为什么英国注定要依赖中国？
参考消息 08.2018
英国《新欧洲人》周报网站8月10日发表题为《拿走控制权：为什么英国注定要依赖中国？》的文章，作者是英国历史学家、考古学家伊恩·莫里斯。作者指出，历史的马车向西跨越大西洋后，如今又向东方驶去。随着国际舞台不断扩大并向东方倾斜，英国是认识到北京才是关键的时候了。全文摘编如下：
大约2300年前，塞浦路斯人芝诺移居雅典，宣扬自己的一套哲学，他喜欢用简单的类比向追随者阐释生活。
他喜欢说，想象你是一只小狗，拴在马车后面。小狗有自由意志，于是，马车动起来后，你就能决定怎样做。你可以随着马车奔跑，享受其中，或许还能吃到坐车的人掉落的食物残渣；或者你可以朝不同的方向奔跑；还可以一动不动，在这种情况下，你会被拽着脖子拖行，甚至遭到碾压。
在芝诺看来，我们任何人都没有强大到可以忽视拖拽我们的巨大客观力量的地步，不过我们也并非弱小到别无选择。我们既不是听从命运的摆布，也不是命运的主宰。成功的秘诀在于观察马车朝哪个方向走，然后想办法最大限度地加以利用。
西方沉迷于一种错觉
自英伦三岛形成以来，英国人正是这样做的，也取得了不同程度的成功。大多数时候，英国人的舞台局限于西欧，历史的走向主要看他们在欧洲大陆有怎样的际遇。
罗马帝国让英国的舞台向地中海延伸，后又转向波罗的海，并得到极大的拓宽，不过在任何一个节点，都是由英国人自己来决定朝哪个方向奔跑、跑多快。这是最近500年来一切重大战略辩论的终极主题，也是21世纪还将继续的争论。
历史的马车在拖着小狗向西跨越大西洋后，如今又向东方驶去。2016年英国公投本来应该针对的问题不是如何对待布鲁塞尔，而是如何对待北京。
英国脱欧争论是一场灾难，因为脱欧派和留欧派白白浪费了关键的五年，在身份、流动性、繁荣、安全和主权等短期而肤浅的问题上争执不下，却鲜少谈及长期的地理问题。这个错误让两个阵营都沉迷于一种错觉，即欧洲仍在舞台上挑大梁。
历史的马车在向东走，芝诺的狗却跑错了方向。
中国是国际舞台关键
几乎在芝诺创立自己一套理论的同一时期，印度史诗《摩诃婆罗多》的作者们提出，国际关系遵循“鱼类生存法则”：干旱时期，大鱼吃小鱼。21世纪，整个世界都在合并。我们正在经历一场特大“干旱”。
观察人士说，如今的小鱼开始以防御姿态看待集团，各国政府得出的结论是，避免被大鱼吃掉的最好办法是让自己依附于另一条大鱼。
合并不是什么新鲜事。自1973年以来，欧洲这条大鱼一直在吃英国这条小鱼，美国自1916年以来也在做着同样的事情。它们只是不声不响而已。先前的大鱼——马人、撒克逊人、维京人、诺曼人——像大白鲨一样撕咬英国，20世纪的美国和欧洲则更像成群的小鱼。它们一点点蚕食英国的主权与身份，直到最后，对英国繁荣与安全更有发言权的不是伦敦，而是华盛顿和布鲁塞尔。2016年的公投争论完全聚焦于欧洲的蚕食对英国是好是坏，但是更应该问的是，相对于英国在脱离欧盟后会从中国那里得到的待遇而言，遭到欧洲蚕食的局面是好是坏。
和21世纪第一个10年期间的澳大利亚一样，21世纪20年代的英国可能会发现自己不得不在已有的美国这个安全伙伴与越来越强硬的中国这个经济伙伴之间作出选择。最极端的结果是，英国决定放弃与美国的联盟，转而把中国作为首要的安全伙伴。当年，英国迅速将宿敌法国和俄罗斯变为盟友，开始走上与美国建立长期伙伴关系的道路。只要前首相帕默斯顿的定律——英国的利益是恒久的，朋友则不然——依然具有说服力，那么断言未来30年不会出现类似的战略重组——中国成为英国的盟友，而美欧则成为对手——就显得过于草率。
民调结果显示，半数英国人预计苏格兰到2030年时会脱离英国。此外，北爱尔兰近半数人口如今支持与爱尔兰共和国统一。
对于苏格兰和爱尔兰、或许还有威尔士来说，攀附财力雄厚的欧盟也许是与英格兰这个更强大的邻居打交道的最明智方式。在遭到孤立与包围的情况下，英格兰人很可能在琢磨攀附中国是否是他们的最佳选项。听起来不怎么样，但是如果英格兰的活动空间持续被压缩，到本世纪中叶，这也许是剩下的各种糟糕战略中最好的选择了。
过去，英国人经常更看重身份、流动性、安全和主权，而不是繁荣，他们以后也许还会这样做。不管怎样，最重要的决定将在远离伦敦的地方做出。英国也许会双倍押注于建立已久的英美联盟，也有可能让自己成为美国、欧洲和中国之间新的交叉点。
第一步永远是面对真实出现的而不是我们希望看到的现实。在21世纪的这出戏中，每个演员都面临着同样的问题：芝诺的狗会怎么做？大历史没有给出预先准备好的答案，因为这不是历史的运行方式，但它的确迫使我们关注最鲜少提及的一个方面——地理的意义正在比以往更快地发生着改变。随着国际舞台不断扩大并向东方倾斜，是认识到北京而不是布鲁塞尔才是关键的时候了。
Take away control: Why Britain is destined to depend on China
https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/ian-morris-britain-is-destined-to-depend-on-china/
In spite of human rights and its ongoing threat to Taiwan, Brexit and concerns over the union could soon force us to align with the communist state
Image: The New European
Around 23 centuries ago a Cypriot named Zeno moved to Athens and set up shop as a philosopher. His followers came to be called Stoics, because they met in a shady, colonnaded stoa around Athens’s marketplace, where Zeno explained life to them in homely analogies.
Imagine, he liked to say, that you are a puppy, tied to the back of a cart. Puppies have free will – in abundance – so, when the cart starts moving, you are able to decide what to do. You can trot along with the cart, enjoying your run and perhaps catching scraps dropped by the people in it; or you can race off in a different direction; or you can refuse to move at all, in which case you’ll be dragged by the neck or even run over.
