Ng Eng Hen 新加坡前防长解读北京和华盛顿在亚洲的意图

Facebook  https://www.facebook.com/ngenghen/

Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore

https://www.aspensecurityforum.org/2024-asf-speakers/ng-eng-hen-

 黄永宏(1958 年 12 月 10 日出生)[1] 是新加坡政治家和前肿瘤学家,自 2011 年起担任国防部长。他是执政的人民行动党 (PAP) 成员,自 2001 年起担任碧山-大巴窑集选区大巴窑中区国会议员。进入政界之前,黄永宏是新加坡中央医院 (SGH) 的外科顾问医生,后来成为伊丽莎白医院的私人外科肿瘤学家。

在担任国防部长之前,黄曾在 2004 年至 2005 年担任教育部第二部长,2004 年至 2008 年担任人力部长,2005 年至 2011 年担任国防部第二部长,2011 年至 2015 年担任下议院领袖。黄还是 SAFRA 理事会主席。

早年生活和教育

黄是新加坡华裔兴华人,童年时与五个兄弟姐妹住在锡安路的一套出租公寓里。他在英华学校和国家初级学院接受教育,之后在新加坡国立大学完成医学院学业。他还在德克萨斯大学 MD 安德森癌症中心接受了外科肿瘤学的进修培训。[2]

黄先生于 1992 年至 1997 年担任新加坡中央医院的外科顾问医生,之后于 1997 年至 2001 年在伊丽莎白医院担任外科肿瘤学家,开始私人执业。[3]

政治生涯

黄先生于 2001 年大选中首次亮相政坛,作为人民行动党五人团队的一员,在碧山-大巴窑集选区竞选,并以毫无悬念的胜利获胜,并当选为碧山-大巴窑集选区大巴窑中区国会议员。自 2001 年以来,他一直担任该区的国会议员,并在随后的大选中成功保住了席位。他还是碧山-大巴窑镇议会和碧山-大巴窑基层组织的顾问。

2002 年,黄永宏被任命为教育部政务部长和人力部政务部长。[4]

2004 年 8 月,黄永宏升任部长,并被任命为人力部部长和教育部第二部长。2005 年,他辞去教育部第二部长一职,出任国防部第二部长。[5] 2008 年 4 月,他辞去人力部部长一职,出任教育部长。

黄永宏还曾担任人力部就业工作组主席和低薪工人部际委员会主席。

2007 年 6 月,黄永宏应法国国防部邀请参观巴黎航空展,并参观了驻扎在卡佐空军基地的新加坡共和国空军 (RSAF) 常驻支队。[6][7]

2010 年 3 月,黄永宏提到,由于新加坡教育体系强调英语,小学离校考试(PSLE)中母语考试的比重可能会降低,以便让一些母语较弱的学生受益。这引发了支持在教育中强调母语的新加坡人的争论。黄永宏随后向新加坡人保证,PSLE 中母语的比重不会降低。

在 2011 年大选中,黄永宏作为人民行动党五人小组的一员,在碧山-大巴窑集选区竞选,赢得了 56.93% 的选票,击败了新加坡人民党。

2011 年,黄永宏辞去教育部长一职,被任命为国防部长。在国会,他于 2007 年至 2011 年担任下议院副领袖,后来于 2011 年至 2015 年担任下议院领袖。[5]

2015 年大选期间,黄永宏率领人民行动党五人团队在碧山-大巴窑集选区竞选,在人民党第二次挑战下,赢得 73.59% 的选票。

2018 年,法国政府授予黄永宏法国荣誉军团勋章。[8][9]

2020 年大选期间,黄永宏率领人民行动党四人团队在碧山-大巴窑集选区竞选,在人民党挑战下,赢得约 67% 的选票。[10]

个人生活

黄永宏的妻子是儿科医生和遗传学家黄瑞莲,她一直担任新加坡保健集团的首席执行官[11],两人育有四个孩子。

新加坡卫生服务集团 Singapore Health Services 或 SingHealth

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SingHealth

该集团成立于 2000 年,由四家公立医院、三家社区医院、五家国家专科中心和八家综合诊所网络组成。新加坡中央医院 (SGH) 是该集团中最大的医院,也是该集团的旗舰医院。

新加坡如何应对中美紧张局势

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/singapore-manage-u-s-china-tensions-ng-eng-hen/?

