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> 4.The Meiji Reform
4.The Meiji Reform
The battlecry that ushered in the modern era in Japan was Sonno joi，“Restore the Emperor and expel the Barbarian。”It was a slogan that sought to keep Japan uncontam-inated by the outside world and to restore a golden age of the tenth century before there had been a“dual rule”of Emperor and Shogun。The Emperor's court at Kyoto was reac-tionary in the extreme。The victory of the Emperor's party meant to his supporters the humiliation and expulsion of foreigners。It meant reinstatement of traditional ways of life in Japan。It meant that“reformers”would have no voice in affairs。The great Outside Lords，the daimyo of Japan's strongest fiefs who spearheaded the overthrow of the Shogu-nate，thought of the Restoration as a way in which they，instead of the Tokugawa，could rule Japan。They wanted a mere change of personnel。The farmers wanted to keep more of the rice they raised but they hated“reforms。”The samurai wanted to keep their pen-sions and be allowed to use their swords for greater glory。The merchants，who financed the Restoration forces，wanted to expand mercantilism but they never arraigned the feu-dal system。
When the anti-Tokugawa forces triumphed and“dual rule”was ended in 1868 by the Restoration of the Emperor，the victors were committed，by Western standards，to a fiercely conservative isolationist policy。From the first the regime followed the opposite course。It had been in power hardly a year when it abolished the daimyo's right of taxa-tion in all fiefs。It called in the land-registers and appropriated to itself the peasants'tax of“40 per cent to the daimyo。”This expropriation was not without compensation。The government allotted to each daimyo the equivalent of half his normal income。At the same time also the government freed the daimyo of the support of his samurai retainers and of the expenses of public works。The samurai retainers，like the daimyo，received pensions from the government。Within the next five years all legal inequality among the classes was summarily abolished，insignia and distinctive dress of caste and class were outlawed-even queues had to be cut，-the outcasts were emancipated，the laws a-gainst alienation of land withdrawn，the barriers that had separated fief from fief were re-moved and Buddhism was disestablished。By 1876 the daimyo and samurai pensions were commuted to lump sum payments which were to become due in five to fifteen years。These payments were either large or small according to the fixed income these in-dividuals had drawn in Tokugawa days and the money made it possible for them to start enterprises in the new non-feudal economy。“It was the final stage in the sealing of that peculiar union of merchants and financial princes with the feudal or landed princes which was already evident in the Tokugawa period。”
These remarkable reforms of the infant Meiji regime were not popular。There was far more general enthusiasm for an invasion of Korea from 1871 to 1873 than for any of these measures。The Meiji government not only persisted in its drastic course of reform，it killed the project of the invasion。Its program was so strongly opposed to the wishes of a great majority of those who had fought to establish it that by 1877 Saigo，their greatest leader had organized a full-scale rebellion against the government。His army represented all the pro-feudal longings of Imperial supporters which had from the first year of the Restoration been betrayed by the Meiji regime。The government called up a non-samu-rai voluntary army and defeated Saigo's samurai。But the rebellion was an indication of the extent of the dissatisfaction the regime aroused in Japan。
The farmers'dissatisfaction was equally marked。There were at least 190 agrarian revolts between 1868 and 1878，the first Meiji decade。In 1877 the new government made its first tardy moves to lessen the great tax burden upon the peasants，and they had reason to feel that the regime had failed them。The farmers objected in addition to the establishment of schools，to conscription，to land surveys，to having to cut their queues，to legal equality of the outcasts，to the drastic restrictions on official Buddhism，to cal-endar reforms and to many other measures which changed their settled ways of life。
Who，then，was this“government”which undertook such drastic and unpopular reforms？It was that“peculiar union”in Japan of the lower samurai and the merchant class which special Japanese institutions had fostered even in feudal times。They were the samurai retainers who had learned statecraft as chamberlains and stewards for the daimyos，who had run the feudal monopolies in mines，textiles，pasteboards and the like。They were merchants who had bought samurai status and spread knowledge of pro-ductive techniques in that class。This samurai-merchant alliance rapidly put to the fore able and self-confident administrators who drew up the Meiji policies and planned their execution。The real problem，however，is not from what class they came but how it hap-pened that they were so able and so realistic。Japan，just emerging from medievalism in the last half of the nineteenth century and as weak then as Siam is today，produced lead-ers able to conceive and to carry out one of the most statesmanlike and successful jobs ever attempted in any nation。The strength，and the weakness too，of these leaders was rooted in traditional Japanese character and it is the chief object of this book to discuss what that character was and is。Here we can only recognize how the Meiji statesmen went about their undertaking。
They did not take their task to be an ideological revolution at all。They treated it as a job。Their goal as they conceived it was to make Japan into a country which must be reckoned with。They were not iconoclasts。They did not revile and beggar the feudal class。They tempted them with pensions large enough to lure them into eventual support of the regime。They finally ameliorated the peasants'condition；their ten-year tardiness appears to have been due rather to the pitiful condition of the early Meiji treasury than to a class rejection of peasants'claims upon the regime。
The energetic and resourceful statesmen who ran the Meiji government rejected，however，all ideas of ending hierarchy in Japan。The Restoration had simplified the hi-erarchal order by placing the Emperor at its apex and eliminating the Shogun。The post-Restoration statesmen，by abolishing the fiefs，eliminated the conflict between loyalty to one's own seigneur and to the State。These changes did not unseat hierarchal habits。They gave them a new locus。“Their Excellencies，”the new leaders of Japan，even strengthened centralized rule in order to impose their own workmanlike programs upon the people。They alternated demands from above with gifts from above and in this way they managed to survive。But they did not imagine that they had to cater to a public o-pinion which might not want to reform the calendar or to establish public schools or to outlaw discrimination against the outcasts。
One of these gifts from above was the Constitution of Japan，which was given by the Emperor to his people in 1889.It gave the people a place in the State and established the Diet。It was drawn up with great care by Their Excellencies after critical study of the varied constitutions of the Western World。The writers of it however，took“every possi-ble precartion to guard against popular interference and the invasion of public opinion。”The very bureau which drafted it was a part of the Imperial Household Department and was therefore sacrosanct。
Meiji statesmen were quite conscious about their objective。During the eighteen-eighties Prince Ito，framer of the Constitution，sent the Marquis Kido to consult Herbert Spencer in England on the problems lying ahead of Japan and after lengthy conversations Spencer wrote to his judgments。On the subject of hierarchy Spencer wrote that Japan had in her traditional arrangements an incomparable basis for national well-being which should be maintained and fostered。Traditional obligations to superiors，he said，and beyond all to the Emperor，were Japan's great opportunity。Japan could move forward solidly under its“superiors”and defend itself against the difficulties inevitable in more individualistic nations。The great Meiji statesmen were well satisfied with this confirma-tion of their own convictions。They meant to retain in the modern world the advantages of observing“proper station。”They did not intend to undermine the habit of hierarchy。
