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这就是为什么《非洲增长机会法案》下的美非贸易对一些国家来说是成功的，但对另一些国家来说则不然
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/heres-why-us-africa-trade-under-agoa-has-been-successful-for-some-countries-but-not-others/
兰德里·西涅 2023 年 7 月 11 日@LandrySigne
非洲增长计划项目
《非洲增长与机会法案》（AGOA）是否实现了改善美国与非洲之间贸易和投资的目标？ AGOA 于 2000 年创建，并于 2015 年更新，是美国政府的一项贸易计划，为撒哈拉以南非洲国家提供进入美国市场的优惠，使它们能够免关税向美国出口产品。 《非洲增长机会法案》无疑有助于促进非洲对美国的出口，但贸易数据引发了人们的疑问：为什么一些国家能够更好地利用优惠贸易规则。 我发现政策实施理论——具体来说，弥合政策意图和期望结果之间差距的能力——有助于解释这种差异，并指出一种弥合未来高绩效者和低绩效者之间差距的方法。
当白宫和国会考虑 2025 年后 AGOA 的未来时，这些见解可以帮助政策制定者和商界领袖探索根据该计划进一步扩大美非贸易和投资的战略。
非洲国家对 AGOA 的利用各不相同
所有符合条件的撒哈拉以南非洲国家（截至 2023 年 5 月为 35 个国家）都将从美国贸易计划中受益，但 AGOA 的利用率和结果差异很大。 肯尼亚和莱索托的 AGOA 利用率最高：肯尼亚 88% 的出口和莱索托对美国的 99% 的出口符合零关税待遇的条件。 服装产品在两国对美国的出口中占主导地位。
但同期几乎一半的受益国的利用率为 2% 或更低，这意味着美国从这些国家进口的商品中有 98% 需缴纳美国关税。 正如威特尼·施奈德曼 (Witney Schneidman)、凯特·麦克纳尔蒂 (Kate McNulty) 和娜塔莉·迪查里 (Natalie Dicharry) 先前指出的那样，利用率上的这些差异阻碍了 AGOA “在经济发展、商业机会增长和创造就业机会方面扭转局面”的潜力。
为什么有些国家没有从 AGOA 中受益？
许多因素可以解释 AGOA 利用率的差异，包括商业环境的差异、利益竞争、缺乏信贷、缺乏互联网接入、能力不足、缺乏政府投资以及生产成本和瓶颈。 鉴于这些因素对 AGOA 实施的直接影响的经验证据有限，我的研究通过政策实施理论以另一种方式看待 AGOA 的利用。
政治学家理查德·马特兰解释了决定政策实施成败的两个主要因素：政策模糊性和政策冲突。 政策冲突的程度可以通过参与政策制定过程的理性且往往是自私的行为者之间的趋同或分歧程度来解释。 由于利益经常存在分歧，这通常会导致冲突。 当认知界或关键决策者和利益相关者对于解决特定政策挑战的方法存在分歧时，就会出现政策模糊性。 马特兰认为，高或低的模糊性和冲突的结合会给任何特定政策带来独特的实施挑战。
在 AGOA 的背景下，如果一个国家不生产符合 AGOA 优惠的出口商品，或者使用 AGOA 的总体目标和收益不明确，那么该国的政策就会高度模糊。 如果私营部门、政府、外国投资者、工人等各方对使用 AGOA 的条款、愿景或策略存在分歧，或者美国将某个国家或其贸易伙伴从受益国名单中剔除，那么一国内部的政策冲突可能会很严重。
截至 2022 年，39 个受益国中有 18 个制定了利用 AGOA 计划的战略。 公布2021年战略的16个国家中有14个增加了非原油出口。 马里、莫桑比克、多哥和赞比亚等许多采用国家 AGOA 战略的国家都取得了特别成功，在此期间对美国的出口增长了 90% 以上。
虽然值得注意，但可能还有其他因素在起作用。 制定国家 AGOA 战略与看到积极成果之间的积极联系是复杂的，而且可能是非线性的。 可以肯定的是，一个已经拥有有利资源、政治意愿、私营部门支持或其他有利因素的国家可能更有可能从 AGOA 中受益，并且更有可能制定利用战略。
与此同时，利用 AGOA 的国家战略可以作为识别和加强这些因素的一种方式。 从马特兰的理论来看，利用策略可以确保每个人都达成共识，从而减少政策冲突。 制定适当的战略可以为增加出口制定明确的前进道路，从而减少政策的模糊性。
例如，在美国实施制裁之前，埃塞俄比亚制定了利用战略，确定了特定部门的限制因素并制定了解决这些问题的战略，从而增加了符合《非洲增长和机会法案》资格的出口。 这一战略促成了一站式技术和信息中心的创建，以协助埃塞俄比亚政府在该国 AGOA 利用战略中确定的五个优先产品领域——纺织品和服装、皮革和皮革制品、园艺、手工艺品和农产品加工。 该中心开业一年后，埃塞俄比亚对美国的出口增长了 50% 以上，远高于 2015 年至 2016 年同期符合 AGOA 条件的国家对美国的出口增长总额（平均 19%）。
2017年，博茨瓦纳制定了AGOA利用战略，确定了具体的出口壁垒，并建立了评估标准和制度结构来跟踪特定优先事项的关键指标。 2021年，博茨瓦纳与各部委的公务员、私营部门协会、个体公司、妇女团体以及非政府和半政府组织进一步举行了利益相关者参与会议，以收集有关经济新关注领域的意见，从而修订了战略。 博茨瓦纳不断适应形势变化的战略，可以为非洲其他国家如何减少政策冲突和模糊性、成功弥合政策制定与实施之间的差距提供重要范例。
拜登的非洲战略对 AGOA 的利用意味着什么