这个城市国家的国防部长解读了北京和华盛顿在亚洲的意图。

《外交政策》主编拉维·阿格拉沃尔 (Ravi Agrawal) 撰稿 2024 年 7 月 18 日

很少有国家比新加坡更善于解读中美关系。这个小而富裕的城市国家与华盛顿和北京有着广泛的联系,了解双方。它知道利害关系。它致力于将两国拉到一起,避免印太地区发生冲突。新加坡主办一年一度的香格里拉对话,世界各地的国防部长都出席了会议。上个月,该峰会成为中美国防部长高层会晤的举办地。

很少有国家比新加坡更善于解读中美关系。这个小而富裕的城市国家与华盛顿和北京有着广泛的联系,了解双方。它知道利害关系。新加坡致力于将两国拉近距离,避免印太地区发生冲突。新加坡每年都会主办香格里拉对话,各国国防部长都会出席。上个月,中美国防部长在香格里拉对话峰会上举行了高层会晤。

那么,新加坡如何看待世界?在科罗拉多州阿斯彭安全论坛开幕之夜,我与新加坡国防部长黄永宏就一系列问题进行了交谈,从美国的软实力到中国的自信。以下是谈话记录,为清晰起见,我们对其进行了轻微编辑和压缩。

拉维·阿格拉沃尔:黄部长,毫无疑问,在过去十年左右的时间里,中国变得更加好战。正如您所理解的那样,您认为为什么中国人在过去十年左右的时间里变得更加自信和好战?

黄永宏:我并不假装了解中国,也不假装为中国辩护。那么让我来阐述一下我们的观点。我们有两个冲突战场,对吧?一个在乌克兰。另一个在 10 月 7 日哈马斯袭击之后开始。以色列国防军的报复和报复对我们所有人都是痛苦的。但更大的问题是,它可能扩展到加沙和以色列之外。

我们承受不起亚洲第三个冲突战场。首先,我认为体制无法承受。但我认为更重要的是,我认为开战的理由根本不存在,至少现在还没有。

RA:当然。但你是一位敏锐的中国观察家。从与对话者的交谈中,你能试着解释一下他们如何看待世界以及他们为什么这样做吗?

NEH:好吧,如果你把自己放在中国,他们做的很多事情对他们来说都是有意义的。我并不是说他们没有犯过任何错误。但是,比如在南海修建岛礁,将他们的前沿防线向前推进几百公里,这在军事战略上是完全合理的。岛链概念是美国的概念,旨在遏制中国。从这个角度来看,如果他们能做到,他们就会这么做。他们也确实这么做了。

你所描述的在南海的强硬态度可能是一种糟糕的外交政策。如果你平静而坦率地和他们交谈,他们会说他们并没有对每一寸海域都提出主权要求。他们公开这么说,但私下里却说他们没有。如何收回这些主权是他们需要处理的问题。

RA:让我反过来问这个问题。美国对华政策在过去七八年里也发生了巨大变化。这让你担心吗?

NEH:是的。但让我试着重新审视一下。今天的中国是对 20 世纪 60 年代到 21 世纪美国伟大外交政策的精彩见证。事实上,整个亚洲都是如此。从肯尼迪总统开始,历届政府都曾表示,“任何形式的殖民控制都不应被铁腕专制所取代”,当时美国率先发起了反共斗争。克林顿总统支持中国加入世贸组织。

他说服两党的理由是,这对亚洲的安全很重要。从这个角度来看,从 1960 年代到 2010 年左右,美国的外交政策始终如一,致力于建立一个让大国和小国都受益的全球体系。其成果十分惊人。从经济上讲,中国现在占世界贸易的 17%,经济规模为 17 万亿美元。[美国仍以 28 万亿美元位居第一。]但有 8 亿人摆脱了贫困。从历史上看,没有任何国家能做到这一点。在 1960 年代,如果把整个亚洲算在内,它占全球贸易的 4%。现在这个比例是 30%。所有这些都是美国的成功。

RA:我注意到你止步于 2010 年。那么 2010 年至 2024 年呢?

