Introduction
Author Tobias Bunde 
Author Sophie Eisentraut
2. Russia and China promote a version of the international order in which the interests of autocratic leaders take precedence over liberal-democratic values. Liberal democracies are slowly waking up to the challenge.
3. The defenders of the liberal vision can push back effectively if they recognize the fundamental nature of the revisionist challenge and swiftly reinvigorate their own vision of a desirable international order.
4.To be successful, these defenders need to do more than just nurture the global coalition of liberal democracies. They must also build a larger coalition willing to actively defend the key principles of the liberal order. This demands paying due respect to the legitimate resentment that many countries of the “Global South” have toward the existing order. Simply defending the status quo will not do the trick. They need to re-envision it.
On February 24, 2022, Russia not only launched a war against Ukraine; with its brutal and unprovoked invasion of a sovereign state, it also mounted an attack against the foundational principles of the post–World War II order.[1]
"This battle is not only for the territory – for this or another part of Europe. This battle is not only for life, freedom, and security of Ukrainians or any other nation, which Russia attempts to conquer. This struggle will define in what world our children and grandchildren will live and then their children and grandchildren."
Volodymyr Zelensky•Ukrainian President, US Congress, December 22, 2022
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians have been killed, millions have been forced to flee their homes, and war damages have run into the hundreds of billions of euros.[2] Russia’s revisionist war has cost innocent lives throughout Ukraine’s territory – from the Donbas to the Western oblasts (Figure 1.1). While there are innocent victims in every war, Russia’s aggression is extraordinarily brutal. War crimes are not just a byproduct of the war, but an essential feature of Russian warfare in Ukraine. In clear violation of humanitarian law, the Russian military continues to attack not just military targets, but often aims at civilian infrastructure to increase human suffering and break the Ukrainian resistance. Countless cases of sexual violence committed by Russian soldiers and mercenaries are documented, and Russian authorities have abducted thousands of Ukrainian children.[3] On Russian TV shows, analysts casually fantasize about nuclear escalation or call for ever more punishment against Russia’s neighboring country.[4] Compassion with Ukrainians seems almost completely absent in Russian society.[5] With the ruthlessness of its aims and the brutality of its means, this Russian war evokes memories of the worst episodes in European history.
Debates about different visions for the future international order and its guiding principles – at the Munich Security Conference or elsewhere – are often abstract and theoretical. But the plight of the Ukrainians demonstrates that the clash of different visions can become a matter of life and death. Even for many people not directly affected, the Russian invasion represents what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called a Zeitenwende, a watershed.[6] In all countries polled for the Munich Security Index, except for Japan, majorities see the Russian invasion as a turning point in world politics (Figure 1.2). But where is world politics turning?
"We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order."
Joseph Biden•US President, Preface to the US National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022
The Revisionist Moment: Russia and China and Their Autocratic Vision
Russian President Vladimir Putin has long complained about a world order ostensibly dominated by the West – especially by the United States.[7] For him, the war represents “the beginning of a radical breakdown of the US-style world order [and] the transition from liberal-globalist American egocentrism to a truly multipolar world.”[8] A Russian victory in Ukraine, and the failure of the West to prevent it, would be “a potent symbol of a new post-Western era, the collapse of the old order and the rise of a new, authoritarian-friendly multipolarity.”[9]
"The current developments in the world are not so much about Ukraine as about attempts to shape a new international order."
Sergey Lavrov•Russian Foreign Minister, MGIMO University, March 23, 2022
Putin’s war would have been less likely if this vision were not supported by a much more powerful revisionist, who shares the Russian leader’s core grievances with the liberal thrust of the international order and his desire for a sphere of influence: Chinese President Xi Jinping. Just a few weeks before Moscow invaded Ukraine, Putin and Xi issued a joint statement about the beginning of a “new era,” characterized by much deeper Chinese–Russian cooperation. According to the statement, both countries share a friendship “without limits,” which includes “strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests.”[10] In this spirit, Beijing has not only refused to condemn Russia’s war of aggression; Chinese media has also amplified Russian war propaganda, blaming NATO for the start of the war and “shrouding the Russian regime’s culpability.”[11] It may be true that Beijing has also been careful not to associate itself too closely with Russia’s war on Ukraine. At times, it has even distanced itself from Moscow and publicly condemned Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.[12] But given the close coordination of the world’s most powerful autocrats in response to the war in Ukraine, it is difficult not to see the Russian invasion through the lens of a broader contest between different visions for the international order.
"I think [the Russia-China joint statement] is the culmination of a long-standing campaign. It’s an act of defiance. It’s a clear revisionist manifesto. It’s a manifesto to review the world order."
Josep Borrell•EU High Representative, Munich Security Conference, February 20, 2022
Chinese–Russian collaboration to subvert and reshape elements of the inter- national order are hardly a new phenomenon. For many years, both countries, with China in the driver’s seat, have been trying to bring about an order that favors non-democratic forms of governance and the narratives and interests of autocrats in the international system – a world, in short, “where liberal values carry no merit or moral freight in their own right.”[13] To this end, Moscow and Beijing have often coordinated their votes at the United Nations. In the realm of human rights, which has recently seen Beijing prevent the discussion of a UN report documenting massive human rights violations committed against Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, this joint effort has been particularly obvious (Chapter 2). But efforts to push back against liberal rules and principles and replace them with autocratic ones has also been evident in many other realms of the international system (Chapters 3 and 4).
Yet none of their efforts to revise existing elements of the post–World War II order have been as fundamental and brazen as Russia’s attack against the principles of non-aggression and territorial integrity. Putin has left no doubt that in his attempt to reestablish the Russian empire, he no longer feels bound by even the minimum standards of international law. Instead, he seeks to replace them with 19th-century principles of unconstrained power politics that allow big countries to carve out regional spheres of influence, irrespective of the wishes of local populations.[14]
"External attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time. […] We must […] be more mindful of potential dangers, be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios, and be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters, and even dangerous storms."
Xi Jinping•Chinese President, 20th Party Congress, October 16, 2022
Just as Moscow seeks to dominate Russia’s “near abroad,” Beijing has tried to assert its sphere of influence in East Asia, often by selectively interpreting international law. Although it promised a “one country, two systems” model for Hong Kong, China introduced a national security law in 2020 that has effectively reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy.[15] Beijing has also doubled down on its policies in the South China Sea, fortifying its artificial islands, pushing more ambitious territorial claims, and intimidating its neighbors.[16] It has refused to accept the 2016 ruling of the Arbitration Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration case, which rejected China’s expansive maritime claims.[17] Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese government has intensified the pursuit of unification with Taiwan.[18] While Xi stressed that China would continue to seek a peaceful solution, he also warned that China would “never promise to renounce the use of force” and “reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.”[19] In the past year, Beijing massively stepped up its military intimidation of Taipei, including via repeated incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (Figure 1.3) and increased military activities in the Taiwan Strait.[20] This Chinese belligerence has provoked a significant rise in the perceived risk of China invading Taiwan among the respondents surveyed for the Munich Security Index.[21] Some analysts fear that Chinese leadership might adopt a more hawkish foreign policy to distract from looming economic woes. Together with the consolidation of Xi’s power, with fewer checks and balances, and his “securitization of everything,”[22] this could prove a toxic cocktail. Russia’s war against Ukraine is “the 21st century’s first imperial war,”[23] but it may not be the last.
