回复起哄架秧子的评论:
在下不清楚非正常死亡的算法，但是中国官方的《中国人口年鉴》的统计数字是这样。阁下觉得官方的非正常死亡数字高些对官方有利呢？还是官方的统计数字低些对官方有利呢？
在下贴出来的是CAMBRIDGE的the history of china,在下顺手把这章节的作者注了出来，阁下是归海的精英，不会不了解国外学者教授的严谨和认真吧？作为一位史学家，况且能在CAMBRIDGE著书出版的史学家，应该知道该秉笔直书，把历史史实呈现给社会。
阁下可以下载
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA
General editors
DENIS TWITCHETT and JOHN K. FAIRBANK
Volume 14
The People's Republic, Part 1:
The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965
8 The Chinese economy under stress, 1958-1965
by NICHOLAS R. LARDY
这部分去看，verycd上就有。
回复起哄架秧子的评论:按照阁下的理论，确实是发生了自然灾害，那粮食棉花的出口数量该降低啊，看看当时究竟发生了什么。
Most astounding, even as the mortality rate was rising in 1959, Chinese exports of cereals, shown in Table 8, were reaching peak historical levels. Exports (primarily rice and soybeans) in 1959 reached a level twice the average of the 1st FYP, while imports (mostly wheat) fell to the lowest level in six years. Thus net exports in 1959 were more than double the average annual level of the 1st FYP.
Similarly, in 1959 cotton yarn and cotton cloth exports were double and almost double, respectively, the levels of 1957. In value terms, Chinese exports to the Soviet Union rose 50 percent between 1957 and 1959 and in 1959 made up 60 percent of China's exports.52 Moreover, at the height of the GLF crisis in 1958-62, government expenditures for rural relief averaged less than 450 million yuan per year, or about eight-tenths of a yuan annually for each individual in collective agriculture,53 while the market price of grain in shortage areas had reached 2 to 4 yuan per kilogram. The internal welfare funds of collective units did not provide an effective alternative source of support for starving rural people. In i960, the peak of the mortality crisis, internal welfare funds totaled only 370 million yuan.54
回复起哄架秧子的评论:
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA
General editors
DENIS TWITCHETT and JOHN K. FAIRBANK
Volume 14
The People's Republic, Part 1:
The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965
8 The Chinese economy under stress, 1958-1965
by NICHOLAS R. LARDY
THE INCIDENCE OF THE CHINESE FAMINE
Little is known about the incidence of this massive famine, but two hypotheses can be advanced. First, the famine was disproportionately a rural phenomenon. Second, even within rural areas, deaths were highly concentrated regionally.
Several types of empirical evidence suggest that the famine was disproportionately rural. First, as shown in Table 5, the decline in grain consumption on average was far more severe in rural areas. By 1960 rural consumption of cereals had fallen 24 percent, while urban consumption had fallen less than 2 percent. In 1961, when average national consumption reached its lowest point, rural consumption had fallen 52 kilograms or 25 percent, while urban consumption was off only 15 kilograms or 8 percent. In absolute terms, consumption of vegetable oils and pork fell by more in urban than in rural areas, but the urban consumption of these items remained twice that of rural areas. Moreover, since caloric intake was derived so overwhelmingly from direct consumption of cereals, there is little doubt that urban consumers suffered less deprivation than peasants.
P'eng personally posed a dramatic challenge to the strategy of the Great Leap Forward and, more important, to Mao's leadership at the crucial party meeting convened at Lushan in July 1959. But P'eng's broadside was decisively rebuffed by Mao, and the GLF entered a new upsurge in which criticism of policy became impossible. Far more significant, the intensive mobilization of resources for industrialization accelerated. During 1959 the rate of investment rose to an all-time peak of 43.4 percent of national income. The state supported this drive in large measure by increasing its extractions of cereals, vegetables, and fiber crops from the peasantry. The effect of rising cereal procurement on the rural population is shown in Table 7. In 1959 retained grains, which included amounts that had to be utilized for livestock feed and seed for the following year's crop, fell dramatically to 223 kilograms per capita, only three-quarters of the level of 1957. Similarly, even though production was down, the state's procurement of oil-bearing seeds rose by one-quarter in 1959 compared to 1957. A growing quantity of agricultural goods were exported to the Soviet Union in payment for the stepped-up imports of machinery and equipment that were a key component of the higher rate of investment.
Most astounding, even as the mortality rate was rising in 1959, Chinese exports of cereals, shown in Table 8, were reaching peak historical levels. Exports (primarily rice and soybeans) in 1959 reached a level twice the average of the 1st FYP, while imports (mostly wheat) fell to the lowest level in six years. Thus net exports in 1959 were more than double the average annual level of the 1st FYP.