NEH:推动全球化的动力突然转变,并决定为全球化创建的机构不适用于这一进程。该法案没有通过,但美国试图退出世贸组织。巴黎协定。拉

How Singapore Manages U.S.-China Tensions

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/singapore-manage-u-s-china-tensions-ng-eng-hen/

The city-state's defense minister decodes what Beijing and Washington want in Asia.

By Ravi Agrawal, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy.  July 18, 2024

Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what's at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.

Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.

So, how does Singapore see the world? I spoke with the country’s defense minister, Ng Eng Hen, on a range of issues, from U.S. soft power to Chinese assertiveness, on the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. What follows is a transcript, lightly edited and condensed for clarity.

Ravi Agrawal: Minister Ng, there’s little question now that over the last decade or so, China has just become a lot more belligerent. As you understand them, why do you think the Chinese have shifted in the last decade or so to become more assertive and belligerent?

Ng Eng Hen: I don’t pretend to understand China or to be an apologist for China. So let me frame our perspective. We have two theaters of conflict, right? One in Ukraine. And you have one which started after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. The retaliation and the retribution by the IDF is painful for all of us. But the greater problem there is that it can expand beyond Gaza and Israel.

We can ill afford a third theater of conflict in Asia. First, I don’t think the system can take it. But I think more importantly, I think the reasons for casus belli are simply not there, or at least not yet.

RA: Well, sure. But you’re an astute observer of China. From speaking to your interlocutors, can you try and explain how are they seeing the world and why they’re acting as they are?

NEH: Well, if you situate yourself in China, a lot of things that they’re doing make sense to them. I’m not saying they didn’t make any mistakes. But to build, for example, features within the South China Sea to move their forward defense line a couple of hundred kilometers makes perfect military strategic sense. The island chain concept was an American concept, and it was meant to contain China. And, from that point of view, if they could do it, they would. So they did.

The assertiveness you were describing in the South China Sea was probably a bad foreign policy. If you speak to them quietly and candidly, they say that they don’t claim every inch of water. They’ve said so publicly, but in private, they say they don’t. How to roll it back is something that they need to deal with.

RA: So let me flip that question. America’s approach toward China has also changed dramatically in the last seven or eight years. Does that worry you?

NEH: It does.

But let me try to reframe it. The China of today is a wonderful testament to great American foreign policy from the 1960s to the 2000s. In fact, the whole of Asia is. Across administrations, starting from President Kennedy [who said] “one form of colonial control [shall] not … be replaced by an iron tyranny” in 1961 when America spearheaded the fight against communism. You talk about President Clinton, sponsoring China’s ascension into the WTO. The reason he gave to convince both sides of the aisle was that it was important for the security of Asia. Now, from that perspective, American foreign policy from the 1960s to somewhere in 2010 has been consistent in building a global system that benefited small and large countries. And the results have been spectacular. Economically, China is now 17% of world trade, with an economy of $17 trillion. [The U.S. still leads at $28 trillion.] But 800 million people were lifted out of poverty. No way, historically, has any country ever done that. In the 1960s, if you take all of Asia, it accounted for 4 percent of global trade. It’s now 30 percent. All these have been American successes.

RA: I noted you stopped at 2010 there. What about 2010 to 2024?

NEH: The moving spirit did a volte-face and decided that the institutions created for globalization didn’t work for this process. The bill didn’t pass, but America tried to get out of the WTO. The Paris Agreement. Pulling out of the TPP. So America was the moving spirit for the globalized world, for trade, for finance that would benefit small and large countries. It’s now changed. We don’t know where it will go. And I don’t think China is the only reason. And we have to ask ourselves, where will the U.S. be and where will China be?

Because the reality now for China is that from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. Now, Joseph Nye talks about soft power. Kissinger talks about legitimacy. But here’s a question for you. Can the U.S. sustain its global presence and its military presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?



RA: I’m guessing the answer is no. I mean, that was a rhetorical question.