"I myself have a strong sense of urgency that ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow."
Fumio Kishida•Japanese Prime Minister, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, September 21, 2022
Although Chinese and Russian aspirations are clearly at odds with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, both countries like to portray themselves as defenders of the UN Charter. Aware that their attempted authoritarian overhaul of the international system requires support in the “Global South,” Russia and China purport to envision a multipolar world that grants greater say to other centers of power beyond the traditional West.
Yet Sino-Russian revisionism is now facing resistance. China’s assertive policies are already producing a backlash that is undermining Beijing’s global ambitions.[24] Moreover, the humiliating setbacks that Ukrainian forces have inflicted on the Russian offensive, together with international sanctions, have weakened Russia’s military and economy while also dealing a blow to the image of competent authoritarian rule.[25] Recent protests in China – and also in Iran – suggest that “the inevitable overreach by societies who try to control human beings is ultimately not sustainable.”[26] Moreover, evidence is mounting that there are more limits to the supposed “no limits” partnership than Beijing and Moscow would like to admit. It is thus far from clear whether authoritarian great powers will emerge stronger from the war in Ukraine. But even if they don’t, there is no room for complacency. The past year provided ample evidence on how enormously disruptive and destructive authoritarian revisionism has become.
"Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years."
Antony Blinken•US Secretary of State, George Washington University, May 26, 2022
Acquiescence in Revisionism: The Order Going South
Notwithstanding unequivocal violations of the UN Charter, many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have proven unwilling to speak up against Russia’s brutal attack and isolate Moscow economically and diplomatically. Often called “fence-sitters,” the new “non-aligned,” or “hedging middle,” a significant number of states have refused to take sides in the war against Ukraine.[27] In fact, while the overwhelming majority of countries condemned Russia’s invasion (141 countries) and the attempted annexation of additional parts of Ukraine (143 countries) in votes at the UN General Assembly in March and October (Figure 1.4), those that abstained or voted against the condemnation – among them large and influential countries such as India and South Africa – are home to almost 50 percent of the global population.[28]
"Russia’s war marks a new reality. It requires each and every one of us to take a firm and responsible decision, and to take a side."
Annalena Baerbock •German Foreign Minister, Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, March 1, 2022
Given the massive ripple effects of Russia’s war, especially for poorer countries, it is hardly surprising that material support for Ukraine has only come from the world’s rich democracies and that few other countries have introduced sanctions against Russia. In fact, not a single state from Africa or Latin America is part of the loose coalition that has imposed sanctions on Russia.[29] But many politicians in the West were bothered by
a perceived lack of empathy for Ukraine, the reluctance to take a stand against the violation of key norms and principles, and the fact that some governments even exploited Russia’s war to advance their countries’ economic interests. From the dominant Western perspective, many countries in the “Global South” were wittingly or unwittingly complicit in Russian efforts to weaken international norms.[30] Disappointment with the way Brazil, South Africa, and India – and the “Global South” more broadly – have responded to the Russian invasion is also evident in the results of the Munich Security Index (Figure 1.5).
Yet it would be too simplistic to conclude that the “Global South” has turned against the existing order. There are many examples of countries from the “Global South” that spoke up against Russia’s attack of key principles of the post–World War II order. Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN Martin Kimani launched a passionate defense of the norm against territorial conquest, while the Permanent Representative of Fiji to the UN Satyendra Prasad strongly criticized Russia’s invasion as a clear violation of the UN Charter.[31] Moreover, almost every Pacific Island state voted in favor of the March 2 resolution.[32] For these and other small countries, the end of their legal guarantee of territorial integrity would be particularly worrisome.
Even among the countries unwilling to unambiguously side with Ukraine, there are stark differences, with each state possessing “its own unique set of interests, concerns, and objectives” with regard to Russia and the broader international order.[33] These may include the desire to stay on the sidelines of growing geopolitical rivalry; a perception of the war as a conflict exclusively between Europeans over European security; and vulnerability to Russian coercion that comes with dependence on Moscow.[34] They may also include a preoccupation with what governments regard as more proximate threats, including food insecurity. In fact, the repercussions of Russia’s war, such as rising prices for food and energy, have disproportionately harmed countries from the “Global South” – a fact that Western states did not take seriously enough at first.[35] At the same time, other influential states such as India, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia are quite actively hedging their bets in the current geopolitical standoff – both when it comes to Ukraine but also on many other policy issues.[36] Rather than being guided by deep feelings about the international order, their responses to the war in Ukraine and their stances in the broader international contest over the international order seem to be guided by much more pragmatic reasoning.[37]
"Russia’s attack on Ukraine [...] is a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter. It is bad for every country, but especially for small states like Singapore. Our security, our very existence, depend on the international rule of law."
Lee Hsien Loong •Singaporean Prime Minister, May Day Rally, May 1, 2022
Yet frustrations about the existing order abound in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It would be far too easy to trivialize these resentments as irrelevant to states’ responses to the war in Ukraine – or as insignificant to their behavior in other arenas of the global order contest. Many of these countries “have steadily lost faith in the legitimacy and fairness of the international system,”[38] which has neither granted them an appropriate voice in global affairs, nor sufficiently addressed their core concerns. Most recently, this has included too little help with rising food prices, access to energy, the acquisition of Covid-19 vaccines, mounting sovereign debt, and the consequences of the climate crisis (Chapters 4 and 5).
To many states, these failures are deeply tied to the West. They find that the Western-led order has been characterized by postcolonial domination, double standards, and neglect for developing countries’ concerns, rather than by liberal principles and true multilateralism.[39] Thus in many parts of the world, the concept of a “multipolar” or “post-Western” order does not need much advertising. The West’s immediate response to the war in Ukraine certainly did not help. Rather than assisting countries in tackling spiking food and energy prices, the West reprimanded them for not showing enough solidarity with Kiev. For countries that have experienced the West as a fence-sitter to the devastating wars and conflicts in their own regions, many of them much more deadly than the war in Ukraine, the request not to stay neutral in a European war certainly rung hollow. While G7 countries have pledged to address the detrimental global consequences of the war, for some analysts, the West’s initial messaging on Ukraine “has taken its tone-deafness to a whole new level.”[40]
"Europe has to get out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems."
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar •Indian Foreign Minister, Globsec 2022 Bratislava Forum, June 3, 2022
Yet as revealed in the Munich Security Index, dissatisfaction with the West in key countries in the “Global South” does not translate into a desire to see China and Russia exercise more influence over the future international order. Respondents in India, Brazil, and South Africa mostly want a greater role for developing nations when it comes to shaping international rules. But when asked to rate the attractiveness of rules made by Russia and China as opposed to rules made by the US and Europe (Figure 1.6), their choices were surprisingly clear. Alienation from the existing international order and its main guardians does not seem to equate to general support for autocratic revisionism.
Call to Order? The Defenders of the Liberal-Democratic Vision
From the perspective of the world’s liberal democracies, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call to defend the principles of the liberal, rules- based international order against autocratic challengers. After the end of the Cold War, they believed that the liberal vision based on the triad of human rights, liberal democracy, and market economy had triumphed and would conquer the whole globe over time. But despite its undeniable achievements, key elements of this liberal vision have lost both domestic and international support.[41] The storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, has been the most dramatic symbol of the erosion of liberal-democratic norms, which threatens not only the stability of liberal democracies, but also the liberal international order. The fact that the liberal-democratic model is increasingly contested in some Western democracies has undeniably encouraged revisionist powers to promote their alternative vision much more assertively.
