文科生的思维方式和理工科生的思维方式有些不同，这是一个大家普遍见证的经验常识。这里文科生指的是接受过正规的文科(liberal arts)教育的人，而理工科生指的是接受过正规的理工科（science and engineering）教育的人（特别声明一下，这里的理工科包括以实验为基础的现代心理学）。而文科生中愈接近文学领域的人的思维一般来说与理工生的思维相去愈远。现代的理工科生的思维的一个基本特点是受到诸如质能守恒，热力学第二定律，数理逻辑等已知的自然定律或逻辑常识的约束，这些约束在很大程度上限制了他们对于不符合已知自然定律和逻辑常识的现象，使得他们的思维中有着很多不能跨越的无形的框框，因而他们的言论中常会表现出一种所谓的科学的严格性。而具有文学背景的人的思维则不同。由于少了自然和逻辑的法则的硬性约束，他们遐想的思路就可以开阔许多（当然他们因自然的启发而产生的联想就相应地不如理工科生了）。对他们来说，只要不违背语法规则，就可以敲打着键盘（或在没有键盘的时候挥毫书写）行云流水地构筑文字里的世界，甚至即便是违背了正常的语法规则，他们也照样可以行云流水的敲打或书写，只要让读者们感觉所面对的是一首诗，他们不但会容忍语法上的不正规，而且会努力去领会猜测作者的各种有悖与自然常识的描述所表达出的深意来。
但是另一方面，缺少了硬性逻辑约束的文科生们不但更能够接受一些各时期的当代科学因无法解释而难以接受的观点而且对于人们的情感及人际关系的微妙细节更加敏感；尽管他们常无法用简单的语言对他们所感知的现象做概括性的介绍，他们却可以用细腻的文笔去很多不同的角度去描述一个他们并不理解的现象的各个细节，他们能够以小说的形式生动地再现生活中人们所熟识却不易描述的情形与模式，可以通过对自己内心世界的反思及对于他人进行感同身受的理解而刻画人们在一些特定环境下的相对普遍的感受。不过文科生中也有一类很大的例外，这是因为文科领域中也有着虽然不如自然规律那么硬却也是硬得足以压倒英雄汉的法则，那就是金钱所要遵循的守恒律[1]。所以，文科中与金钱接近的领域所培养出来的人的思维在严格性这方面比较接近理工科生的思维。当然，哪个学科领域中都会有些异类的个别人物。
那么文科生与理工科生的思维特点的区别与黑格尔的哲学有什么关系呢？简单地说，黑格尔在论述他声称是只有受过特殊训练的人才能把握的严格的逻辑问题时，常跨越自然与逻辑法则的框框而运用文学的思维进行展开讨论，以致于包括成名的黑学专家们在内的期待着从他的哲学中学习理解严格的逻辑思辨的读者们常会觉摸不着头绪，甚至把比他稍年轻一些的同胞叔本华气的骂说黑格尔是吹牛者而黑格尔哲学是空洞的恶心废话[2]。
Φ179. 自我意识面对着另一个自我意识；它出自于它自身。这一点有着双重的意义。首先，它失去了它的自己，因为它发现它的自己成为了另一个存在；第二，它因而扬弃了另一个自我意识，因为它不认为有必要将那另一个视为真实，而只不过是从中看到它自己而已。
Φ180. 它必须将它的另一个消除掉。为了做到这一点，它需要对于上述双重意义的第一个进行扬弃，从而也就将第二个双重意义进行了扬弃。首先，它必须让自己决定扬弃另一个独立的存在，以便使自己确定成为一个真正的存在；第二，它接着便扬弃它自己，因为那另一个便是它自己。
Φ181. 这种对于它自己的双重意义上的另一方的双重意义上的扬弃的同时便使得它又重新在双重意义上回到了它自己当中。因为首先它通过消除了另一方而与自己合一，使得它通过扬弃拿回了它自己；但是第二，由于它曾经在另一方中意识到自己的存在，因而消除自己在对方中的存在也就把对方释放了，所以它在得回自己的同时也以同样的方式让另一方得回了它（即另一方）的自己。
Φ 182.自我意识的这一相对于另一个自我意识的处理是自我意识的单一的行为。但是，自我意识的这一行为本身立即具有了既是自我意识自己的行为又是另一方的行为的双重意义。因为另一方同样也是独立，封闭在它自身之中，没有一样不是通过它自己而处于它自己之中的。这第一个自我意识所面对的对象并非基本上为欲望对象特征的被动形式，而是因它自己而存在的一个独立的对象，由于这个对象的存在，如果没有那个对象以相同的行为来配合，自我意识无力为它自己作任何事。这个过程因而绝对是这两个自我意识的双相过程。每个看到对方和自己做同样的事；每个它自己都做着它要求对方做的事，而且因为那个原因而作它所作的，只要对方在做同样的事。其中一个的单方面的行动将是无效的，因为只有双方共同的合作才能产生结果。
Φ183.这个行为因而具有双重意思，不仅因为这是一个既对自己又对另一方的行为，而且因为这个行为本身既是自我意识自己的行为又是另一方的行为（尽管它们彼此之间相互区别）。