None of us, Zeno insisted, is strong enough to ignore the vast impersonal forces that pull us around – but neither are we so weak as to lack all choice. We are neither fate’s pawns nor its masters. The secret of success is seeing which way the cart is going and working out how to make the most of it.
Big history shows that geography is the key to working out what the cart is doing. We experience the cart’s movement through its impact on identity, mobility, prosperity, security and sovereignty, but if we want to understand what is actually happening, we need to dig down to the maps. Only by observing how technology and organisation determine the size of the stage we act on can we, as individuals or communities, identify the most important actors and find the most rewarding role for ourselves.
With varying degrees of success, this is what Britons have been doing for the entire 8,000 years since the Isles physically formed. For most of that time Britain’s stage was limited to western Europe and was dominated by actors off to the south and east. For people in what eventually became England, history was largely about dealing with what came their way from the continent; for those further north and west, it was about what came their way from England.
The stage was stretched towards the Mediterranean by Rome, reoriented towards the Baltic after the empire fell and then enlarged enormously after Columbus and Cabot escaped from the Hereford Map, but at every point it has been up to islanders themselves to work out which way to run, and ho fast. This is what the great strategic debates of the last half-millennium – over Catholicism, the balance of power, splendid isolation, imperial preference, the Atlantic alliance, the European Union – have all ultimately been about, and it is what arguments will continue to be about in the 21st century.
After pulling the puppy westwards across the Atlantic for more than a century, history’s cart is now heading east again. The question that should have been on the referendum in 2016 was not what to do about Brussels. It was what to do about Beijing.
What made the wrangling over Brexit such a disaster was that leavers and remainers consumed a crucial halfdecade in arguing over resolutely short-term, superficial issues of identity, mobility, prosperity, security and sovereignty, while leaving long-term geography least spoken of. That error allowed both camps to indulge in a shared delusion that Europe still filled the stage.
The political scientist Kerry Brown tells a revealing (or perhaps horrifying) story about giving a public lecture on Anglo-Chinese relations shortly before the 2016 vote. “The audience listened to news and analysis of the fundamental rearrangement of the power structures and realignment of geopolitical forces in the world they were living in with an almost preternatural calm,” he says, while just metres away “a debate on the UK and the EU in a neighbouring room nearly ended in a riot.” History’s cart was rolling eastwards, but Zeno’s dog was running the wrong way.
