2024 年 7 月 24 日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Dz7bjysXLs
探索乌克兰加入北约的野心背后的迷人故事，北约 2011 年的报告《后橙色乌克兰：内部动态和外交政策优先事项》中重点介绍了这一背景。尽管目前争论激烈，但这份历史快照显示，当时乌克兰人对加入北约的支持率非常低。只有大约 20% 的乌克兰人赞成加入北约，这受到北约轰炸贝尔格莱德等过去事件的影响。即使是由亚努科维奇总统领导的政府也选择了“非集团政策”，避免军事政治联盟。该文件表明，乌克兰最终需要在西方或俄罗斯之间做出选择，这对中立的可持续性产生了怀疑。
乌克兰的北约梦：可能引发全球冲突的导火索
梅德韦杰夫的警告：乌克兰加入北约是宣战吗？探索影响欧洲安全未来的高风险紧张局势
詹姆斯·布劳尔 2024 年 7 月 17 日
乌克兰加入北约的愿望和俄罗斯的反应：利害攸关？
俄罗斯安全委员会副主席德米特里·梅德韦杰夫就乌克兰可能加入北约发出了严厉警告，地缘政治格局岌岌可危。梅德韦杰夫在一份充满不祥色彩的声明中将乌克兰加入北约描述为向莫斯科宣战，强调了俄罗斯与北约之间的深刻紧张关系。这一发展引发了关于欧洲安全未来和更广泛的全球冲突可能性的关键问题。
北约对乌克兰的承诺
在最近的北约峰会上，领导人承诺支持乌克兰“不可逆转地全面融入欧洲-大西洋，包括加入北约”。然而，加入北约的时间表仍未确定，反映出这一问题的复杂性和敏感性。自乌克兰独立以来，北约对乌克兰的支持一直坚定不移，特别是在俄罗斯于 2014 年吞并克里米亚以及乌克兰东部持续冲突之后，这种支持进一步加强。
梅德韦杰夫的警告
梅德韦杰夫是俄罗斯政坛的知名人物，也是克里姆林宫鹰派中的关键人物，他在接受《论据与事实》采访时直言不讳。他强调，乌克兰加入北约将升级为对俄罗斯安全的直接威胁，相当于延迟宣战。这与克里姆林宫长期以来的叙述一致，即认为北约东扩是侵略性的，侵犯了俄罗斯的势力范围。
梅德韦杰夫表示：“多年来，俄罗斯的对手一直在对我们采取扩大联盟的行动……将北约推向了无可挽回的地步。”这种情绪反映了俄罗斯更广泛地将北约视为直接对手的看法，加剧了人们对全面军事对抗的担忧。
紧张的历史
自 1949 年北约成立以来，北约一直是西方防御战略的基石，最初旨在对抗苏联的军事力量。苏联解体后，北约扩大到包括前东欧集团国家，莫斯科将此举视为战略包围。这一历史背景对于理解俄罗斯强烈反对北约进一步扩张至关重要，尤其是反对进入乌克兰，俄罗斯认为乌克兰在其势力范围内。
升级的风险
鉴于当前的地缘政治气候，梅德韦杰夫的言论尤其令人担忧。他警告说，北约继续支持乌克兰，包括提供先进武器，可能会激起俄罗斯的强烈反应。梅德韦杰夫警告说：“这种企图越多，我们的回应就越严厉”，暗示可能会出现灾难性的升级，包括核冲突。
这种言论并不新鲜，但随着乌克兰冲突的持续，这种言论的紧迫感越来越强烈。梅德韦杰夫在总统任期内（2008-2012 年）从亲西方的现代化主义者转变为坚定的鹰派，凸显了俄罗斯对西方的政策和情绪的转变。
对全球安全的影响
乌克兰可能加入北约的影响远远超出了地区政治。任命马克·吕特为北约秘书长虽然意义重大，但莫斯科认为，这无助于改变北约的基本立场。梅德韦杰夫尖锐地指出，北约内部的真正决定是由美国推动的，这进一步证实了莫斯科和华盛顿之间的双边关系是这场地缘政治僵局的核心这一观点。
北约的扩张战略和俄罗斯的咄咄逼人的姿态形成了一种不稳定的组合，有可能破坏全球安全。随着北约继续坚持对乌克兰的承诺，而俄罗斯的反应越来越敌视，爆发更广泛冲突的风险越来越大。
结论
德米特里·梅德韦杰夫的警告标志着国际关系进入了一个关键时刻。乌克兰寻求加入北约是一个爆发点，可能会重新定义欧洲乃至世界的安全态势。由于北约和俄罗斯都坚持自己的立场，国际社会面临着一项艰巨的任务，即驾驭这些危险的水域，以防止可能造成毁灭性全球后果的升级。
了解利害关系和历史背景对于理解当前危机至关重要。它强调了外交努力的重要性以及战略审慎的必要性，以避免可能破坏全球和平与安全的冲突。
橙色革命后的乌克兰外交政策
2005 年 3 月 5 日
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/ukraines-foreign-policy-after-the-orange-revolution
乌克兰学者 Oleksandr Merezhko 讨论了乌克兰最近总统选举的结果如何影响其与俄罗斯、美国和欧洲的关系。
