中国 sharp power 不占领土地却占领人心

中国不占领土地却占领人心 CHINA'S SHARP POWER

2017-12-18 来源：英国路透社

“锐实力”的目的并不一定是为了寻求赢得“民心民意”，而是为了试图通过操控目标群体所能收到的信息而实现对目标群体的影响。

西方国家越来越担心中国影响力渗透（图源：VCG）

《经济学人》12月14日发表题为《如何应对中国"锐实力"》的文章称，东方大国中国，正在搅动西方民主国家的决策层。而西方对此最好的布防，就是透明。

当一个崛起大国挑战一个守成大国时，通常会爆发战争，是谓“修昔底德陷阱”，因古希腊历史学家修昔底德而得名，这样的情势，在中国与西方，特别是美国之间，也正在显现。而且，一场更为隐暗的对抗角力，也正逐渐浮出水面。即使中国不寻求占领外国的土地，很多人却担心，中国正试图占领外国的人心。

对于中国使出的伎俩，澳大利亚是第一个拉响红色警报的西方国家。12月5日，有关中国在澳大利亚政界、大学以及出版行业的干涉指控，使得澳大利亚政府提出新法案，以应对立法议员受到“史无前例的、越来越复杂精准的”外国势力的影响。本周，一位澳大利亚参议员因作为反对党发言人时收受中方资金并为自己辩护而辞职。英国、加拿大以及新西兰也都正拉响红色警报。12月10日，德国指责中国试图通过社交网站搜集德国高官情资以进行收买。12月13日，美国国会就中国逐渐增强的影响力举行了听证会。

位于华盛顿的智库美国国家民主基金会（National Endowment for Democracy）给中国的上述行为命名为“锐实力”（Sharp Power）。

与通过文化、价值观的吸引力来增强自己的影响力的“软实力”（Soft Power）不同，“锐实力”则主要是指独裁或威权政权通过胁迫、操控外国人的态度来增强自己的影响力。

西方国家越来越担心中国影响力渗透。对此，《金融时报》12月15日发表题为《美国盘查中国输出"锐实力"，在美华人受影响？》的文章称，从澳大利亚、新西兰、加拿大到德国，随着各国对于涉华政治运作的“清算”，除了中国政治影响力之外，中国“软实力”的体现，也逐渐有被诠释为“锐实力”的趋向。

美国国会和媒体最近更是积极展开对于中国软实力的盘查，让人担忧这个风潮是不是也将波及华人组织和个体。

美国华人精英组织“百人会”在今年发布了《起诉中国‘间谍’：美国经济间谍法的实证分析》的研究白皮书，和2017年《中美两国公众印象》民意调查报告。在对中国崛起影响力质疑的大环境下，这两个研究都隐约指向了，美国华人的个人经历似乎将不免陷于大语境的牵连。

根据《外交政策》的报道，香港前行政长官董建华通过他的中美交流基金会（CUSEF），赞助约翰•霍普金斯大学高等国际研究学院、布鲁金斯学会和其他组织的研究。《华盛顿邮报》认为董建华和中国政府关系紧密。

而《华盛顿邮报》也引用美国国会中国执行委员会联席主席参议员马可•卢比奥说，中国政府赞助的孔子学院，在美国的大学校园内运作不透明的协议，经常被指控干涉与中国有关的教育活动。卢比奥主张审查中国赞助的智库研究、学术主席和知识合作。

How China's "sharp power" is muting criticism abroad

WHAT TO DO ABOUT CHINA'S "SHARP POWER”

China is manipulating decision-makers in Western democracies. The best defence is transparency.

Dec 14th 2017

https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21732524-china-manipulating-decision-makers-western-democracies-best-defence

WHEN a rising power challenges an incumbent one, war often follows. That prospect, known as the Thucydides trap after the Greek historian who first described it, looms over relations between China and the West, particularly America. So, increasingly, does a more insidious confrontation. Even if China does not seek to conquer foreign lands, many people fear that it seeks to conquer foreign minds.