Φ 184.在这一运动中我们可以看到展现在我们眼前的一个不断重复的较力的过程；而在我们现在讨论的这一议题中，我们看到的是意识中的较力过程。前者对我们所产生的效果在这里自己成为条件。处于是将自己破解到极致的自我意识；而每个极端都是自身的确定性之间的相互交换及向相反方向的转换。尽管就意识来说它毫无疑问地来自它自身之外，它在存在于它自身之外的同时仍然被限制在它的内部，它为它自己而存在，而且它为了意识而自我外化。意识发现它既直接地就是又不是另一个意识，同样地这另一个仅仅在取消了为了自己而存在的时候才为了自己而存在，而且它的自我存在仅仅在它另一个的自我存在之中。它们中的每一个都是另一个的媒介条件，通过这种媒介它们中的每一个都自我关联和统一了；它们中的每一个对于自己和另一个来说都是真实的直接的自我存在，而这种真实的存在同时只有通过彼此互为媒介而为自身而存在。它们通过对于相互的辨认而认识他们的整体。
或许真正的文科生们在读了上述几段话并不觉得亲切到了如同自己的同行写的文字。但是，我可以告诉你，这肯定不会是今天的在诸多硬性的自然与逻辑法则约束下的理工科所使用的专业特质的语言。其实上面这5段话所描写的内容如果用受到硬性自然和逻辑法则约束的理工科生的语言来描述的话，大体上应该是这样的：
“自我意识与一般意义上的意识的一个最大的不同点在于：自我意识既是意识的对象又是意识的主体。这与一般意义上的意识不同，比如，我此时意识电脑屏幕上的随着我敲打键盘而出现文字，但是文字或电脑却都无法知道我的意识；但是，我在写这段话的时候，我不仅知道我要写的内容而且我还非常明确地感受到‘我知道’这一点及所‘知道’的内容。。。”
从上面这段话所表现出来的对于硬性的自然与逻辑法则的顺从可以看出这段话的写作风格与黑格尔将所描写的对象的近乎拟人化地表现出的相当完整的人格化的主体的做法之间是有着本质的区别的，而就黑格尔的类似拟人的手法在文学里面不论是诗歌还是散文小说都是完全可以接受的。所以我们可以将黑格尔的手法称为半文学性的手法，这里用“半”这个字来表示文科生可能也不熟悉黑格尔的书写风格这一点。当然，对于很多读者来说，上述那段理工科式的描述可能并不比黑格尔的那种半文学性的描述更容易懂，甚至更难懂，在这个意义上两者并没有太大的不同；但实际上黑格尔对于自然与逻辑法则的硬性约束的打破会难以避免地产生一些负面的效应，这一点我在本文后面还要讨论。
但是从另一方面来看，黑格尔的半文学性的手法却给他讨论象意识这样的难以解释的对象提供了一个非常有效的工具。其实，以人的思想意识为基础的社会文化实际上与人的自我意识有一个共同点：社会性思想的产物仍然可以是社会性思想过程的一部分，人们不但可以知道自己在想什么，而且社会性的文化也可以将文化内部所发生的事情通过文字表现出来。因此黑格尔半文学性手法同样可以运用到更一般的社会问题中去。
客观地说，我们可以把黑格尔的半文学性的手法看成是如同数学上通过设定中间参数而将一个耦合性的问题分解为相对较小的问题来解的技术性的措施。但是，这显然不是黑格尔采用那半文学性手法的法理依据。对于黑格尔来说，他之所以可以将带有主观性的语言运用到任何现实的现象和过程中去，是因为他认为世界上的一切都只不过是绝对理念及其运动的表现而已，而绝对理念是有着完全的自我意识的存在，这才应该是黑格尔他可以放任自己在旁人看来近乎随心所欲地将客体近似地拟人化的理由。
当然，读者或许会说我前面举出的几段黑格尔的话是关于意识的讨论，而意识本身是人之所以为人的主要元素，所以在对意识进行讨论时采用任何的拟人化都不过分（其实并非如此，因为这里涉及到综合与分析的层次差别问题）。但实际上，黑格尔的半文学性手法并非局限于对于意识的讨论。我们再来看一个对于非意识的讨论的例子。下面这几段话是黑格尔的《逻辑学（Science of Logic[4]）》的英译版（）的几段话的中译文：
§134 纯存在和纯无因而是一回事。真理既不是存在也不是无，而是存在（没有过去却已经过去）进入无，以及无进入存在。而同样正确的是它们彼此之间又不是没有区别的，而恰恰相反的是它们并非一回事，而是绝对不同的，但同时又是未分离且无法分离的，因为它们之中的任何一个都瞬间消失而成为另一方。所以他们的真相就是这个瞬间消失而成为另一个的运动：成为，这样一种运动，参与运动的双方之间相互区别，但是使得它们彼此区别开来的差异却瞬间的消失掉。
。。。。。
§184 扬弃，以及被扬弃的（那个理想地作为一个瞬间而存在的），构成了哲学上最重要的一个概念。这是哲学史上重复出现的一个基本的确定，其意义将被清楚地把握尤其是与无相区别。被扬弃的并没有被归于无极。无只是一个直接的表现；而被扬弃的则是一个过程的结果；它是一个非存在但却因此而源于一个存在。它仍具有它的来源的确定性。
§185‘扬弃’在语言中具有双重的意思：一方面它意味着保留，维持，但同样也意味着终止。即便是‘保留’这个词本身也包含了负面的元素，亦即为了保留它而从它的影响中除去的内容。因此，被扬弃的部分同时也就是被保留的部分；它只是失去了它原有的直接特征，而没有因此而彻底消失了。
§ 274我们前面给出的关于‘扬弃’的两个定义可以作为这个词语的字典意思而加以引用。但是更精彩的是我们发现一个语言可以给同一个词两个相反的意思来。对于想象性的思维来说，在语言中找到具有想象性的词汇来是一件令人愉悦的事。德语中有一些这样的词汇。拉丁语中的tollere一词的双重意思都没有这么夸张；它的正面的确切的意思仅仅是举起来。一个东西被扬弃了仅仅意味着它进入了与它对立面的统一；这个特定的被扬弃的东西更适合于被称为矩。以杠杆为例，重量与到一点的距离因它们的等效性而被合起来称为杠杆的力矩，尽管与一个真实的东西，如重量，与理想的东西，如仅仅是空间中确定的物体（如一条几何线）的组合之间形成的对比。我们将经常会用拉丁词汇来作为哲学的技术语言来表示经琢磨而得到的确定意思，这或是因为母语中没有能够表达该意思的词汇，或是因为母语中的词汇更多的是让人想到直接的意思而外国语则更多的是让人琢磨它隐含的意思。