乌克兰的民主橙色革命不仅对乌克兰的政治气候产生了巨大影响，而且对全球事务也产生了巨大影响。它证明了尽管库奇马政府试图操纵舆论，但人民的意愿确实很重要。但其他国家可以从这一经验中学到的主要教训是，和平、非暴力的抵抗可以发出有效的信息并推翻独裁政权。
橙色革命将影响乌克兰与其三个主要伙伴的关系：俄罗斯、美国和欧洲。形象地说，俄罗斯和乌克兰让我想起了连体双胞胎。从历史上看，俄罗斯一直是乌克兰最亲密的战略伙伴，也将继续如此。在普京总统竞选期间公开支持维克多·亚努科维奇之后，俄罗斯和乌克兰试图修复关系并建立新的关系就显得尤为重要，这种关系应以相互尊重、不干涉内政和承认乌克兰有权与欧盟建立更紧密的关系为基础。
乌克兰与美国的关系似乎更加不平衡。乌克兰视美国为其政治独立的保证人；然而，乌克兰打算从伊拉克撤出军事部队。尽管这一决定可能对双边关系产生负面影响，但它反映了乌克兰领导层根据国家利益制定政策的独立性。乌克兰政治精英认识到，对美国来说，俄罗斯比乌克兰更重要。因此，乌克兰必须制定灵活的外交政策，以便在追求国家利益的同时巧妙地平衡与俄罗斯和美国的关系。
关于与欧洲的关系，乌克兰总统维克多·尤先科已将加入欧盟作为一项战略目标。乌克兰新领导层打算在努力建立正式加入欧盟的谈判的同时，维护该国作为欧盟准成员国的地位。但迄今为止，欧盟仍忽视乌克兰的成员国地位，这可能会对欧洲的未来产生严重影响。如果欧盟继续将乌克兰视为欧洲和俄罗斯之间的缓冲区，欧洲和西方可能会发现乌克兰重新回到俄罗斯的轨道上。
乌克兰革命可以看作是一个动态过程，其最终目标是用更透明、更自由的政治制度取代独裁统治。许多人还希望新领导层能将乌克兰的犯罪寡头经济转变为更自由的自由市场经济。橙色革命开启了乌克兰历史的新篇章，并给乌克兰一个独特的机会，使其在国内真正的民主和社会正义以及与邻国稳定和安全的关系的基础上塑造自己的未来。
当北约承认不到 20% 的乌克兰人希望加入北约时
作者：Bharat Dogra 20/07/2024
https://countercurrents.org/2024/07/when-nato-admitted-that-less-than-20-people-of-ukraine-want-its-membership/
美国总统乔·拜登于 2024 年 7 月 11 日在华盛顿特区北约峰会期间会见了乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基。图片来源：Getty Images。
由于乌克兰加入北约的问题最近引起了广泛的讨论，有必要回顾一下，2011 年北约曾关切地注意到乌克兰人民对这一成员资格的接受度极低。
这可以从北约文件《后橙色乌克兰：内部动态和外交政策优先事项》中看出，该文件由北约议会民主治理小组委员会于 2011 年 10 月准备。
该文件明确指出：“乌克兰与北约关系面临的最大挑战在于乌克兰人民对北约的看法。北约成员国在该国并未得到广泛支持，一些民意调查显示，民众对北约的支持率不到 20%。”
该文件进一步指出，北约轰炸贝尔格莱德在乌克兰尤其不受欢迎。
尽管乌克兰努力改善北约在乌克兰人民中的看法，但该文件指出，“对许多乌克兰人来说，北约的形象仍然唤起一种恐惧感。”
不仅仅是成员国；大多数乌克兰人似乎也反对与北约建立其他形式的密切关系。正如该文件所写，“大多数乌克兰人既不支持加入北约，也不支持与北约进行更密切的合作。”
如果这是人民的观点，那么此时（本文引用的文件是在 2011 年 10 月准备的）由亚努科维奇总统领导的民选政府的观点是什么？
该文件告诉我们我们——亚努科维奇先生明确表示，乌克兰不再需要加入北约（乌克兰加入北约是 2008 年北约峰会上接受的一项政策决定）。
该文件指出——2010 年 6 月，总统签署了一项法案，要求乌克兰采取“非集团政策，即不参与军事政治联盟”。更重要的是，反对派领导人也对此表示支持。一些反对派领导人认为，乌克兰的外交政策已经变得更加平衡。
因此，如果人民、政府和主要反对派人物不支持加入北约，事情就应该到此结束。
然而，北约文件并没有表达对乌克兰反对加入北约的日益一致的高兴或乐观。
相反，该文件表达了这种中立可能会结束或应该结束的可能性。更确切地说，该文件指出，“乌克兰没有就长期保持西方和俄罗斯之间的平衡方针是否有可能达成共识。可以说，这两个方向至少部分是矛盾的，乌克兰最终需要明确选择自己的道路。”此外，该文件更明确地指出，北约的大门仍然为乌克兰敞开。
