现在马克龙说：“我必须承认西方霸权即将结束”
对于法国来说，美国是平等的之一
https://www.thecitizen.in/opinion/now-macron-says-i-must-admit-western-hegemony-is-coming-to-an-end-335394
作者：SAEED NAQVI|2022 年 8 月 27 日 12:38
既然法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙已经用如此多的言辞宣称“西方霸权可能即将结束”，乌克兰的冲突，即真正的战斗，可能会扩大到美国和俄罗斯代理人可以攻击和攻击的地区。 被攻击。 如果冲突遵循这种模式，战略家就必须弄清楚拥有更多军事基地是优势还是劣势？
在美国的怂恿下，乌克兰袭击了俄罗斯声称拥有其领土的克里米亚，人们对冲突可能蔓延的担忧加剧。 俄罗斯外交部已明确表示：美国任何进一步鼓励将战争扩大到克里米亚的行为都将意味着美国成为冲突的一部分。
如果任何一方似乎失败，莫斯科或华盛顿（乌克兰只是西方选择的地盘）这两个主要交战方中的任何一方的冲突都将迫在眉睫。 乌克兰战争双方都无法承受失败，因为失败将意味着世界秩序发生不利的改变。
法国的声明显然会挫伤西方士气，但这一声明并未公开发表。 但它会造成更大的损害，因为这是法国总统在一次闭门内部会议上向法国高级外交官和特使发表的详细、令人信服的演讲。 这份题为“马克龙调查西方主导地位的终结”的内部文件已被泄露。
马克龙表示，法国、英国和美国使西方伟大了300年。 在他看来，三者的贡献如下：“法国是文化，英国是工业，美国是战争”。 他是在嘲笑美国吗？ ”
我们已经习惯了这种伟大，它使我们对全球经济和政治拥有绝对的主导地位——但情况正在发生变化。”
他详细阐述了特朗普早在特朗普之前就一系列美国总统做出的“错误选择”，“克林顿的对华政策、布什的战争政策、奥巴马的世界金融危机”。 在这篇令人震惊的西方大国讣告中，马克龙接着谈到“我们不仅在两年前，而且早在十年或二十年前就低估了新兴大国的崛起”。 他坚称，“多年来，中国和俄罗斯在不同的领导风格下取得了巨大成功。” 在马克龙的世界观中，印度也赫然存在。 “中国、俄罗斯、印度这些国家与美国、法国和英国相比都很好。”
这些国家的政治想象力“远远强于今天的西方人”。 他本人也感到震惊：中国已经让7亿人摆脱了贫困……但在法国，“市场经济正在以前所未有的速度加剧收入不平等”。
令人高兴的是，托马斯·皮凯蒂（Thomas Piketty）的《21世纪资本》出版近十年后，一位法国政治家注意到了这一点。 马克龙坦率地分析了他自己的政党在最近的国民议会选举中惨败的情况，尽管他没有用这句话。
马克龙目前受到由魅力超凡的让-吕克·梅朗雄和极右翼马琳·勒庞领导的左翼联盟的围困。 马克龙没有提到的是，当梅朗雄竞选总理职位时，中间派和他一起帮助极右翼勒庞增加了席位。 这日益成为西方民主国家的一种模式：左翼阐明的人民要求威胁着中间派所立足的资本主义结构。
通过控制媒体等工具，他们通过提出身份问题来转移不满情绪，这是各地极右翼的主要内容。 这是法国和其他地方的马克龙式中间派的危机。
这并不是法国例外论第一次刺破西方团结的表象。 我们不必深入历史。 戴高乐的例外论曾一度促使他以法国商标“Vive la France”结束他在加拿大魁北克的演讲。 丘吉尔和罗斯福发现他自负。 他确信他们密谋反对他。
法国外交部长休伯特·韦德里纳(Hubert Vedrine)在90年代末不厌其烦地将美国描述为“超级大国”，需要更强大的联合国系统来遏制。 “美国的霸权延伸到经济实力、货币、技术、军事、生活方式、语言和大众文化产品，这些产品淹没了我们的生活，甚至美国的敌人也渴望这些。” 这是钦佩还是羡慕？
弗朗索瓦·密特朗总统最不愿意加入玛格丽特·撒切尔和老布什总统为沙漠风暴行动鼓吹的“自愿联盟”。 他知道这是一项让英裔美国人保持冷战后世界秩序主导地位的行动。 德国的统一是另一个令人担忧的问题。 商业利益迫使他加入。
2003年，在美国入侵伊拉克前夕，当唯一的超级大国光芒四射时，法国例外论却反对这一不幸事件。 法国外交部长多米尼克·德维尔潘的介入令人难以忘怀：他是在那次紧张的联合国安理会会议上唯一反对强流的声明。 后来，担任总理的维尔潘更加直言不讳：法国知道美国人不希望通过检查路线来确定大规模杀伤性武器的存在。 “他们想要入侵和占领。”
当美国衰落时，马克龙已经卷起了袖子。 他留下了否认的余地：毕竟，他只与他的官员私下交谈过。 他一定知道重磅炸弹会爆炸。 他为欧洲制定了一个新的安全架构，其中有俄罗斯的空间，欧洲军队，法国与美国的印太战略。 法国将推动中国新丝绸之路与欧洲互联互通战略更好融合。
迅速变化的全球形势使印度处于有利位置，为各方提供了新的战略选择。 同样，乌克兰事件后美国的衰落，鼓励法国将自己视为西方强国，并有多种选择。 在法国的框架内，美国只是其中之一。
Now Macron Says, "I must Admit Western Hegemony Is Coming To An End"
For France US is one among equals
By SAEED NAQVI|27 Aug 2022 12:38 AM
Now that French President Emmanuel Macron has, in so many words, declared that "western hegemony may be coming to an end", the conflict in Ukraine, the real fighting, may expand to theatres where US and Russian proxies may be available to attack and be attacked. If the conflict follows this pattern, strategists will have to sort out whether having more military bases is an advantage or a handicap?