上述这几段话可能是黑格尔哲学中比较接近正常人语言的部分，它并没有违背一般的语言和形式逻辑。虽然理工科生可能会不大习惯“纯存在和纯无因而是一回事”之后在接着说“而恰恰相反的是它们并非一回事，而是绝对不同的，但同时又是未分离且无法分离的，因为它们之中的任何一个都瞬间消失而成为另一方”这样的描述，但那仍然属于稍微运用一些文学性的想象就能够接受的表达方式。其实，这里与前面对于自我意识的讨论所使用的半文学性手法在本质上还是相通的：都缺乏对自然与逻辑法则的严格尊重。
§ 273无限大是超出了极限的自我复原的对于否定，肯定的否定。无限大比第一个直接的存在更强的否定；它是高于极限的真正存在。无限大这个名字使人的心与脑都为之而亮，因为在无限大里面，绝对理念不仅仅是抽象地呈现给自己，而且上升到它的自我，到它的思维之光，到它的普世之光，自由之光。
§ 274无限大是存在的；在这个直接的存在当中它同时也是对于它的一个对立面，即有限的否定。作为一种简单形式的存在的同时又是它对里面的非存在，因此它已经落回到一般性的确定存在的类别- 更确切地说，进入到有限的一类中，这是因为无限大是反映到它自身之中的确定性存在，是对于一般的确定性的扬弃的结果，因而是假定为区别于它的确定性的确定存在。与此这一确定性相一致地，有限站在无限大的对立面作为真实的确定性的存在；它们处于一种定性的关系之中，每一方都保持着在对方之外；无限大的直接的存在使得它的否定，也就是最初看来消失在无限大之中的有限，得到了复苏。
应该说，康德以及之前的哲学家都非常注意文章论述中逻辑的严格性，包括比康德稍早但基本上与康德同期的极具法语文化浪漫文采的卢梭在运用自己丰富的想象力推测原始文明如何进化的时候都会尽量保持逻辑的严格性。到了康德的晚年即黑格尔的青壮年时期，经过了几十年的社会实践的考验及哲学思辨的发展，人们发现了康德的哲学体系的一些欠缺因而出现对之进行批评的声音这是很自然的。这些批评的声音当然受到当时德国包括哲学在内的整体文化状态的影响，不过对于该时期德国文化状态的全面考察和讨论超出了本文的议题范围，我们这里的主要感兴趣的是黑格尔哲学的特点。现在哲学界的一种普遍的说法是黑格尔对于康德及之前（一定程度上把介于康德与黑格尔之间的费希德也包括在内）的哲学的主要批评是说康德他们的哲学缺乏生命力[6],[7],[8]。这种说法甚至被进一步地引申为一种过去一个来世纪里大家耳熟能详的一种说法，即黑格尔的辩证哲学克服了之前的形而上学的缺乏生命力的问题。关于形而上学和所谓的辩证法之间的对比这种观点显然是错误的和缺乏依据的。
这里需要特别提请读者注意的是这里所提到的黑格尔所说的生命力其实与本文的主题是密切相关的。黑格尔对康德哲学的所做的“缺乏生命了”的指控并非是类似我们通常说一篇文章缺乏生命力或活力时所带有的象征的意义，而在很大程度上是从一种自然的角度来指出康德将理性思维的对象分为几种基本的类别这种做法是将客观存在分解为了无生命的元素。这在很大程度上相当于今天有人指责生物化学把有生命的机体分解为没有生命的分子或原子甚至量子一样。所不同的是生物化学所研究的人体或动物体的生命所具有明确意义使得如果有人从特定的哲学角度或信仰层次来反对将之进行无生命化的解释对于大多数人来说是可以理解甚至接受的；而理性思维对象这种可以说是宇宙的整体的生命在我们来说在很大程度上只是一种象征的意义，因而对于理性思维的对象采取归类分析应该说从整体原则上并不属于是一种将生命体降为无生命的做法。
过去一个来世纪里对于这里所讨论的黑格尔所说的“生命”的意义有一种相当流行的诠释，即黑格尔是在批评过去的形而上学对客观世界缺乏全面的发展的有机的看待，而黑格尔的辩证哲学对于过去的形而上学的这种缺陷的克服是通过所谓的内因外因质量互变否定之否定的对立统一等理论提供了一个全面的发展的和有机的认识方法论。这种诠释不但造成了对于形而上学的错误的曲解，而且也没有真正揭示出黑格尔心目中的哲学生命力的真正意义。
我们可以从两个方面来看出黑格尔心目中的哲学生命力的真正意义。第一个方面是绝对理念在他的哲学中的地位，他在他的《逻辑学[9]》中指出"只有绝对理念是存在的，不朽的生命，自觉的全真理；其它都是错误，困惑，观点，努力，冲动和暂时的"（顺便提一句，黑格尔对于绝对理论的观点是与他关于概念--notion--的认识密切关联的）；第二个方面就是本文所讨论的黑格尔在哲学论述中所采用如我们前面所看到的表现了绝对理念的自觉自主性的主体人格特征半文学性的语言。从这两个方面可以看出，当黑格尔批评过去的形而上学缺少生命力，他心目中的“生命”的意义并非象仅仅是如后来诠释黑格尔的人所展示给人们那样的仅是简单的象征意义，而是类似于我们看待人体及动物的生命时所感受到的一种自觉自知的生命。