In every field of activity，whether political or religious or economic，the Meiji states-men allocated the duties of“proper station”between the State and the people。Their whole scheme was so alien to arrangements in the United States or England that we usually fail to recognize its basic points。There was，of course，strong rule from above which did not have to follow the lead of public opinion。This government was administered by a top hierarchy and this could never include elected persons。At this level the people could have no voice。In 1940 the top government hierarchy consisted of those who had“access”to the Emperor，those who constituted his immediate advisors，and those whose high ap-pointments bore the privy seal。These last included Cabinet Ministers，prefectural gover-nors，judges，chiefs of national bureaus and other like responsible officers。No elected of-ficial had any such status in the hierarchy and it would have been out of the question for elected members of the Diet，for instance，to have any voice in selecting or approving a Cabinet Minister or head of the Bureau of Finance or of Transportation。The elected Lower House of the Diet was a voice of the people which had the not inconsiderable privilege of interrogating and criticizing the Higher Officials，but it had no real voice in appointments or in decisions or in budgetary matters and it did not initiate legislation。The Lower House was even checked by a non-elected Upper House，half of them nobility and another quar-ter Imperial appointees。Since its power to approve legislation was about equal to that of the Lower House，a further hierarchal check was provided。
Japan therefore ensured that those who held high government posts remain“Their Excellencies，”but this does not mean that there was not self-government in its“proper place。”In all Asiatic nations，under whatever regime，authority from above always rea-ches down and meets in some middle ground local self-government rising from below。The differences between different countries all concern matters of how far up democratic accountability reaches，how many or few its responsibilities are and whether local lead-ership remains responsive to the whole community or is preempted by local magnates to the disadvantage of the people。Tokugawa Japan had，like China，tiny units of five to ten families，called in recent times the tonari gumi，which were the smallest responsible units of the population。The head of this group of neighboring families assumed leader-ship in their own affairs，was responsible for their good behavior，had to turn in reports of any doubtful acts and surrender any wanted individual to the government。Meiji statesmen at first abolished these，but they were later restored and called the tonari gu-mi。In the towns and cities the government has sometimes actively fostered them，but they seldom function today in villages。The hamlet（buraku）units are more important。The buraku were not abolished nor were they incorporated as units in the government。They were an area in which the State did not function。These hamlets of fifteen or so houses continue even today to function in an organized fashion through their annually ro-tating headmen，who“look after hamlet property，supervise hamlet aid given to families in the event of a death or a fire，decide the proper days for co-operative work in agricul-ture，housebuilding or road repair，and announce by ringing the fire bell or beating two blocks together in a certain rhythm the local holidays and rest days。”These headmen are not responsible，as in some Asiatic nations，also for collecting the State taxes in their community and they do not therefore have to carry this onus。Their position is quite unambivalent；they function in the area of democratic responsibility。
Modern civil government in Japan officially recognizes local administration of cities，towns and villages。Elected“elders”choose a responsible headman who serves as the representative of the community in all dealings with the State，which is represented by the prefectural and national governments。In the villages the headman is an old resident，a member of a land-owning farm family。He serves at a financial loss but the prestige is considerable。He and the elders are responsible for village finances，public health，ma-intenance of the schools and especially for property records and individual dossiers。The village office is a busy place；it has charge of the spending of the State's appropriation for primary school education for all children and of the raising and spending of its own much larger local share of school expenses，management and rent of village-owned prop-erty，land improvement and afforestation，and records of all property transactions，which become legal only when they are properly entered at this office。It must also keep an up-to-date record of residence，marital status，birth of children，adoption，any encounter with the law and other facts on each individual who still maintains official residence in the community，besides a family record which shows similar data about one's family。Any such information is forwarded from any part of Japan to one's officer home office and is entered on one's dossier。Whenever one applies for a position or is tried before a judge or in any way is asked for identification，one writes one's home community office or vis-its it and obtains a copy to submit to the interested person。One does not face lightly the possibility of having a bad entry inscribed on one's own or one's family's dossier。
The city，town，and village therefore has considerable responsibility。It is a commu-nity responsibility。Even in the nineteen-twenties，when Japan had national political par-ties，which in any country means an alternation of tenure between“ins”and“outs，”lo-cal administration generally remained untouched by this development and was directed by elders acting for the whole community。In three respects，however，local administrations do not have autonomy；all judges are nationally appointed，all police and school teachers are employees of the State。Since most civil cases in Japan are still settled by arbitration or through go-betweens，the courts of law figure very little in local administration。Police are more important。Police have to be on hand at public meetings but these duties are in-termittent and most of their time is devoted to keeping the personal and property records。The State may transfer policemen frequently from one post to another so that they may re-main outsiders without local ties。School teachers also are transferred。The State regulates every detail of the schools，and，as in France，every school in the country is studying on the same day the same lesson from the same textbook。Every school goes through the same calisthenics to the same radio broadcast at the same hour of the morning。The community does not have local autonomy over schools or police or courts of justice。
The Japanese government at all points thus greatly differs from the American，where elected persons carry the highest executive and legislative responsibility and local control is exercised through local direction of police and police courts。It does not，however，dif-fer formally from the governmental set-up of such thoroughly Occidental nations as Hol-land and Belgium。In Holland，for instance，as in Japan，the Queen's Ministry drafts all proposed laws；the Diet has in practice not initiated legislation。The Dutch Crown legally appoints even mayors of towns and cities and thus its formal right reaches further down in-to local areas of concern than it did in Japan before 1940；this is true even though in practice the Dutch Crown usually approves a local nomination。The direct responsibility to the Crown of the police and of the courts is also Dutch。Though，in Holland，schools may be set up at will by any sectarian group，the Japanese school system is duplicated in France。Local responsibility for canals，polders and local improvements，also，is a duty of the community as a whole in Holland，not of a mayor and officials politically elected。
