澳大利亚智库对华观念的新思维

澳大利亚智库对华观念的新思维

澳大利亚与中国的关系，自1972年底建立外交关系以来，一直都较好。二年前，中国还成为澳大利亚最大的贸易伙伴。可是也因为这样的关系，去年底今年以来，澳大利亚与中国的纠纷就越来越多，分歧也越来越大。尽管现在的总理陆克文能说一口流利的汉语，但这种优势并未能给予充分利用，反而成为其进一步加强与中国关系的障碍。过去几个月，澳中之间关于铁矿石谈判及力拓公司胡士泰间谍案的角逐，澳大利亚总理的咄咄逼人态度，就是一例。澳中关系进入一个敏感时期。

也就在这个澳中关系进入微妙的时期，澳洲最大的智库罗伊国际政策研究所所长易主。今年5月，魏思礼(Michael Wesley)教授接任所长之职。

魏思礼非常年轻，刚过40岁的年纪，但已是澳洲国际关系方面最具影响力的中生代人物。在此之前，就担任格理菲思大学(Griffith University)亚洲研究所所长一职。达六年之久。在来格理菲思大学之前，他曾于苏格兰大学获博士学位之后，在新南威尔士大学(University of New South Wales)担任国际政治讲师，几年后升任高级讲师，之后几年又去到澳洲国家情报局担任局长助理。在陆克文上台后于2007年在堪培拉召开的“2020精英”大会上，魏思礼就是这次大会的召集委员会成员之一，并担任其中一个主题的总召集人之职。其受宠之深甚至引起许多资深专业人士的质疑，为此，陆克文特地为其辩护，谓未来的国家决策和政策制定，需要培养年轻而有潜力的学者担当此任，魏思礼的资历和成就，足以胜任此职。可见其知遇之隆。

之前，魏思礼的主要研究方向是印尼。最近几年，开始对中国与澳洲的关系感兴趣。自2007年开始，他开始介入对中国的研究，先与北京大学开展合作，后又与中山大学进行交流，并与后者于今年7月在广州共同召开有关澳中非传统安全问题的对话研讨会。同时，他还因夫人在澳大利亚驻香港总领事馆工作的关系，于2008年8月份前往香港居住，在香港大学国际政治系做研究，频繁出入中国大陆，从而加深了对中国的了解。这可能对其上任罗伊国际政策研究所所长一职后对政府的建言有所帮助。

果然，在中华人民共和国成立6周年的前夕，也是在澳中关系进入非常微妙的这样一个时期，魏思礼发表了澳中关系的一篇文章，提出澳洲是将其文化价值观从传统的西方阵营转入面对亚洲世纪亦即中国世纪的时候了。鉴于魏思礼目前的地位以及与陆克文的那种私交关系，或许他的这种观点多少反映了目前澳洲政府的困境，也反映了澳洲精英界督促政府正视国家利益和调整思维正确处理与近邻大国关系的心情。至少，他的文章提出了一个信号，即澳洲的福祉不仅仅依赖于与传统的欧美关系，还在于小心处理与新兴大国的交往上。

下面是魏思礼的那篇文章及网上找到的译文。

附：

China/>/>: an unfamiliar terrain

Michael Wesley

September 26, 2009

When China/> became its largest trading partner two years ago, Australia/>/> entered uncharted territory. For the first time in our history our most significant trading partner is not a member of our alliance system. Our most important trading partner is our closest ally's strategic competitor. And that trading partner is not a democracy.

With each passing month the Sino-Australian relationship becomes more complex and difficult to manage, as its strands become contradictory and tangled. Canberra/> has a schizophrenic attitude to China/>'s rise: happy about windfall gains in the short term but, longer term, worried about China/>/> as a great power.

The chill in Sino-Australian relations this year has drawn attention to the need to get Australia/>'s relationship with China/>/> right. This goes beyond the bilateral relationship; it is a test of whether Australia/>/> can look after its interests in an emerging world in which our international fortunes will not be solely determined by countries that are culturally similar to us.