文件中没有给出采取这一立场的理由，尽管常识会表明相反——长期的中立政策对乌克兰的稳定和进步非常有用。尽管乌克兰人越来越一致地认为他们需要中立和平衡，但该文件对乌克兰继续走中立道路表示了严重怀疑。
其他人也指出，乌克兰缺乏对加入北约或与北约建立更紧密关系政策的支持。挪威东南大学 (USN) 的 Glenn Diesen 教授在他最近的文章《用理想主义摧毁乌克兰》中写道（可以在作者的 substack 或 Brave New Europe 网站上阅读，2024 年 7 月 17 日），“西方公众很少被告知，1991 年至 2014 年之间的每一项民意调查都表明，只有极少数乌克兰人想加入北约 (NATO)。"
此外，西方高级外交官、学者和其他以致力于和平而闻名的专家一直在警告北约东扩，特别是不要让乌克兰成为北约成员。
美国外交部门苏联事务高级专家、后来担任美国驻莫斯科大使的约翰·马特洛克 (John Matlock) 在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时表示，“如果冷战结束后北约没有扩张，就不会有当前危机的基础。”他进一步补充说：“普京的要求非常合理。”众所周知，当时俄罗斯的主要担忧是乌克兰不应加入北约。
此前，英国驻俄罗斯前大使罗德里克·莱恩 (Roderic Lyne) 曾在 2020 年警告说，推动乌克兰加入北约是一个巨大的错误。他甚至更不祥地表示：“如果你想与俄罗斯开战，这是最好的办法。”（R.Lyne，牛津大学访谈系列：Nikita Gyazin 采访罗德里克·莱恩爵士，牛津大学联盟，2020 年 12 月 18 日）。
前德国总理安格拉·默克尔表示，俄罗斯会将乌克兰加入北约的可能性解读为宣战。（A. Welsh——安格拉·默克尔谈乌克兰、普京及其遗产，德国之声，2022 年 6 月 7 日）。
此前，包括前高级军官、外交官和参议员在内的 50 名美国外交政策专家签署了一封题为“北约扩张是历史性的政策错误”的信函。乌克兰新任间谍头目联系了美国中央情报局和 M16，建立针对俄罗斯的秘密行动伙伴关系（最终导致美国中央情报局在俄罗斯边境建立了 12 个间谍基地）。如果没有事先计划，这种事情不可能这么快开始。
Ukraine's NATO Dreams: The Flashpoint That Could Ignite Global Conflict
https://futureforwardnewsletter.beehiiv.com/p/ukraine-nato-membership-russia-reaction-global-security
Medvedev's Warning: Is Ukraine's NATO Membership a Declaration of War? Explore the High-Stakes Tensions Shaping Europe's Security Future
James Brauer July 17, 2024
UKRAINE’S NATO ASPIRATIONS AND RUSSIA'S REACTION: WHAT'S AT STAKE?
The geopolitical landscape is on edge as Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council, issued a stark warning regarding Ukraine's potential accession to NATO. In a statement laden with ominous overtones, Medvedev described Ukraine's membership in the alliance as tantamount to a declaration of war against Moscow, underscoring the profound tensions between Russia and NATO. This development raises critical questions about the future of European security and the potential for broader global conflict.
