美国公众对中国态度的重大转变
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-momentous-shift-in-us-public-attitudes-toward-china/
威廉·高尔斯顿 2021 年 3 月 22 日
尽管公众舆论很少决定美国外交政策的细节，但它通常定义了公众能见度的政策可以长期维持的区域。 最近的调查研究突显了美国人对中国态度的转变，这种转变影响深远，足以维持半个世纪前尼克松政府开放关系以来对中国最具敌对的立场。
3 月 16 日，盖洛普民意调查（“中国作为美国最大敌人的看法再创新高”）发现：
去年，将中国视为最大敌人的美国人比例翻了一番，从 22% 增至 45%。
尽管皮尤研究中心 2020 年 10 月的一项民意调查发现，64% 的美国人不赞成中国处理 COVID-19 大流行的方式，但中国经济崛起引发的担忧是公众舆论转变的关键。 现在，63% 的美国人将中国的经济实力视为“严重威胁”，高于 2018 年的 40% 和 2019 年的 46%。
中国经济崛起引发的担忧跨越了政治领域。 现在，81% 的共和党人、59% 的独立人士和 56% 的民主党人认为这是一个严重威胁，而 2019 年，这一比例为 54% 的共和党人、47% 的独立人士和 37% 的民主党人。
这些恐惧也遍及意识形态领域。 77%的保守派、56%的温和派和54%的自由派现在认为中国的经济崛起是一个重大威胁。
皮尤研究中心 3 月 4 日的一份报告证实并扩展了盖洛普的调查结果。 具体来说：
现在，67% 的美国人对中国持负面看法，高于 2018 年的 46%。这种不断上升的不满情绪具有广泛的政治基础——共和党人中这一比例为 22%，民主党人中为 23%。
百分之八十九的美国人现在认为中国是竞争对手或敌人。 大多数民主党人认为中国是前者，而大多数共和党人则选择后者。
现在，绝大多数人都认为来自中国的威胁涉及广泛，从网络攻击和中国不断增长的军事和技术实力到人权和美国就业岗位的流失。
48% 的人认为限制中国的实力和影响力是美国外交政策的“首要”优先事项，这一比例高于 2018 年的 32%。
53% 的美国人希望在经济政策上对中国采取更强硬的态度，甚至更多的人（70%）希望美国在人权政策上对抗中国。
2020年12月，芝加哥全球事务委员会发布了一份基于调查的报告，重点关注民主党和共和党之间的外交政策差异。 理事会发现，在这种背景下，人们对中国的态度显得异常。 55% 的美国人（三分之二的共和党人和近一半的民主党人）认为中国的崛起对美国的重大利益构成重大威胁，对中国的担忧仅次于新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 大流行和国内暴力极端主义。 只有34%的美国人认为美国政府有效应对了中国的崛起。
鉴于他们对我们过去的对华政策的负面评价，美国人跨党派支持采取一系列更强硬的措施也就不足为奇了。 获得两党支持的政策包括：
对侵犯人权的中国官员实施制裁：86%的受访者表示
加强与我们在该地区和其他地方的传统盟友的关系，而不是与中国的关系：78%
禁止向中国出售高科技设备：74%
禁止中国参与建设美国通信网络：69%
尽管如此，美国人还是区分强硬政策和弄巧成拙的政策。 超过十分之七的人继续支持在可能的情况下与中国合作谈判武器协议并减轻气候变化的威胁。
虽然这些态度转变的意义尚不清楚，但确实出现了一些初步结论。 尽管特朗普政府在强化公众对华态度方面所发挥的作用很难评估，但过去五年显然是美国对北京看法的关键时刻。 在公众和精英层面，二十多年来指导我们对华政策的乐观假设已经失去了可信度。 美国人不再相信中国会在经济或人权方面与美国合作，他们认为竞争与冲突的混合是我们关系的主要特征。
综合考虑，如果拜登政府将与中国的竞争置于其外交政策的核心，它将获得大量公众支持，而且其高级官员最近在阿拉斯加与中国同行会面时所使用的直言不讳的言辞也不会付出什么代价。 。 另一方面，大多数美国人并没有关注这种新兴关系的军事层面，也没有为可能发生的台湾冲突做好准备。
与此同时，政府最好重建我们在这场斗争中可以部署的外交和经济实力，包括对关键技术进行战略投资，以对抗习近平的“中国制造2025”战略。 就在十年前，“产业政策”还为两党精英所憎恶。 与许多其他经济问题一样，他们也改变了在这个问题上的立场，如果他们选择投资那些将决定未来几十年与中国的经济和国家安全竞争的技术，他们将获得公众支持。
A momentous shift in US public attitudes toward China
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/a-momentous-shift-in-us-public-attitudes-toward-china/
William A. Galston March 22, 2021
Although public opinion rarely determines the specifics of U. S. foreign policy, it typically defines the zone within which policies with public visibility can be sustained over time. Recent survey research has underscored a shift in Americans’ attitudes towards China that is far-reaching enough to sustain the most adversarial stance toward the Middle Kingdom since the Nixon administration’s opening of relations half a century ago.