The true difference between the Japanese form of government and such cases in Western Europe lies not in form but in functioning。The Japanese rely on old habits of deference set up in their past experience and formalized in their ethical system and in their etiquette。The State can depend upon it that，when their Excellencies function in their“proper place，”their prerogatives will be respected，not because the policy is ap-proved but because it is wrong in Japan to override boundaries between prerogatives。At the topmost level of policy“popular opinion”is out of place。The govement asks only“popular support。”When the State stakes out its own official field in the area of local concern，also，its jurisdiction is accepted with deference。The State，in all its domestic functions，is not a necessary evil as it is so generally felt to be in the United States。The State comes nearer，in Japanese eyes，to being the supreme good。
The State，moreover，is meticulous in recognizing“proper place”for the will of the people。In areas of legitimate popular jurisdiction it is not too much to say that the Japa-nese State has had to woo the people even for their own good。The State agricultural ex-tension agent can act with about as little authoritarianism in improving old methods of ag-riculture as his counterpart can in Idaho。The State official advocating State-guaranteed farmers'credit associations or farmers'co-operatives for buying and selling must hold long-drawn-out round-tables with the local notables and then abide by their decision。Local affairs require local management。The Japanese way of life allocates proper author-ity and defines its proper sphere。It gives much greater deference-and therefore free-dom of action-to“superiors”than Western cultures do，but they too must keep their station。Japan's motto is：Everything in its place。
In the field of religion the Meiji statesmen made much more bizarre formal arrange-ments than in government。They were however carrying out the same Japanese motto。The State took as its realm a worship that specifically upholds the symbols of national u-nity and superiority，and in all the rest it left freedom of worship to the individual。This area of national jurisdiction was State Shinto。Since it was concerned with proper respect to national symbols，as saluting the flag is in the United States，State Shinto was，they said，“no religion。”Japan therefore could require it of all citizens without violating the Occidental dogma of religious freedom any more than the United States violates it in re-quiring a salute to the Stars and Stripes。It was a mere sign of allegiance。Because it was“not religion，”Japan could teach it in the schools without risk of Occidental criti-cism。State Shinto in the schools becomes the history of Japan from the age of the gods and the veneration of the Emperor，“ruler from ages eternal。”It was State-supported，State-regulated。All other areas of religion，even denominational or cult Shinto，to say nothing of Buddhist and Christian sects，were left to individual initiative much as in the United States。The two areas were even administratively and financially separated；State Shinto was in the charge of its own bureau in the Home Office and its priests and cere-monies and shrines were supported by the State。Cult Shinto and Buddhist and Christian sects were the concern of a Bureau of Religion in the Department of Education and were supported by voluntary contributions of members。
Because of Japan's official position on the subject one cannot speak of State Shinto as a vast Establishment Church，but one can at least call it a vast Establishment。There were over 110000 shrines ranging all the way from the great Ise Shrine，temple of the Sun Goddess，to small local shrines which the officiating priest cleans up for the occa-sion of a special ceremony。The national hierarchy of priests paralleled the political and the lines of authority ran from the lowest priest through the district and prefectural priests to their priestly Excellencies at the top。They performed ceremonies for the people rather than conducting worship by the people，and there was in State Shinto nothing paralleling our familiar church-going。Priests of State Shinto-since it was no religion-were forbid-den by law to teach any dogma and there could be no church services as Westerners un-derstand them。Instead，on the frequent days of rites official representatives of the com-munity came and stood before the priest while he purified them by waving before them a wand with hemp and paper streamers。He opened the door of the inner shrine and called down the gods，with a high-pitched cry，to come to partake of a ceremonial meal。The priest prayed and each participant in order of rank presented with deep obeisance that omnipresent object in old and new Japan：a twig of their sacred tree with pendant strips of white paper。The priest then sent back the gods with another cry and closed the doors of the inner shrine。On the festival days of State Shinto the Emperor in his turn observed rites for the people and government offices were closed。But these holidays were not great popular fete-says like the ceremonies in honor of local shrines or even Buddhist holidays。Both of these are in the“free”area outside of State Shinto。
In this area the Japanese people carry on the great sects and fete-days which are close to their hearts。Buddhism remains the religion of the great mass of the people and the various sects with their different teachings and founding prophets are vigorous and om-nipresent。Even Shinto has its great cults which stand outside of State Shinto。Some were strongholds of pure nationalism even before the government in the nineteen-thirties took up the same position，some are faith-healing sects often compared to Christian Science，some hold by Confucian tenets，some have specialized in trance states and pilgrimages to sacred mountain shrines。Most of the popular fete-days，too，have been left outside of State Shinto。The people on such days throng to the shrines。Each person purifies himself by rinsing out his mouth and he summons the god to descend by pulling a bell rope or clap-ping his hands。He bows in veneration，sends back the god by another pull of the bell cord or clapping of hands，and goes off for the main business of the day which is buying knickknacks and tidbits from the vendors who have set up their stalls，watching wrestling matches or exorcism or kagura dances，which are liberally enlivened by clowns，and gen-erally enjoying the great throng。An Englishman who had lived in Japan quoted William Blake's verse which he always remembered on Japanese fete-days：
If at the church they would give us some ale，
And a pleasant fire our souls to regale，
We'd sing and we'd pray all the livelong day，
Nor ever once wish from the church to stray。
Except for those few who have professionally dedicated themselves to religious aus-terities，religion is not austere in Japan。The Japanese are also addicted to religious pil-grimages and these too are greatly enjoyed holidays。
Meiji statesmen，therefore，carefully marked out the area of State functioning in government and of State Shinto in the field of religion。They left other areas to the peo-ple but they ensured to themselves as top officials of the new hierarchy dominance in matters which in their eyes directly concerned the State。In setting up the Armed Forces they had a similar problem。They rejected，as in other fields，the old caste system but in the Army they went farther than in civilian life。They outlawed in the Armed Services even the respect language of Japan，though in actual practice old usage of course per-sists。The Army also promoted to officer's rank on the basis of merit，not of family，to a degree which could hardly be put into effect in other fields。Its reputation among Japa-nese in this respect is high and apparently deservedly so。It was certainly the best means available by which to enlist popular support for the new Army。Companies and platoons，too，were formed from neighbors of the same region and peacetime military service was spent at posts close to one's home。This meant not only that local ties were conserved but that every man who went through Army training spent two years during which the rela-tionship between officers and men，between second-year men and first-year men，super-seded that between samurai and farmers or between rich and poor。The Army functioned in many ways as a democratic leveler and it was in many ways a true people's army。Whereas the Army in most other nations is depended upon as the strong arm to defend the status quo，in Japan the Army's sympathy with the small peasant has lined it up in repeated protests against the great financiers and industrialists。
