中东倡议教务主任塔里克·马苏德表示，仍有许多改革支持者，但十年的动乱和混乱让许多阿拉伯人对西式民主深感怀疑
塔里克·马苏德主演 2021 年 3 月 25 日
被统称为“阿拉伯之春”的民主运动兴起十年后，阿拉伯世界是一个以截然不同的方式演变的政府和社会的复杂组合。 有像突尼斯这样的民主成功国家，也有像埃及这样的失败国家，也有像也门和利比亚这样失败的国家。 在沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国等一些地方，威权主义者已经演变为应对对其权力的威胁，而在伊拉克和黎巴嫩等其他地方，民主冲动仍然存在，但代议制政府却悬而未决。 哈佛大学肯尼迪学院教授塔里克·马苏德是中东倡议的教席主席，也是世界上对阿拉伯世界政治最敏锐、最博学的观察家之一。 他与主持人托科·莫约 (Thoko Moyo) 一起探讨过去 10 年发生的事情、未来的情况，以及美国新政府可以采取哪些措施来支持这个许多人仍持极度怀疑态度的地区的民主。
Book 艰难之地的民主
https://ash.harvard.edu/publications/democracy-hard-places
梅因沃林.斯科特 Scott Mainwaring 和塔里克·马苏德 Tarek Masoud, 2022 牛津大学出版社 2022 年 8 月
过去十五年见证了“民主衰退”。 以前被认为是根深蒂固的民主国家——匈牙利、波兰、巴西，甚至美国——都受到了极端民族主义和民粹主义领导人崛起的威胁，这些领导人口头上迎合人民的意愿，但每天都在破坏 自由和多元化是民主治理的基础。 民主在我们最意想不到的地方崩溃的可能性，给关于民主一旦实现如何能够持久的古老问题增添了新的紧迫性。
在《艰难之地的民主》一书中，斯科特·梅因沃林和塔里克·马苏德汇集了一批杰出的贡献者，阐述了世界各地的民主国家如何在民主衰落的时代继续生存。 总的来说，他们认为我们可以从民主的幸存中学到很多东西，这些幸存的民主就像发达国家某些角落发生的民主侵蚀一样出人意料。 正如社会科学家长期以来相信完善的、西方的、受过教育的、工业化的和富裕的民主国家是不朽的，他们也认为缺乏这些特征的国家几乎没有民主的机会。 然而，许多不具备这些假设的民主有利条件的国家，无视数十年的社会科学智慧，不仅实现了民主，而且年复一年地维持着民主。 民主如何在种族异质、饱受经济危机蹂躏、国家软弱困扰的国家中持续存在？ 民主在艰苦地区长存的秘诀是什么？
这本书是迄今为止第一本系统地考察不太可能的民主国家的生存持久性的书，它提出了九个案例研究，在这些案例中民主出现并在困难中生存下来。 作者采用比较、跨区域的视角，总结了在动荡和危机、经济欠发达、民族语言分裂和长期制度薄弱的情况下民主为何能够坚持下去的经验教训。 通过将这些案例进行相互对话，梅恩瓦林和马苏德获得了强有力的理论教训，说明如何在主流社会科学理论让我们最意想不到的地方建立和维护民主。
艰难之地的民主
塔里克·马苏德·斯科特·梅因沃林 | Tarek Masoud Scott Mainwaring 2022 年 8 月 5 日
摘要
民主如何在贫穷、种族异质、遭受经济危机和国家软弱困扰的国家长期持续？ 在《艰难之地的民主》一书中，研究比较政治制度的顶尖学者试图通过考察民主在“艰难之地”中不太可能生存的案例来回答这个问题：这些国家缺乏结构性因素，并且存在于学者们长期以来与民主出现联系在一起的背景之外。 和耐力。 艰苦地区的民主克服了不发达、民族语言多样性、国家软弱和父权文化规范等问题。 这本书提供了丰富的、以经验为基础的理论辩论，讨论民主是否仅仅因为权力平衡和正式制度限制行动者推翻它而得以生存，或者民主是否也因为一些关键行动者规范地致力于民主而得以生存。 这本书介绍了由该学科的顶尖专家撰写的九个案例研究，这些案例研究了民主的出现和克服困难的经历。 这些案例几乎来自世界上民主“第三次浪潮”一部分的每个地区。 在每种情况下，许多传统上与持久民主相关的条件要么被削弱，要么不存在。 每个案例研究都详细介绍了特定国家面临的一系列民主障碍，描述了有可能影响政权轨迹的主要政治参与者，并解释了如何避免或避免民主崩溃的威胁。
精选评论
