉所以倾覆衰败的原因。先帝在世时，每次与我谈论这些事，没有一次不对桓、灵二帝感到叹息、惋惜痛心的。侍中郭攸之、费祎，尚书陈震，长史张裔，参军蒋琬，这些都是忠贞贤良能够以死报国的忠臣，希望陛下亲近他们、信任他们，那么汉室的兴隆就指日可待了。
我本来是一介平民，在南阳亲自种田，只求能在乱世中暂且保全性命，不奢求在诸侯面前有什么名气。先帝不因我身世卑微、见识短浅，反而降低自己的身份，三次到草庐里来访问我，向我征询对当今天下大事的意见，我因此十分感激，于是答应先帝愿为他奔走效劳。后来遇到失败，我在战败的时候接到委任，在危难的时候奉命出使东吴，从那时到现在已经二十一年了。先帝（刘备）知道我谨慎，因此在临终前把国家大事托付给我（诸葛亮）。自从接受任命以来，我日夜忧虑叹息，担心不能将先帝的托付的事情办好，有损先帝的圣明。所以我在五月渡过泸水，深入到荒凉的地方。现在南方已经平定，兵器已经准备充足，应当鼓舞并率领三军，向北方平定中原。希望全部贡献出自己平庸的才能，铲除奸邪凶恶的曹魏，复兴汉室，回到原来的都城洛阳。这是我用来报答先帝并忠于陛下的职责的本分。至于对政事的斟酌兴废，进献忠诚的建议，那是郭攸之、费祎、董允等人的责任。
希望陛下把讨伐奸贼、复兴汉室的任务交给我，如果没有完成，就请治我重罪，来告慰先帝在天之灵。如果没有劝勉陛下宣扬圣德的忠言，就责备郭攸之、费祎、董允等人的怠慢，来揭露他们的过失；陛下自己也应该认真考虑国家大事，征询治理国国的好办法，听取正确的意见，深切追念先帝的遗训。如果能够这样，我就受恩感激不尽了。现在我就要辞别陛下远行了，面对奏表热泪纵横，不知说了些什么。
先帝考虑到蜀汉和曹贼是不能同时存在的，复兴王业不能偏安一方，所以他才把征讨曹贼的大事托付给我。凭着先帝的英明来衡量我的才干，本来他是知道我去征讨曹贼，我的才能是很差的，而敌人是强大的。但是不征伐曹贼，他所创建的王业也会丢掉，坐着等待灭亡，哪里比得上去讨伐敌人呢？因此先帝毫不迟疑地把讨伐曹贼的事业托付给我。
我接受遗命以后，每天睡不安稳，吃饭不香。想到为了征伐北方的敌人，应该先去南方平定各郡，所以我五月领兵渡过泸水，深入到连草木五谷都不生长的地区作战，两天才吃得下一天的饭。不是我自己不爱惜自己，只不过是想到蜀汉的王业决不能够偏安在蜀都，所以我冒着艰难危险来奉行先帝的遗意。可是有些发议论的人却说这样作不是上策。如今曹贼刚刚在西方显得疲困，又竭力在东方和孙吴作战，兵法上说要趁敌军疲劳的时候向他进攻，现在正是进兵的时候。我恭敬地把一些情况向陛下陈述如下：
高帝象日月一样英明，谋臣们智谋渊博深远，却是经历过艰险，受过创伤，遭遇危难以后才得到安全，现在陛下未韶赶得上高帝，谋臣不如张良、陈平，却想采用长期相持的策略来取得胜利，安然平定天下，这是我不理解的第一点。
刘繇、王朗，各自占据州郡，在谈论如何才能安全、提出种种计谋时，动不动就引用圣贤的话，满腹都是疑问，胸中塞满了难题，今年不战，明年又不出征，使得孙策安然强大起来，于是吞并了江东。这是我不理解的第二点。
曹操的智慧计谋，远远地超过一般人，他用起兵来就好象孙膑、吴起一样，可是他却曾在南阳受困，在乌巢处于险境，在祁连山上遭到危险，在黎阳被逼，几乎在北山失败，差一点死在潼关，后来才在表面上稳定了一段时间。何况我的才力很弱，却打算不经历危险来安定天下。这是我不理解的第三点。
曹操五次攻打昌霸没有获胜，四次渡过巢湖没有获得成功，任用李服，可是李服却图谋杀死他，委任夏侯渊，可是夏侯渊却战败身亡。先帝常常称赞曹操是个有才能的人，他还有这些失误的地方，何况我才能平庸低下，哪里就一定能获胜呢？这是我不理解的第四点。
自从我到汉中，其间不过一年罢了，可是却失去了赵云、阳群、马玉、阎芝、丁立、白寿、刘邰、邓铜等人，以及部曲中的首领、屯兵中的将官共七十多人，冲锋无前的将领，賨、羌民族将士以及散骑、武骑各路骑兵一千多人，这都是几十年来从四处聚合起来的精锐力量，不是一州所能具有的。如果再过几年，那就要损失全军的三分之二，那时拿什么兵力去消灭敌人呢？这是我不理解的第五点。