The fear that the conflict could spread increased after Ukraine, prodded by the US, attacked Crimea which Russia claims as its territory. The Russian foreign office has made it clear: any further US encouragement to extend the war to Crimea will mean that the US is part of the conflict.
Escalation of the conflict by either of the two principal combatants, Moscow or Washington (Ukraine is only the West's chosen turf) would become imminent if any one side appears to be losing. Neither side can afford to lose the Ukraine war because defeat would imply an unfavourably altered world order.
The French statement which would obviously demoralize the West was not made in public. But it will do even more damage because it was a detailed, cogently argued presentation by the French President before an audience of senior French diplomats and envoys in a closed door, internal meeting. Titled, "Macron surveys the end of western dominance", this internal document has been leaked.
France, the UK and the USA have made the West great for 300 years Macron said. In his view, the three contributed in the following way: "France is culture, England is industry and America is war." Is he mocking at the US? "
We are used to this greatness which gives us absolute dominance over the global economy and politics – but things are changing."
He dwelt on "wrong choices" made by a series of US Presidents long before Trump "Clinton's China policy, Bush's war policy, Obama's world financial crisis." In this astonishing obituary of Western power, Macron then turns to "our underestimating the rise of emerging powers, not just two years ago but as early as ten or twenty years ago." He insists that "that China and Russia have achieved great success over the years under different leadership styles." In Macron's world view, India looms too. "China, Russia, India, these countries compare well with the US, France and UK."
The political imagination of these countries "is far stronger than today's Westerners." He himself was shocked: China has lifted 700 million people out of poverty….. but in France "the market economy is increasing income inequality at an unprecedented rate."
It is nice that almost a decade after publication, Thomas Piketty's Capital In The 21st Century, a French statesman is taking note. Macron has candidly analysed, though not in these words, his own party having been trounced in the recent National Assembly Elections.
Macron is at present hemmed in by the Left alliance led by the charismatic Jean-Luc Melenchon and the far right, Marine Le Pen. What Macron does not mention is that at the sight of a larger than life Melenchon making a bid for the Prime Ministerial chair, the centrists with him, helped the ultra right, Le Pen, to increase her seat share. This increasingly is a pattern in Western democracies: people's demands articulated by the Left, threaten the Capitalists structure on which centrists stand.
With their control over instruments like the media they divert discontent by raking up issues of identity which is the staple for the far right everywhere. This is the crisis of Macron style Centrism in France as elsewhere.
This is not the first time that French exceptionalism has punctured the façade of Western unity. We do not have to go far into history. Charles De Gaulle's exceptionalism once famously drove him to end his speech in Quebec (Canada) with the French trade mark Vive la France. Churchill and Roosevelt found him conceited. He was convinced they conspired against him.
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine would not tire in the late 90s describing the US as a "hyperpower" which needed to be contained by a stronger UN system. "The US supremacy extends to economic power, currency, technology, military, lifestyle, language and the products of mass culture that inundate our lives and which even the enemies of the US long for." Is this admiration or envy?
President Francois Mitterand was the most reluctant to join the "coalition of the willing" that Margaret Thatcher and President Bush Sr were drumming up for operation Desert Storm. He knew it was an operation to keep the Anglo-Americans on top of the post-Cold war world order. A reunified Germany was another anxiety. Commercial interests forced him to join.
In 2003, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, when the sole superpower moment shone bright, it was French exceptionalism which argued against the misadventure. The intervention by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin is difficult to forget: his was the only statement against the strong current at that charged UN Security Council session. Later, Villepin, as Prime Minister, was even more blunt: France knew Americans did not wish to pursue the inspection route to establish the presence of weapons of mass destruction. "They wanted to invade and occupy."
Macron has rolled up his sleeves when the US is in decline. He has left room for deniability: he has, after all, only spoken to his officials in confidence. He must have known that the bombshell would explode. He has spelt out a new security architecture for Europe with room for Russia in it, a European army, a French strategy for the Indo-Pacific with the US. "France will promote a better integration of China's new silk route with the European connectivity strategy."
The rapidly changing global situation has placed India at a sweet spot, opening new strategic options on all sides. US decline post Ukraine likewise, encourages France to see itself as a Western power, with options all around. In the French framework the US is only one among equals.