NEH: In case you haven’t noticed, Americans weren’t always popular in Asia. In the 1960s, there was a real anti-American backlash. Now in 1990, America became more popular because basically the foreign policy worked. “A rising tide lifts all boats,” and the Asian economies grew. But, when American forces had to pull out of Clark and Subic [military bases], we offered Singapore. Today, American ships and planes are the largest user of Changi Naval Base.

So from Singapore’s perspective, we’ve held that the U.S. presence in Asia is a force for stability. We’ve said it’s indispensable. But that was of a U.S. that was leading the global charge. And [then-Singaporean Prime Minister] Lee Kuan Yew, when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 1985, said America, as a superpower, will have to decide on the rules and enforce it, which America did marvelously, I would say, for 20 years hence. Today, I would argue that it’s a different America, and one that has to be careful to maintain its moral legitimacy, even in Asia.

RA: Are you saying America has lost its moral legitimacy in Asia?

NEH: Has to maintain its moral legitimacy.

The Chinese say to us, “You ASEAN countries or Asian countries, you’re very difficult. You choose China when it comes to trade, and you choose America when it comes to military power.” So we look at them and say, “Why not?”

>>>>>

Minister for Defence Speaks at Opening Night of Aspen Security Forum

7 Jul 2024 23:00 (GMT+8)

17jul24_nr_photo1  

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen (left) spoke at the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum today. The session was moderated by Foreign Policy Editor in Chief Ravi Agrawal (right).


Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen spoke at a fireside chat panel during the opening session of the Aspen Security Forum on 17 July 2024 (Singapore Time). The opening night was attended by more than 400 distinguished leaders and key players in the security and defence community, including policy experts, military leaders, and US national security officials.

In his fireside chat panel, which was moderated by Foreign Policy’s Editor in Chief Ravi Agrawal, Dr Ng discussed the role of the US and its presence in Asia. He said, “America, which would have been the moving spirit for the globalised world for trade and finance, that would benefit small and large countries, is now changed. We do not know where we will go, and I do not think China is the only reason. And we will have to ask ourselves where will the US be, where will China be? Because the reality now, from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. The question is: Can US sustain its presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?” On US-China relations, Dr Ng highlighted that, “The US-China conundrum will decide the fates of all our nations for this decade and the next. America has to decide – the policies of “small yard, high fences”, security alliances – ultimately, its foreign policy towards China ... there are good reasons to believe that if the US can have a positive trajectory with China, it will make for certain greater stability, and certain greater growth. And I believe it is within the powers of American leadership, if not now, maybe later.”

The Aspen Security Forum is a biannual security and foreign policy conference that brings together distinguished leaders and key players in the security and defence community. The Forum has been convened annually in Colorado since 2010. Dr Ng is in the US from 15 to 18 July 2024 (Singapore Time).

YouTube Transcript

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XjTjmPHgkk?

Ravi Agrawal 

Minister  hen it's a real pleasure to have you here welcome to the United States welcome to Aspen you must be