“我们正在经历一场民主衰退，扭转了世界各地长达数十年的选举和民主治理扩张。为什么会发生这种情况以及可以采取哪些措施来阻止衰退？这本引人入胜的书以一种不同寻常的方式解决了这个问题—— 着眼于民主得以持续的案例（例如印度、南非和印度尼西亚），尽管几乎没有与成功相关的先决条件。这些内容丰富且经过仔细研究的记录提醒读者，并非一切都由经济决定 “发展和其他此类结构性因素。广泛共享的规范和价值观以及具体的政策选择都会产生影响。最重要的是，政治领导人很重要。没有民主就不可能有民主。” ——法里德·扎卡里亚，《华盛顿邮报》
“我们生活在一个很难不意识到民主的脆弱性并对其未来感到担忧的时代。《困境中的民主》并没有提供另一种关于民主衰败的研究，而是为我们提供了一些政治学最杰出的学者对民主如何衰落的分析。 即使在表面上不吉祥的环境中，民主也能够生存下来。对于那些寻求了解民主的当代问题并提出解决方案的人来说，《艰难之地中的民主》将具有无价的价值。
——Sheri Berman，哥伦比亚大学巴纳德学院政治学教授
“最近学术界转向对政权更迭更加结构主义的解释，但留下了一个尚未解答的重要问题：非洲、亚洲、东欧和拉丁美洲的许多民主国家继续‘超出’现有理论的预期。为什么以及如何脆弱？ 尽管国内和国际形势严峻，民主国家仍能生存下来吗？本书提供了一些重要的答案。”
——史蒂文·莱维茨基 (Steven Levitsky)，哈佛大学大卫·洛克菲勒拉丁美洲研究教授兼政府学教授
印度民主的长寿及其陷入困境的轨迹
阿舒托什·瓦尔什尼
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197598757.003.0002
第 34 页–C2.N48 2022 年 8 月
摘要
第二章将印度视为民主长寿的一个例子，尽管存在理论上违反直觉的条件。 尽管印度似乎几乎完全丧失了学者们认为有利于民主的东西，但在过去七十三年中，印度已经有七十一年是民主国家了。 印度一直未能实现自由主义理想，目前面临着民粹主义挑战，与其他一些成熟的民主国家所面临的挑战没有什么不同，但它仍然可能是民主最引人注目的成功故事。 对印度如何避免大多数理论预测的民主崩溃的解释强调了该国现代创始人，特别是其第一任总理贾瓦哈拉尔·尼赫鲁的信仰和价值观的重要性。 尽管印度民主的诞生归功于该国创始人的价值观，但民主的持久性却源于这样一个事实：印度的政治精英已经开始认为民主符合他们自己的利益。
印度民主的长寿及其陷入困境的轨迹 阿舒托什·瓦什尼 (Ashutosh Varshney) 本章的核心在于一个悖论。*
一方面，印度是发展中国家持续时间最长的民主国家； 另一方面，自 2014 年以来，民主无疑已经开始衰退。自由之家和 V-Dem 研究所这两份全球范围内阅读量最大的年度民主评估报告中，毫不含糊地指出了印度的民主倒退 。 自由之家现在称印度仅“部分自由”，而 V-Dem 研究所表示印度已成为“选举专制国家”（自由之家 2021b；V-Dem 研究所 2021）。 无论我们是否认为这些术语准确，印度的民主削弱是毫无疑问的。 随着纳伦德拉·莫迪上台，世界上最大的民主国家已经进入了一个明显不稳定的时期。 但我们应该如何从概念上描绘出这种抖动呢？ 我在本章中的基本主张是，2014 年之后的印度不是民主崩溃的案例，而是民主侵蚀或民主倒退的案例。1 我将互换使用后两个术语。 本章的分析任务是双重的。 印度的民主为何能够长久存在？ 如何解释最近的下降轨迹？ 我在这里的尝试是提供一个综合论证，旨在回答这两个问题。 但在提出论点并进行详细讨论之前，对印度的民主记录进行简要概述似乎是合适的。 对于大多数民主理论家来说，竞争性选举是民主运作的必要条件。 “没有选举就没有民主”是被广泛接受的理论格言。 让我们从印度的选举记录开始吧。 自1947年独立以来，印度已举行17次全国选举和389次邦选举。 国家首都权力易手八次，州一级权力易手数十次。 后一种现象现在非常普遍，以至于政治学家已经停止计算州级政府的更替情况。 直到 1992-93 年，第三级政府（镇和村一级）是唯一非选举产生的一级政府，但宪法修正案最终也填补了这一空白。 自20世纪90年代中期以来，每五年选举大约300万地方立法委员。 除了长达 21 个月的全国威权主义时期（1975 年 6 月至 1977 年 3 月）以及一些地区的选举暂停之外由于动乱和叛乱，选举决定了谁将统治印度及其各邦，以及 1992-93 年之后的地方政府。 