Japanese statesmen may not have approved of all the consequences of building up a people's army but it was not at this level where they saw fit to ensure Army supremacy in the hierarchy。That objective they made sure of by arrangements in the very highest spheres。They did not write these arrangements into the Constitution but continued as customary procedure the already recognized independence of the High Command from the civil government。The Ministers of the Army and the Navy，in contrast for instance to the head of the Foreign Office and domestic bureaus，had direct access to the Emper-or himself and could therefore use his name in forcing through their measures。They did not need to inform or consult their civilian colleagues of the Cabinet。In addition the Armed Services held a whip hand over any Cabinet。They could prevent the formation of a Cabinet they distrusted by the simple expedient of refusing to release generals and ad-mirals to hold military portfolios in the Cabinet。Without such high officers of the active service to fill the positions of Army and Navy Ministers there could be no cabinet；no ci-vilians or retired offices could hold these posts。Similarly，if the Armed Services were displeased at any act of the Ministry，they could cause its dissolution by recalling their Cabinet representatives。On this highest policy level the top military hierarchy made sure that it need brook no interference。If it needed any further guarantees it had one in the Constitution：“If the Diet fails to approve the budget submitted，the budget of the previ-ous year is automatically available to the Government for the current year。”The exploit of the Army in occupying Manchuria when the Foreign Office had promised that the Ar-my would not take this step was only one of the instances when the Army hierarchy suc-cessfully supported its commanders in the field in the absence of agreed Cabinet policy。
As in other fields，so with the Army：where hierarchal privileges are concerned the Jap-anese tend to accept all the consequences，not because of agreement about the policy but because they do not countenance overriding boundaries between prerogatives。
In the field of industrial development Japan pursued a course which is unparalleled in any Western nation。Again their Excellencies arranged the game and set the rules。They not only planned，they built and financed on government money the industries they decided they needed。A State bureaucracy organized and ran them。Foreign technicians were imported and Japanese were sent to learn abroad。Then when，as they said，these industries were“well organized and business was prosperous，”the government disposed of them to private firms。They were sold gradually at“ridiculously low prices”to a cho-sen financial oligarchy，the famous Zaibatsu，chiefly the Mitsui and Mitsubishi families。Her statesmen judged that industrial development was too important to Japan to be en-trusted to laws of supply and demand or to free enterprise。But this policy was in no way due to socialistic dogma；it was precisely the Zaibatsu who reaped the advantages。What Japan accomplished was that with the minimum of fumbling and wastage the industries she deemed necessary were established。
Japan was by these means able to revise“the normal order of the starting point and succeeding stages of capitalist production。”Instead of beginning with the production of consumer goods and light industry，she first undertook key heavy industries。Arsenals，shipyards，iron works，construction of railroads had priority and were rapidly brought to a high stage of technical efficiency。Not all of these were released to private hands and vast military industries remained under government bureaucracy and were financed by special government accounts。
In this whole field of the industries to which the government gave priority，the small trader or the non-bureaucratic manager had no“proper place。”Only the State and the great trusted and politically favored financial houses operated in this area。But as in oth-er fields of Japanese life there was a free area in industry too。These were the“left-o-ver”industries which operated with minimum capitalization and maximum utilization of cheap labor。These light industries could exist without modern technology and they do。They function through what we used to call in the United States home sweat-shops。A small-time manufacturer buys the raw material，lets it out to a family or a small shop with four or five workers，takes it back again，repeats by letting it out again for another step in processing and at last sells the product to the merchant or exporter。In the nine-teen-thirties no less than 53 per cent of all persons industrially employed in Japan were working in this way in shops and homes having less than five workers。Many of these workers are protected by old paternalistic customs of apprenticeship and many are moth-ers who in Japan's great cities sit in their own homes over their piecework with their ba-bies strapped on their backs。
This duality of Japanese industry is quite as important in Japanese ways of life as duality in the field of government or religion。It is as if，when Japanese statesmen decid-ed that they needed an aristocracy of finance to match their hierarchies in other fields，they built up for them the strategic industries，selected the politically favored merchant houses and affiliated them in their“proper stations”with the other hierarchies。It was no part of their plan for government to cut loose from these great financial houses and the Zaibatsu profited by a kind of continued paternalism which gave them not only profit but high place。It was inevitable，granted old Japanese attitudes toward profit and money，that a financial aristocracy should fall under attack from the people，but the government did what it could to build it up according to accepted ideas of hierarchy。It did not en-tirely succeed，for the Zaibatsu has been under attack from the so-called Young Officers'groups of the Army and from rural areas。But it still remains true that the greatest bitter-ness of Japanese public opinion is turned not against the Zaibatsu but against the na-rikin。Narikin is often translated“nouveau riche”but that does not do justice to the Japanese feeling。In the United States nouveaux riches are strictly“newcomers”；they are laughable because they are gauche and have not had time to acquire the proper pol-ish。This liability，however，is balanced by the heartwarming asset that they have come up from the log cabin，they have risen from driving a mule to controlling oil millions。But in Japan a narikin is a term taken from Japanese chess and means a pawn promoted to queen。It is a pawn rampaging about the board as a“big shot。”It has no hierarchal right to do any such thing。The narikin is believed to have obtained his wealth by de-frauding or exploiting others and the bitterness directed toward him is as far as possible from the attitude in the United State toward the“home boy who makes good。”Japan provided a place in her hierarchy for great wealth and kept an alliance with it；when wealth is achieved in the field outside，Japanese public opinion is bitter against it。
The Japanese，therefore，order their world with constant reference to hierarchy。In the family and in personal relations，age，generation，sex，and class dictate proper be-havior。In government，religion，the Army，and industry，areas are carefully separated into hierarchies where neither the higher nor the lower may without penalty overstep their prerogatives。As long as“proper station”is maintained the Japanese carry on without protest。They feel safe。They are of course often not“safe”in the sense that their best good is protected but they are“safe”because they have accepted hierarchy as legiti-mate。It is as characteristic of their judgment on life as trust in equality and free enter-prise is of the American way of life。
Japan's nemesis came when she tried to export her formula for“safety。”In her own country hierarchy fitted popular imagination because it had moulded it。Ambitions could only be such as could take shape in that shape in that kind of a world。But it was a fatal commodity for export。Other nations resented Japan's grandiloquent claims as an impertinence and worse。Japan's officers and troops，however，in each occupied coun-try continued to be shocked that the inhabitants did not welcome them。Was Japan not offering them a place，however lowly，in a hierarchy and was not hierarchy desirable e-ven for those on the lower steps of it？Their War Services continued to get out series of war films which figured China's“love”for Japan under the image of desperate and dis-ordered Chinese girls who found happiness by falling in love with a Japanese soldier or a Japanese engineer。It was a far cry from the Nazi version of conquest yet it was no more successful in the long run。They could not exact from other nations what they had exac-ted of themselves。It was their mistake that they thought they could。They did not recog-nize that the system of Japanese morality which had fitted them to“accept their proper station”was something they could not count on elsewhere。Other nations did not have it。It is a genuine product of Japan。Her writers take this system of ethics so much for granted that they do not describe it and a description of it is necessary before one can understand the Japanese。