jetlagged um so there's a lot that I

want to cover with you and I thought I'd

begin with a topic that many of us in

the west like to ask singaporeans about

China and listening to the previous

discussion you know it's there's little

question now that over the last decade

or so China's just become a lot more

belligerent uh you can speak to the

Indians about that on their border speak

to the Filipinos uh speak to the

Australians uh China is of course uh

threatening Taiwan uh it is providing

components to Russia that are aiding it

in its war on Ukraine and the question

that I want to ask you and I have been

trying to understand for some time is

why you understand the Chinese well why

do you think they have shifted in the

last decade or so to become more

assertive and belligerent


Dr Ng Eng Hen

well thank you Ravi first thank you very much to the

Aspen uh security forum for inviting me

here it's my first time to Aspen I I

don't pretend to be to understand China

or to be want to be an apologist for

China so let me frame our

perspective we have uh two theaters of

conflict right one in Ukraine from

February 24th 2022 as uh J I said the

third year of conflict military

objectives can't be achieved on either

side uh zinski doesn't want to deal with

a diplomatic ex solution which he says

publicly and he said in shangala

dialogue you have one which started

October 7 Hamas attack uh the

retaliation the retribution by the IDF

is painful for all of us but the greater

problem there is that it can expand

Beyond Gaza and Israel and I would say

that uh we can ill afford a third

theater of conflict in

Asia first I don't think we would the

system can take

but I think more importantly I think the

reasons for kasus Bai are simply not

there and not yet or at least not yet so

uh I know you ask a lot of questions but

let me stop there because I'm sure

having framed it uh the way Singapore

sees it uh you would have more specific

questions


Ravi Agrawal 

sure well I mean so once again

you're such an astute Observer of China

can you try and explain from speaking to

them from your interlocutors there how

are they seeing the world them why do

you think they're acting as they are




well if you sort of situate yourself in

China a lot of things that they're doing

seem to make sense to them I'm not

saying they didn't make any mistakes so

to uh build for example features within

the South China Sea to move their

forward defense line a couple of hundred

kilometers forward makes perfect

military strategic sense uh the island

chains concept was an American concept

and it was meant to contain China and uh

from their point of view if I could do

it I would and they did uh Us's

attention was elsewhere after 9911 and

uh they have fortified some of the

features the tribunal ruling said that

they couldn't claim anything beyond the

features tribunal ruling talked about

what uh effectivities these uh Islands

or land masses or low tide elevations

had from I think the South China Sea the

cess of the South China Sea excuse me

was probably a bad foreign policy if you

speak to them quietly and

candidly they say that they don't claim

every inch of water they've said so but

in private they say they don't how to

roll it back I think is something that

they need to deal with so that would be

um positioned in South China see we can

talk about Taiwan and we can talk about

trade uh they articulate articulated a

number of aspects on us on your position

Visa us I think um some of some of it

was born out of huis uh it helps for

economies to go through cycles and I

think it'll be a salutary effect for

China uh to be going through a difficult

period I I hope it tempers and it gives

some sense of reality but not all that

they did over the last 30 years uh would

be from their position

uh

uh against their interests so you talk

about India I agree with you uh people

didn't realize that at one point of time

we had 400,000 troops 200,000 on each

side and it could have gone very wrong

yeah indeed




so let me flip that question

now when you look at how America's

approach towards China has changed

dramatically in the last seven or eight

years does that worry you do you think

it's Justified




it does but let me try to

reframe it China China today is a

wonderful Testament of Great American

foreign

policy from the 1960s to 2000 uh in fact

the whole of Asia uh you talk across uh

administrations starting from President

Kennedy that one form of colonial

control should not be replaced by an

iron tyranny uh that was in 1961 where

America spearheaded the fight against

communism uh talk about Ronald Reagan uh

in for the coming down the Berlin Wall

winning the cow War as it were you talk

about President Clinton uh sponsoring

China's Ascension into WTO and the

reason he he gave and that he could

convince both sides the AL was that it

was important for the security of Asia

now if you ask yourself from that

perspective American foreign policy from

1960s to I think somewhere in 2010

consistent building a Global system that

benefited small and large

countries uh and the results have been

spectacular e economically China uh is

now 177% of World Trade economy of 17

trillion the US is still leading at 28

trillion but 800 million people lifted

out poverty nowhere historically is any

country ever done that asan uh in 1960s

if you take all of Asia they accounted

for 4% of global trade it's now 30% all

these have been American successes now

what's changed since then




