John Mearsheimer 北约的鲁莽扩张激怒了俄罗斯

这位政治学家认为,北约的鲁莽扩张激怒了俄罗斯

2022 年 3 月 19 日

乌克兰战争是自 1962 年古巴导弹危机以来最危险的国际冲突。 如果我们要防止事情变得更糟,并找到一种方法来结束它,那么了解其根本原因至关重要。

毫无疑问,弗拉基米尔·普京发动了这场战争,并对战争的进行负责。 但他为什么这么做则是另一回事了。 西方主流观点认为,他是一个非理性、脱离现实的侵略者,一心想按照前苏联的模式建立一个更大的俄罗斯。 因此,他一个人对乌克兰危机负有全部责任。

但这个故事是错误的。 西方,特别是美国,对2014年2月开始的这场危机负有主要责任。现在这场危机已经演变成一场战争,不仅有可能摧毁乌克兰,而且有可能升级为俄罗斯与北约之间的核战争。

乌克兰问题实际上始于2008年4月的北约布加勒斯特峰会,当时乔治·W·布什政府推动该联盟宣布乌克兰和格鲁吉亚“将成为其成员”。 俄罗斯领导人立即做出愤怒回应,称这一决定对俄罗斯构成生存威胁,并誓言予以阻止。 据一位受人尊敬的俄罗斯记者称,普京“勃然大怒”,并警告说,“如果乌克兰加入北约,克里米亚和东部地区将被排除在外。” 它只会崩溃。” 然而,美国无视莫斯科的红线,并推动乌克兰成为俄罗斯边境的西方堡垒。 该战略还包括另外两个要素:让乌克兰更接近欧盟并使其成为亲美的民主国家。

这些努力最终在 2014 年 2 月引发了敌对行动,起义(得到美国支持)导致乌克兰亲俄总统维克托·亚努科维奇逃离该国。 作为回应,俄罗斯从乌克兰手中夺取了克里米亚,并助长了乌克兰东部顿巴斯地区爆发的内战。

下一次重大对抗发生在 2021 年 12 月,并直接导致了当前的战争。 主要原因是乌克兰正在成为北约事实上的成员。 这一进程始于 2017 年 12 月,当时特朗普政府决定向基辅出售“防御武器”。 然而,什么算作“防御性”却很难明确,而且这些武器对莫斯科及其在顿巴斯地区的盟友来说显然是具有攻击性的。 其他北约国家也加入了这一行动,向乌克兰运送武器,训练其武装部队,并允许其参加联合空中和海上演习。 2021年7月,乌克兰和美国在黑海地区共同举办了一次大型海军演习,共有32个国家的海军参加。 “海风”行动几乎激怒了俄罗斯向一艘故意进入俄罗斯认为其领海的英国海军驱逐舰开火。

在拜登政府领导下,乌克兰和美国之间的联系继续加强。 这一承诺体现在一份重要文件中——《美国-乌克兰战略伙伴关系宪章》——该文件由美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯和乌克兰国务卿德米特罗·库莱巴于 11 月签署。 其目的是“强调......对乌克兰实施全面融入欧洲和欧洲大西洋机构所必需的深入和全面改革的承诺。” 该文件明确建立在“加强乌克兰与美国关系的承诺之上”。 泽伦斯基总统和拜登总统的战略伙伴关系”,并强调两国将以“2008年布加勒斯特峰会宣言”为指导。

不出所料,莫斯科发现这种不断变化的局势无法容忍,并于去年春天开始在乌克兰边境调动军队,以向华盛顿表明其决心。 但这并没有产生任何效果,拜登政府继续向乌克兰靠拢。 这导致俄罗斯在 12 月引发了全面的外交僵局。 正如俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫所说:“我们已经达到了沸点。” 俄罗斯要求乌克兰提供书面保证,保证乌克兰永远不会成为北约的一部分,并要求北约撤走其自 1997 年以来在东欧部署的军事资产。随后的谈判失败了,正如布林肯明确表示的那样:“没有任何改变。 不会有任何改变。” 一个月后,普京发动了对乌克兰的入侵,以消除他所看到的来自北约的威胁。

这种解释

这些事件与西方盛行的口号不一致,西方盛行的口号认为北约扩张与乌克兰危机无关,而是归咎于普京的扩张主义目标。 根据北约最近发给俄罗斯领导人的一份文件,“北约是一个防御性联盟,对俄罗斯不构成威胁。” 现有证据与这些说法相矛盾。 首先,当前的问题不是西方领导人所说的北约的目的或意图是什么;而是西方领导人所说的北约的目的或意图。 这就是莫斯科如何看待北约的行动。