现在百姓穷困、兵士疲惫，可是战争不能停止。战争不能停止，那军队驻扎下来和去攻打敌人，所付出的辛劳和费用正好是相等的。既是这样，不趁现在考虑攻取北方，却想用一州之地，去和曹贼长期相持。这是我不理解的第六点。
天下的事情是很难评论断定的。从前先帝在楚地打了败仗，在这时，曹操拍手称快，认为天下已被他平定了。以后先帝东边联合吴越，西边攻取巴蜀，发兵向北征讨，夏侯渊就被杀掉了，这是曹操未曾想到的，而复兴汉朝的大业将要成功了。后来东吴改变态度，违背了盟约，关羽兵败被杀，先帝又在秭归失误，曹丕称帝，所有的事情都象这样，很难预料。我小心谨慎地为国献出我的一切力量，直到死为止。至于事业是成功是失败，进行得顺利还是不顺利，那就不是我的智慧所能够预见的了。
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赏析：《出师表》是出兵打仗前，主帅给君主上的奏章。这种表，或表明报国之心，或呈献攻城掠地之策。历来以战名世者甚众，以表传后者颇少。惟独诸葛亮的《出师表》不仅存之典册，而且粲然于文苑。
诸葛亮上《出师表》是在蜀汉后主建兴五年（227），率兵北伐之时。这时蜀偏居一隅，国力疲敝，又“北畏曹公之强，东惮孙权之逼”，诸葛亮为了实现刘备振兴汉室、一统天下的遗愿，“五月渡泸，深入不毛”，平定了南方，有了较巩固的后方，并抓住了曹魏兵败祁山、孙吴兵挫石亭的时机，挥师北伐，拟夺取魏的凉州（今甘肃部分地区），向后主刘禅上了两道表文，“前表开守昏庸，后表审量形势”，即出名的《前出师表》《后出师表》。这里谈的是《前出师表》。
诸葛亮自刘备于公元207年“三顾茅庐”后，即忠心耿耿地辅佐刘备，以完成统一大业。经过长期奋战，使寄寓荆州的刘备，一跃而为与魏、吴对峙的蜀汉之主，雄踞一方，到公元221年刘备即帝位。公元222年吴蜀彝陵之战后，刘备败逃白帝城，次年病死。刘备“白帝托孤”时对诸葛亮说：“君才十倍曹丕，必能安国，终定大业。若嗣子可辅，辅之；如其不才，君可自取。”对诸葛亮无比信赖。诸葛亮回答说：“臣敢竭股肱之力，效忠贞之节，继之以死。”刘备吩咐刘禅说：“汝与丞相从事，事之如父。”刘禅继位，即后主。刘禅黯弱昏庸，亲信宦者，远避贤能，胸无大志，苟且偷安，是个“扶不起的阿斗”。诸葛亮主张出兵击魏，侃侃陈词，力排众疑，申明大义以拯其愚，吐露忠爱以药其顽，既有政治家的眼光，又有军事家的头脑，且严守人臣下属的身份。
《出师表》前半部分是临行时的进谏，后半部分乃表明此行夺胜的决心。刘禅虽为蜀主，而蜀之安危成败，实系于诸葛亮之身，因而率众出征时，当促使后主保持清醒的头脑，具备正确的观点，采取得力的措施，才能保证前方顺利进军；同时表明自己忠贞死节之心，既是自勉自励，也是预防小人惑主。
诸葛亮向后主提出三项建议：广开言路，执法公平，亲贤远佞。这三项建议，既是安定后方的措施，也是施政的正理。为了治愚医顽，作者在行文上颇费深思。
由势入理，起笔峥嵘。表文第一节向后主提出“开张圣听”的建议，可是却从形势叙起，这能起振聋发聩的作用，又能激发继承遗志的感情。表文开笔即言“先帝创业未半而中道崩殂”，深痛刘备壮志未酬身先死，深诫后人继承父业不可废，以追念先帝功业的语句领起，至忠至爱之情统领了全文。继而以“今天下三分”，点明天下大势，逐鹿中原，尚不知鹿死谁手；复直言“益州疲敝”，自身条件很差，地少将寡，民穷地荒；进而大声疾呼：“此诚危急存亡之秋也!”大有危在旦夕之势，如不救亡存国，将会出现国破身亡的惨局，笔势陡峭，峥嵘峻拔。在凸显形势的情况下，垫以“侍卫之臣不懈于内，忠志之士忘身于外”，他们不忘先帝恩德，不改对后主的忠心，转危为安，化险为夷还是有依傍的，有力量的，有希望的。在这样的基础上，提出“开张圣听”，“以光先帝遗德，恢弘志士之气”的建议，规劝不可“妄自菲薄，引喻失义，以塞忠谏之路”。表文将是否广开言路，从关系国家存亡的角度来谈，从关系忠于先帝的高度来说，使人闻之惊心，思之动心。如果表文只是一般地申述广开言路的意义，平平道来，那对一个昏聩愚钝的君主来说，显然是不会有多大触动的。