well I noted you kind of stopped at 2010 there what what about 2010 to 2024



the moving

Spirit did a vault phase and decided

that the institutions in which created

for globalization didn't work in its

process and I think the former director

general of WTO Pascal Lami lamented this

I mean the building passed in 2022 but

this was America trying to get out of

the WTO right that was one two uh

terrorists pulling out of the TPP so

America would have been the moving

spirit for a globalized world for trade

finance that was that would benefit

small and large countries is now change

we don't know where it will go and I

don't think China is the only

reason and we'll have to ask ourselves

uh and that panel where proceeding was

fascinating we have to ask ourselves in

the future where will us be where will

China be because the reality now for

China uh from the Asian perspective

China is now the largest trading partner

for almost all countries in Asia

now we jonai talks about soft power kiss

talks about legitimacy and he has a

question for you can us sustained its

Global presence and its military

presence in Asia solely predicated on military power




I'm guessing the answer is no I mean that was a rhetorical question



in the 1960s in case you haven't noted

I'm sorry to have to say this Americans

weren't always popular in Asia in the 1960s as I said uh there was a real

anti-American backlash even though they

understood the fight against communism

uh Soo uh spoke against us and the

situation in Laos in Cambodia the

bombing didn't help my Prime my founding

prime minister was man great wisdom and

he stuck to the courage of its

convictions in 1966 he announced that

American soldiers who were based in

Vietnam could come to Singapore for an

RNR now in 1990 when America uh America

been more popular because basically the

foreign policy worked the Assan

economies that had decolonized had

rising Rising tide lifted all boats and

the assian economies grew but uh when

American American forces had to pull out

of clock and Subic we offered Singapore

not as a base because we're just too

small but even today americ American

ships and planes are the largest user

they rotate through uh Changi and Naval

bases so from Singapore's perspective

we've we've felt that the US presence in

Asia is a force for stability we say

it's indispensable but that was of a us

that was leading the global charge and

Mr leanu when you address the US

Congress in 1985 he had he said this he

said America as a hyper power superpower

will have to decide on the rules and

enforce it which America did marvelously

I would say for 20 years

hence today I would argue that it's a

different America and one that may has

to be careful to maintain its moral

legitimacy even in Asia




are you saying America's lost its moral legitimacy in Asia



it has to maintain its moral legitimacy



let me find another way of

asking you this question

so um I'll talk about a few other Arenas




so there's let me answer that in the

Chinese yes the Chinese say to us you

know you Assan countries or Asian

countries you're very

difficult you choose China when it comes

to trade and you choose America when it

comes to military power so we look at

them and says why not




fair um and you know in a sense

there are many countries now in the

global South that you know sense a

shifting world order that sense not

absolute American decline but relative

uh in relative terms relative American

Decline and a relative rise for China

and that changes things and I'm curious

as you know we're here at Aspen security

conference but you host Shangri La and

you get to see all these defense

ministers from around the world who come

there just last month your counterparts

from America and China were there I'm

curious if there were to be a skirmish

uh in the Indo Pacific what would that

look like what happens 




that would be

cataclysmic whatever the

outcome uh it would

test PEX

Americana and Discovery I think is what

we want to avoid and let me clarify that

in the third Taiwan Straits in 1995 1996

you remember President Clinton mobilized

two AC Carriers uh Chinese and missiles

pointing towards Taiwan and thankfully

uh both stood down or at least both

claimed that they stopped their

exercises uh if you had another

situation today I'm not sure what the

outcome is and I'm not sure that we want

to discover it because it won't be a

simple

uh or short outcome i' I've said

that Taiwan is not Ukraine and China is

not Russia Taiwan is an island to

resupply Taiwan you would need Japan and

Korea and draw them in uh in China is

not right Russia China is uh has got

military capabilities 177% of trade but

the effect on us will be devastating so

this is a very complex situation we

talked about you know what American's

policy is when it comes to Commerce and

trade uh the truth is we really not

quite sure how that goes but from the

security perspective I think all of us

should be very very careful to avoid any

physical conflict for for at least this

decade if not for the longer because

Discovery will be very painful and will

be probably lifechanging

if America is able

to maintain its military Supremacy in

Asia that won't stop China China will

hunker down global trade will end with

China China will spend more on military

spending and the contest will go on for

another couple of decades maybe even

more than one generation if America we

discover can't maintain its military

Supremacy I think that's the beginning

of the end of PEX

Americana uh um




I'm only going to ask