Australia was the first to raise a red flag about China's tactics. On December 5th allegations that China has been interfering in Australian politics, universities and publishing led the government to propose new laws to tackle "unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated” foreign efforts to influence lawmakers (see article). This week an Australian senator resigned over accusations that, as an opposition spokesman, he took money from China and argued its corner. Britain, Canada and New Zealand are also beginning to raise the alarm. On December 10th Germany accused China of trying to groom politicians and bureaucrats. And on December 13th Congress held hearings on China's growing influence.

This behaviour has a name—“sharp power”, coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based foundation and think-tank. “Soft power” harnesses the allure of culture and values to add to a country's strength; sharp power helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad.

The West needs to respond to China's behaviour, but it cannot simply throw up the barricades. Unlike the old Soviet Union, China is part of the world economy. Instead, in an era when statesmanship is in short supply, the West needs to find a statesmanlike middle ground. That starts with an understanding of sharp power and how it works.

Influencing the influencers

Like many countries, China has long tried to use visas, grants, investments and culture to pursue its interests. But its actions have recently grown more intimidating and encompassing. Its sharp power has a series of interlocking components: subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self-censorship. For China, the ultimate prize is pre-emptive kowtowing by those whom it has not approached, but who nonetheless fear losing funding, access or influence.

China has a history of spying on its diaspora, but the subversion has spread. In Australia and New Zealand Chinese money is alleged to have bought influence in politics, with party donations or payments to individual politicians. This week’s complaint from German intelligence said that China was using the LinkedIn business network to ensnare politicians and government officials, by having people posing as recruiters and think-tankers and offering free trips.

Bullying has also taken on a new menace. Sometimes the message is blatant, as when China punished Norway economically for awarding a Nobel peace prize to a Chinese pro-democracy activist. More often, as when critics of China are not included in speaker line-ups at conferences, or academics avoid study of topics that China deems sensitive, individual cases seem small and the role of officials is hard to prove. But the effect can be grave. Western professors have been pressed to recant. Foreign researchers may lose access to Chinese archives. Policymakers may find that China experts in their own countries are too ill-informed to help them.

Because China is so integrated into economic, political and cultural life, the West is vulnerable to such pressure. Western governments may value trade over scoring diplomatic points, as when Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticising China’s record on human rights, shortly after a Chinese firm had invested in the port of Piraeus. The economy is so big that businesses often dance to China’s tune without being told to. An Australian publisher suddenly pulled a book, citing fears of “Beijing’s agents of influence”.

What to do?

Facing complaints from Australia and Germany, China has called its critics irresponsible and paranoid—and there is indeed a danger of anti-Chinese hysteria. However, if China were being more truthful, it would point out that its desire for influence is what happens when countries become powerful.

China has a lot more at stake outside its borders today than it did. Some 10m Chinese have moved abroad since 1978. It worries that they will pick up democratic habits from foreigners and infect China itself. Separately, Chinese companies are investing in rich countries, including in resources, strategic infrastructure and farmland. China’s navy can project power far from home. Its government frets that its poor image abroad will do it harm. And as the rising superpower, China has an appetite to shape the rules of global engagement—rules created largely by America and western Europe and routinely invoked by them to justify their own actions.

To ensure China’s rise is peaceful, the West needs to make room for China’s ambition. But that does not mean anything goes. Open societies ignore China’s sharp power at their peril.

Part of their defence should be practical. Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion. All three need Chinese speakers who grasp the connection between politics and commerce in China. The Chinese Communist Party suppresses free expression, open debate and independent thought to cement its control. Merely shedding light on its sharp tactics—and shaming kowtowers—would go a long way towards blunting them.

Part should be principled. Unleashing a witch-hunt against Chinese people would be wrong; it would also make Western claims to stand for the rule of law sound hollow. Calls from American politicians for tit-for-tat “reciprocity”, over visas for academics and NGO workers, say, would be equally self-defeating. Yet ignoring manipulation in the hope that China will be more friendly in the future would only invite the next jab. Instead the West needs to stand by its own principles, with countries acting together if possible, and separately if they must. The first step in avoiding the Thucydides trap is for the West to use its own values to blunt China’s sharp power.

中国 sharp power 不占领土地却占领人心

中国不占领土地却占领人心 CHINA'S SHARP POWER

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