NATO's Commitment to Ukraine
At the recent NATO summit, leaders pledged to support Ukraine on an "irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership." However, the timeline for this membership remains open-ended, reflecting the complexities and sensitivities surrounding the issue. NATO’s support for Ukraine has been steadfast since the country's independence, particularly intensifying after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
Medvedev's Warning
Medvedev, a prominent figure in Russian politics and a key voice among the Kremlin’s hawks, did not mince words in his interview with Argumenty I Fakty. He emphasized that Ukraine joining NATO would escalate beyond a direct threat to Russia's security, equating it to a delayed declaration of war. This aligns with the longstanding Kremlin narrative that views NATO's eastward expansion as aggressive and encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence.
"The actions that Russia's opponents have been taking against us for years, expanding the alliance ... take NATO to the point of no return," Medvedev stated. This sentiment reflects a broader Russian perception of NATO as a direct adversary, exacerbating fears of a full-scale military confrontation.
A History of Tensions
Since NATO's inception in 1949, the alliance has been a cornerstone of Western defense strategy, originally designed to counter Soviet military power. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded to include former Eastern Bloc countries, a move viewed by Moscow as a strategic encirclement. This historical context is crucial in understanding Russia's vehement opposition to further NATO expansion, particularly into Ukraine, which Russia considers within its sphere of influence.
The Risks of Escalation
Medvedev’s remarks are particularly alarming given the current geopolitical climate. He has warned that continued NATO support for Ukraine, including the supply of advanced weaponry, could provoke severe responses from Russia. "The more such attempts there are, the harsher our answers will become," Medvedev warned, hinting at the potential for catastrophic escalation, including nuclear conflict.
This rhetoric is not new but has taken on a heightened sense of urgency as the conflict in Ukraine continues to grind on. Medvedev's transformation from a pro-Western modernizer during his presidency (2008-2012) to a staunch hawk underscores the shift in Russian policy and sentiment towards the West.
Implications for Global Security
The implications of Ukraine's potential NATO membership extend far beyond regional politics. The appointment of Mark Rutte as NATO's Secretary-General, while significant, is seen by Moscow as inconsequential in altering the alliance's fundamental stance. Medvedev pointedly noted that real decisions within NATO are driven by the United States, reinforcing the view that bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington are at the heart of this geopolitical standoff.
NATO's expansion strategy and Russia’s aggressive posturing create a volatile mix with the potential to destabilize global security. As NATO continues to assert its commitment to Ukraine, and as Russia responds with increasing hostility, the risk of a broader conflict looms large.
Conclusion
The warnings from Dmitry Medvedev signal a critical juncture in international relations. Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership represents a flashpoint that could redefine the security dynamics of Europe and potentially the world. As both NATO and Russia hold firm in their positions, the international community faces the daunting task of navigating these treacherous waters to prevent an escalation that could have devastating global consequences.
Understanding the stakes and the historical context is essential for comprehending the current crisis. It underscores the importance of diplomatic efforts and the need for strategic prudence to avert a conflict that could shatter global peace and security.
What we have discovered in a 13 year old Report
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Dz7bjysXLs
Explore the fascinating backstory of Ukraine's NATO membership ambitions, highlighted in NATO's 2011 report, "Post Orange Ukraine: Internal Dynamics and Foreign Policy Priorities." Despite the current heated debate, this historical snapshot reveals that support for NATO membership among Ukrainians was strikingly low at the time. Only about 20% of Ukrainians favored joining NATO, influenced by past events like NATO's bombing of Belgrade. Even the government, led by President Yanukovych, opted for a 'non-bloc policy,' avoiding military-political alliances. The document suggested that Ukraine would eventually need to choose between the West or Russia, casting doubt on the sustainability of neutrality.
Ukraine's Foreign Policy after the Orange Revolution
March 5, 2005
Ukraine Scholar Oleksandr Merezhko discusses how the outcome of Ukraine's recent presidential may impact its relations with Russia, the United States, and Europe.
The democratic Orange Revolution in Ukraine had a tremendous effect upon the political climate not only in Ukraine, but also on global affairs. It proved that the will of the people genuinely matters, despite the Kuchma government's attempts to manipulate public opinion. But the major lesson other countries can learn from this experience is that peaceful, nonviolent resistance can send an effective message and oust authoritarian regimes.