When the anti-Tokugawa forces triumphed and“dual rule”was ended in 1868 by the Restoration of the Emperor，the victors were committed，by Western standards，to a fiercely conservative isolationist policy。From the first the regime followed the opposite course。It had been in power hardly a year when it abolished the daimyo's right of taxa-tion in all fiefs。It called in the land-registers and appropriated to itself the peasants'tax of“40 per cent to the daimyo。”This expropriation was not without compensation。The government allotted to each daimyo the equivalent of half his normal income。At the same time also the government freed the daimyo of the support of his samurai retainers and of the expenses of public works。The samurai retainers，like the daimyo，received pensions from the government。Within the next five years all legal inequality among the classes was summarily abolished，insignia and distinctive dress of caste and class were outlawed-even queues had to be cut，-the outcasts were emancipated，the laws a-gainst alienation of land withdrawn，the barriers that had separated fief from fief were re-moved and Buddhism was disestablished。By 1876 the daimyo and samurai pensions were commuted to lump sum payments which were to become due in five to fifteen years。These payments were either large or small according to the fixed income these in-dividuals had drawn in Tokugawa days and the money made it possible for them to start enterprises in the new non-feudal economy。“It was the final stage in the sealing of that peculiar union of merchants and financial princes with the feudal or landed princes which was already evident in the Tokugawa period。”
These remarkable reforms of the infant Meiji regime were not popular。There was far more general enthusiasm for an invasion of Korea from 1871 to 1873 than for any of these measures。The Meiji government not only persisted in its drastic course of reform，it killed the project of the invasion。Its program was so strongly opposed to the wishes of a great majority of those who had fought to establish it that by 1877 Saigo，their greatest leader had organized a full-scale rebellion against the government。His army represented all the pro-feudal longings of Imperial supporters which had from the first year of the Restoration been betrayed by the Meiji regime。The government called up a non-samu-rai voluntary army and defeated Saigo's samurai。But the rebellion was an indication of the extent of the dissatisfaction the regime aroused in Japan。
The farmers'dissatisfaction was equally marked。There were at least 190 agrarian revolts between 1868 and 1878，the first Meiji decade。In 1877 the new government made its first tardy moves to lessen the great tax burden upon the peasants，and they had reason to feel that the regime had failed them。The farmers objected in addition to the establishment of schools，to conscription，to land surveys，to having to cut their queues，to legal equality of the outcasts，to the drastic restrictions on official Buddhism，to cal-endar reforms and to many other measures which changed their settled ways of life。
Who，then，was this“government”which undertook such drastic and unpopular reforms？It was that“peculiar union”in Japan of the lower samurai and the merchant class which special Japanese institutions had fostered even in feudal times。They were the samurai retainers who had learned statecraft as chamberlains and stewards for the daimyos，who had run the feudal monopolies in mines，textiles，pasteboards and the like。They were merchants who had bought samurai status and spread knowledge of pro-ductive techniques in that class。This samurai-merchant alliance rapidly put to the fore able and self-confident administrators who drew up the Meiji policies and planned their execution。The real problem，however，is not from what class they came but how it hap-pened that they were so able and so realistic。Japan，just emerging from medievalism in the last half of the nineteenth century and as weak then as Siam is today，produced lead-ers able to conceive and to carry out one of the most statesmanlike and successful jobs ever attempted in any nation。The strength，and the weakness too，of these leaders was rooted in traditional Japanese character and it is the chief object of this book to discuss what that character was and is。Here we can only recognize how the Meiji statesmen went about their undertaking。
They did not take their task to be an ideological revolution at all。They treated it as a job。Their goal as they conceived it was to make Japan into a country which must be reckoned with。They were not iconoclasts。They did not revile and beggar the feudal class。They tempted them with pensions large enough to lure them into eventual support of the regime。They finally ameliorated the peasants'condition；their ten-year tardiness appears to have been due rather to the pitiful condition of the early Meiji treasury than to a class rejection of peasants'claims upon the regime。
The energetic and resourceful statesmen who ran the Meiji government rejected，however，all ideas of ending hierarchy in Japan。The Restoration had simplified the hi-erarchal order by placing the Emperor at its apex and eliminating the Shogun。The post-Restoration statesmen，by abolishing the fiefs，eliminated the conflict between loyalty to one's own seigneur and to the State。These changes did not unseat hierarchal habits。They gave them a new locus。“Their Excellencies，”the new leaders of Japan，even strengthened centralized rule in order to impose their own workmanlike programs upon the people。They alternated demands from above with gifts from above and in this way they managed to survive。But they did not imagine that they had to cater to a public o-pinion which might not want to reform the calendar or to establish public schools or to outlaw discrimination against the outcasts。
One of these gifts from above was the Constitution of Japan，which was given by the Emperor to his people in 1889.It gave the people a place in the State and established the Diet。It was drawn up with great care by Their Excellencies after critical study of the varied constitutions of the Western World。The writers of it however，took“every possi-ble precartion to guard against popular interference and the invasion of public opinion。”The very bureau which drafted it was a part of the Imperial Household Department and was therefore sacrosanct。
Meiji statesmen were quite conscious about their objective。During the eighteen-eighties Prince Ito，framer of the Constitution，sent the Marquis Kido to consult Herbert Spencer in England on the problems lying ahead of Japan and after lengthy conversations Spencer wrote to his judgments。On the subject of hierarchy Spencer wrote that Japan had in her traditional arrangements an incomparable basis for national well-being which should be maintained and fostered。Traditional obligations to superiors，he said，and beyond all to the Emperor，were Japan's great opportunity。Japan could move forward solidly under its“superiors”and defend itself against the difficulties inevitable in more individualistic nations。The great Meiji statesmen were well satisfied with this confirma-tion of their own convictions。They meant to retain in the modern world the advantages of observing“proper station。”They did not intend to undermine the habit of hierarchy。