Yet the past year has – for all its horrendous developments – also demonstrated that liberal ideas can still inspire. With their extraordinary resilience and determination (Spotlight Ukraine), the Ukrainian people have galvanized international support for their country’s struggle against the aggressor. In the eyes of the world, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy turned out to be the inspiring democratic hero standing up to the autocratic villain in Moscow – “a metaphor-in-miniature for the worldwide, slow-motion wrestle between the forces of democracy and autocracy.”[42]
"With unimaginable courage and determination, the Ukrainian people are putting their lives on the line for democracy – not only for their own nation but for democracy writ large for the world. […] The Ukrainian people are making the fight for all of us. We must help them."
Nancy Pelosi•then–Speaker of the US House of Representatives, floor speech on the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, April 28, 2022
Russia’s aggression and Ukraine’s response have also instilled a new sense
of purpose into democratic alliances such as the G7, NATO, and the EU, overcoming feelings of “Westlessness” and “helplessness” that had worried observers in previous years.[43] Speaking in Warsaw in March 2022, US President Joseph Biden summarized a widely shared perception: “Russia has managed to cause something I’m sure [Putin] never intended: the democracies of the world are revitalized with purpose and unity found in months that we’d once taken years to accomplish.”[44] Against this backdrop, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock spoke of a “transatlantic moment” – a sentiment shared at many MSC events during the past year that led to the “Transatlantic To-Do List.”[45] But as this renewed sense of purpose extends beyond the transatlantic area, the war on Ukraine has strengthened the idea of values-based cooperation between liberal democracies on a global scale. Some again refer to the “free world” or the “Global West,” made up of “rich liberal democracies with strong security ties to the US” and “defined more by ideas than actual geography.”[46] While a significant majority of governments around the world have condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is this group of like-minded democracies that has helped Ukraine persevere – politically, economically, and militarily.
"Today the victim is Ukraine. Tomorrow it could be any one of us […]. The vision of a world in which only naked power wins is not only wrong and immoral but can lead to a conflagration engulfing the entire world."
Andrzej Duda•Polish President, UN General Assembly, September 20, 2022
Contravening Russia’s imperial fantasies, EU leaders have made clear that they envision a European future for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and have granted the former two the status of candidate countries.[47] In addition, the EU has imposed a series of unprecedented sanctions on Moscow, financed arms supplies for Ukraine, and launched a training mission for the Ukrainian armed forces. While NATO allies have made clear that they will not engage their own forces, to avoid a broader NATO–Russia war, they have upped their individual and collective support. Although critics believe that they should do more, the degree of Western support is unprecedented, and has certainly exceeded expectations in Moscow.
Since they see Russia’s war as a broader assault on the European order and the international rule of law, people in the West have not only changed their views on Ukraine, but also reevaluated their security environment in general. As new data from the Munich Security Index shows, differences in views on Russia, which were considerable before the invasion, have sharply
declined or even disappeared. While respondents in all G7 countries are now more willing to oppose Russia economically and militarily, the shifts in France, Germany, and Italy have been the most dramatic (Figure 1.7). It seems as if Russia’s blunt war of aggression has finally driven home the message that revisionists must be confronted – even in those societies that had long ignored the writing on the wall.[48]
At its 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO issued its new Strategic Concept, which refers to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”[49] NATO members also announced more forward-deployed combat formations and pre-positioned equipment on the Eastern flank, and the aim to increase high-readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000 troops. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, “this constitutes the biggest overhaul of our collective deterrence and defense since the Cold War.”[50] On a national level, many governments have reexamined their respective strategic postures. Sweden and Finland decided to abandon their traditional non-aligned policy and have applied to join NATO. Countries such as Poland, which have long warned about Russian revisionism, are doubling down on defense investments and buying more heavy equipment.[51] Germany, where Zeitenwende was chosen as the “word of the year,” has decided to raise defense spending, make many overdue investments, and discard some of its traditional foreign policy beliefs that turned out to be outdated.[52] While Berlin is working on a new national security strategy, Japan – another influential power often accused of punching below its weight – has already published a new one. Tokyo not only announced that it would double its defense spending, aiming to reach two percent of its GDP by 2027, but also embraced a controversial “counterstrike capability” to hit back against a potential aggressor.[53] All these developments are bad news for autocratic revisionists, who had banked on the passivity and indecisiveness of liberal democratic governments.
"These are tough times for many. But the price we pay as NATO Allies is measured in money. While the Ukrainians, they pay a price which is measured in blood. And if we allow Putin to win, all of us will have to pay a much higher price. Authoritarian regimes around the world will learn that they can get what they want with brute force."
Jens Stoltenberg•NATO Secretary General, 68th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 21, 2022
Russia’s war on Ukraine has also served as a catalyst for rethinking the Western approach to China, which had already begun to shift in recent years.[54] In the long run, Beijing is clearly seen as a far more powerful and ambitious revisionist challenger to the international order than Moscow, and public opinion on China has changed considerably. Yet concern among the G7 countries is less pronounced, and views on how to deal with China are far less coherent than with respect to Russia (Figure 1.8). Whereas some fear that a China policy that is too confrontational will render a new Cold War almost inevitable, others worry that the world’s democracies are not heeding the lessons learned from Russia’s war, risking another, potentially more dramatic, policy failure.[55]
While the world’s liberal democracies are slowly awakening to the challenges posed by autocratic revisionists and have taken the first important steps to pushing back against these states’ subversive efforts, the much bigger task still lies ahead: swiftly conceiving a positive vision for a desirable international order and developing a compelling strategy for it to succeed in the ongoing contest for the order.
Global Divisions: Framing the Debate
One of the few things that world leaders can agree on is that the world is entering what the new US National Security Strategy calls a “decisive decade” for the future shape of the international order. Notions such as Zeitenwende, “historical crossroads,” or “inflection point” are omnipresent.[56] While material power will matter, this struggle is also, and perhaps foremost, about competing visions.
"We are at a crossroads. We are in for probably the most dangerous, unpredictable and at the same time most important decade since the end of World War II."
Vladimir Putin•Russian President, Valdai Discussion Club, October 27, 2022
"We are living through a watershed era. And that means that the world afterwards will no longer be the same as the world before. The issue at the heart of this is whether power is allowed to prevail over the law. Whether we permit Putin to turn back the clock to the nineteenth century and the age of the great powers. Or whether we have it in us to keep warmongers like Putin in check."
Olaf Scholz•German Chancellor, German Bundestag, February 27, 2022
Leaders have tried to frame this contest for the international order using different dichotomies: democracies versus autocracies, rich versus poor, West versus the rest, or those that support the rules-based order versus those that do not. As data from the Munich Security Index shows, these framings resonate to different degrees, but none dominates the perceptions of the respondents in the 12 countries polled (Figure 1.9). As the chapters in this report show in more detail, there remain different cleavages, depending on the topic.