由主而次，肌理缜密。以情动人，更要以理服人。说理应主次分明，先后有序。表文主要是向后主进言的，因而首揭“开张圣听”，以打开进言之路。在打通了忠谏之路的前提下，再言执法公平、亲贤远佞两项。谈执讼公平，又先总提“宫中府中，俱为一体，陟罚臧否，不宜异同”，继而就宫中、府中两方面分述之。分述时，又切紧“开张圣听”的精神，宫中之事，向郭攸之、费、董允这些志虑忠纯之士请教，而且要“事无大小，悉以咨之”，则“必能裨补缺漏，有所广益”。对于府中之事，向“性行淑均，晓畅军事”的向宠请教，“营中之事，悉以咨之”，也“必能使行阵和睦，优劣得所”。最后提出“亲贤臣，远小人”的问题。三项建议，既可独立成项，又相互关联。广开言路，是开的忠谏之路，而非为谗邪开方便之门。亲贤臣远小人，才能广纳郭攸之、向宠等人的良言，才能“昭平民之理”，不让奸邪得势，造成内外异法，赏罚不明。君主昏庸，主要就在于贪于私欲，蔽于视听，昧于事理，因而忠奸不分，贤愚不辨，是非不清，赏罚不当。诸葛亮针对后主宠信宦官黄皓，无视创业勋臣的毛病，对症施药，又说得委婉深曲，入情合理。所列三项，广开言路是前提，执法公平是关键，亲贤远佞是核心。严密的说理，再愚的人也会得到启发。
由近及远，思路开阔。表文为了说明亲贤远佞的利弊，以先汉的“兴隆”和“倾颓”的历史事实，作为前车之鉴，并以先帝叹息痛恨桓帝、灵帝昏庸误国为告诫，促使后主亲信贤臣，并以“汉室兴隆，可计日而待”为鼓励，由近及远，借古鉴今，成败并举，显得衢路交通，经纬成文。
诸葛亮因为后主是个“妄自菲薄，引喻失义”的昏庸之徒，理要说得明，语又不可用得重，既要循循善诱地开导，又要不失臣下尊上的分寸。因而以“形势”使对方震动，明示已临“危急存亡之秋”，如不励精图治，势必国破身亡；以“情感”打动对方，连呼先帝，声声热泪，其业系先帝首创之业，其臣为先帝简拔之臣，其将为先帝称能之将，怎不光先帝之遗德，竟先帝之遗业；以“措施”教之，告知治国理政的具体办法，切实可行，行必有效；以“事业”励之，告诫后主要完成“先帝创业未半”的业，使天下归一，汉室兴隆，促使他有远大的抱负，完成千秋大业。表文从各个方面规箴后主，情真理足，词婉心切，因而虽属奏章表文，却感人至深。
表文的第二部分，由叙自己生平而至言伐魏的意义，进而表明自己“兴复汉室，还于旧都”的决心，也写得慷慨深沉，动人心魄。
由人到己，文势跌宕。表文从第一部分的进谏，到第二部分，忽以“臣本布衣”起笔，另入蹊径，别开生面。叙写自己二十一年来的情况，历数先帝之殊遇，——一是三顾茅庐使之出山效命，一是倾覆之际使之出任丞相，使之由布衣身份一跃而为极位重臣，由躬耕隐士一举而成三军主帅。这一节叙述，好像是逸枝衍蔓，与上下文联系不紧。其实，它与上下文貌分神合，明疏实密。这是因为：第一，追溯二十一年的殊遇，披露感恩戴德之情，说明以上进言纯属忠谏，叫后主听来觉得舒徐入耳。第二，以自身不负先帝殊遇舍命驱驰，作为后主不忘先人之业的榜样，进一步启发后主奋发图强。第三，二十一年不平凡历程，说明创业艰难，激励其不可半途而废，更不能前功尽弃。第四，写出先帝的榜样，不以孔明“卑鄙”，猥自枉屈，三顾茅庐，事不分大小，悉以咨之，于败军之际，危难之间，仍委以重任，可见他任人唯贤，唯才是举，叫后主效法先帝知人善任。第五，表明自己二十一年如一日，竭忠尽智，今后仍一如既往，忠心不改，余力不遗，使后主托之以讨贼兴复之任，且可免因率师北伐，小人进谗而不予信任，坏了大局。诸葛亮的这段叙述，系进一步打动后主的心，乐于接受前面的进言，又是临别时的表白，实有深衷曲意。文章由进言转而为自叙生平，宕开了笔墨，使文势波澜起伏，更为可观。
由叙而誓，推上高潮。表文继叙二十一年遭际之后，续述白帝托孤后的心情、工作，进而表明北定中原的决心。前面的论世、进言、抒情，到此结穴，出师表文的特点由此完全挑明。追言托孤之事，交代这次出师的历史根源，“受命以来，夙夜忧叹，恐托付不效，以伤先帝之明”，说明这次出师的思想基础。“五月渡泸，深入不毛。今南方已定”，指出这次出师的物质准备。在充分叙说条件的基础上，提出“当奖率三军，北定中原，庶竭驽钝，攘除奸凶，兴复汉室，还于旧都”，警拔爽截，铿铿振响，熠熠生光。《出师表》至此才径言出师，切入本题。前面的进言，是为了保证有出师的条件，中间叙事，是说明自身具有出师条件，至此两线归一，提出宜乎出师，也就如瓜熟蒂落，孕足而娩。