即使在2014年以来的民主倒退时期也是如此。一些民主制度受到挑战，造成侵蚀，但选举的完整性并未受到损害。 事实上，竞争性选举是组建政府的唯一途径的观念已经成为该国制度化的政治常识。 这种制度化意味着，长期以来，没有任何主要政治行为体或组织提出过非选举的上台方式。 民主是否比选举更重要的问题仍然悬而未决，也存在争议，但毫无疑问，竞争性选举已经构成了印度民主想象的核心。 很难预测未来几年民主的选举核心是否会不受损害，但截至目前，尽管民主不断受到侵蚀，选举原则仍然完好无损。 自2014年以来，莫迪可能没有在全国范围内失败，但他输掉了许多州选举，其中包括在政治和经济上都极其重要的州。 一场类似特朗普的竞选活动，在失败的情况下质疑选举的公正性，这在世界许多地方并不罕见，但尚未启动。 20 世纪 60 年代中期，巴林顿·摩尔 (Barrington Moore) 是最早注意到印度民主资质的人之一：“作为一个政治物种，[印度]确实属于现代世界。 1964年尼赫鲁去世时，政治民主已经存在了十七年。 如果民主不完美，那么民主就不仅仅是骗局。 。 。 。 无论是在亚洲环境还是在没有工业革命的情况下，政治民主似乎都很奇怪”（Moore 1966, 314）。 大约五年后，罗伯特·达尔在已成为民主理论基础的文本中将印度视为“一个异常案例……”。 。 。 确实是一个多头政治”（Dahl 1971, 68-69）。 大约二十年后，达尔更加强调，称印度是民主理论的“当代主要例外”（Dahl 1989，253）。 最后，又过了十多年，Adam Przeworski 等人。 (2000, 87) 认为，在他们的 1950-90 年国际数据集中，印度的民主寿命是最令人惊讶的：“印度反对民主的可能性非常高。”2 相当多的文献试图解释为什么印度保持民主 长期以来一直处于理论上违反直觉的环境中（Chhibber 2014；Kohli 2001；Kothari 1970b；Moore 1966；Varshney 1998，2013；Weiner 1989）。 在本章中，我将讨论最近时期的比较或理论文献，并探讨衡量全球民主的新数据集。 我提出两个论点。 首先，为了重新审视印度的民主程度，我区分了选举民主制的印度和自由民主制的印度。 利用政治理论、印度的政治历史和 V-Dem 数据集（Coppedge et al. 2021），我认为印度的选举记录比其作为自由民主国家的表现要好得多。 总体而言，印度的选举充满活力，但其民主制度存在严重的自由主义赤字。 在两次当选的莫迪政权（2014 年至今）的领导下，这些赤字扩大得相当惊人。 这些赤字严重侵蚀了公民自由、少数群体权利以及对行政权力的制度限制，主要影响的是民主的自由方面，而不是选举方面。3 在我下面的论点中，我将把竞争性选举称为最低限度的民主要求，同时提出 更充分、或更深入的民主还通过保障公民自由、保护少数人权利以及将行政权力视为制度上的检查和界定来限制政府在选举之间的选择。 印度最近的民主侵蚀是关于后者，而不是前者，这意味着印度仍然实行选举民主，但它已经倒退了几十年来正在进行的民主深化。 其次，为了解释民主的长寿，我的论点集中在精英选择的首要性上，而不是一些民主理论家（尽管不是全部）所强调的民主长寿的结构或文化决定因素。 我对精英的关注分为三个部分：（1）民主的创立时刻和形成时期，（2）自唯一一次全国性的民主崩溃（1975-77）以来到2014年的时期； (3) 自莫迪上台以来（2014 年至今），尽管没有崩溃，但侵蚀时期。 在第一阶段，我展示了精英价值观如何在民主制度化中发挥重要作用。 在第二个时期，我认为，虽然价值观解释了一部分精英的行为，特别是那些领导一些宪法赋予的独立监督机构（例如最高法院和选举委员会）的人，但很大一部分政治权力
Middle East Initiative Faculty Director Tarek Masoud says there are still many supporters of reform, but a decade of turmoil and chaos has left many Arabs deeply suspicious of Western-style democracy.