Still, looking at the big picture, the systemic competition between liberal- democratic and autocratic visions and their respective proponents has become increasingly central to the contest for the international order. While the revisionists have tried to describe the ongoing struggle as a competition between the West and the rest, even respondents in China, Brazil, India, and South Africa do not see this as a major geopolitical fault line today (Figure 1.9). Instead, many democratic leaders have described the current struggle as a competition between democracies and autocracies.[57] This framing captures a significant part of the ongoing contest and resonates comparatively well, with between a quarter and a third of the respondents seeing it as the dominant fault line in global politics today. Indeed, it is hard to deny that the most worrisome attacks against the post-1945 order come from “powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy,” as the US National Security Strategy puts it.[58] Conversely, democracies remain the key supporters of the liberal, rules-based order. As UN voting data shows, there is a clear link between regime type and voting patterns regarding key international norms (Figure 1.10). And without the support of the liberal democracies of the world, Ukraine would not have been able to withstand Russian aggression.
However, the relevance of the regime-type fault line clearly varies across policy fields, as the chapters in this report demonstrate. Issues such as human rights (Chapter 2) or the governance of global infrastructures (Chapter 3) and development (Chapter 4), which are intimately tied to the liberal core of the rules-based order, are much more prone to provoking splits between a democratic and an autocratic vision of order (Figure 1.10). But thinking only in terms of democracies versus autocracies risks brushing over the fact that the contest between authoritarian and democratic visions “is being waged within states as much as between them.”[59] Most importantly, however, it risks missing other relevant dynamics in the global order contest and hampering global collective action in important respects.[60] On trade (Chapter 3), energy (Chapter 5), or nuclear weapons (Chapter 6), for example, the constellation of state interests is more complex. Moreover, to solve many of the world’s global problems, particularly climate change and global health crises, democracies need the support of non-democratic states.[61] Even the new US National Security Strategy, built on the democracy–autocracy dichotomy, acknowledges that while cooperation among democracies is key, the United States will “work with any country that supports a rules-based order.”[62]
"Some would have us believe that there is the West on one side that will defend outmoded values to serve its interests and on the other side, the rest of the world that has suffered so much and seeks to cooperate by supporting the war or by looking the other way. I object to this division […]."
Emmanuel Macron•French President, UN General Assembly, September 20, 2022
Some have thus argued that the real division runs “between those who adhere to a rules-based international order and those who adhere to no law at all but the law of the strongest.”[63] States that might not like the liberal thrust of many international rules still have a strong interest in preserving an order where countries generally feel bound by international law. In other words, “countries do not have to be democracies to join forces in countering Russia’s aggression.”[64] Singapore, for instance, is not a democracy, but is among those countries that have not only condemned Russia’s aggression, but also imposed targeted sanctions as a response. The revisionists, though, have long tried to discredit the concept of a rules-based order as a Western invention, too. For Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, selectively applied “rules” are a Western “counterweight to the universal principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter.”[65] Adding insult to injury, Russia, together with China, even co-founded the “Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations.”[66] But while it is difficult to imagine a more flagrant violation of the Charter than Russia’s attempt to forcibly annex part of another country, the autocratic revisionists’ attempts to question the West’s commitment to the international rule of law fall on fertile ground in some parts of the world where leading Western nations have not always played by these rules.
Visions in Order
The combination of authoritarian efforts to subvert the global order and the widespread reluctance to confront this type of revisionism in many parts of the “Global South” is an urgent call to action for all those who seek to preserve an international order based on rules that apply to and are respected by all states. In fact, in all the countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index, 50 percent or more of the respondents stated that they still see a need for international rules that apply to all states equally. What is thus urgently needed is a reinvigorated vision of the liberal, rules-based international order that ensures that existing international rules and principles are attractive to a much broader global constituency. With the exception of Germany, where 63 percent of respondents agree that international politics need to be governed by universal rules and principles, agreement is stronger among the respondents from China (63 percent), India (61 percent), South Africa (61 percent), and Brazil (57 percent) than among the respondents from all the G7 countries (54 percent on average). At the same time, Chinese respondents’ strong support for the idea that international politics should be based on rules that apply to all countries equally suggests that the rules respondents have in mind might not be the same in all the societies surveyed.
"This is the time to invest in the power of democracies. This work begins with the core group of our like-minded partners: our friends in every single democratic nation on this globe. We see the world with the same eyes. And we should mobilize our collective power to shape global goods."
Ursula von der Leyen•President of the European Commission, 2022 State of the Union Address, September 14, 2022
First, they need to recognize the autocratic challenge for what it is: the attempt to fundamentally transform the international order. For too long, many have underestimated this challenge and thus allowed autocratic revisionists to slowly but surely push the boundaries of the order. Russia’s war against Ukraine should be a wake-up call, as it foreshadows the order that autocratic revisionists have in mind. It is a reminder of the benefits of a liberal vision based on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – and should motivate the necessary resistance to this alternative vision.
Second, liberal democracies need to nurture a strong global community of like-minded states. Given the eroding consensus in many democracies on the liberal-internationalist policies that informed the “liberal order building”[67] after World War II, building domestic support for a new “grand strategy of democratic solidarity”[68] is of paramount importance. To this end, liberal democracies need to refine their own visions of a desirable order and make clear what they want to achieve – not just what they want to avoid. In contrast to China, which is very confident in its own vision for the international order, in France, Germany, and Italy, the three EU countries polled for the Munich Security Index, only 15 percent believe that the EU has a very clear vision of how it would like the international order to be run, while 25 percent believe it has no vision at all (Figure 1.11).
Third, liberal democracies need to build a larger coalition of states beyond the liberal-democratic core. While strengthening values-based cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies is necessary, it is clearly not sufficient. For too long, democracies have overestimated the attractiveness of the liberal, rules-based international order. The wake-up call provided by Russia’s war and the diffidence of many countries from the “Global South” has roused them from their complacency, reminding them that the international order, just like democracy itself, is in constant need of renewal.[69] Given the grievances and widespread perception of exclusion among many states of the world, merely defending the status quo will not be enough. While the international order needs no revision, it is clearly in need of reform. To win the hearts and minds of “not yet aligned” governments and societies, liberal democracies need to re-envision the order as one that better represents the many countries that have hitherto been confined to the role of rule-takers, as one that better delivers on its promises, and as one that truly benefits everyone equally.
"To stand against global politics of fear and coercion; to defend the sovereign rights of smaller nations as equal to those of larger ones; to embrace basic principles like freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and arms control — no matter what else we may disagree on, that is the common ground upon which we must stand."
Joseph Biden•US President, UN General Assembly, September 21, 2022
As such, this moment of crisis for the liberal international order might also be its greatest chance for renewal. If its proponents succeed in enlarging the coalition of committed stakeholders, the revisionist moment will remain just that – a moment confined to history rather than the birth of an authoritarian international order. And President Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people will have played a big part in this achievement.
Re:vision – Munich Security Report 2023
Bibliographical Information: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte, Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly, “Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.
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Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Re:vision,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Natalie Knapp/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, 13−37, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.
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- [1] Moscow’s war is “among the most – if not the most – significant shocks to the global order since World War II.” See Ingrid Brunk and Monica Hakimi, “Russia, Ukraine, and the Future World Order,” American Journal of International Law 116:4 (2022), 687–697, doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2022.69, 688.