归纳前意，总绾全篇。表文结束之前，将出师与谏言两层意思拢合一起。一方面提出“愿陛下托臣以讨贼兴复之效，不效，则治臣之罪”，另一方面还提出“陛下亦宜自谋，以咨诹善道，察纳雅言”，诸葛亮主动领受任务，并表示如失职，甘愿受罚，以显示“平明之理”。最后还不放心，谆谆告诫，要后主“深追先帝遗诏”。先帝临终时训示后主：“勿以恶小而为之，勿以善小而不为。惟贤惟德，能服于人。”最后又回复到“开张圣听”的问题上来，可见修明内政与北伐胜败的关系。这也就将前面两部分内容，沟通了内在联系。
表文以“今当远离，临表涕零，不知所言”作结，其声呜咽似泣，其情沛然如注，勤勤恳恳之态如现，耿耿忠心尽袒。
“出师未捷身先死”，可惜诸葛亮此行未能如愿却先逝世，后人对此颇多惋叹。杜甫曾写道：“三顾频烦天下计，两朝开济老臣心。出师未捷身先死，长使英雄泪满襟。”（《蜀相》）宋代文天祥身陷囹圄，还高唱“或为《出师表》，鬼神泣壮烈。”（《正气歌》）陆游更是多次提到《出师表》：“《出师》一表通古今，夜半挑灯更细看。”（《病起书怀》）“《出师》一表千载无”（《游诸葛武侯台》），“一表何人继出师”（《七十二岁吟》），“凛然《出师表》，一字不可删。”（《感状》），“《出师》一表真名世，千载谁堪伯仲间。”（《书愤》）总之，这道《出师表》，因其深情厚意寄翰墨，忠肝义胆照简编，一直为人所乐道。
《出师表》能写到如此地步，决不是偶然的。文章皆有所为而发。时当北伐在即，作为主帅的诸葛亮要向君主上一道表文，他不是作为例行公事，而是从北伐的全局上考虑，只有后主修明政治，才能保证北征顺利，因而先进安后之言，再表夺胜决心。表文又极为注意收表对象的特点，因而决不是一般的上条陈，列述方策，而是熔议论、叙事、抒情于一炉，启愚矫顽。诸葛亮是后主的丞相，又是受“托孤”的对象。他给后主上表文，既不宜用训斥的口吻，又不便用卑下的声气，写得不卑不亢，方为得体。尤其文中连称先帝，最为合宜。全文称先帝凡十三次，显得情词十分恳切。诸葛亮自叙“先帝知臣谨慎，故临崩寄臣以大事也”，确实“诸葛一生惟谨慎”，细玩本文，从虑事到措词，无不体现了“谨慎”精神，这也是此表被之为“至文”的重要原因。
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Petition on Taking the Field
Permit your servant, Liang, to observe: the late sovereign was taken from us while his life's work, the restoration of the Han, remained unfinished. Today, in a divided empire, our third, the province of Yizhou, war-worn and under duress, faces a season of crisis that threatens our very survival. Despite this, the officials at court persevere in their tasks, and loyal-minded officers throughout the realm dedicate themselves to you because one and all they cherish the memory of the exceptional treatment they enjoyed from the late sovereign and wish to repay it in service to Your Majesty.