Getting China/> right means Australia/> must make the effort to better understand China/>, to locate where its interests lie in the context of China/>'s development, and to articulate its position clearly to Beijing/>/>, firmly but not confrontationally.

China/>/> defies easy understanding. It is a country that evokes extremes of opinion. People tend to make simple, sweeping judgments about China/>/> because it is huge, complex, and changing rapidly.

It is an authoritarian state in which no one exercises clear authority. Power and resources in China/> are far more fragmented among competing authorities than in Australia/> and, arguably, even the US/>/>. The Chinese political system rigidly divides bureaucratic authority, is fundamentally factionalised, and is prone to protracted competition between Beijing/>/> and provincial governments. More often than not, policy outcomes are the result of prolonged haggling, compromises and power plays.

China/>/> is seen as one of the saviours of global capitalism from the recent crisis, but is deeply committed to communism. For all of its economic reforms, the Chinese Communist Party still believes it is building a socialist system. Its intellectuals and leaders are adamant it was communism that first predicted globalisation, that can best see and exploit its contradictions, and that can best harness it to vanquish capitalism.

China/>/>, the growth engine of the world economy, the holder of the largest stock of foreign exchange reserves, is still a poor country. Its per capita wealth puts it in the same league as Egypt/> and El Salvador/>/>. Even when its economy becomes the largest in the world, it (with India/>/>) will still be the poorest great power in history. This will affect its mindset. There is a tendency among Chinese leaders to view the world as having been stitched up by wealthy Western powers. And Beijing/>/> is justifiably nonplussed at the progress of its attempts to break in.

In general terms, the developed world encourages China/>/> to become more engaged in the global economy and institutions; but it reacts with alarm when a Chinese company tries to buy equity in a wealthy country's resources or energy companies. Beijing/> is constantly lectured about dealing with unsavoury regimes by countries happy to buy energy from Saudi Arabia/>, Russia/> and Nigeria/>/>.

China/>/> is determined to be recognised and respected, but is allergic to leadership. Beijing/>/> has learned all of the attention it has attracted is not an unalloyed benefit. Mixed in with the admiration has been criticism. Neither have China/>/>'s leaders enjoyed being catapulted by others to a world leadership role by the financial crisis. Unexpectedly for an authoritarian country, China/>/> has long been an advocate for the "democratisation" of international affairs - a world controlled not by one or a few great powers, but in which most states have a say.

Coming to terms with these complexities is not easy, but even beginning to perceive them develops a much more nuanced understanding of China/>/> than is conveyed by simple judgments. Even harder is the process of working out how Australia/>'s interests are affected by China/>/>, both positively and negatively.

The traditional formula of Australia/>'s national interests - security, prosperity and values - shows just how difficult this task is, because the China/>/> relationship pulls these interests in different directions. While Canberra/> and Beijing/>/> agree stability in our region is the best guarantee of security, they disagree on the methods. We would prefer the US/>/> to be the main guarantor of regional and global security. When push comes to shove, our security preferences are going to be different from Beijing/>/>'s.

Our prosperity, however, demands that we are attentive to China/>/>'s economic wishes. But even our prosperity interests in relation to China/>/> are more complex on closer inspection. Beijing/>/> has a preference for acquiring equity stakes in resource producers in the interests of price stability and long-term supply security, and we have yet to think through the implications of selling to Chinese state-owned enterprises.

Our values are also likely to be challenged by China/>/>. Beijing/>/>'s brittleness about its internal cohesion makes it less than willing to accept the democratic freedoms of other countries that allow Chinese dissidents to visit.

This year's events have shown each of these interests cannot be managed in isolation. Building a durable relationship with China/> requires some hard thinking about how we prioritise our interests, and how they are affected by the complex, dynamic reality of China/>/>. Because how we manage this relationship is being watched by other countries, too, and will have major impacts on how we are able to deal with the rest of our region.