The Orange Revolution will impact Ukraine's relations with its three key partners: Russia, the United States, and Europe. Russia and Ukraine, figuratively speaking, remind me of Siamese twins. Russia historically has been, and will remain, Ukraine's closest strategic partner. It is especially important, after President Putin's overt support of Viktor Yanukovich during the election campaign, that Russia and Ukraine try to mend fences and build new relations based on mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and recognition of Ukraine's right to pursue closer relations with the European Union.
Ukrainian-U.S. relations seem more uneven. Ukraine views America as a guarantor of its political independence; however, Ukraine intends to withdraw its military contingent from Iraq. Even though this decision may negatively impact bilateral relations, it reflects the Ukrainian leadership's independence in setting policy in accordance with its national interest. Ukraine's political elite recognizes that, for the United States, Russia is a higher priority than Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine must develop a flexible foreign policy so it can skillfully balance relations with Russia and the United States while pursuing its national interests.
Regarding relations with Europe, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has made EU membership a strategic goal. Ukraine's new leadership intends to safeguard the country's status of EU associate member while trying to establish talks toward full-fledged membership. But to date, the EU continues to overlook Ukraine's membership, which may have serious repercussions for the future of Europe. If the EU continues to view Ukraine as a buffer zone between Europe and Russia, Europe and the West might find Ukraine sliding back into Russia's orbit.
Ukraine's revolution can be viewed as a dynamic process, the ultimate goal of which is to replace authoritarian rule with a more transparent and liberal political system. Many also hope the new leadership will transform Ukraine's criminal oligarchic economy into a more liberal version of a free-market economy. The Orange Revolution initiated a new chapter in Ukraine's history, and has given Ukraine a unique chance to shape its future on the basis of true democracy and social justice at home and on stable and secure relations with its neighbors.
The Orange Revolution will impact Ukraine's relations with its three key partners: Russia, the United States, and Europe. Russia and Ukraine, figuratively speaking, remind me of Siamese twins. Russia historically has been, and will remain, Ukraine's closest strategic partner. It is especially important, after President Putin's overt support of Viktor Yanukovich during the election campaign, that Russia and Ukraine try to mend fences and build new relations based on mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and recognition of Ukraine's right to pursue closer relations with the European Union.
Ukrainian-U.S. relations seem more uneven. Ukraine views America as a guarantor of its political independence; however, Ukraine intends to withdraw its military contingent from Iraq. Even though this decision may negatively impact bilateral relations, it reflects the Ukrainian leadership's independence in setting policy in accordance with its national interest. Ukraine's political elite recognizes that, for the United States, Russia is a higher priority than Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine must develop a flexible foreign policy so it can skillfully balance relations with Russia and the United States while pursuing its national interests.
Regarding relations with Europe, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has made EU membership a strategic goal. Ukraine's new leadership intends to safeguard the country's status of EU associate member while trying to establish talks toward full-fledged membership. But to date, the EU continues to overlook Ukraine's membership, which may have serious repercussions for the future of Europe. If the EU continues to view Ukraine as a buffer zone between Europe and Russia, Europe and the West might find Ukraine sliding back into Russia's orbit.
Ukraine's revolution can be viewed as a dynamic process, the ultimate goal of which is to replace authoritarian rule with a more transparent and liberal political system. Many also hope the new leadership will transform Ukraine's criminal oligarchic economy into a more liberal version of a free-market economy. The Orange Revolution initiated a new chapter in Ukraine's history, and has given Ukraine a unique chance to shape its future on the basis of true democracy and social justice at home and on stable and secure relations with its neighbors.
When NATO admitted that less than 20% people of Ukraine want its membership
by Bharat Dogra 20/07/2024
U.S. President Joe Biden meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington D.C. on July 11, 2024. Photo credit: Getty Images.
As the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership has been debated so extensively recently, it is useful to recall that in 2011 NATO had noted with concern the extremely low acceptability of this membership among the people of Ukraine.
This can be seen in a NATO document titled ‘Post Orange Ukraine: Internal dynamics and foreign policy priorities’ prepared by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance in October 2011.
This document states very clearly, “The greatest challenge for Ukrainian-NATO relations lies in the perception of NATO among the Ukrainian people. NATO membership is not widely supported in the country, with some polls suggesting that popular support of it is less than 20 per cent.”
Further this document notes that NATO bombing of Belgrade was particularly unpopular in Ukraine.
Despite efforts being made to improve the perception of NATO among the people of Ukraine, this document noted, “for many Ukrainians the image of NATO still evokes a sense of fear.”
It is not just membership; most Ukrainians appeared to also oppose other kinds of close relations with NATO. As this document writes, “A majority of Ukrainians supports neither membership of NATO nor even closer cooperation with the Alliance.”