In every field of activity，whether political or religious or economic，the Meiji states-men allocated the duties of“proper station”between the State and the people。Their whole scheme was so alien to arrangements in the United States or England that we usually fail to recognize its basic points。There was，of course，strong rule from above which did not have to follow the lead of public opinion。This government was administered by a top hierarchy and this could never include elected persons。At this level the people could have no voice。In 1940 the top government hierarchy consisted of those who had“access”to the Emperor，those who constituted his immediate advisors，and those whose high ap-pointments bore the privy seal。These last included Cabinet Ministers，prefectural gover-nors，judges，chiefs of national bureaus and other like responsible officers。No elected of-ficial had any such status in the hierarchy and it would have been out of the question for elected members of the Diet，for instance，to have any voice in selecting or approving a Cabinet Minister or head of the Bureau of Finance or of Transportation。The elected Lower House of the Diet was a voice of the people which had the not inconsiderable privilege of interrogating and criticizing the Higher Officials，but it had no real voice in appointments or in decisions or in budgetary matters and it did not initiate legislation。The Lower House was even checked by a non-elected Upper House，half of them nobility and another quar-ter Imperial appointees。Since its power to approve legislation was about equal to that of the Lower House，a further hierarchal check was provided。
Japan therefore ensured that those who held high government posts remain“Their Excellencies，”but this does not mean that there was not self-government in its“proper place。”In all Asiatic nations，under whatever regime，authority from above always rea-ches down and meets in some middle ground local self-government rising from below。The differences between different countries all concern matters of how far up democratic accountability reaches，how many or few its responsibilities are and whether local lead-ership remains responsive to the whole community or is preempted by local magnates to the disadvantage of the people。Tokugawa Japan had，like China，tiny units of five to ten families，called in recent times the tonari gumi，which were the smallest responsible units of the population。The head of this group of neighboring families assumed leader-ship in their own affairs，was responsible for their good behavior，had to turn in reports of any doubtful acts and surrender any wanted individual to the government。Meiji statesmen at first abolished these，but they were later restored and called the tonari gu-mi。In the towns and cities the government has sometimes actively fostered them，but they seldom function today in villages。The hamlet（buraku）units are more important。The buraku were not abolished nor were they incorporated as units in the government。They were an area in which the State did not function。These hamlets of fifteen or so houses continue even today to function in an organized fashion through their annually ro-tating headmen，who“look after hamlet property，supervise hamlet aid given to families in the event of a death or a fire，decide the proper days for co-operative work in agricul-ture，housebuilding or road repair，and announce by ringing the fire bell or beating two blocks together in a certain rhythm the local holidays and rest days。”These headmen are not responsible，as in some Asiatic nations，also for collecting the State taxes in their community and they do not therefore have to carry this onus。Their position is quite unambivalent；they function in the area of democratic responsibility。
Modern civil government in Japan officially recognizes local administration of cities，towns and villages。Elected“elders”choose a responsible headman who serves as the representative of the community in all dealings with the State，which is represented by the prefectural and national governments。In the villages the headman is an old resident，a member of a land-owning farm family。He serves at a financial loss but the prestige is considerable。He and the elders are responsible for village finances，public health，ma-intenance of the schools and especially for property records and individual dossiers。The village office is a busy place；it has charge of the spending of the State's appropriation for primary school education for all children and of the raising and spending of its own much larger local share of school expenses，management and rent of village-owned prop-erty，land improvement and afforestation，and records of all property transactions，which become legal only when they are properly entered at this office。It must also keep an up-to-date record of residence，marital status，birth of children，adoption，any encounter with the law and other facts on each individual who still maintains official residence in the community，besides a family record which shows similar data about one's family。Any such information is forwarded from any part of Japan to one's officer home office and is entered on one's dossier。Whenever one applies for a position or is tried before a judge or in any way is asked for identification，one writes one's home community office or vis-its it and obtains a copy to submit to the interested person。One does not face lightly the possibility of having a bad entry inscribed on one's own or one's family's dossier。
The city，town，and village therefore has considerable responsibility。It is a commu-nity responsibility。Even in the nineteen-twenties，when Japan had national political par-ties，which in any country means an alternation of tenure between“ins”and“outs，”lo-cal administration generally remained untouched by this development and was directed by elders acting for the whole community。In three respects，however，local administrations do not have autonomy；all judges are nationally appointed，all police and school teachers are employees of the State。Since most civil cases in Japan are still settled by arbitration or through go-betweens，the courts of law figure very little in local administration。Police are more important。Police have to be on hand at public meetings but these duties are in-termittent and most of their time is devoted to keeping the personal and property records。The State may transfer policemen frequently from one post to another so that they may re-main outsiders without local ties。School teachers also are transferred。The State regulates every detail of the schools，and，as in France，every school in the country is studying on the same day the same lesson from the same textbook。Every school goes through the same calisthenics to the same radio broadcast at the same hour of the morning。The community does not have local autonomy over schools or police or courts of justice。
The Japanese government at all points thus greatly differs from the American，where elected persons carry the highest executive and legislative responsibility and local control is exercised through local direction of police and police courts。It does not，however，dif-fer formally from the governmental set-up of such thoroughly Occidental nations as Hol-land and Belgium。In Holland，for instance，as in Japan，the Queen's Ministry drafts all proposed laws；the Diet has in practice not initiated legislation。The Dutch Crown legally appoints even mayors of towns and cities and thus its formal right reaches further down in-to local areas of concern than it did in Japan before 1940；this is true even though in practice the Dutch Crown usually approves a local nomination。The direct responsibility to the Crown of the police and of the courts is also Dutch。Though，in Holland，schools may be set up at will by any sectarian group，the Japanese school system is duplicated in France。Local responsibility for canals，polders and local improvements，also，is a duty of the community as a whole in Holland，not of a mayor and officials politically elected。
The true difference between the Japanese form of government and such cases in Western Europe lies not in form but in functioning。The Japanese rely on old habits of deference set up in their past experience and formalized in their ethical system and in their etiquette。The State can depend upon it that，when their Excellencies function in their“proper place，”their prerogatives will be respected，not because the policy is ap-proved but because it is wrong in Japan to override boundaries between prerogatives。At the topmost level of policy“popular opinion”is out of place。The govement asks only“popular support。”When the State stakes out its own official field in the area of local concern，also，its jurisdiction is accepted with deference。The State，in all its domestic functions，is not a necessary evil as it is so generally felt to be in the United States。The State comes nearer，in Japanese eyes，to being the supreme good。