Truly this is a time to widen your sagely audience in order to enhance the late Emperor's glorious virtue and foster the morale fo your dedicated officers. It would be unworthy of your majesty to demean yourself by resorting to ill-chosen justifications that would block the avenues of loyal remonstrance.
The royal court and the ministerial administration constitute a single government. Both must be judged by one standard. Those who do evil and violate the codes, as well as those who are loyal and good, must receive their due from the proper authorities. This will make manifest Your Majesty's fair and enlightened governance. Let no unseemly bias lead to different rules for the court and the administration.
Privy Counselors and Imperial Attendants like Guo Youzhi, Fei Yi, and Dong Yun are all solid, reliable men, loyal of purpose, pure in motive. The late Emperor selected them for office so that they would serve Your Majesty after his demise. In my own humble opinion, consulting these men on palace affairs great or small before action is taken will prevent errors and shortcomings and maximize advantages. Xiang Chong, a general of fine character and fair-minded conduct, profoundly versed in military matters proved himself in battle during the previous reign, and the late Emperor pronounced him capable. That is why the assembly has recommended him for overall command. In my humble opinion, General Xiang Chong should be consulted on all military matters large or small to ensure harmony in the ranks and judicious use of personal.
The Former Han thrived because its emperors stayed close to worthy vassals and far from conniving courtiers. The opposite policy led the Later Han to ruin. Whenever the late Emperor discussed this problem with me, he decried the failings of Emperors Huan and Ling. Privy Counselors Guo Youzhi and Fei Yi, Secretary Chen Zhen, Senior Advisor Zhang Yi, and Military Counselor Jiang Wan are all men of shining integrity and unshakable devotion. I beg Your Majesty to keep close to them and to trust them, for that will strengthen our hopes for the resurgence of the house of Han.
I began as a common man, toiling in my fields in Nanyang, doing what I could to keep body and soul together in an age of disorder and taking no interest in making a name for myself among the lords of the realm. Though it was beneath the dignity of the late Emperor to do so, he honored my thatched cottage to solicit my counsel on the events of the day. Grateful for his regard, I responded to his appeal and threw myself heart and soul into his service. Hard times followed for the cause of the late Emperor. I assumed my duties at a critical moment for our defeated army, accepting assignment in a period of direst danger. Now twenty-one years have passed. The late Emperor always appreciated my meticulous caution and, as the end neared, placed his great cause in my hands. Since that moment, I have tormented myself night and day lest I prove unworthy of his trust and thus discredit his judgment.
That is why I crossed the River Lu in the summer heat and penetrated the barren lands of the Man. Now, the south subdued, our arms sufficing, it behooves me to marshal our soldiers to conquer the northern heartland and do my humble best to remove the hateful traitors, restore the house of Han, and return it to the former capital. This is the way I mean to honor my debt to the late Emperor and fulfill my duty to Your Majesty.
As for weighing the advantages of internal policy and making loyal recommendations to Your Majesty, that is the responsibility of Guo Youzhi, Fei Yi, and Dong Yun. My only advice is to obtain and execute your commission to chasten the traitors and restore the Han. Should I prove unfit, punish my offense and report it to the spirit of the late Emperor. If those three vassals fail to sustain Your Majesty's virtue, then their negligence should be publicized and censured.