https://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/news/2022/Democracy%20in%20Hard%20Places%20-%20India%27s%20Democratic%20Longevity%20and%20Its%20Troubled%20Trajectory.pdf
FEATURING TAREK MASOUD
MARCH 25, 2021
Ten years after the rise of pro-democracy movements collectively dubbed “the Arab Spring” the Arab world is a complicated mix of governments and societies that have evolved in vastly different ways. There have been democratic successes like Tunisia, failures like Egypt), and failed states like Yemen and Libya. In some places like Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, authoritarians have evolved to meet the threat to their power, while in others like Iraq and Lebanon democratic impulses still exist, but representative government hangs in the balance. Harvard Kennedy School Professor Tarek Masoud is the faculty chair of the Middle East Initiative and one of the world’s keenest and most knowledgeable observers of the Arab world’s politics. He joins host Thoko Moyo to explore what has happened over the past 10 years, what lies ahead, and what the new US administration can do to support democracy in a region where many still view it with extreme suspicion.
Democracy in Hard Places
https://ash.harvard.edu/publications/democracy-hard-places
Citation:
Scott Mainwaring and Tarek Masoud, August 2022
The last fifteen years have witnessed a "democratic recession." Democracies previously thought to be well-established--Hungary, Poland, Brazil, and even the United States--have been threatened by the rise of ultra-nationalist and populist leaders who pay lip-service to the will of the people while daily undermining the freedom and pluralism that are the foundations of democratic governance. The possibility of democratic collapse where we least expected it has added new urgency to the age-old inquiry into how democracy, once attained, can be made to last.
In Democracy in Hard Places, Scott Mainwaring and Tarek Masoud bring together a distinguished cast of contributors to illustrate how democracies around the world continue to survive even in an age of democratic decline. Collectively, they argue that we can learn much from democratic survivals that were just as unexpected as the democratic erosions that have occurred in some corners of the developed world. Just as social scientists long believed that well-established, Western, educated, industrialized, and rich democracies were immortal, so too did they assign little chance of democracy to countries that lacked these characteristics. And yet, in defiance of decades of social science wisdom, many countries that were bereft of these hypothesized enabling conditions for democracy not only achieved it, but maintained it year after year. How does democracy persist in countries that are ethnically heterogenous, wracked by economic crisis, and plagued by state weakness? What is the secret of democratic longevity in hard places?
This book--the first to date to systematically examine the survival persistence of unlikely democracies--presents nine case studies in which democracy emerged and survived against the odds. Adopting a comparative, cross-regional perspective, the authors derive lessons about what makes democracy stick despite tumult and crisis, economic underdevelopment, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and chronic institutional weakness. By bringing these cases into dialogue with each other, Mainwaring and Masoud derive powerful theoretical lessons for how democracy can be built and maintained in places where dominant social science theories would cause us to least expect it.