- [2] Maryam Zakir-Hussain, “The Human Cost of Putin’s War: 200,000 Soldiers and 40,000 Civilians Killed in Ukraine,” The Independent, November 10, 2022, perma.cc/LVB5-SD9V; UNHCR, “Ukraine Refugee Situation,” Geneva: UNHCR, January 3, 2023, perma.cc/Z8HX-T3B8; Dan Bilefsky and Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Ukraine’s Prime Minister Says Rebuilding Will Cost 0 Billion,” The New York Times, July 5, 2022, perma.cc/TMQ9-JAFN. At the end of November 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that the damage suffered by Ukraine was estimated at 600 billion euros. See Ursula von der Leyen, “Statement by President von der Leyen on Russian Accountability and the Use of Russian Frozen Assets,” Brussels, November 30, 2022, perma.cc/77EP-37R7.
- [3] Sofia Sereda, “War Crimes Are Part of Russia’s War Culture, Says Ukrainian Nobel Peace Prize Winner,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 24, 2022, perma.cc/6PVH-K585; Julia Friedrich and Niklas Masuhr, “Why Is Russia Being so Brutal in Ukraine?,” Political Violence at a Glance, May 23, 2022, perma.cc/8ZBT-DVP6; AP, Frontline, and PBS, “War Crimes Watch Ukraine,” perma.cc/XBL4-N5ZR; Emma Bubola, “Using Adoptions, Russia Turns Ukrainian Children Into Spoils of War,” The New York Times, October 22, 2022, perma.cc/TPH5-Y4KY.
- [4] Simon Childs, “‘A Circus Show’: Why Russian State TV Keeps Threatening to Nuke Everything,” Vice World News, May 10, 2022, perma.cc/QUG9-GQMS; Justin Ling, “Russia Is Ramping Up Nuclear War Propaganda,” Wired, November 4, 2022, perma .cc/AZ8H-D99Q.
- [5] On the lack of compassion see the interview with Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, who says that “just 1.5 to 2 percent of respondents” in his polls show compassion: “And only an average of 10 percent of the population feels guilt and shows empathy – Russian society is amoral.” Christina Hebel, “Interview With Opinion Researcher Lev Gudkov: ‘Russians Have Little Compassion for the Ukrainians’,” Spiegel International, January 5, 2023, perma.cc/2VDD-7679.
- [6] Olaf Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag,” Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, February 27, 2022, perma.cc/4KE6-H6E6.
- [7] In his often-quoted speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin already noted that “we have reached a decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.” See Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 10, 2007, perma.cc/3DNL-FUYW.
- [8] Vladimir Putin, “Meeting with State Duma Leaders and Party Faction Heads,” Moscow: Kremlin, July 7, 2022, perma.cc/7D8Y-7WFT.
- [10] Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” Beijing: Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China, February 4, 2022, perma.cc/M4G7-NK62.
- [11] The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” Berlin: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, May 8, 2022, perma.cc/TU6B-T99H.
- [12] Kate Connolly, “China and Germany Condemn Russian Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” The Guardian, November 4, 2022, perma.cc/LG6H-W3LB.
- [13] Rana Mitter, “China: Revolutionary or Revisionist?,” The Washington Quarterly 45:3 (2022), 7–21, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017.
- [14] Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende,” Foreign Affairs 102:1 (2023), 22–38 , perma.cc/8EES-ZFWG.
- [15] For an analysis of the legislation see Brendan Clift, “Hong Kong’s Made-in-China National Security Law: Upending the Legal Order for the Sake of Law and Order,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 21:1 (2020), 1–23
- [16] Elizabeth Economy, “Xi Jinping’s New World Order: Can China Remake the International System?,” Foreign Affairs 101:1 (2022), 52–67, perma.cc/8REQ-35G6, 54.
- [17] On the PRC’s expansive claims and their limited consistency with international law see United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, “People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Washington, DC: United States Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas 150, January 2022, perma.cc/SY3W-YC3L.
- [18] In August 2022, the Chinese government issued a new White Paper, “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” which underscores the importance of reunification, calling it “indispensable for the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and “a historic mission” of the Communist Party. See “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” Beijing: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, August 2022, perma.cc/5YKJ-GLPS. For an assessment see Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s New White Paper Lays Out Vision for Post Reunification’ Taiwan,” The Diplomat, August 11, 2022, perma.cc/MD4C-CZYV.
- [19] Xi Jinping, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.”
- [20] Bonny Lin and Joel Wuthnow, “Pushing Back Against China’s New Normal in the Taiwan Strait,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2022, perma.cc/ER94-2WQT.
- [21] Since March 2021, this sentiment has increased in all countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index. For instance, while only 22 percent of respondents in Germany believed China invading Taiwan posed a great risk to the world in March 2021, this number increased to 45 percent in October and November 2022. In Japan, numbers rose from 49 percent to 60 percent.
- [22] Katja Drinhausen and Helena Legarda, “‘Comprehensive National Security’ Unleashed: How Xi’s Approach Shapes China’s Policies at Home and Abroad,” Berlin: MERICS, MERICS China Monitor, September 15, 2022, perma.cc/977H-QTWD.
- [23] Jeffrey Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Eurasia’s New Imperial Moment,” The Washington Quarterly 45:2 (2022), 127–147, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022 .2090761, 128.
- [24] Luke Patey, How China Loses: The Pushback Against Chinese Global Ambitions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
- [25] Larry Diamond, “All Democracy Is Global: Why America Can’t Shrink From the Fight for Freedom,” Foreign Affairs 101:5 (2022), 182–197.
- [26] John Avlon, “The Tide Is Turning Against Autocracy,” CNN, December 1, 2022, perma.cc/TF85-8L43; Fareed Zakaria, “Enough About Democracy’s Weaknesses. Let’s Talk About Its Strengths,” The Washington Post, December 1, 2022, perma.cc/M23J-7M9J.
- [27] Bruce Jones, “A Strategy for the Fence Sitters: Learning to Live With Countries That Refus to Take Sides on Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2022, https:// perma.cc/Q678-NQK3; Angela Stent, “The West vs. the Rest,” Foreign Policy, May 2, 2022, perma.cc /VLL3-A88P; Michael J. Mazarr, “How to Save the Postwar Order: The United States Should Rethink Its Defense of the System,” Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2022, perma.cc/X7LZ-LEFT.
- [28] “General Assembly Resolution Demands End to Russian Offensive in Ukraine,” UN News, March 2, 2022, perma.cc/5MNU-HGKC; Jones, “A Strategy for the Fence Sitters.”
- [29] David L. Sloss and Laura A. Dickinson, “The Russia- Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral Order,” American Journal of International Law 116:4 (2022), 798–809, doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2022.55, 801.
- [30] Mazarr, “How to Save the Postwar Order.”
- [31] Shannon Tiezzi, “How Did Asian Countries Vote on the UN’s Ukraine Resolution?,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2022, perma.cc/YQ63-WTQZ.
- [32] Tiezzi, “How Did Asian Countries Vote on the UN’s Ukraine Resolution?”
- [33] Jones, “A Strategy for the Fence Sitters.”
- [34] Shivshankar Menon, “The Fantasy of the Free World: Are Democracies Really United Against Russia?,” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2022, perma.cc/GY42-8KB5.
- [35] Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende for the G7: Insights From the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 3, June 2022, doi.org/10.47342/JDIE4364, 28–44.
- [36] Ivan Krastev, “Middle Powers are Reshaping Geopolitics,” Financial Times, November 18, 2022, perma.cc/4HE2-P3EL.
- [37] Nicholas Mulder, “Don’t Expect Sanctions to Win the Ukraine War,” The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2022, perma.cc/38JD-B6ZY.
