读《中国和塔利班（英文）》有感
庄冬
我把ywa13网友转的《中国和塔利班（英文）》附在最后供大家参考
我读了《中国和塔利班（英文）》以为这篇文章揭示了一个特别重要的战争和实现战争成果的问题。
记得小时候看关于抗日战争的小说就注意到日军特别需要中国人帮忙（主要是两种）：一种是伪军和汉歼翻译官什么的就不用说了；另一种是就连一些当时是属于比较现代化的东西，比如说铁路、电话和发电厂也得中国人来管理，虽然有日军监视。
所谓现代化的社会和比较现代化的国家的人们的生活是需要各种各样的工业设施的有条不紊的运行来实现的，所以战争过后要实现战争的成果已经不像当年西方人到非洲、美洲和亚洲那样只要军队到了带上足够的军火就可以实现战争的成果了，因为那时别的东西都基本上可以就地取材来解决。
现代化的社会不仅人们的生活是需要各种各样的工业设施的有条不紊的运行来实现的，就连现代化的占领军（比如说美军）在一个不太现代化的国家（比如说阿富汗）运作都需要当地有一定的工业设施的有条不紊的运行（比如说这篇文章里提到的电话和电力）。
一个现代化的占领军（比如说美军）在一个不太现代化的国家（比如说阿富汗）完全是为了占领军自己的军事需要就面临着建立或者至少也要维持当地的一定的基本的工业设施的有条不紊的运行，因为美军自己不可能带着个发电厂自己长期或永远都自己为自己提供自己需要的所有电力。说了基本的能源电力，还要有汽油，恐怕美军自己也许自己长期或永远都自己从阿富汗外为自己运送自己需要的所有汽油。即便是被占领国有石油，比如说伊拉克，也还是需要炼油厂的正常运行。这些都需要占领军或者伪军来维持。
即便只是说军事，占领军也有跟当地人通讯的问题，因此需要通讯设施的正常运行。当然啦，仅仅是军事还不能实现战争的成果，要实现实现战争的成果就必须有当地人的合作。美国人借以得到当地人的合作的方法就是改善当地人的生活，也就是把当地人的生活给搞的现代化一些。这又需要当地有一定的工业设施的有条不紊的运行！
建立或者至少也要维持一个不太现代化的国家（比如说阿富汗，甚至伊拉克）有一定的工业设施的有条不紊的运行也不是美军甚至美国可以解决的问题，这倒不是因为美国人没有解决这些问题的技术，而是因为美国人自己来做这些事美国人和当地人都支付不起，因此现代化的美军占领了一个不太现代化的国家就必须有其它的国家的人们到这个国家来以比较便宜的价格去做这些事。
当然啦，美国人的盟友们的日子过的都不错，虽然他们的价格也许会比美国人便宜那么一点点也还是不太好用或者根本用不起的。这样一来，美军就需要有一定的技术力量又价格不是太高的人们来帮助美军实现战争的成果。
《中国和塔利班（英文）》这篇文章里提到的是阿富汗，而且在美军入侵之前中国就在那里跟当地人有某些电力和电话方面的合作了。我猜自从美军入侵到现在，阿富汗的各种工业设施的建立和正常运行需要中国人帮忙的时候只会越来越多。也就是说，美国为了在阿富汗的实现战争的成果而需要中国人帮忙的时候只会越来越多。特别是我好象记得美国人还违反美国法律买了中国制造的子弹哪！
网友回复：这篇文章显示911前中国势力已经进入阿富汗，美国开打冲中国来。
如果中国势力成功进入阿富汗，中国即可打通到伊朗的石油通道。不但冲破美国围堵，还对印度形成钳形包围，中国西部威胁基本解除。连带疆独势力一并剪除。这个绝对不是美国可以接受的。美国打阿富汗可能还有许多理由，但这个针对中国的动作不可忽略。
如今阿富汗通道已被美军绞断，美军付出的代价就是不停出血。中国在这种情况下，切不可真心实意帮美军在阿富汗站稳。一切应以明帮暗怠为原则。通过走私等方法协助塔利班继续为美军放血。只有在阿富汗拖住美军，中国东线才可以安稳。既然美军要在南海军演，就让中国到阿富汗的军火走私来得更猛烈些吧，反正我们要把军力东调，以保朝鲜半岛安全，不是吗？
我答：简单说中国是民事渗透而美国是军事占领
谁能长期在阿富汗待下去笑到最后呢？拭目以待吧
好玩的是这篇文章显示中国跟塔利班拉上关系是从塔利班支持疆独开始由巴基斯坦介绍的，正可谓“不打不相识”啊！
我永远相信得人心者得天下。
由于中国是民事渗透而美国是军事占领，这也就在阿富汗人眼里有了事实上的美国的军事占领跟中国的民事渗透的比较。
阿富汗人看到的这两个外来户的所作所为以后就必然会有一个比较和人心所向的，因此美国的军事占领很可能会到头来进一步帮助了中国的民事渗透，特别是中国的民事渗透是阿富汗人和美军都需要的。
有意思吧？
附：《中国和塔利班（英文）》
China's Taliban Connection
By Harvinder Sahota
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao expended the better part of a week deflecting attention from his country’s extensive dealings with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Zhu Bangzao described as "absurd" any suggestions that China had been involved in any manner with the Taliban [1]. For a state that habitually complains of being a victim to terrorism and “splittists” in Xinjiang, the People’s Republic of China courted the terrorists quite actively.
Ever pragmatic, the People’s Republic of China sought to nip the Uighur separatist movement in the bud by engaging its sponsors in Afghanistan. With the escalation of separatist violence across Xinjinag in 1998, China pressurized its Pakistani clients to rein in Islamic terrorists based in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan facilitated contact between the two sides. Five senior Chinese diplomats arrived in Kabul for talks with the ruling Taliban in February 1999, the first of a series of interactions. Chinese diplomats met with Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Interior Minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq and Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Zayef, Chinese food aid to the Taliban at the start