《观察者网》
今日（7月12日），海牙国际仲裁法庭对菲律宾南海仲裁案作出非法无效的所谓最终裁决。对此，中华人民共和国政府及中华人民共和国外交部均发出声明，重申中方不接受、不承认的立场。国家主席习近平也在会晤欧洲理事会主席、欧盟委员会主席时强调，南海诸岛自古以来就是中国领土。
阿利森（Graham Allison）：In ignoring an upcoming verdict on the South China Sea, Beijing is following well-established precedent by great powers
《观察者网翻译》
而就在7月11日（美国时间），《外交》杂志网站发表格拉汉姆·埃利森（Graham Allison）的文章，文中列举了俄罗斯、英国、美国等例并表示，从未有过任何一个联合国安理会常任理事国服从国际仲裁法庭有关海洋法的裁决。“如果中国拒绝接受南海仲裁案结果，它不过做了其他大国这几十年一直在做的事”。当然，文章虽然持现实主义立场，讲出了一定的道理，但文中将中美相提并论，显然也是从美国的国际视野、道德观念和霸权习惯出发，以己度人。文章混淆了中国维护自身领土主权的正义举动，与美国一贯奉行的霸权主义。中国的崛起是和平崛起，绝不会走西方列强的老路，也绝不会出现文中所引修昔底德的名言：“强者为所欲为”。中国从来不是要抛弃国际法，我们不能接受的是对领土主权的无端仲裁，以及对国际法的滥用。
以下为观察者网翻译的文章全文。
本周，海牙国际仲裁法庭将公布菲律宾南海仲裁案结果。为了阻止中国将南海变成内水，菲律宾声称中国对九段线以内南海岛屿及浅滩的主权声张无国际法依据。仲裁法庭的判决结果并无悬念：它必定偏向于菲律宾一方。美国及其盟友已开始批评中国对仲裁案的态度，中国早已宣布不会接受仲裁结果，而中国一位官员上周业已表示，仲裁结果“不过是一张废纸”。
如果问中国是否应该听我们的话，或者相反，中国会不会学我们的做法，那就感觉太不“美国”了。不过我们假设有人很大胆地问了上述问题，首先他们将发现的是，从未有过任何一个联合国安理会常任理事国服从国际仲裁法庭有关海洋法的裁决。实际上，联合国安理会五常从未接受任何一项有损其主权或国家利益的国际法庭裁决结果。因此，如果中国拒绝接受南海仲裁案结果，它不过做了其他大国这几十年一直在做的事。
从菲律宾寻求上诉的那一天起，中国便论述称国际仲裁法庭无权受理该案，因为此事有关“主权”问题——海洋法公约明文禁止就此问题发起仲裁。当国际仲裁法庭驳回了中国的反对，后者便拒绝参与听证会并明确表示将无视仲裁法庭的判决结果。美国和其他国家批评了中国的这种姿态。但是，如果我们问问别的常任理事会在相同的情况下如何反应，得到的答案肯定不是我们想要的。
2013年，俄罗斯海军在靠近俄罗斯海岸线的水域扣押荷兰船只，荷兰将俄罗斯告上国际法庭。俄罗斯认为，法庭无权受理此案并拒绝出席听证会。同时，俄罗斯也无视了国际法庭要求释放荷兰船员的要求。当国际仲裁法庭判定俄罗斯违反海洋法，并要求俄罗斯支付荷兰赔偿金时，俄罗斯也拒绝了。
英国首相卡梅伦预料到了菲律宾南海仲裁案的结果，他声明道：“我们想鼓励中国成为守法世界的一部分。我们想鼓励所有人依法行事，服从判决。”不过他可能忘了，就在去年，国际仲裁法庭曾判决英国在扎格斯群岛（Chagos Islands）单方设立海洋保护区一事违反了海洋法。英国政府无视该判决，且扎格斯群岛的海洋保护区至今仍然存在。
美国从来没有就《海洋法公约》而遭到起诉，这是因为，与中国不同，华盛顿根本就没有批准这部国际法。因此，美国自然也就不受其束缚。相信在裁决案结果公布后，中国方面一定会强调这一点。
与南海仲裁最为相近的一个案例便是1980年代发生的尼加拉瓜诉美国的仲裁案。与中国一样，美方同样强调国际法庭对尼加拉瓜案没有管辖权。当国际法庭拒绝采纳美国立场时，美国不仅没有参加之后的庭审，而且还否决了其后国际法庭对所有涉美案件的裁判权，除非美国明确提出例外情况。如果中国照此办理，中国极有可能会彻底退出海洋法公约，和美国一道成为非缔约国。
在尼加拉瓜案中，当国际法庭支持尼加拉瓜主张并要求美国做出赔偿的时候，美国断然拒绝，并随后否决了六项要求执行判决的安理会决议。对国际法庭的性质，时任美国驻联合国代表的柯克帕特里克曾做过一个精妙的总结：“半合法、半司法、半政治性的实体，对于其决定，涉事国家有时接受，有时却又不接受。”
如果注意到联合国常任理事国的行事方式就可以知道，对于现实主义者而言，海牙国际海事法庭及其姊妹——国际刑事法庭都只是小国可以仰仗的手段。大国从来都不会承认这类法庭的司法权——除非大国认为，参与这类法庭对其较为有利。修昔底德（古希腊史学家——观察者网注）的名言“强者为所欲为，弱者委曲求全”或许有些夸大其词了，但仲裁庭终将感受到，中国作为一个大国，将会一如既往地按照大国的逻辑行事。
原文：
In ignoring an upcoming verdict on the South China Sea, Beijing is following well-established precedent by great powers.