At roughly the same time that Zeno was theorising in Athens, the authors of the Indian epic the Mahabharata – living through an era when hundreds of separate city-states in the Ganges Valley were being consolidated into a few empires – proposed that international relations are governed by a “law of the fishes”: that in times of drought the big fish eat the little ones. In the 21st century the whole world is consolidating. We are living through a mega-drought.
Today’s little fish, a former deputy secretary-general of the United Nations observes, are “start[ing] to think in a defensive way about blocs”. The best way to avoid being eaten by one big fish, governments are concluding, is by attaching themselves to another (hopefully less threatening) big fish. Yet this is just the moment, he adds, that Britain has chosen to cast itself “adrift without a bloc”.
Consolidation is not a new story. A European fish has been eating Britain since 1973, and an American one since 1916. They have just been doing it quietly. Earlier big fish – Romans, Saxons, Vikings, Normans – tore into the Isles like Jaws, and Hitler or Stalin would have done much the same; but 20th-century Washington and Brussels acted more like shoals of minnows. Little by little, they nibbled away at British sovereignty and identity until governments in London had less say over the Isles’ prosperity and security (and, in Europe’s case, mobility) than their counterparts in Washington and Brussels. The 2016 debates focused obsessively on whether European nibbling was good or bad for Britain, but would have done better to ask whether it was good or bad relative to what a Britain outside the European Union would experience from China.
Some analysts, particularly American ones, infer from Beijing’s behaviour in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong that Jaws is again attacking. “If we bend the knee now,” Donald Trump’s secretary of defence said in 2020, “‘our children’s children may be at the mercy of the Chinese Communist party.” Other observers (particularly in China) insist that China barely even qualifies as a minnow. The real issue, says one financier, is that westerners are “so used to your supremacy. Your being treated nicely by everyone. It hurts to think, OK, now we have to be on an equal footing to other people.” Somewhere in the middle, and frankly much more convincing, is Kerry Brown’s measured assessment that “Chinese interests in the UK fall into three broad categories: investment, finance and intellectual partnership (the latter inclusive of technology and expertise)”.
The accountants are coming – but there will be no Chinese armada shooting its way up the Channel, no prime minister rallying the troops at Tilbury. China will be a nibbler, too. Nibbling with Chinese characteristics will in many ways look rather like the American and European versions, particularly as regards prosperity.
British incomes quadrupled in real terms between the first tranche of Marshall Plan aid in 1948 and voting to leave the European Union in 2016. Most economists expect Brexit to hurt prosperity (the Bank of England thinks the economy will be 3-4% smaller by 2030 than it would have been otherwise), but its champions counter that a nation freed from Brussels will reinvent itself as Global Britain. Rather than being “confined to the immediate European hinterland as we see the rise of new powers,” Boris Johnson suggests, “we should make a new approach to policymaking, as regards China”. The plan is that by turning into what critics mock as “Singapore-on-Thames” – a low-tariff, low-tax and low-regulation hub for global commerce – Britain will generate more than enough prosperity to offset the post-Brexit red ink.
Global Britain will very probably face fierce European competition for the same Chinese trade, and American antagonism to leaning eastwards, and even if it weathers these successfully, the consequences may not be to everyone’s liking. Not least, running to China seems certain to boost mobility, such a red line for Brexiteers. Some of the forces driving mobility are beyond Britain’s control: the World Bank expects 140 million climate refugees to flee Latin America, Africa and central and south Asia by 2050, with Britain one of their preferred destinations.
But becoming Global Britain will also require further, smaller flows of skilled, highly educated immigrants from trading partners. These have, in fact, already begun. European migration to Britain fell by three-quarters between the Brexit vote and the coronavirus outbreak in 2020, but non-European migration increased enough in this period to cancel it out. Most of the newcomers were Chinese, and most of these Chinese were students. British law limits their postgraduate residence to two years, but fully half say they hope to stay longer.
The students overwhelmingly settle in cities, chiefly London, and if Chinese business practices in other countries are any guide, tens of thousands of skilled professionals will follow in their footsteps. Some will end up in connected northern cities such as Manchester, and a few, perhaps, in less connected ones; but Singapore-on-Thames will surely widen the gaps between the south-east and everywhere else.