The State，moreover，is meticulous in recognizing“proper place”for the will of the people。In areas of legitimate popular jurisdiction it is not too much to say that the Japa-nese State has had to woo the people even for their own good。The State agricultural ex-tension agent can act with about as little authoritarianism in improving old methods of ag-riculture as his counterpart can in Idaho。The State official advocating State-guaranteed farmers'credit associations or farmers'co-operatives for buying and selling must hold long-drawn-out round-tables with the local notables and then abide by their decision。Local affairs require local management。The Japanese way of life allocates proper author-ity and defines its proper sphere。It gives much greater deference-and therefore free-dom of action-to“superiors”than Western cultures do，but they too must keep their station。Japan's motto is：Everything in its place。
In the field of religion the Meiji statesmen made much more bizarre formal arrange-ments than in government。They were however carrying out the same Japanese motto。The State took as its realm a worship that specifically upholds the symbols of national u-nity and superiority，and in all the rest it left freedom of worship to the individual。This area of national jurisdiction was State Shinto。Since it was concerned with proper respect to national symbols，as saluting the flag is in the United States，State Shinto was，they said，“no religion。”Japan therefore could require it of all citizens without violating the Occidental dogma of religious freedom any more than the United States violates it in re-quiring a salute to the Stars and Stripes。It was a mere sign of allegiance。Because it was“not religion，”Japan could teach it in the schools without risk of Occidental criti-cism。State Shinto in the schools becomes the history of Japan from the age of the gods and the veneration of the Emperor，“ruler from ages eternal。”It was State-supported，State-regulated。All other areas of religion，even denominational or cult Shinto，to say nothing of Buddhist and Christian sects，were left to individual initiative much as in the United States。The two areas were even administratively and financially separated；State Shinto was in the charge of its own bureau in the Home Office and its priests and cere-monies and shrines were supported by the State。Cult Shinto and Buddhist and Christian sects were the concern of a Bureau of Religion in the Department of Education and were supported by voluntary contributions of members。
Because of Japan's official position on the subject one cannot speak of State Shinto as a vast Establishment Church，but one can at least call it a vast Establishment。There were over 110000 shrines ranging all the way from the great Ise Shrine，temple of the Sun Goddess，to small local shrines which the officiating priest cleans up for the occa-sion of a special ceremony。The national hierarchy of priests paralleled the political and the lines of authority ran from the lowest priest through the district and prefectural priests to their priestly Excellencies at the top。They performed ceremonies for the people rather than conducting worship by the people，and there was in State Shinto nothing paralleling our familiar church-going。Priests of State Shinto-since it was no religion-were forbid-den by law to teach any dogma and there could be no church services as Westerners un-derstand them。Instead，on the frequent days of rites official representatives of the com-munity came and stood before the priest while he purified them by waving before them a wand with hemp and paper streamers。He opened the door of the inner shrine and called down the gods，with a high-pitched cry，to come to partake of a ceremonial meal。The priest prayed and each participant in order of rank presented with deep obeisance that omnipresent object in old and new Japan：a twig of their sacred tree with pendant strips of white paper。The priest then sent back the gods with another cry and closed the doors of the inner shrine。On the festival days of State Shinto the Emperor in his turn observed rites for the people and government offices were closed。But these holidays were not great popular fete-says like the ceremonies in honor of local shrines or even Buddhist holidays。Both of these are in the“free”area outside of State Shinto。
In this area the Japanese people carry on the great sects and fete-days which are close to their hearts。Buddhism remains the religion of the great mass of the people and the various sects with their different teachings and founding prophets are vigorous and om-nipresent。Even Shinto has its great cults which stand outside of State Shinto。Some were strongholds of pure nationalism even before the government in the nineteen-thirties took up the same position，some are faith-healing sects often compared to Christian Science，some hold by Confucian tenets，some have specialized in trance states and pilgrimages to sacred mountain shrines。Most of the popular fete-days，too，have been left outside of State Shinto。The people on such days throng to the shrines。Each person purifies himself by rinsing out his mouth and he summons the god to descend by pulling a bell rope or clap-ping his hands。He bows in veneration，sends back the god by another pull of the bell cord or clapping of hands，and goes off for the main business of the day which is buying knickknacks and tidbits from the vendors who have set up their stalls，watching wrestling matches or exorcism or kagura dances，which are liberally enlivened by clowns，and gen-erally enjoying the great throng。An Englishman who had lived in Japan quoted William Blake's verse which he always remembered on Japanese fete-days：
If at the church they would give us some ale，
And a pleasant fire our souls to regale，
We'd sing and we'd pray all the livelong day，
Nor ever once wish from the church to stray。
Except for those few who have professionally dedicated themselves to religious aus-terities，religion is not austere in Japan。The Japanese are also addicted to religious pil-grimages and these too are greatly enjoyed holidays。
Meiji statesmen，therefore，carefully marked out the area of State functioning in government and of State Shinto in the field of religion。They left other areas to the peo-ple but they ensured to themselves as top officials of the new hierarchy dominance in matters which in their eyes directly concerned the State。In setting up the Armed Forces they had a similar problem。They rejected，as in other fields，the old caste system but in the Army they went farther than in civilian life。They outlawed in the Armed Services even the respect language of Japan，though in actual practice old usage of course per-sists。The Army also promoted to officer's rank on the basis of merit，not of family，to a degree which could hardly be put into effect in other fields。Its reputation among Japa-nese in this respect is high and apparently deservedly so。It was certainly the best means available by which to enlist popular support for the new Army。Companies and platoons，too，were formed from neighbors of the same region and peacetime military service was spent at posts close to one's home。This meant not only that local ties were conserved but that every man who went through Army training spent two years during which the rela-tionship between officers and men，between second-year men and first-year men，super-seded that between samurai and farmers or between rich and poor。The Army functioned in many ways as a democratic leveler and it was in many ways a true people's army。Whereas the Army in most other nations is depended upon as the strong arm to defend the status quo，in Japan the Army's sympathy with the small peasant has lined it up in repeated protests against the great financiers and industrialists。