Your Majesty, take counsel with yourself and consult widely on the right course. Examine and adopt sound opinions, and never forget the last edict fo the late Emperor. Overwhelmed with gratitude for the favor I have received from you, I now depart on a distant campaign. Blinded by my tears falling on this petition, I write I know not what.
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Second Petition on Taking the Field
Painfully recognizing that either the kingdom of Han or the kingdom of Wei must fall and that our royal rule will never know security if confined to a part of the realm, the later Emperor empowered me to wage righteous war against the northern traitors. Accurately appraising his vassal's abilities, he knew full well what feeble talent I had to pit against so strong an enemy; but not to go forward spelled our doom. To arms, rather than to bow to fate! Thus, the late Emperor charged me, and he never wavered in that commitment.
The day I received his mandate, I neither slept nor ate; the northern expedition occupied my thoughts. But first we had to move into the region south of us. In the fifth month I crossed the River Lu and penetrated deep into aboriginal territory, going without food for days at a time-not because I threw caution to the winds but because, knowing that your majesty's rule could never have survived confined to the Shu capital, we would have faced any danger, any difficulty, to carry out the late Emperor's last wishes. Critics have complained of this plan. Now, when teh traitors are spent in the west and occupied in the east, military logic tells us to exploit their distress. It is time to move forward. Allow me to present further details of this case.
The founder of the Han, Emperor Gao Zu, had wisdom of a heavenly scale and advisers of great depth and subtlety. Yet he tested treacherous terrain and suffered painful defeats, gaining security only after many trials and ordeals. Your Majesty will never surpass Emperor Gao Zu; your advisers will never surpass Zhang Liang and Chen Ping. How Your Majesty could seek a long-range plan for conquering the empire from a passive position is the first thing I fail to understand.
Imperial Inspector Liu Yao and Governor Wang Lang each held imperial territory. They were concerned for their security and worked out plans, freely citing the ancient sages. But a crowd of doubts filled their breasts, innumerable obstacles impeded their thinking, and they put off military action from year to year. That they thus allowed Sun Ce to wax in power unhampered and eventually engross the whole of the Southland is the second thing I fail to understand.
Cao Cao-no shrewder planner than he- waged war in a manner worthy of Sunzi and Wu Qi. Nonetheless, his enemies trapped him at Nanyang, put him in straits in Wuchao, imperiled his life at Qilian, pressed him hard at Liyang, nearly ruined him at Beishan, and almost killed him at Tong Pass. After all that, he enjoyed a brief period of false security. How then this vassal, Liang, with so much less talent than Cao Cao, could ever conquer the north without running risks is the third thing I fail to understand.
Cao Cao attacked Changba five times but could not subdue it. He tried to cross Lake Chao four times and failed. He took Li Fu into his service, but Li Fu conspired against him. He gave authority to Xiaohou Yuan, but Xiaohou Yuan died. The late Emperor always acknowledged Cao Cao's capabilities, yet he had his failures too. How then one so inferior as this vassal could guarantee a victory is the fourth thing I fail to appreciate.
Alas, since arriving in Hanzhong, in one year we have lost Zhao Zilong, Yang Qun, May Yum Yan Zhi, Ding Li, Bo Shou, Liu He, Deng Tong, and others, in addition to unit leaders and positional commanders totaling more then seventy. We also lost more then a thousand of our special forces-shock troops, units of the Cong, Sou, and Black Qiang nations, rangers and armed cavalry. To assemble these elite forces from around the realm took many decades; no single province can make up the loss. And in a few more years, we will lose another two-thirds of them. How to deal with the enemy is the fifth thing I fail to understand. At present, though the population is strained to the utmost and the armed forces near exhaustion, events will not stand still; and in their swift course, action is no dearer then restraint. Not to act when the hour beckons, trying instead to sustain a protracted struggle with the resources of but a single province is teh sixth thing I fail to understand.
Events are the hardest things to control. Once the late Emperor lost a battle in Jingzhou, and Cao Cao gleefully rubbed his hands together, confident that he had conquered the empire. But then the late emperor allied himself with Wu and Yue in the east, took Ba and Shu in the west, and marched against the north. Xiahou Yuan fell. This was something Cao Cao failed to reckon on and a promise of success for the cause of Han. But the Southland turned on its Riverlands ally; Lord Guan perished, Zigui fell, and Cao Pi proclaimed a new dynasty. That's how things happen; it is difficult to anticipate things to come. Humbly I shall toil to the last ounce of my strength, until my end; but whether the outcome will favor us or not is beyond my powers of prediction.
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老骨头收集