最终，AGOA 计划为那些更多使用该计划的非洲国家带来了好处，但正如利用率的差异所表明的那样，这些好处并未在各国之间平等分享。 拜登总统的非洲战略意味着 AGOA 的利用率将受到更严格的审查，因为政策制定者希望了解 AGOA 是否兑现了其承诺以及未来的发展方向。 这里讨论的数据和政策实施理论表明，解决这些差异和加速促成因素的最佳方法是制定明确、全面和不断发展的利用战略。 不言而喻，这种成功实施的努力应该会带来长期的社会经济成果，并通过将《非洲增长机会法案》延长到 2025 年以后，更好地促进美国和非洲的共同利益。
Here's why US-Africa trade under AGOA has been successful for some countries but not others
Landry Signé July 11, 2023 @LandrySigne
Has the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) achieved its goal of improving trade and investment between the U.S. and Africa? Created in 2000 and renewed in 2015, AGOA is a U.S. government trade program that gives countries in sub-Saharan Africa preferential access to U.S. markets, allowing them to export products to the United States tariff-free. AGOA has certainly helped boost African exports to the United States, but the trade data raise questions about why some countries are better able to capitalize on the preferential trade rules. I found that policy implementation theory—specifically, the ability to bridge the gap between policy intentions and desired outcomes—helps explain this variation and points a way to bridge the gap between high and low performers going forward.
As the White House and Congress consider the future of AGOA post-2025, these insights can aid policymakers and business leaders alike as they explore strategies to further expand U.S.-Africa trade and investment under the program.
African countries vary in their utilization of AGOA
All eligible sub-Saharan African countries (35 countries as of May 2023) stand to benefit from the U.S. trade program, but AGOA utilization rates and results vary widely. Kenya and Lesotho have had some of the highest AGOA utilization rates: 88 percent of Kenyan exports and 99 percent of Lesotho’s exports to the U.S. qualified for zero-tariff treatment. Apparel products dominated both countries’ exports to the United States.
But almost half of all beneficiary countries had a utilization rate of 2 percent or lower during the same time period—this means 98 percent of U.S. imports from those countries were subject to U.S. tariffs. These discrepancies in utilization rates have hindered AGOA’s potential “to tip the scales when it comes to economic development, growth of commercial opportunities, and job creation,” as Witney Schneidman, Kate McNulty, and Natalie Dicharry previously noted.
Why are some countries not benefiting from AGOA?