On March 16, a Gallup poll (“New High in Perceptions of China as the U.S.’s Greatest Enemy”) found:
- The share of Americans who see China as our greatest enemy has doubled in the past year, from 22% to 45%.
- Although an October 2020 Pew Research Center poll found that 64% of Americans disapprove of China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, fears triggered by China’s economic rise are key to shifts in public opinion. Sixty-three percent of Americans now see China’s economic power as a “critical threat,” up from 40% in 2018 and 46% in 2019.
- The fears engendered by China’s economic rise span the political spectrum. Eighty-one percent of Republicans, 59% of Independents, and 56% of Democrats now see this as a critical threat, up from 54% of Republicans, 47% of Independents, and 37% of Democrats in 2019.
- These fears also pervade the ideological spectrum. Seventy-seven percent of conservatives, 56% of moderates, and 54% of liberals now see China’s economic rise as a critical threat.
A March 4 report from the Pew Research Center confirms and expands Gallup’s findings. Specifically:
- Sixty-seven percent of Americans now have negative views toward China, up from 46% in 2018. This rising disapproval is politically broad-based — 22 percentage points among Republicans, 23 points among Democrats.
- Eighty-nine percent of Americans now consider China to be a competitor or enemy. A majority of Democrats see China as the former, while a majority of Republicans opt for the latter.
- Strong majorities now perceive threats from China across a broad range, from cyberattacks and China’s rising military and technological power to human rights and the loss of U.S. jobs.
- Forty-eight percent see limiting China’s power and influence as a “top” U.S. foreign policy priority, up from 32% in 2018.
- Fifty-three percent of Americans want to get much tougher with China on its economic policies, and even more — 70% — want the U.S. to confront China over its human rights policy.
In December 2020, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs published a survey-based report that focused on the foreign policy differences between Democrats and Republicans. In this context, the Council found, attitudes toward China emerged as an outlier. Fifty-five percent of Americans — two-thirds of Republicans and nearly half of Democrats — view China’s rise as a critical threat to vital American interests, ranking concerns about China behind only the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic violent extremism. Only 34% of Americans believe that the U.S. government has handled China’s rise effectively.
Given their negative assessment of our past China policy, it is not surprising that Americans across party lines support a range of measures to get tougher. Among the policies enjoying bipartisan support:
Placing sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses: 86% of respondents overall
Strengthening relations with our traditional allies in the region and elsewhere rather than with China: 78%
Prohibiting the sale of high-tech equipment to China: 74%
Prohibiting Chinese involvement in building U.S. communications networks: 69%
Still, Americans distinguish between tough policy and self-defeating policy. More than seven in 10 continue to support working with China when possible to negotiate arms agreements and abate the threat of climate change.
While the significance of these shifting attitudes is not yet clear, some tentative conclusions do emerge. Although the role of the Trump administration in hardening public attitudes toward China is hard to assess, it is evident that the past five years represent a hinge-moment in U.S. perceptions of Beijing. At the public as well as elite levels, the optimistic assumptions that guided our China policy for more than two decades have lost credibility. Americans no longer believe that China will cooperate with the United States on economics or human rights, and they see a mix of competition and conflict as the principal feature of our relationship.
All things considered, the Biden administration will enjoy substantial public support if it places competition with China at the center of its foreign policy, and it will pay little price for the blunter rhetoric its senior officials employed during the recent meetings in Alaska with their Chinese counterparts. On the other hand, most Americans have not focused on the military dimensions of this emerging relationship and are not prepared for a possible conflict over Taiwan.
In the meantime, the administration would do well to rebuild the diplomatic and economic strength we can deploy in this struggle, including strategic investments in key technologies to counter Xi Jinping’s “Made in China 2025” strategy. As recently as a decade ago, “industrial policy” was anathema to elites in both parties. Along with many other economic issues, they have changed their stance on this matter, and they will enjoy public support if they choose to invest in the technologies that will define the economic and national security competition with China in coming decades.