Global Britain also seems likely to revive the kind of anxieties about sovereignty that dogged George Osborne’s China policy in the early 2010s. Chinese diplomats regularly dismiss such concerns, arguing that its foreign policy is different from those of earlier great powers such as Britain and the US. While these 19th and 20th-century giants created unequal world-systems guaranteed by chains of military bases, China’s foreign policies are Confucian, and therefore non-coercive. However, calling a policy Confucian means no more than calling it Christian or Muslim. There is so much in the Bible, Qur’an and Confucian classics that these labels can cover almost any sin. Ancient and medieval Confucians had few qualms about using force for ends they deemed virtuous, and created profoundly hierarchical empires. It is hard to disagree with the strategist Robert Kaplan that, whatever its diplomats may say, in practice China is an “über-realist power”, pursuing advantage in ways that Palmerston would have recognised.
China has already shown what its influence might mean for the rule of law. In 2014 the Communist party devoted a plenary session of its Congress to the topic. In Washington or London any such event would have involved discussions of how law constrains government action, but in Beijing it focused on the law’s role in enforcing the party’s will – which Xi Jinping promptly extended into a call for “the rule of law in international relations”. It was perhaps this kind of law that China’s ambassador to London had in mind when he warned Britain in 2020 that “We want to be your friend […] but if you want to make China a hostile country, you will have to bear the consequences.” Being eaten by China may well compromise sovereignty much more than American and European nibbling did in the 20th century.
Then-PM David Cameron with Xi Jinping at the UK-China Business Summit in London, 2015. Photo: Leon Neal/Getty Images
Like Australia in the 2010s, Britain in the 2020s may find itself having to choose between its established American security partner and an increasingly assertive Chinese economic partner. The most extreme outcome would be a British decision to abandon the American alliance and make China its chief security partner. As of the early 2020s, this looks every bit as implausible as jumping ship from the US security system to the Soviet one did during the cold war – but if China succeeds in breaking or even just outflanking the Pacific counterscarp, the shock to Britain’s strategic assumptions will be as severe as anything since the rise of the German mountain of money in the late 19th century.
Back then, Britain quickly converted its arch-rivals, France and Russia, into allies and started down the path towards a long-lasting Anglo-American partnership. So long as Palmerston’s law – that Britain’s interests are eternal while its friends are not – retains any force, it will be rash to rule out a similar strategic reshuffle within the next 30 years, turning China into an ally and the US and European Union into rivals.
The biggest barrier to such a pivot might be identity. Shared history, culture and language bind Britain to the other English-speaking peoples, and the World Values Survey’s “culture map”, compiled from thousands of responses to opinion polls, puts Britain and China at opposite extremes. Despite China’s economic triumphs, its authoritarianism is just not very attractive overseas.
The Soft Power 30 index (which defines soft power as “the ability to achieve objectives through attraction and persuasion”) ranked China 27th in the world in 2019, with a score of 51.25 out of 100, dragged down by worries about its political system. Britain, by contrast, came in at No 2, with 79.47 points, having lost its No 1 spot to France, largely over the seemingly endless Brexit wrangling.
Efforts to project Chinese soft power in the west, such as the more than 500 Confucius Institutes established on university campuses, have had mixed results at best.
The British businessman Martin Sorrell once predicted that “Chinese and computer code are the only two languages the next generation should need”, but few Britons seem convinced, at least about the former.
Out of more than 270,000 students sitting A-level exams in 2018, only 3,334 took Mandarin. They slightly outnumbered the just over 3,000 takers for German, but Spanish and French each had twice as many students. Only one state school in 12 even offers Mandarin classes, but one in three independent schools does so – another sign, perhaps, of a prosperous, mobile, Sinophile and Europhile elite pulling away from everyone else, fragmenting current senses of British identity and opening spaces for alternatives.
British identity itself is, of course, a relatively recent invention that hardly existed before the 1707 Anglo-Scottish Acts of Union. Forging a sense of Britishness was crucial to the quest to close England’s back door, but as that strategic imperative faded across the 20th century, so too did the rationale for a shared insular identity.
Polls suggest that half of all Britons expect Scotland to leave the union by 2030, and almost half of Northern Ireland’s population now favours reunification with the Republic.
The geographical logic behind the Franco-Scottish Auld Alliance of 1295 and the Saxon-Pict-Scotti “Barbarian Conspiracy” of 367 has not gone away. For Scotland and Ireland, and perhaps Wales too, climbing on to the European Union’s mountain of money could be the most sensible way to deal with their bigger English neighbour. Isolated and encircled – if that is how things turn out – the English may well wonder whether climbing the Chinese mountain is their own best option, even at the cost of becoming what Kerry Brown calls “a new kind of tributary state, economically, and eventually politically ‘owned’ by China, undermining its own values, and driven purely by mercenary motives”. Unattractive as it sounds, this may be among the least bad strategies left by mid-century if England’s freedom of manoeuvre keeps contracting.