普京肯定知道,征服和占领东欧大片领土的成本对俄罗斯来说是难以承受的。 正如他曾经说过的:“谁不思念苏联,谁就没有心。” 谁想拿回来,谁就没有脑子。” 尽管他相信俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的紧密联系,但试图夺回整个乌克兰就像试图吞下一只豪猪一样。 此外,包括普京在内的俄罗斯政策制定者几乎没有提及征服新领土以重建苏联或建设一个更大的俄罗斯。 相反,自2008年布加勒斯特峰会以来,俄罗斯领导人一再表示,他们认为乌克兰加入北约是一种必须加以防止的生存威胁。 正如拉夫罗夫一月份指出的那样,“一切的关键是保证北约不会东扩。”

很明显,西方领导人在 2014 年之前很少将俄罗斯描述为对欧洲的军事威胁。正如美国前驻莫斯科大使迈克尔·麦克福尔 (Michael McFaul) 指出的那样,普京夺取克里米亚的计划并不长久; 这是针对推翻乌克兰亲俄领导人的政变而做出的冲动举动。 事实上,在那之前,北约扩张的目的是将整个欧洲变成一个巨大的和平区,而不是遏制危险的俄罗斯。 然而,危机一旦爆发,美国和欧洲的政策制定者就无法承认是他们试图将乌克兰融入西方而引发了这场危机。 他们宣称问题的真正根源是俄罗斯的复仇主义及其统治乌克兰(如果不是征服乌克兰的话)的愿望。

鉴于自 20 世纪 90 年代末以来许多著名的美国外交政策专家就对北约扩张发出警告,我关于冲突原因的故事不应引起争议。 在布加勒斯特峰会期间,美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨认识到“试图将格鲁吉亚和乌克兰纳入北约确实是太过分了”。 事实上,在那次峰会上,德国总理安格拉·默克尔和法国总统尼古拉·萨科齐都反对推动乌克兰加入北约,因为他们担心这会激怒俄罗斯。

我的解释的结果是,我们正处于极其危险的境地,而西方政策正在加剧这些风险。 对于俄罗斯领导人来说,乌克兰发生的事情与他们的帝国野心受挫没有多大关系; 这是为了应对他们认为对俄罗斯未来构成直接威胁的问题。 普京可能误判了俄罗斯的军事能力、乌克兰抵抗运动的有效性以及西方反应的范围和速度,但人们永远不应该低估当大国自以为陷入困境时的冷酷无情。 然而,美国及其盟友正在加倍努力,希望给普京带来耻辱性的失败,甚至可能引发他的下台。 他们正在增加对乌克兰的援助,同时利用经济制裁对俄罗斯进行大规模惩罚,普京现在认为此举“类似于宣战”。

美国及其盟友也许能够阻止俄罗斯在乌克兰取得胜利,但该国即使不被肢解,也将受到严重损害。 此外,乌克兰以外地区还存在局势升级的严重威胁,更不用说核战争的危险了。 如果西方不仅在乌克兰战场上挫败莫斯科,而且还对俄罗斯经济造成严重、持久的损害,那么它实际上是在将一个大国推向崩溃的边缘。 普京随后可能会转向核武器。

目前尚无法知道解决这场冲突的条款。 但是,如果我们不了解其深层原因,我们将无法在乌克兰遭到破坏以及北约最终与俄罗斯发生战争之前结束它。

约翰·J·米尔斯海默 (John J. Mearsheimer) 是芝加哥大学政治学 R. 温德尔·哈里森 (R. Wendell Harrison) 杰出服务教授。

John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis?utm_medium=

The political scientist believes the reckless expansion of NATO provoked Russia

THE WAR in Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close.

There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. The mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis.

But that story is wrong. The West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only threatens to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and NATO.

The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. Bush’s administration pushed the alliance to announce that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”. Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, characterising this decision as an existential threat to Russia and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy.

These efforts eventually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after an uprising (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. In response, Russia took Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.

The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to the current war. The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The process started in December 2017, when the Trump administration decided to sell Kyiv “defensive weapons”. What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and these weapons certainly looked offensive to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region. Other NATO countries got in on the act, shipping weapons to Ukraine, training its armed forces and allowing it to participate in joint air and naval exercises. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters.

The links between Ukraine and America continued growing under the Biden administration. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was signed in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.”

Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving situation intolerable and began mobilising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” Russia demanded a written guarantee that Ukraine would never become a part of NATO and that the alliance remove the military assets it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO.

This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters, the issue at hand is not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees NATO’s actions.

Mr Putin surely knows that the costs of conquering and occupying large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.”

Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine.

My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s. America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia.

The upshot of my interpretation is that we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and Western policy is exacerbating these risks. For Russia’s leaders, what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future. Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”.

America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered. Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war. If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, lasting damage to Russia’s economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr Putin might then turn to nuclear weapons.

At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia.

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

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