Graham Allison, July 11, 2016
This week the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) will deliver its award in the Philippines’ case against China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. In a bid to thwart Beijing’s attempt to turn the South China Sea into its own virtual lake, Manila contends that China’s claim to exclusive sovereignty over all the islands and shoals within the nine-dashed line – which encompasses 86 percent of the Sea – has no basis in international law. There is not much suspense about what the tribunal will decide: it will almost certainly side with the Philippines. The United States and its allies have already started criticizing China for signaling in advance that it will ignore the court’s ruling, which one Chinese official derided last week as “nothing more than a piece of paper.”
It may seem un-American to ask whether China should do as we say, or, by contrast, as we do. But suppose someone were bold enough to pose that question. The first thing they would discover is that no permanent member of the UN Security Council has ever complied with a ruling by the PCA on an issue involving the Law of the Sea. In fact, none of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have ever accepted any international court’s ruling when (in their view) it infringed their sovereignty or national security interests. Thus, when China rejects the Court’s decision in this case, it will be doing just what the other great powers have repeatedly done for decades.
From the day the Philippines went to court, China has argued that the PCA has no legitimate jurisdiction on this issue since it concerns “sovereignty” – which the text of the Law of the Sea treaty explicitly prohibits tribunals from addressing. When the Court rejected China’s objection, Beijing refused to participate in its hearings and made it clear that it will ignore the PCA’s ruling. The United States and others have criticized Beijing for taking this stance. But again, if we ask how other permanent members of the Security Council have acted in similar circumstances, the answer will not be one we like.
When the Netherlands sued Russia after the latter’s navy boarded and detained the crew of a Dutch vessel in waters off of the Russian coast in 2013, Moscow asserted that the court had no jurisdiction in the matter and refused to participate in the hearings. It also ignored a tribunal’s order that the crew be released while the dispute was being resolved. After the PCA ruled that Russia had violated the Law of the Sea and ordered Moscow to pay the Netherlands compensation, Russia refused.
Anticipating the Court’s ruling in the case brought by the Philippines, UK Prime Minister David Cameron proclaimed: “We want to encourage China to be part of that rules-based world. We want to encourage everyone to abide by these adjudications.” Perhaps he had forgotten that just last year the PCA ruled that the UK had violated the Law of the Sea by unilaterally establishing a Marine Protected Area in the Chagos Islands. The British government disregarded the ruling, and the Marine Protected Area remains in place today.
The United States has never been sued under the Law of the Sea because – unlike China – Washington has not ratified the international agreement and is thus not bound by its rules. Expect Chinese commentators to emphasize this point in the mutual recriminations that will follow the Court’s announcement.
The closest analogue to the Philippines case involving the United States arose in the 1980s when Nicaragua sued Washington for mining its harbors. Like China, the United States argued that the International Court of Justice did not have the authority to hear Nicaragua’s case. When the court rejected that claim, the United States not only refused to participate in subsequent proceedings, but also denied the Court’s jurisdiction on any future case involving the United States, unless Washington explicitly made an exception and asked the Court to hear a case. If China followed that precedent, it could withdraw from the Law of the Sea Treaty altogether – joining the United States as one of the world’s only nations not party to the agreement.
In the Nicaragua case, when the Court found in favor of Nicaragua and ordered the United States to pay reparations, the U.S. refused, and vetoed six UN Security Council resolutions ordering it to comply with the court’s ruling. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick aptly summed up Washington’s view of the matter when she dismissed the court as a “semi-legal, semi-juridical, semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don’t.”
Observing what permanent members of the Security Council do, as opposed to what they say, it is hard to disagree with realist’s claim that the PCA and its siblings in The Hague – the International Courts of Justice and the International Criminal Court – are only for small powers. Great powers do not recognize the jurisdiction of these courts – except in particular cases where they believe it is in their interest to do so. Thucydides’ summary of the Melian mantra – “the strong do as they will; the weak suffer as they must” – may exaggerate. But this week, when the Court finds against China, expect Beijing to do as great powers have traditionally done.
Graham Allison is director of Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and author of the forthcoming book, “Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides’s Trap.”