But, as so often, “if” is the operative word. There is more to life than money. Britons in the past regularly weighed identity, mobility, security and sovereignty more heavily than prosperity, and may yet do so again. And in any case, the most important decisions will be taken far from London.
Perhaps the US and EU will come together to contain China. Or perhaps the Europeans will join China to undermine American hegemony. Or, unlikely as it looks in the early 2020s, Americans and Chinese may divide the world between them, leaving Europe out in the cold.
Any number of intermediate positions are possible, each presenting its own opportunities and challenges. Britain might double down on its old American alliance, or offer itself as a new point of junction between American, European and Chinese circles.
Then again, it might be tempted by something like the “Fortress Britain” philosophy championed by Labour leftists in the 1970s (and again, some suspected, in the late 2010s). It could even return to the EU. After all, that is what England did in 1553, 19 years after its Englexit from the original European Union – before exiting again just five years later. There are always options, and if Britain’s 8,000-year history teaches anything, it is surely that the islanders in the past have risen to plenty of challenges bigger than this one.
The first step is always to face the facts as they are rather than as we would like them to be. Every actor in the 21st-century drama confronts the same question: what would Zeno’s dog do? Big history does not provide a pre-packaged answer, because that is not how history works, but it does force us to focus on the thing least spoken of – that the meanings of geography are changing faster than ever. As the global stage expands and tilts eastwards and the cart rolls across it, the time has come to recognise that Beijing, not Brussels, is the issue.
Distracted by the Brexit debate, Zeno’s dog has spent a critical half-decade running the wrong way. In 1910, another moment when wealth and power were moving rapidly from one part of the world to another, the American poet Ella Wheeler Wilcox sent a sharp message across the Atlantic: “England, awake! from dreams of what has been, Look on what is, and put the past away.” The map has changed since Wilcox’s day, but her point has not. Britain, awake. 2103 will be here sooner than you think.
Extracted from Geography Is Destiny: Britain and the World, a 10,000 Year History (Profile, £25) by Ian Morris, a British historian, archaeologist, and Willard Professor of Classics at Stanford University
See inside the China's increasing chokehold on Britain edition
When Britain voted to leave the European Union in 2016, the 48 percent who wanted to stay and the 52 percent who wanted to go each accused the other of stupidity, fraud, and treason. In reality, the Brexit debate merely reran a script written ten thousand years earlier, when the rising seas physically separated the British Isles from the European continent. Ever since, geography has been destiny—yet it is humans who get to decide what that destiny means.
Ian Morris, the critically acclaimed author of Why the West Rules—for Now, describes how technology and organization have steadily enlarged Britain’s arena, and how its people have tried to turn this to their advantage. For the first seventy-five hundred years, the British were never more than bit players at the western edge of a European stage, struggling to find a role among bigger, richer, and more sophisticated continental rivals. By 1500 CE, however, new kinds of ships and governments had turned the European stage into an Atlantic one; with the English Channel now functioning as a barrier, England transformed the British Isles into a United Kingdom that created a worldwide empire. Since 1900, thanks to rapid globalization, Britain has been overshadowed by American, European, and—increasingly—Chinese actors.
In trying to find its place in a global economy, Britain has been looking in all the wrong places. The ten-thousand-year story bracingly chronicled by Geography Is Destiny shows that the great question for the current century is not what to do about Brussels; it’s what to do about Beijing.
Sometime around 1750, English entrepreneurs unleashed the astounding energies of steam and coal, and the world was forever changed. The emergence of factories, railroads, and gunboats propelled the West's rise to power in the nineteenth century, and the development of computers and nuclear weapons in the twentieth century secured its global supremacy. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, many worry that the emerging economic power of China and India spells the end of the West as a superpower. In order to understand this possibility, we need to look back in time. Why has the West dominated the globe for the past two hundred years, and will its power last?
Describing the patterns of human history, the archaeologist and historian Ian Morris offers surprising new answers to both questions. It is not, he reveals, differences of race or culture, or even the strivings of great individuals, that explain Western dominance. It is the effects of geography on the everyday efforts of ordinary people as they deal with crises of resources, disease, migration, and climate. As geography and human ingenuity continue to interact, the world will change in astonishing ways, transforming Western rule in the process.