you one question uh about Donald Trump




I won't answer



I'll put it too hypothetically



nice man




hypothetically hope this year

recovers yeah we all do we in all

seriousness we all do but hypothetically

we we've all heard now several potential

ranges of what a trump 2.0 China policy

could look like ranging from you know we

will dismiss managed competition we're

in it to win it um you heard about the

trade tariffs um a lot of that would

rock the boat significantly um is

anything going on behind the scenes to try 




well it is what it is but I

would remind you that you know we've

worked with the Trump Administration for

meeting Singapore and he was very happy

with Singapore Singapore because uh we

have a trade soace with

you and mil uh security wise it was in

20 uh 15 that my prime minister leisan

renewed

theou mou the military mou to continue

American ships and planes going through

Singapore so we've worked with the Trump

Administration I I I'm not so much

concerned because it makes a big

difference but on trade and uh you had

experts talking about it now when it

comes to list I think it's possible uh

to try to have small yard high fences

and you talk about strategic

non-strategic but when you break it down

you're not quite sure because the

fundamental aspect I think it was

touched upon if you talk about trade

it's not quite trade it's information uh

information and we talked about how

electric cars can and if you ask well if

if I'm trying to protect information and

that becomes a security risk then the

yard goes bigger if you talk about

security food security interdependency

the yard goes bigger if you talk about

Capital which is the most fungible of

all it's already begun you invest in a

Chinese company that has a whole in in a

which are security aspects and therefore

you cannot do business with America or

America's companies then it becomes very

difficult and probably I think we it's

not undoable but I would humbly submit

that we are not sure it's very hard to

decipher what the real outcome of this

new industrial policy is


15:20



fair I want to ask you about the war in Gaza um in

Southeast Asia you're surrounded by a

lot of countries that have significant

Muslim populations Indonesia Malaysia

your own country as well um what is the

mood like and how are you gauging uh the

West's role in the Middle East oh anger

uh the they Singapore has a Muslim

population of

15% and uh you we had just announced um

two people that were picked up because

they were radicalized to and this was a

14-year-old boy who pledged that he

would commit Jihad so obviously effects

and um it's been difficult for countries

of that whether they have Muslim

populations or not I think the problem

is that you've radicalized another

generation wouldbe terrorists in Gaza

and elsewhere so uh we we hope that um

the violence in Gaza would end soon and

all we have done is to try to help in

give humanitarian Aid we gave air drops

to Gaza by way of

but really this I think is a longer tale

and it's unfortunate that it happened

and uh but the larger problem of course

is Iran uh and the Israelis know it and

the the progressive uh Arab states know

it how much this has um upended the

Abraham Accord I think it has I think

some of the states want to resume um

relations

with Israel but domestically in their

politics

this has made it very very difficult for

them to sell that message do you think

America given what you're saying I mean

the first word you said was anger is

America losing soft power not so much

soft power but I think across many

countries we've lost the Young on this

the young are even in Singapore

particularly insens that about the

violence and the fact that nothing is

done to stop it uh so you would lose

political support I I don't think not

not so much in soft power and some of it

uh but

there are other issues that I talked

about in terms of what do America want

to do about trade what what Asians

people I suppose don't can't wrap their

minds around is how can the US say that

the trade practice is unfair when it's

to them they're the richest country in

the world where America's you know 28

trillion economy per capita GDP uh there

may be inequality in America but when

they see America they see a rich country

so when you talk about unfair unfair

trade practices and they're not talking

about us and China they're talking about

us and them they find that difficult to

understand so if there was a plea which

ever person occupies the White House is

that uh we believe that America's

military presence should continue and we

will facilitate that we believe that

America should continue to be a global

leader in setting the rules of trade we

believe that America should continue to

trade and we and I am fully in agreement

with the previous panel to talk about

engagement the last time um the defense

ministers visited each other from us and

China was in 2018 this was Jim Mattis

and wayer I think that has to resume

very quickly I think the lines of

communication should be set up between

military to military I completely with

Ana that it's very dangerous not to have

comms it's a good thing that t chin

who's the new defense minister agreed

that he wanted more Communications with

secretary Austin so I hope whoever

occupies the White House and the new

defense minister that they would follow

up on that um your country's been

investing a lot more in defense itself I

think uh if you look at the last four

years the percentage increase has been