Democracy in Hard Places
Tarek Masoud Scott Mainwaring | Aug. 05, 2022
Abstract
How does democracy persist for long periods of time in countries that are poor, ethnically heterogenous, wracked by economic crisis, and plagued by state weakness? In Democracy in Hard Places, leading scholars of comparative political regimes attempt to answer this question by examining cases of unlikely democratic survival in “hard places”: countries that lack the structural factors and exist outside of the contexts that scholars have long associated with democracy’s emergence and endurance. Democracies in hard places overcome underdevelopment, ethnolinguistic diversity, state weakness, and patriarchal cultural norms. The book offers rich, empirically grounded theoretical debates about whether democracy survives only because a balance of power and formal institutions constrain actors from overthrowing it, or if it also survives in part because some critical actors are normatively committed to it. The book presents nine case studies—written by leading experts in the discipline—of episodes in which democracy has emerged and survived against long odds. The cases are drawn from almost every region of the world that formed part of the “third wave” of democracy. In each case, many of the conditions conventionally associated with durable democracy were either attenuated or absent. Each case study details the constellation of obstacles to democracy faced by a given country, describes the major political actors with the potential to impact regime trajectories, and explains how the threat of democratic breakdown was staved off or averted.
SELECTED REVIEWS
"We are living through a democratic recession, reversing a decades-long expansion of elections and democratic governance around the world. Why is this happening and what could be done to arrest the decline? This compelling volume tackles this question in an unusual way-by looking at cases (such as India, South Africa, and Indonesia) where democracy has endured, despite having few of the pre-conditions that tend to be associated with success. These rich and carefully researched accounts remind readers that not everything is determined by economic development and other such structural factors. Broadly shared norms and values and specific policy choices all make a difference. Above all, political leaders matter. You cannot have democracy without democrats." -- Fareed Zakaria, The Washington Post
"We are living through an era when it is hard not to be aware of democracy's fragility and concerned about its future. Rather than provide another study of democratic decay, Democracy in Hard Places offers us analyses by some of political science's most eminent scholars of how democracy manages to survive, even in ostensibly inauspicious settings. Democracy in Hard Places will be invaluable to those seeking to understand democracy's contemporary problems as well as come up with solutions to them." -- Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University
"The recent scholarly turn to more structuralist explanations of regime change has left an important question unanswered: many democracies in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America continue to 'overperform' the expectations of existing theories. Why―and how―do fragile democracies survive despite daunting domestic and international conditions? This volume offers some important answers." -- Steven Levitsky, David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies and Professor of Government, Harvard University
India's Democratic Longevity and Its Troubled Trajectory
https://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/news/2022/Democracy%20in%20Hard%20Places%20-%20India%27s%20Democratic%20Longevity%20and%20Its%20Troubled%20Trajectory.pdf
By Ashutosh Varshney
At the core of this chapter lies a paradox.*
On one hand, India is the longest lasting democracy of the developing world; on the other hand, since 2014 a democratic decline has unquestionably set in. In their recent reports, the two most widely read annual assessments of democracy worldwide, by Freedom House and the V-Dem Institute, have noted India’s democratic retrogression in no uncertain terms. Freedom House now calls India only “partly free,” and the V-Dem Institute says India has become an “electoral autocracy” (Freedom House 2021b; V-Dem Institute 2021). Whether or not we find these terms precise, India’s democratic diminution is not in doubt. With the rise of Narendra Modi to power, the world’s biggest democracy has entered a manifestly shaky period. But how should we conceptually map the shakiness? My basic claim in this chapter is that India after 2014 is not a case of democratic collapse but one of democratic erosion or democratic backsliding.1 I will use the latter two terms interchangeably. The analytical task of this chapter is twofold. What explains India’s democratic longevity? And how might one explain the recent downward trajectory? My attempt here is to provide an integrated argument, which seeks to answer both questions. But before the argument is presented and to anchor the detailed discussion, it seems fitting to present a brief overview of India’s democratic record. For most democratic theorists, competitive elections are a necessary condition for the functioning of a democracy. “No elections, no democracy” is a theoretical dictum of widespread acceptability. So let us begin with India’s electoral record. Since independence in 1947, India has held 17 national and 389 state elections. Power has changed hands eight times in the national capital and tens of times at the state level. The latter phenomenon is by now so common that political scientists have stopped counting state-level government turnovers. Until 1992–93, the third tier of government—at the town and village level—was the only unelected tier, but a constitutional amendment finally filled that gap, too. Since the mid-1990s, roughly three