Deeply researched and brilliantly argued, Why the West Rules—for Now spans fifty thousand years of history and offers fresh insights on nearly every page. The book brings together the latest findings across disciplines—from ancient history to neuroscience—not only to explain why the West came to rule the world but also to predict what the future will bring in the next hundred years.
"War! . . . . / What is it good for? / Absolutely nothing," says the famous song—but archaeology, history, and biology show that war in fact has been good for something. Surprising as it sounds, war has made humanity safer and richer.
In War! What Is It Good For?, the renowned historian and archaeologist Ian Morris tells the gruesome, gripping story of fifteen thousand years of war, going beyond the battles and brutality to reveal what war has really done to and for the world. Stone Age people lived in small, feuding societies and stood a one-in-ten or even one-in-five chance of dying violently. In the twentieth century, by contrast—despite two world wars, Hiroshima, and the Holocaust—fewer than one person in a hundred died violently. The explanation: War, and war alone, has created bigger, more complex societies, ruled by governments that have stamped out internal violence. Strangely enough, killing has made the world safer, and the safety it has produced has allowed people to make the world richer too.
War has been history's greatest paradox, but this searching study of fifteen thousand years of violence suggests that the next half century is going to be the most dangerous of all time. If we can survive it, the age-old dream of ending war may yet come to pass. But, Morris argues, only if we understand what war has been good for can we know where it will take us next.
Most people in the world today think democracy and gender equality are good, and that violence and wealth inequality are bad. But most people who lived during the 10,000 years before the nineteenth century thought just the opposite. Drawing on archaeology, anthropology, biology, and history, Ian Morris explains why. Fundamental long-term changes in values, Morris argues, are driven by the most basic force of all: energy. Humans have found three main ways to get the energy they need—from foraging, farming, and fossil fuels. Each energy source sets strict limits on what kinds of societies can succeed, and each kind of society rewards specific values. But if our fossil-fuel world favors democratic, open societies, the ongoing revolution in energy capture means that our most cherished values are very likely to turn out not to be useful any more. Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels offers a compelling new argument about the evolution of human values, one that has far-reaching implications for how we understand the past—and for what might happen next. Originating as the Tanner Lectures delivered at Princeton University, the book includes challenging responses by classicist Richard Seaford, historian of China Jonathan Spence, philosopher Christine Korsgaard, and novelist Margaret Atwood.
In the past thirty years, there have been fierce debates over how civilizations develop and why the West became so powerful. The Measure of Civilization presents a brand-new way of investigating these questions and provides new tools for assessing the long-term growth of societies. Using a groundbreaking numerical index of social development that compares societies in different times and places, award-winning author Ian Morris sets forth a sweeping examination of Eastern and Western development across 15,000 years since the end of the last ice age. He offers surprising conclusions about when and why the West came to dominate the world and fresh perspectives for thinking about the twenty-first century.
Adapting the United Nations' approach for measuring human development, Morris's index breaks social development into four traits—energy capture per capita, organization, information technology, and war-making capacity—and he uses archaeological, historical, and current government data to quantify patterns. Morris reveals that for 90 percent of the time since the last ice age, the world's most advanced region has been at the western end of Eurasia, but contrary to what many historians once believed, there were roughly 1,200 years—from about 550 to 1750 CE—when an East Asian region was more advanced. Only in the late eighteenth century CE, when northwest Europeans tapped into the energy trapped in fossil fuels, did the West leap ahead.
Resolving some of the biggest debates in global history, The Measure of Civilization puts forth innovative tools for determining past, present, and future economic and social trends.
Die meisten Menschen heutzutage halten Demokratie und Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter für eine gute Sache und sprechen sich gegen Gewalt und Ungleichheit aus. Aber bevor sich solche Auffassungen und die damit verbundenen Wertvorstellungen allmählich im 19. Jahrhundert herausbildeten, galten 10000 Jahre lang genau gegenteilige grundsätzliche Annahmen und andere Werte. Woran liegt das? An unseren Energiequellen, sagt Ian Morris in seinem neuen großen Wurf, diese formen unsere Gesellschaft wie nichts sonst. Was kommt auf die Menschheit nach dem Ende der fossilen Ära zu? In seiner Bedeutung vergleichen führende Historiker »Beute, Ernte, Öl« mit Jared Diamonds »Kollaps« und Steven Pinkers »Gewalt«.