Japanese statesmen may not have approved of all the consequences of building up a people's army but it was not at this level where they saw fit to ensure Army supremacy in the hierarchy。That objective they made sure of by arrangements in the very highest spheres。They did not write these arrangements into the Constitution but continued as customary procedure the already recognized independence of the High Command from the civil government。The Ministers of the Army and the Navy，in contrast for instance to the head of the Foreign Office and domestic bureaus，had direct access to the Emper-or himself and could therefore use his name in forcing through their measures。They did not need to inform or consult their civilian colleagues of the Cabinet。In addition the Armed Services held a whip hand over any Cabinet。They could prevent the formation of a Cabinet they distrusted by the simple expedient of refusing to release generals and ad-mirals to hold military portfolios in the Cabinet。Without such high officers of the active service to fill the positions of Army and Navy Ministers there could be no cabinet；no ci-vilians or retired offices could hold these posts。Similarly，if the Armed Services were displeased at any act of the Ministry，they could cause its dissolution by recalling their Cabinet representatives。On this highest policy level the top military hierarchy made sure that it need brook no interference。If it needed any further guarantees it had one in the Constitution：“If the Diet fails to approve the budget submitted，the budget of the previ-ous year is automatically available to the Government for the current year。”The exploit of the Army in occupying Manchuria when the Foreign Office had promised that the Ar-my would not take this step was only one of the instances when the Army hierarchy suc-cessfully supported its commanders in the field in the absence of agreed Cabinet policy。
As in other fields，so with the Army：where hierarchal privileges are concerned the Jap-anese tend to accept all the consequences，not because of agreement about the policy but because they do not countenance overriding boundaries between prerogatives。
In the field of industrial development Japan pursued a course which is unparalleled in any Western nation。Again their Excellencies arranged the game and set the rules。They not only planned，they built and financed on government money the industries they decided they needed。A State bureaucracy organized and ran them。Foreign technicians were imported and Japanese were sent to learn abroad。Then when，as they said，these industries were“well organized and business was prosperous，”the government disposed of them to private firms。They were sold gradually at“ridiculously low prices”to a cho-sen financial oligarchy，the famous Zaibatsu，chiefly the Mitsui and Mitsubishi families。Her statesmen judged that industrial development was too important to Japan to be en-trusted to laws of supply and demand or to free enterprise。But this policy was in no way due to socialistic dogma；it was precisely the Zaibatsu who reaped the advantages。What Japan accomplished was that with the minimum of fumbling and wastage the industries she deemed necessary were established。
Japan was by these means able to revise“the normal order of the starting point and succeeding stages of capitalist production。”Instead of beginning with the production of consumer goods and light industry，she first undertook key heavy industries。Arsenals，shipyards，iron works，construction of railroads had priority and were rapidly brought to a high stage of technical efficiency。Not all of these were released to private hands and vast military industries remained under government bureaucracy and were financed by special government accounts。
In this whole field of the industries to which the government gave priority，the small trader or the non-bureaucratic manager had no“proper place。”Only the State and the great trusted and politically favored financial houses operated in this area。But as in oth-er fields of Japanese life there was a free area in industry too。These were the“left-o-ver”industries which operated with minimum capitalization and maximum utilization of cheap labor。These light industries could exist without modern technology and they do。They function through what we used to call in the United States home sweat-shops。A small-time manufacturer buys the raw material，lets it out to a family or a small shop with four or five workers，takes it back again，repeats by letting it out again for another step in processing and at last sells the product to the merchant or exporter。In the nine-teen-thirties no less than 53 per cent of all persons industrially employed in Japan were working in this way in shops and homes having less than five workers。Many of these workers are protected by old paternalistic customs of apprenticeship and many are moth-ers who in Japan's great cities sit in their own homes over their piecework with their ba-bies strapped on their backs。
This duality of Japanese industry is quite as important in Japanese ways of life as duality in the field of government or religion。It is as if，when Japanese statesmen decid-ed that they needed an aristocracy of finance to match their hierarchies in other fields，they built up for them the strategic industries，selected the politically favored merchant houses and affiliated them in their“proper stations”with the other hierarchies。It was no part of their plan for government to cut loose from these great financial houses and the Zaibatsu profited by a kind of continued paternalism which gave them not only profit but high place。It was inevitable，granted old Japanese attitudes toward profit and money，that a financial aristocracy should fall under attack from the people，but the government did what it could to build it up according to accepted ideas of hierarchy。It did not en-tirely succeed，for the Zaibatsu has been under attack from the so-called Young Officers'groups of the Army and from rural areas。But it still remains true that the greatest bitter-ness of Japanese public opinion is turned not against the Zaibatsu but against the na-rikin。Narikin is often translated“nouveau riche”but that does not do justice to the Japanese feeling。In the United States nouveaux riches are strictly“newcomers”；they are laughable because they are gauche and have not had time to acquire the proper pol-ish。This liability，however，is balanced by the heartwarming asset that they have come up from the log cabin，they have risen from driving a mule to controlling oil millions。But in Japan a narikin is a term taken from Japanese chess and means a pawn promoted to queen。It is a pawn rampaging about the board as a“big shot。”It has no hierarchal right to do any such thing。The narikin is believed to have obtained his wealth by de-frauding or exploiting others and the bitterness directed toward him is as far as possible from the attitude in the United State toward the“home boy who makes good。”Japan provided a place in her hierarchy for great wealth and kept an alliance with it；when wealth is achieved in the field outside，Japanese public opinion is bitter against it。
The Japanese，therefore，order their world with constant reference to hierarchy。In the family and in personal relations，age，generation，sex，and class dictate proper be-havior。In government，religion，the Army，and industry，areas are carefully separated into hierarchies where neither the higher nor the lower may without penalty overstep their prerogatives。As long as“proper station”is maintained the Japanese carry on without protest。They feel safe。They are of course often not“safe”in the sense that their best good is protected but they are“safe”because they have accepted hierarchy as legiti-mate。It is as characteristic of their judgment on life as trust in equality and free enter-prise is of the American way of life。
Japan's nemesis came when she tried to export her formula for“safety。”In her own country hierarchy fitted popular imagination because it had moulded it。Ambitions could only be such as could take shape in that shape in that kind of a world。But it was a fatal commodity for export。Other nations resented Japan's grandiloquent claims as an impertinence and worse。Japan's officers and troops，however，in each occupied coun-try continued to be shocked that the inhabitants did not welcome them。Was Japan not offering them a place，however lowly，in a hierarchy and was not hierarchy desirable e-ven for those on the lower steps of it？Their War Services continued to get out series of war films which figured China's“love”for Japan under the image of desperate and dis-ordered Chinese girls who found happiness by falling in love with a Japanese soldier or a Japanese engineer。It was a far cry from the Nazi version of conquest yet it was no more successful in the long run。They could not exact from other nations what they had exac-ted of themselves。It was their mistake that they thought they could。They did not recog-nize that the system of Japanese morality which had fitted them to“accept their proper station”was something they could not count on elsewhere。Other nations did not have it。It is a genuine product of Japan。Her writers take this system of ethics so much for granted that they do not describe it and a description of it is necessary before one can understand the Japanese。