million local legislators have been elected every five years. Other than a twenty-one-month period of nationwide authoritarianism (June 1975–March 1977) and a few electoral suspensions in areas of unrest and insurgency, elections have decided who will rule India and its states and, after 1992–93, its local governments as well. This has been true even in the period of democratic backsliding since 2014. Several democratic institutions have been challenged, causing the erosion, but the integrity of elections has not been undermined. Indeed, the idea that competitive elections are the only way to form governments has been the institutionalized political commonsense of the country. Such institutionalization means that for a long time now, no major political actor or organization has proposed a non-electoral way of coming to power. The question of whether there is more to democracy than elections has remained unsettled and contested, but there is no doubt that competitive elections have formed the core of India’s democratic imagination. It is hard to predict whether the electoral core of democracy will remain unimpaired in the coming years, but as of now, despite the ongoing democratic erosion, the electoral principle remains intact. Modi may not have lost nationally since 2014, but he has lost a number of state elections, which include states that are, politically and economically, extremely significant. A Trump-like campaign, questioning election integrity in the face of defeat, something not uncommon in many parts of the world, has not been launched. In the mid-1960s, Barrington Moore was among the first to note India’s democratic credentials: “[A]s a political species, [India] does belong to the modern world. At the time of Nehru’s death in 1964, political democracy had existed for seventeen years. If imperfect, the democracy was no mere sham. . . . Political democracy may seem strange in both an Asian setting and one without an industrial revolution” (Moore 1966, 314). Roughly half a decade later, in what has become a foundational text of democratic theory, Robert Dahl identified India as “a deviant case . . . indeed a polyarchy” (Dahl 1971, 68–69). About two decades later Dahl was even more emphatic, calling India “a leading contemporary exception” to democratic theory (Dahl 1989, 253). Finally, after a little over another decade, Adam Przeworski et al. (2000, 87) argued that in their 1950–90 international dataset, India’s democratic longevity was the most surprising: “The odds against democracy in India were extremely high.”2 A fairly substantial body of literature has sought to explain why India stayed democratic for so long in a theoretically counterintuitive setting (Chhibber 2014; Kohli 2001; Kothari 1970b; Moore 1966; Varshney 1998, 2013; Weiner 1989). In this chapter, I engage the comparative or theoretical literature of a more recent vintage, as well as probe the new datasets that measure democracy worldwide. I advance two arguments. First, seeking a reexamination of how democratic India has been, I draw a distinction between India as an electoral democracy and India as a liberal democracy. Using political theory, India’s political history, and the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2021), I argue that India’s electoral record is considerably better than its performance as a liberal democracy. India has, on the whole, been electorally vibrant, but its democracy has substantial liberal deficits. Under the twice-elected Modi regime (2014–present), these deficits have widened quite alarmingly. Substantially eroding civil freedoms, minority rights, and institutional constraints on executive power, these deficits have primarily affected the liberal side of democracy, not the electoral side.3 In my argument below, I will call competitive elections a minimal democratic requirement, while proposing that a fuller, or deeper, democracy also constrains governments between elections—by guaranteeing civil freedoms, protecting minority rights, and viewing executive authority as institutionally checked and delimited. India’s recent democratic erosion is about the latter, not about the former, meaning that India remains electorally democratic but it has rolled back the democratic deepening that was under way for decades. Second, for explaining democratic longevity, my argument concentrates on the primacy of elite choices, not on the structural or cultural determinants of democratic longevity that several democratic theorists have privileged, though not all. My focus on elites is divided into three parts: (1) the founding moment and the formative period of democracy, (2) the period since the only nationwide collapse of democracy (1975–77) until 2014; and (3) the period of erosion, though not collapse, since the rise of Modi (2014–present). In the first period, I demonstrate how elite values played a big role in institutionalizing democracy. In the second period, I argue that while values explain the behavior of a segment of elites, especially those who led some of the constitutionally given independent institutions of oversight, such as the Supreme Court and the Election Commission, a large section of political e
Tarek Masoud
Tarek Masoud is the Ford Foundation Professor of Democracy and Governance at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His research focuses on political development in Arabic-speaking and Muslim-majority countries. He is the author of Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 2014), The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform with Jason Brownlee and Andrew Reynolds (Oxford University Press, 2015), and several articles and book chapters. He is a 2009 Carnegie Scholar, a trustee of the American University in Cairo, and the recipient of grants from the National Science Foundation and the Paul and Daisy Soros foundation, among others. He holds an AB from Brown and a PhD from Yale, both in political science.