A number of factors could explain variations in AGOA utilization, including differences in business environments, competing interests, lack of credit, lack of internet access, insufficient capacity, lack of government investment, and production costs and bottlenecks. Given the limited empirical evidence on the direct effects of these factors on AGOA implementation, my research looks at AGOA utilization another way, by using policy implementation theory.
Political scientist Richard Matland explains the two primary factors that determine success or failure in policy implementation: policy ambiguity and policy conflict. The degree of policy conflict is explained by the level of convergence or divergence between rational and often self-interested actors involved in the policymaking process. Since interests regularly diverge, this usually leads to conflict. Policy ambiguity arises when there is a divergence within the epistemic community or key policymakers and stakeholders about approaches to solve specific policy challenges. Matland argues that a combination of high or low ambiguity and conflict create a unique implementation challenge for any given policy.
In the context of AGOA, a country would have high policy ambiguity if it doesn’t produce goods to export that fall under AGOA preferences, or if the overall goals and benefits of AGOA utilization are unclear. Policy conflict within a country may be high if various players—the private sector, the government, foreign investors, workers, etc.—disagree over the terms, vision, or strategy for using AGOA, or if the U.S. takes a country or its trading partners off the beneficiary list.
As of 2022, 18 of the 39 beneficiary countries had developed a strategy to utilize the AGOA program. And 14 of the 16 countries that had published strategies in 2021 increased their non-crude oil exports. Many countries that adopted a national AGOA strategy—such as Mali, Mozambique, Togo, and Zambia—experienced particular success and saw their exports to the U.S. rise by over 90 percent during this period.
While noteworthy, there may be other factors at work. The positive association between having developed a national AGOA strategy and seeing positive outcomes is complex and likely nonlinear. To be sure, a country that already has favorable resources, political will, private sector support, or other enabling factors may be more likely to benefit from AGOA and be more likely to develop a utilization strategy.
At the same time, a national strategy for utilizing AGOA can serve as a way to identify and strengthen those factors. Seen in terms of Matland’s theory, a utilization strategy reduces policy conflict by making sure everyone is on the same page. And having a strategy in place reduces policy ambiguity by laying out a clear path forward to increase exports.
For example, prior to U.S. sanctions, Ethiopia boosted its AGOA-eligible exports after developing a utilization strategy that identified sector-specific constraints and formulated strategies to address them. This strategy led to the creation of a one-stop technical and information hub to assist the five priority product areas the Ethiopian government identified in the country’s AGOA utilization strategy—textiles and garments, leather and leather products, horticulture, handcrafts, and agro-processing. One year after the hub opened, Ethiopia increased its exports to the United States by over 50 percent—much more than the total increase of exports from AGOA-eligible countries to the United States during the same time period, from 2015 to 2016 (19 percent on average).
In 2017, Botswana developed an AGOA utilization strategy that identified specific barriers to exports, and established evaluation criteria and an institutional structure to track key metrics of specific priorities. In 2021, Botswana held further stakeholder engagement meetings with civil servants in various ministries, private sector associations, individual firms, women’s groups and nongovernmental and semi-governmental organizations to gather input on new areas of concern in the economy, resulting in a revised strategy. Botswana’s strategy of continuously adjusting to changing circumstances, may offer an important example for other countries in Africa on how to reduce policy conflict and ambiguity to successfully bridge the gap between policy formulation and implementation.
What Biden's Africa strategy means for AGOA utilization
Ultimately, the AGOA program has shown benefits for those African countries that use the program more, but as the variance in utilization rates demonstrates, these benefits have not been shared equally among countries. President Biden’s Africa strategy means that AGOA utilization rates will be coming under increased scrutiny as policymakers look to see whether AGOA has delivered on its promise and what is the way forward. The data and the policy implementation theory discussed here suggest that the best way to address these discrepancies and accelerate enabling factors will be by mobilizing a clear, comprehensive, and continuously evolving utilization strategy. It goes without saying that such efforts toward successful implementation should deliver long-term socioeconomic outcomes and better advance mutual U.S. and African interests with the extension of AGOA beyond 2025.