黑格尔的这种半文学性的哲学思维或许与黑格尔本人的经历有一定的关系。严格地说，黑格尔并非今天大家心目中的文科生，他甚至曾经凭一篇关于星球运行的论文在Jena University获得一份讲师的位置[10]，所以很显然他对当时的自然科学知识并非陌生。他十八岁时进入图宾根（Tübingen）大学的神学院，与同寝室的谢林和荷尔德林组成了日后闻名世界的图宾根三杰。但是，不象他那两个伙伴以优异的成绩毕业，黑格尔毕业时并未得到他所期待的哲学学位而是因为他的中等生的成绩只得到了一个被认为低于哲学的一个学位[11]（也有一说是一个与古希腊文字翻译有关的学位，而且是他毕业后可以做语言家庭辅导老师的原因）。而他一生中至少有两位著名的诗人对他的哲学甚至人生有重大的影响，一位就是与他同为图宾根三杰的荷尔德林，另一位就是作为良师益友的歌德。这两个人都曾帮助黑格尔解决就业的问题。黑格尔的这种经历与他在他那强调严格的逻辑的哲学中带有明显的文学的色彩恐怕是有着很大的关系。
黑格尔把存在着的一切都归于是绝对理念及其运动的表现的观点使得他不但有必要建立一个可以对存在着的一切进行解释的哲学体系，而且在原则上也具备了这种可能性。更重要的是他的对于意识及各种概念(notion)的那种半文学性的语言为他提供了一种对所有的概念进行相类似的描述的工具。
另一方面，虽然黑格尔的哲学在很大程度上得益于他的这种特殊的思维方式，但是也正是他的这种思维方式以及相应的语言建构不但为包括他同时期的德国同胞叔本华在内的其他读者阅读理解他的哲学带来很大的困难，而且由于从根本上缺乏理工科生们所依赖的逻辑上的严格性使得他的理论在很多场合下可以产生怎么说都对的缺乏实际意义的诡辩。更为严重的是，他的这种思维方式及其相应的语言特征引导着崇拜名人的专业哲学界的包括一些被誉为大家的后来之士习惯于用模棱两可似是而非的语言来论述哲学，以至于最后不得不由受他影响最深的德国哲学家在黑格尔辞世一个世纪之后来宣布哲学死了。在这段时间了，英法语国家出了罗素和伯格森这样优秀的其语言特征完全没有黑格尔的痕迹的优秀的获诺贝尔奖的哲学家，而德国的哲学虽有杰斯帕斯这样的杰出的人物，以及马克思和海德格尔这样的名家，终究对十九世纪之后的世界哲学的发展未能起到应有的前沿性的领导作用。就这一点来说，叔本华当初对于黑格尔的语言将给哲学带来的灾难性的后果的语言是有先见之明的。
最后有必要指出，虽然黑格尔的近似拟人化的半文学性的语言给世界哲学界带来了很大的困惑，这种困惑却并非是一般而言的文学性思维的必然后果。实际上，作为黑格尔的良师益友的大诗人歌德就曾在1829年二月13日写给黑格尔的信中说[12]，“自然永远是真实的，永远是严肃的，永远是严峻的；它总是对的，而错误总是人类的。”他接着向黑格尔指出他所做的是试图要建立的一个庞大的抽象系统来解释不论是日常生活还是科学观察中都可以简单地直接假设的现象。对于歌德来说，黑格尔的主要问题是在他的逻辑学中试图通过对存在的逻辑概念进行分析来描述整体的特性以及在他的现象学中对于感官所获得的关于自然物体的观察的升华，这对歌德来说是无法接受地忽略了作为科学的任务所应去理解的：生命的自然形式的发展，对于这种发展来说，主观思维当然处于一个核心的地位，但也仅仅是其中的一部分而已。。。。。。
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附录：文中所引的黑格尔原文的英译版：
一．Phenomenology of Mind（见前面参考【3】）
Φ 179. Self-consciousness has before it another
self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance.
First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being;
secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other
as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance.
First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being;
secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other
as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
Φ 180. It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of
that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to
sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to
sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
Φ 181. This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a
double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise
gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of
being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets
the other again go free.
double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For,
firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise
gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of
being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets
the other again go free.
Φ 182. This process of self-consciousness in relation to anotherself-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the
action of one alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the
double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself,
and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does
not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic primarily
of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently for itself,
over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behalf, if that
object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other
do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the
other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the
same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can
only be brought about by means of both.
action of one alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the
double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself,
and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does
not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic primarily
of the object of desire, but as an object existing independently for itself,
over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behalf, if that
object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other
do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the
other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the
same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can
only be brought about by means of both.