If this was the view of the people, what was the view of the democratically elected government led by President Yanukovych at this point of time (when the document being quoted here was prepared in October 2011)?
This document tells us –Mr. Yanukovych made it clear that Ukraine no longer needs NATO membership (membership of Ukraine was accepted as a policy decision at the 2008 NATO summit).
The document states–In June 2010, the President signed a bill which commits Ukraine to a ‘non-bloc policy which means non-participation in military-political alliances’. What is more, there was also support of important opposition leaders for this. Some opposition leaders believed that Ukraine’s foreign policy had become more balanced.
So if the people, the government and the leading opposition figures were not for NATO membership, the matter should have ended there.
However the NATO document did not express its happiness or optimism with this growing agreement in Ukraine for opposing NATO membership.
Instead the document expressed the likelihood that this neutrality would end or should end. More precisely, the document stated, “There is no consensus in Ukraine whether maintaining a balanced approach between the West and Russia is possible in the long run. It can be argued that these two vectors are at least partly contradictory, and that Ukraine would eventually need to clearly choose its path.” Further this document stated even more clearly that the doors of NATO remain open for Ukraine.
No reasons for taking this position are given in the document, although common sense would suggest the contrary– that a longer-term policy of neutrality would be very useful for the stability and progress of Ukraine. Serious doubts are expressed in the document regarding the continuation of the neutrality path by Ukraine despite growing agreement among the Ukrainians that they need neutrality and balance.
Others have also pointed out the lack of support for the policy of NATO membership or closer relations with NATO in Ukraine. Prof. Glenn Diesen of the University of South-Eastern Norway (USN) has written in his recent essay titled ‘Destroying Ukraine with Idealism’ (this can be read at the author’s substack or at Brave New Europe website, July 17 2024), “The Western public is rarely informed that every opinion poll between 1991 and 2014 demonstrated that only a very small minority of Ukrainians ever wanted to join the alliance (NATO).”
In addition all the time senior western diplomats, academics and other experts who are known for their commitment to peace have been warning against the eastwards expansion of NATO in general and making Ukraine a member of NATO in particular.
John Matlock, top expert on Soviet affairs in the US Foreign Service who was later US ambassador in Moscow stated around the time of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, “There would have been no basis for the present crisis if there had been no expansion of the alliance (NATO) following the end of the Cold War.” He further added, “What Putin is demanding is eminently reasonable.” As is well-known the main concern of Russia at that time was that there should be no NATO membership of Ukraine.
Earlier the former British ambassador of UK to Russia, Roderic Lyne had warned in 2020 that it was a huge mistake to push the NATO membership for Ukraine. He stated even more ominously, “If you want to start a war with Russia, that’s the best way of doing it.” (R.Lyne, the UC interview series : Sir Roderic Lyne by Nikita Gyazin, Oxford University Consortium, 18 December 2020).
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Russia would interpret the possibility of Ukraine’s NATO membership as a declaration of war. (A. Welsh—Angela Merkel opens up on Ukraine, Putin and her legacy, Deutsche Welle, 7 June 2022).
Earlier 50 foreign policy experts of the USA including former senior military officers, diplomats and senators had signed a letter titled “NATO expansion a policy error of historical proportions.”
So we had a situation around year 2013-14 in which Ukrainian people, government and opposition leaders were against Ukraine’s membership of NATO and prominent western experts and leaders known for desiring peace had serious concerns regarding the high costs and undesirability of NATO membership of Ukraine.
In this situation the USA and close allies instigated a coup in 2014 to oust the democratically elected government of Ukraine and install a regime that would follow the dictates of the USA. As the leaked Nuland-Pyatt phone conversation revealed, the USA was planning a regime change, who would be in positions of power, who would be kept out, how some justification for coup would be found. (BBC Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call, 7 February 2014).
The general prosecutor of Ukraine Vikror Shokin later complained that since 2014, “the most shocking thing is that all the (government) appointments were made in agreement with the US.” (Newsweek, Does Ukraine have kompromat on Joe Biden, 8 August, 2023).
A Entous and M.Schwirtz reported in The New York Times (The Spy War—How the CIA secretly helps Ukraine fight Putin, 25 February, 2024) that on the first day following the coup, Ukraine’s new spy chief contacted the CIA and M16 to establish a partnership for covert operations against Russia (ultimately leading to 12 CIA spying bases along the Russian border). This kind of thing could not have been started so quickly without previous planning.