Michael Wesley is executive director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. On Tuesday he will deliver the Sydney Ideas lecture on this topic at Sydney/> University/>/>.

Source: Sydney Morning Herald, 26 September 2009, p. 9

中国：一个不熟悉的领域

　　当中国在两年前成为澳大利亚最大贸易伙伴时，澳大利亚就进入了一个未知领域。我们最重要的贸易伙伴不是同盟体系中的一员，而是我们最亲密盟友的战略竞争对手，这在澳大利亚历史上第一次出现。
　　每过去一个月，中澳关系就会变得更加纠结和混乱，因此更加复杂和难以管理。对于中国的崛起，堪培拉有着一种精神分裂式的态度：对于短期内带来的横财而欢欣鼓舞，却对于在更长时期后中国成为一个强国而忧心忡忡。
　　今年中澳关系经历的寒意，已经使得正确对待中澳关系成为注意焦点。中澳之间不仅仅是双边关系，它对澳大利亚是一种考验：澳大利亚能否在一个新兴世界里追求自身利益，在这个世界里，我们的国际命运将不再只被那些文化上与我们相似的国家所左右。
　　正确对待同中国的关系，意味着澳大利亚必须努力了解中国，在中国发展的背景下确定出自己的利益所在，而且要向北京清楚地阐述自己的立场，态度坚定但不挑衅。
　　中国不是一个容易理解的国家。这是一个容易让外人得出极端结论的国家。由于中国幅员辽阔、复杂，而且变化迅速，所以人们往往对中国容易做出简单而片面的判断。
　　中国被视为能把全球资本主义从最近的危机中解救出来的救星之一，但是它坚定地致力于发展共产主义。中国是全球经济增长引擎和外汇储备量最大的国家，但仍然是一个贫穷的国家。人均财富使其与埃及和萨尔瓦多为伍。即使当中国经济规模成为世界上最大时，它仍具有最贫穷大国的历史，这将影响到它的心态。总体来说，发达国家鼓励中国更多地参与全球经济和全球组织，但当中国的公司试图购买富裕国家的资源和能源公司时，发达国家又会做出惊慌的反应。
　　中国注定会得到承认并赢得尊重，但它对世界领导权又很敏感。北京已经认识到它所获得的所有注意力并不纯粹是好事。与羡慕混合在一起的是批评。中国长期以来是国际事务“民主化”的支持者：世界不应由一个或少数几个大国所控制，而是大多数国家在其中都有发言权。
　　弄清楚澳大利亚的利益受中国的影响程度有多大，不管是积极方面的还是消极方面的，这都是非常困难的。澳大利亚国家利益的传统原则———安全、繁荣和价值，也表明这个任务是多么困难，因为同中国的关系把这些利益带向了不同的方向。尽管堪培拉和北京同意地区稳定是安全的最好保障，但是他们却在方法上持不同观点。我们宁愿赞同美国是地区和全球安全的主要保障。当到了需要做出决定时，我们的安全选择便与北京发生冲突。
　　然而，我们的繁荣诉求需要我们关注中国的经济愿望。出于价格稳定和长期安全供应的考虑，北京希望获取资源公司的股份，在向中国国有企业出售这些股份时，我们必须仔细考虑可能带来的影响。我们的价值观可能受到中国的挑战。
　　今年（影响中澳关系）的事件表明，所有这些利益问题都不能孤立地得到解决。同中国建立一种持久的关系需要认真地思考我们如何确定优先利益、它们如何受到中国的复杂性和变化的现实所影响。由于我们如何管理中澳关系正被其他国家密切地关注着，所以这也将对我们如何与该地区其他国家打交道产生重大影响。

（作者迈克尔·卫斯理是澳大利亚罗伊国际政策研究所所长。陈一译）

澳大利亚《悉尼先驱晨报》9月26日文章

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