you know ranging between 5 and 12%

increases year on year which is quite a

lot um you're a small country but a

mighty country talk to us a little bit

about how you're thinking about defense

regionally and is this coming from a

place of fear um about potential

adversaries well uh it comes from

paranoia yeah you know paranoid survive

so but paranoid about what if you if you

know our history uh we were uh we we

separated from Malaysia and it was a

difficult time for Southeast Asia there

was threat of Communism actually our

defense spending has come down we used

to spend as much as 5% of our GDP on

defense and now spending about three

three 3.1 3.2 and I think it will be it

will stabilize of that but you're right

in nominal terms is absolutely and we

believe believe that defense is uh the

best deterrence we have we have no plans

or no capability of projecting ourselves

and we don't want to protect ourselves

anywhere but uh Mr Lee Mr Lee had this

term poison shrimp uh for for Defense

Forces we think we're bigger than a

shrimp now but we're still poison so

we'll keep it as that and we think that

we'll continue to spend by the way we

have conscription so every 18yearold

spends 2 years fulltime in a military

and then you know we call them back for

a few weeks 10 years after that so it's

it's a People's Army but uh we're fairly

well equipped so we we we think we

project the good image of deterrence and

if the government continues to fund it

the my department continue to raise that

armed forces that we think we need I

want to talk about your country's fairly

studied neutrality when it comes to

world events and that's of immense value

clearly I mean just listening to you

talk your perspective is so useful but

I'm curious how you think about

neutrality in a world that is in flux in

a world that is at

War um I'm not sure that we believe

neutrality I mean again I I I quote a

lot Mr Le because it's a profound

influence but he he and

the Prime Minister leis and L and all of

us are quite taken with you know the

milar dialogue the strong do what they

can and the weak suffer what they must

that's our ethos and if you're weak then

what do you do well we believe not so

much in neity but in information in

observing in trying to be ultimate

realists and saying what works what

doesn't and we don't believe that we can

balance superpowers but we would speak

to them and we would try to find some

space where all science need us whether

we can succeed I mean history will tell

but uh I think the US China conundrum

will will decide the fates of all our

Nations for

this decade and next and what America

has to decide and I understand all the

policies of small yard high fences

security alliances but ultimately what

is the foreign policy towards

China I'm not sure that I have a clear

idea is China me an enemy is China me

enemy for how long will CH can China be

your

friend and how would you go about

it those are difficult questions have

you asked those questions of constantly

every day we're looking at you and

saying what's

up what

gifts very quickly just a last thought

um I talked about a world in flux this

is also a world in which you know there

are all these Grand ideas and terms

being thrown around a new Cold War um a

new battle between democracies and

autocracies

and again I mean your point of speaking

to all sides uh is well taken um but how

do you fit in values when when you see

countries profess competing agendas and

values

essentially if you this is not a contest

of ideas ideology at least well not not

overtly like capitalism and communism it

is a

contest but if you look at us no one

should bet against the US uh we talked

about

advanced technology I'm trying to answer

your question but bear with me man for

men and I was minister of education so I

visited the universities in China

whether it was Chang or Shang or futan

university man for man uh the Chinese

students can match any American student

you know him you have them but systems

wise the American system is still ahead

and that's the reason why you have more

Chinese or Japanese who win Nobel prizes

when they come out of their countries to

come to he and that's what you still

still have and that's what you continue

to have uh what value system produces

that well that's psychoanalyzing us

which is too

difficult but whatever you have you have

it and you should keep at

it but is China led by the CCP the

Communist Party of

China one that has wrong values kissing

jel call China historical

Singularity right it's a what palum say

in other words if you strip away

different forms of government there is

still China and goes way down deep the

values deep uh and I think that if you

want to make China an enemy it'll be a

self-fulfilling prophecy but I I I feel

very strongly that engagement is

important that as you did

previously that China is worth becoming

a friend and we know Graham Allison's

book that you know says that the outcome

for may be War but there are good

reasons to believe that if us can have a

positive trajectory with China that I

think it'll make

for certainly greater stability certain

greater growth and I believe it is

within the powers of American leadership

if not now maybe later but I well

believe that when when when you you need

something Innovative when you need to

fix a difficult problem then Americans

have always shown us that you can do it

so we look to you for leadership this is

a really useful perspective Minister un

thank you very much Round of Applause


登录后才可评论.