- [38] Shivshankar Menon, “Nobody Wants the Current World Order: How All the Major Powers—Even the United States—Became Revisionists,” Foreign Affairs, August 3, 2022, perma.cc/62ZR-5SX2, News 18.
- [39] Michael Zürn, “Eine außenpolitische Doppelstrategie für Zeiten des Systemkonflikts,” Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute and Auswärtiges Amt, 49security, October 5, 2022, perma.cc/QD5K-NQZF; Amrita Narlikar, “Must the Weak Suffer What They Must? The Global South in a World of Weaponized Interdependence,” in: Daniel Drezner/ Henry Farrell/Abraham Newman (eds.), The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021, 289–304.
- [40] Trita Parsi, “Why Non-Western Countries Tend to See Russia’s War Very, Very Differently,” New York: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, April 11, 2022, perma.cc/H3RY-97NE.
- [41] This has been a core theme of previous Munich Security Reports. See Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2020: Westlessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2020, doi.org/10 .47342/IAQX5691.
- [42] Hans van Leeuwen, “How Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping Could Ruin 2023,” Financial Review, December 28, 2022, perma.cc/RDU7-EQ67.
- [43] Tobias Bunde, “Overcoming Westlessness,” in: Tobias Bunde/Benedikt Franke (eds.), The Art of Diplomacy: 75+ Views Behind the Scenes of World Politics, Berlin: Econ, 2022, 151–6; van Leeuwen, “How Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping Could Ruin 2023”; Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2022, doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724.
- [45] Annalena Baerbock, “Seizing the Transatlantic Moment: Our Common Responsibility in a New World,” New York: The New School, August 2, 2022, perma.cc/ST6J-FA2U. The transatlantic to-do list can be found n the MSC website at https:// securityconference.org/en/transatlantic-to-do-list/. Among others, it contains section relations with Russia, China, and the “Global South.”
- [46] Gideon Rachman, “Xi Jinping’s China and the Rise of the ‘Global West’,” Financial Times, October 24, 2022, perma.cc/L5X5-HTHG. On efforts to revive cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies see Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021: Between States of Matter – Competition and Cooperation,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, June 2021, doi.org/10.47342/CYPE1056, 24–27.
- [47] European Council, “European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, the Membership Applications of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, Western Balkans and External Relations,” Brussels: European Council, June 23, 2022, perma.cc/UE9L-TDG4.
- [48] See in detail Bunde and Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende for the G7.”
- [49] NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” Madrid: NATO, June 29, 2022, perma.cc/PV6W-UBUY, §8.
- [50] Jens Stoltenberg, “Pre-Summit Press Conference,” Madrid, June 27, 2022, perma.cc/89MJ-T2KS.
- [51] Matilde Stronell, “Poland Unveils Record 2023 Defence Budget,” Janes, September 1, 2022, perma.cc/E5TL-CYQT.
- [52] Andreas Kluth, “This Is the Dawning of the Age of Zeitenwende,” Bloomberg, December 23, 2022, perma.cc/ZZX7-CSDX; Tobias Bunde, “Lessons (to Be) Learned? Germany’s Zeitenwende and European Security After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Contemporary Security Policy 43:3 (2022), 516–530, doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820.
- [53] Mirna Galic, “What You Need to Know About Japan’s New National Security Strategy,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, December 19, 2022, perma.cc/8U79-BZ84.
- [54] See in detail Wolfgang Ischinger and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), “Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy – Report of the Distinguished Reflection Group on Transatlantic China Policy,” Munich/Berlin/ Washington, DC: Munich Security Conference, Mercator Institute for China Studies, Aspen Strategy Group, July 2021, doi.org/10.47342/GXWK1490; Mikko Huotari, Anja Manuel, and Boris Ruge, (eds.), “Bridging the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy,” Berlin/Munich/Washington, DC: MERICS, Munich Security Conference, Aspen Strategy Group, forthcoming.
- [55] Liana Fix and Thorsten Benner, “Germany’s Unlearned Lessons: Berlin Must Reduce Its Dependence Not Just on Russia but on China, Too,” Foreign Affairs, December 15, 2022, perma.cc/WH2G-7L6C.
- [56] Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag”; Kishida, “Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue”; Vladimir Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting,” Moscow: Valdai International Discussion Club, October 27, 2022, perma.cc 6CYH-4U9J; Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” Munich/Washington, DC: Munich Security Conference, February 19, 2021, perma.cc/84Z9-W7TE.
- [57] Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021,” 24–27. See recently The White House, “National Security Strategy”; Ursula von der Leyen, “2022 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen,” Strasbourg, September 14, 2022, perma.cc/3AE5-M8Y5.
- [58] The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 8.
- [59] Matthew Duss, “The War in Ukraine Calls for a Reset of Biden’s Foreign Policy: America Can’t Support Democracy Only When It’s Convenient,” Foreign Affairs, May 4, 2022, perma.cc/3UKV-QN4V.
- [60] For another dynamic not covered in this report see Martin Binder and Autumn Lockwood Payton, “With Frenemies Like These: Rising Power Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly,” British Journal of Political Science 52:1 (2022), 381–398, doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000538.
- [61] Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021.”
- [62] The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 16.
- [63] Christoph Heusgen, “The War in Ukraine Will Be a Historic Turning Point,” Foreign Affairs, May 12, 2022, perma.cc/GYS3-THMX.
- [64] Michito Tsuruoka, “Why the War in Ukraine Is Not About Democracy Versus Authoritarianism,” London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RUSI Commentary, June 27, 2022, perma.cc/3HGK-TL4G.
- [65] Sergey Lavrov, “On Law, Rights and Rules,” Russia in Global Affairs 19:3 (2021), 228–240, 229.
- [66] Tom O’Connor, “China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and More Join Forces ‘in Defense’ of U.N.,” Newsweek, March 12, 2021, perma.cc/79DM-7Q2H.
- [67] Marjo Koivisto and Tim Dunne, “Crisis, What Crisis? Liberal Order Building and World Order Conventions,” Millennium 38:3 (2010), 615–640, doi.org/10.1177/0305829810363509.
- [68] Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity,” The Washington Quarterly 44:1 (2021), 29–47, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X .2021.1893003.
- [69] The argument that democracy is in constant need of renewal, as made by Sebastian Enskat et al., “Die wehrhafte(re) Demokratie: Russland und zehn weitere Gefahren für unsere Freiheit,” Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, perma.cc/H557-YPCE, 67–73., also applies to the international order.
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Chapter - 6 Atomized Nuclear Order
https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2023/nuclear-order/
Author Jintro Pauly
On February 24, 2022, Russia not only launched a war against Ukraine. With its brutal and unprovoked invasion of a sovereign state, Moscow has also mounted an attack against the foundational principles of the post–World War II order. Since that fateful decision, the world has changed dramatically. Data from the Munich Security Index 2023, an exclusive annual index of risk perceptions that the MSC developed together with its partner Kekst CNC, shows that people around the world feel they are indeed witnessing a turning point in world politics.
To explore where the global order is actually turning toward, the 2023 edition of the Munich Security Report (MSR) zooms in on various domains where the contest for the future international order is currently playing out – human rights, the governance of global infrastructures, development, energy security, and nuclear stability. As the chapters show, the Russian war against Ukraine is just the most brazen attack by authoritarian revisionists on the liberal, rules-based international order. Revisionist actors are trying to undermine the status quo and change the international order in many different ways. At the same time, the chapters highlight that in the contest between different visions for the future international order, the divide between democracies and autocracies is not the only cleavage that matters – and powerful autocrats are not alone in their deep dissatisfaction with existing international norms and institutions.