Φ 183. The action has then a double entente not only in the
sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
sense that the act simpliciter
is the act of the one as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the
sense that the act simpliciter
is the act of the one as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
Φ 184. In this movement we see the process
repeated which came before us as the play of forces; in the present case,
however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for
us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle
term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each
extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition
into the opposite. While qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside
itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself,
and its self-externalization is for consciousness. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not
another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the
self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through
which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to
the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists
thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing one another.
repeated which came before us as the play of forces; in the present case,
however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for
us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle
term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each
extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition
into the opposite. While qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside
itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself,
and its self-externalization is for consciousness. Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not
another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the
self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through
which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to
the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists
thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as
mutually recognizing one another.
二．Science of Logic （见前面的参考【4，5】）
§ 134 Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What
is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over
but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally
true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary,
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are
unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite.
Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one
into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference
which has equally immediately resolved itself.
is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over
but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally
true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary,
they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are
unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite.
Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one
into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference
which has equally immediately resolved itself.
……….
§ 184To sublate, and the sublated (that
which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions
in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout
the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and
especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced
to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the
result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in
a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it
originates.
§ 184To sublate, and the sublated (that
which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions
in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout
the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and
especially distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced
to nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the
result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a result which had its origin in
a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it
originates.
§ 185'To sublate' has a twofold meaning
in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally
it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes
a negative elements, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in
order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has
only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.
in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally
it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes
a negative elements, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in
order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has
only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.
§ 186The two definitions of 'to
sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings of this
word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one
and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative
thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative
meaning; the German language has a number of such. The double meaning of the
Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum
est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only
a lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity
with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something
reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the case of the lever,
weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account
of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something
real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial
determination, a line.' We shall often have occasion to notice that the
technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it
has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate,
whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.
sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings of this
word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one
and the same word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative
thought to find in the language words which have in themselves a speculative
meaning; the German language has a number of such. The double meaning of the
Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: tollendum
est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only
a lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity
with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something
reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the case of the lever,
weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account
of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something
real, such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial
determination, a line.' We shall often have occasion to notice that the
technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it
has, as here, because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate,
whereas the foreign language suggests more what is reflected.
。。。。
§ 274 The Notion of the infinite as it first presents itself
is this, that determinate being in its being-in-itself determines itself as
finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to
transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. Thus the
infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to
the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite.
Neither do we only, as subjective reason, pass beyond the finite into the
infinite; as when we say that the infinite is the Notion of reason and that
through reason we rise superior to temporal things, though we let this happen
without prejudice to the finite which is in no way affected by this exaltation,
an exaltation which remains external to it. But the
finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an
alien force; on the contrary, it is its nature to be related to itself as
limitation,— both limitation and as an ought-and to transcend the same, or
rather, as self-relation to have negated the limitation and to be beyond it. It
is' not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes
to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature
to become itself the infinite. The infinite is its affirmative determination, that
which it truly is in itself.
is this, that determinate being in its being-in-itself determines itself as
finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to
transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. Thus the
infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to
the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite.
Neither do we only, as subjective reason, pass beyond the finite into the
infinite; as when we say that the infinite is the Notion of reason and that
through reason we rise superior to temporal things, though we let this happen
without prejudice to the finite which is in no way affected by this exaltation,
an exaltation which remains external to it. But the
finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an
alien force; on the contrary, it is its nature to be related to itself as
limitation,— both limitation and as an ought-and to transcend the same, or
rather, as self-relation to have negated the limitation and to be beyond it. It
is' not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes
to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature
to become itself the infinite. The infinite is its affirmative determination, that
which it truly is in itself.
文中所引的黑格尔关于绝对理念的原话的英译版：
All else is error, confusion, opinion, endeavour, caprice
and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life,
self-knowing truth, and is all truth.
and transitoriness; the absolute Idea alone is being, imperishable life,
self-knowing truth, and is all truth.
[3]The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phconten.htm
[4]Science of Logic, Hegel, URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm#HL1_82a
[5] Science
of Logic, Hegel, Infinity, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl136.htm#HL1_137a
of Logic, Hegel, Infinity, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl136.htm#HL1_137a
[8]人们对于黑格尔对康德之前的哲学的这一态度的说法的一个重要的依据是黑格尔在他的《The Phenomenology of Mind,PREFACE（URL：https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm）》中指出康德的哲学体系是缺乏生命力的。
[9] Science
of Logic, Hegel, The Absolute Idea, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm#HL3_824
of Logic, Hegel, The Absolute Idea, URL:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlabsolu.htm#HL3_824