Similarly, in 1959 cotton yarn and cotton cloth exports were double and almost double, respectively, the levels of 1957. In value terms, Chinese exports to the Soviet Union rose 50 percent between 1957 and 1959 and in 1959 made up 60 percent of China's exports.52 Moreover, at the height of the GLF crisis in 1958-62, government expenditures for rural relief averaged less than 450 million yuan per year, or about eight-tenths of a yuan annually for each individual in collective agriculture,53 while the market price of grain in shortage areas had reached 2 to 4 yuan per kilogram. The internal welfare funds of collective units did not provide an effective alternative source of support for starving rural people. In i960, the peak of the mortality crisis, internal welfare funds totaled only 370 million yuan.54
The only policy responses to the famine visible in i960 were meager, given the magnitude of the crisis. Cereal procurements were scaled back by more than 16 million tons (Table 7). But since resales to peasants did not increase over the previous year and total production fell by more than 25 million tons, the grain retained in the countryside fell even farther from the already low levels of 1959, and rural mortality rates skyrocketed. Second, exports were scaled back and the Chinese opened discussions for large-scale wheat imports. But exports in i960 remained well above the average level of the 1st FYP (Table 8), and the decision to import appears to have been more related to an emerging crisis of urban consumption standards than a response to the rural crisis that by the time contract negotiations opened, had been going on for a year and a half. Urban consumption standards had been maintained in 1958 and 1959 not only through record levels of procurement but in part by drawing down statecontrolled grain inventories. In an effort to conserve the small remaining stocks, in September 1960 the amount of grain supplied to urban residents through the rationing system was reduced by one kilogram per capita per month.55 In October, contracts for wheat imports were negotiated and signed.
年年有余 发表评论于
(出处：
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA
General editors
DENIS TWITCHETT and JOHN K. FAIRBANK
Volume 14
The People's Republic, Part 1:
The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965
8 The Chinese economy under stress, 1958-1965
by NICHOLAS R. LARDY)
THE PARTY S RESPONSE TO THE FAMINE CRISIS
The crisis created by the Great Leap Forward posed the most severe challenge the Party had faced since coming to power in 1949. Yet the course of political events not only made it difficult for the Party to anticipate the magnitude of the crisis but led to policy decisions that exacerbated the famine. Even more startling is the fact that once incontrovertible evidence of widespread famine was in hand, the Party remained paralyzed, unable or unwilling to formulate a timely and cohesive response to the most massive famine of the twentieth century.
Evidence of the failure of the agricultural mobilization strategy was available as early as the winter of 1958- 59. It was clear to members of the Central Committee at the time of the Wu-ch'ang Plenum in November and December 1958 that there was precious little basis for the announcement that 1958 grain output was 375 million metric tons and cotton output was 3.5 million metric tons. The account by P'eng Te-huai, then a member of the Politburo and minister of national defense, of the discussions at that meeting shows that the statistical system had deteriorated to the point where it was impossible to know the actual harvest level with any degree of confidence. According to P'eng, some comrades at the meeting thought that the harvest was in excess of 500 million tons and that regardless of the precise amount, "industry is now vastly behind agriculture." P'eng challenged the accuracy of the reported levels of output. According to P'eng, Mao personally made the decision to announce a figure of 375 million
metric tons.48 The published output figures thus reflected a political rather than a statistical judgment.
Although those figures became the basis for agricultural planning for 1959, at least two members of the Politburo challenged the veracity of substantial increases in reported cereal production. P'eng Te-huai, some time after the conclusion of the Wu-ch'ang Conference, traveled to Hunan province for a firsthand examination of rural conditions. He found that conditions in the countryside where he visited were grave and concluded that the output figures previously submitted to the center were inflated. Not waiting until he could return to Peking and report his findings directly, and fearing that "the masses are in danger of starving," he sent an urgent cable to the Central Committee requesting that the province's tax and compulsory delivery quota be reduced by one-fourth.49
Ch'en Yun, the fifth ranking member of the Party and by far the most senior on economic affairs, also distrusted the reports being submitted to Peking and in the spring of 1959 pointedly chose to visit Honan, the province that had played such a path-breaking role in the water conservancy campaign in the winter of 1957-58 and subsequently in the formation of communes. He too found that local political cadres were out of touch with conditions in the rural areas of the province, lacked adequate data on the true grain situation, and were deluded by the inflated reports submitted from the grassroots level.50 It is not clear how Ch'en brought his findings to the attention of other members of the Politburo, but it is implausible to argue that he kept the information to himself.
The reports of P'eng Te-huai and Ch'en Yun in the winter and spring of 1959 signaled that the fundamental strategy of the GLF was flawed. Organization of large-scale communes and massive political mobilization had not raised agricultural output in 1958 even with weather conditions that, on balance, were more favorable than in either 1956 or 1957.5I