The extraordinary resilience and determination of the Ukrainian people, which is also evident in the Munich Security Index survey result from Ukraine, has instilled a new sense of purpose into democratic countries and governance formats. But while liberal democracies have shown their willingness and ability to push back against authoritarian efforts to subvert key rules and principles, another difficult task still lies ahead: re-envisioning the liberal, rules-based international order to make it more attractive among the wider international community. Against the backdrop of multiple cleavages at play in the global order contest and legitimate resentments that many countries of the “Global South” have toward the existing order, simply defending the status quo will not do the trick. Instead, liberal democracies have to offer a positive vision for a more peaceful and prosperous world.
"The citizens of Russia can rest assured that the territorial integrity of our Motherland, our independence and freedom will be defended – I repeat – by all the systems available to us."
Vladimir Putin•Russian President, Address to the Nation, September 21, 2022
With its revisionist war of aggression, Russia has upended the international nuclear order. By threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine, a state that in 1994 gave up its own nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russia’s commitment to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity,[4] Russia has undermined two key pillars of this order: the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the nuclear taboo. The NPT, at its core, is a grand bargain in which the five recognized nuclear-weapon states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – pledged to act as responsible nuclear powers and pursue eventual nuclear disarmament in exchange for the continued non-proliferation of the other NPT parties.[5] The nuclear taboo refers to the idea that nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction so abhorrent that their use is considered unacceptable.[6] By questioning the nuclear taboo, neglecting its obligations under the NPT, and breaking its commitment to Ukraine, Russia has lost its credibility as a responsible nuclear-weapon state.
Russia’s nuclear threats pose a fundamental challenge to those seeking to prevent the use of nuclear weapons now and in the future. If a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine were to go unpunished, it would severely damage the existing nuclear order and make future use of nuclear weapons more likely, as it would set a precedent of nuclear attacks being an acceptable and possibly beneficial course of action in military conflict.[7] There is also
a risk, however, of triggering a spiral of further escalation with a strong response to a Russian nuclear attack. Therefore, the international community’s response to such an attack would have to be measured enough to prevent further escalation, yet strong enough to prevent the precedent of an unpunished nuclear strike.[8]
Alas, Russian brinkmanship is only the most immediate threat to the international nuclear order. A wide range of other threats and challenges stem from other revisionist actors. In an environment of rising geopolitical tensions and eroding arms control regimes, such challenges have the potential to fundamentally change the global nuclear security architecture.
"The Russian invasion and the war in Ukraine, in many senses, has shone a very bright light on the cracks in the façade of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime which have started to emerge some time ago."
Izumi Nakamitsu •UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 10, 2022
Expiring Arms Control Treaties: Approaching the Wrong Global Zero
The international nuclear arms control regime has been eroding for some time. Since the 2002 US withdrawal from the US–Russian Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, North Korea has left the NPT, Russia violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – prompting the US to withdraw from it –, the US pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, and the US and Russia left the Open Skies Treaty.[9] New START, the last existing bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia, is set to expire in 2026, and its replacement by a new treaty is uncertain.[10] Although US President Joseph Biden recently expressed his willingness to negotiate one, he also indicated it is Russia’s responsibility to demonstrate its commitment to resuming arms control cooperation after its invasion of Ukraine.[11] Whether Russia will take this initiative is uncertain. With ever fewer nuclear arms control treaties in place, the world is approaching the wrong kind of “global zero” – a world with zero arms control treaties but an increasing number of nuclear warheads.
The five nuclear-armed permanent UN Security Council members caused a flicker of optimism when they issued a statement in January 2022 stating that nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought,” thereby seemingly reaffirming their commitment to the nuclear taboo.[12] This optimism waned, however, as Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine and started issuing nuclear threats. In August, the NPT Review Conference, which was held by the parties to the NPT to review the treaty’s implementation, failed to adopt a substantive outcome document due to Russian objections over a reference to the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This failure dealt yet more damage to the nuclear order and further isolated Russia on the international stage.[13] The lack of cooperation between the nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT, a key pillar of the international nuclear order, undermines the sustainability of this order.[14]
With its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the US has not only violated a UN Security Council resolution,[15] thereby dealing a further blow to the UN’s authority, but also greatly reduced Iran’s nuclear breakout time.[16] Although negotiations to revive the agreement started in 2021, revival efforts are complicated by domestic opposition to the agreement in both Iran and the US, Iran’s recent deliveries of weaponry to Russia for use against Ukraine, and Iran’s brutal repression of domestic protests.[17] If Iran were to produce nuclear warheads, this could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Proliferation cascades have been wrongly predicted before, and other would-be Middle Eastern nuclear powers would face obstacles on their way to the bomb, but Saudi Arabia would feel pressured to seek nuclear weapons in such a scenario. Meanwhile, Iranian proliferation might cause Israel – already a nuclear power – to consider a preemptive strike against Iran, given the long history of Iranian threats to annihilate the country and its people.[18]
"If Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off. [...] Regional states will certainly look towards how they can ensure their own security."
Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud•Saudi Foreign Minister, World Policy Conference, December 11, 2022
These new developments that further hollow out the nuclear arms control regime come on top of already existing challenges to this regime. Already, four states outside of the NPT framework possess nuclear weapons. Three of these, India, Israel, and Pakistan, never signed the NPT.[19] The fourth, North Korea, withdrew from the NPT in 2003, although it is disputed whether this withdrawal is valid under international law.[20] Political developments in some of these states also pose risks to international nuclear security. Enduring political instability in Pakistan raises questions on how responsibly the country will be able to handle its nuclear arsenal in the future.[21] North Korea, meanwhile, conducted 86 missile tests in 2022 alone, a record number for the country.[22] There are also indications that it is preparing for a new nuclear test. In September, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced a more assertive nuclear posture, which allows for nuclear first-use under certain circumstances.[23]
These “extra-NPT” nuclear activities are examples of a revisionist challenge by the non-NPT nuclear-weapon states and Iran vis-à-vis the NPT-based nuclear order, which seeks to classify them as non-nuclear-weapon states. With its aggressive behavior, North Korea takes this challenge even further than the other states, thereby threatening the security of states in East Asia and beyond.
Meanwhile, the circumstances for reinvigorating nuclear arms control regimes are suboptimal: great-power competition is becoming ever more intense, trust among nuclear and would-be nuclear adversaries is low, and few are willing to risk losing geopolitical competitive advantages by pursuing arms control measures. Nonetheless, the international community must recommit to arms control. The further erosion of the international nuclear arms control regime has removed important safeguards against further nuclear proliferation, arms races between existing nuclear powers, unintended nuclear escalations, and all the risks that come with those. But the Cold War has shown that even in times of great-power competition, arms control cooperation may be possible.
Trinity Test: China as the Third Nuclear Superpower?
A new nuclear arms race may already be underway: there are strong signs that China is on track to massively expand its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade.[24] Compared to Russia and the US, with 4,477 and 3,708 nuclear warheads, respectively, China maintains a modest arsenal of 350 warheads.[25] This arsenal has, however, grown steadily in recent years and might grow even faster in the coming decade (Figure 6.1).[26] In 2021, the US Department of Defense estimated that China might possess as many as 1,000 warheads by 2030,[27] given that China is currently constructing approximately 280 new nuclear missile silos, more than ten times as many as it operates today (Figure 6.2).[28]
There are some caveats to these predictions. Massive Chinese nuclear expansion has been predicted before, but it never manifested.[29] It is also uncertain whether China will fill all silos with missiles, or how many warheads it plans to equip each missile with. It is possible that the US Department of Defense overestimated these unknown factors when making its 2030 forecast.
If China were to immensely expand its nuclear arsenal or possibly even seek nuclear parity with Russia and the US, this would create a nuclear order fundamentally different from the bipolar nuclear order of the Cold War. Nuclear stability would then have to be achieved between at least three competing nuclear superpowers and the US would need to deter two nuclear near-peers.[30] This would vastly complicate arms control efforts, as the dynamics of negotiations and verification mechanisms would inevitably be more complex with three parties.[31] Such complications are manifesting themselves already, as China does not show any intention of engaging in trilateral arms control with the US and Russia, thereby undermining US and Russian appetite to engage in mutual bilateral arms control from which China might gain strategic advantages.
China’s nuclear expansion also constitutes a revisionist challenge to the nuclear order in which the US and Russia are the two nuclear superpowers. By expanding its nuclear arsenal without being transparent about it and refusing to engage in arms control talks, China seeks to either join the ranks as a nuclear superpower, or at least strengthen its strategic position relative to Russia and the US. This expansion could, for example, provide China with additional leverage in a confrontation with the US over Taiwan.[32]
"China is conducting an unprecedented, concerning nuclear buildup without any transparency."
Joseph Biden•US President, UN General Assembly, September 21, 2022
Separation Anxiety: Proliferation Risks Among US Allies
Ever since former US President Donald Trump sowed doubt about the US’s commitment to defending its allies, the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence has become the subject of debate.[33] Trump may no longer be president, but a return to the White House of someone without a strong commitment to the US’s alliances remains a possibility. Furthermore, the possibility that the US nuclear arsenal may soon have to deter two nuclear peer-competitors raises questions regarding the long-term ability of the US to live up to its extended nuclear deterrence commitments.[34] Some experts have warned that a further loss of credibility in this area could trigger a new form of nuclear revisionism: if US allies no longer trust in the US security guarantees that they received in exchange for their commitment to non-proliferation, some of them may seek to become nuclear-weapon states themselves.[35]
US allies in Asia, for example, face both an expanding Chinese nuclear arsenal and continuing nuclear threats by North Korea. In South Korea, popular support for the acquisition of a national nuclear arsenal is increasing, with one 2022 poll putting it as high as 71 percent.[36] In Japan, on the contrary, several polls in recent years showed broad popular support for joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).[37] At the same time, Japan’s 2022 national security strategy, although not announcing nuclear proliferation in any way, does seem to signal a pivot to much more assertive foreign policy and security policy in response to the increasing threats posed by China and North Korea.[38] This, together with the fact that Japan is a nuclear-threshold state, meaning it possesses the technological capabilities to develop nuclear weapons if it decided to do so, would make Japan a potential proliferation risk if it were to ever lose faith in the US-provided nuclear umbrella.[39]
Speaking Firmly, but Not Carrying a Big Stick: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
The TPNW, which has 68 state parties and 91 signatory states, poses a different kind of revisionist challenge to the existing nuclear order.[40] As frustration over the lack of progress on arms control by NPT nuclear-weapon states grew, several civil society organizations initiated a campaign for a treaty banning nuclear weapons altogether.[41] In 2017, this led several non-nuclear-weapon NPT states to launch the TPNW in an effort to promote the implementation of NPT Article VI, which outlines the obligation of nuclear-weapon states to work toward complete nuclear disarmament.[42] The TPNW thus seeks to change the nuclear order by eliminating all nuclear weapon arsenals, including those of the states permitted to have them under the NPT. It mainly draws support from smaller states from the “Global South” that neither have nuclear weapons nor enjoy the benefits of a nuclear umbrella (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).[43]
"We must recognize that this treaty is the democratic wish of the overwhelming majority of UN member states and the people of the world. No longer should the world’s people’s be held hostage to the unspeakable terror of these weapons."
Alvin Botes•South African Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, First meeting of state parties to the TPNW, June 21, 2022
Faced with deteriorating geopolitical conditions, the TPNW has been unable to make significant inroads among states who enjoy the benefits of nuclear deterrence, either through their own nuclear arsenal or an ally’s extended nuclear deterrence. In its 2022 Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaffirmed it will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.[44] The US also reiterated its rejection of the TPNW in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.[45] And in Europe, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has decreased enthusiasm for the TPNW. A 2022 public opinion poll showed that support for nuclear deterrence has significantly increased in Germany, a country traditionally very skeptical of it. Now, a plurality of 38 percent of the population supports Germany’s participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement, whereas 31 percent reject it.[46] The 2022 decision to buy dual-capable F-35 aircraft signaled that the German government remains committed to NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement.[47] Finland’s and Sweden’s applications to join NATO have probably ended any hopes of these states, both TPNW observers, actually joining the treaty.[48] These issues add to the already existing problems for the TPNW, such as criticism of its proposed non-proliferation verification mechanisms and the fact that its strategy of relying on societal pressure to motivate nuclear-weapon states to join is ineffective in autocracies and thus selectively targets democracies.[49]
Although the TPNW may face difficulties convincing more states to join, its broad support in the “Global South” is a signal to be taken seriously. It shows the widespread frustration among non-nuclear-weapon states in this part of the world with the lack of progress on implementing Article VI of the NPT and with the inequality of the nuclear order. If this discontent is not addressed, the NPT risks losing credibility.
The Nuclear Order Is Dead – Long Live the Nuclear Order?
The existing nuclear order faces various challenges: nuclear brinkmanship by Russia and North Korea, nuclear expansion by China, and various horizontal proliferation risks. The safeguards provided by arms control treaties are steadily eroding. Meanwhile, an alternative and more radical arms control regime in the form of the TPNW challenges the existing regime built around the NPT.
"We are here to defend the rules-based international order. The NPT is not just a piece of paper. It embodies some of the most fundamental commitments of humankind."
Annalena Baerbock •German Foreign Minister, 10th NPT Review Conference, August 1, 2022
The nuclear order needs revision to again enjoy the broad support among the international community that is needed to ensure nuclear stability and arms control. With great-power competition on the rise, this is difficult. Nevertheless, world leaders must make an effort, wherever possible, to reestablish a nuclear order that halts further proliferation and promotes arms control. This requires cooperation on these issues between the NPT nuclear-weapon states. It is especially critical here to build an incentive structure to convince China to create transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal expansion and engage in arms control discussions. If substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals are to prove unobtainable in the current geopolitical environment, nuclear powers should at least try and expand transparency and nuclear risk-reduction measures. Such measures could include a satellite non-interference treaty, ensuring parties’ capabilities to observe each other’s nuclear capabilities, as well as more active use of the Washington–Beijing military hotline.[50] Reinvigorating arms control regimes may be difficult, but nuclear powers must nonetheless try. The likely alternative is unregulated arms races and further nuclear proliferation, with all the associated risks.