of winter laid the groundwork for the visit. Following their first meeting, the Chinese announced they had agreed to start direct flights between Kabul and Urumqi, the capital of the troubled Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and open formal trade ties with the Taliban [2]. The Chinese also agreed to help provide the Taliban with arms and spares for its ageing equipment. Apparently, the two sides agreed to institutionalize military to military contacts [3]. In return the Taliban made it clear that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used against China [4]. The Taliban also facilitated the transfer of at least two unexploded US Tomahawks to China for $20 million each [5].
For the Taliban, its Chinese connection soon proved a commercial and strategic windfall. By 2001 China had become the biggest investor in Afghanistan, with ‘legitimate’ investments running to several tens of millions of dollars [6]. On the strategic front, the Chinese agreed to consider the Taliban’s position when UN sanctions against Afghanistan came up for discussion. In July 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with a Taliban delegation whilst visiting Pakistan. A Chinese delegation headed by Lu Shulin, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, met with Mullah Muhammad Omar in this regard on December 12, 2000; becoming the first non-Muslims to meet with him. The Chinese trip came in response to a Taliban plea to Beijing to veto US-Russian moves to tighten United Nations sanctions against the Afghan Government. The fresh sanctions under discussion at the Security Council included travel restrictions against Taliban officials [7]. Earlier, in November 2000, a delegation from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an influential think-tank run by the Ministry of State Security, visited Kabul and Kandahar [8].
In 2000, China's Huawei Technologies Co., the company that Washington has accused of helping Iraq to upgrade its military communications system despite Chinese denials, has other controversial interests in the region. It signed an agreement with the Taliban to install 12,000 fixed-line telephones in Kandahar. Meanwhile, another southern Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, had agreed to install 5,000 telephone lines in Kabul. The deal stalled until Pakistan could provide guarantees for the project [9].
Afghanistan's power grid, severely damaged by years of war, became the destination for the bulk of China’s investment. Repair and expansion work on the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province began in early 2001. The Chinese Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Company was hired to add 16.5 MW to its generating [10]. Work was still in progress when the site was bombed in November this year [11]. Transmission lines from the Kajaki Dam to Kandahar were repaired in early 2001, along with a substation in the city, restoring supplies of electricity. The Dahla Dam in Kandahar province also has been restored to operation, along with the Breshna-Kot Dam in Nangarhar province, which has a generating capacity of 11.5 MW. The 66 MW Mahipar hydroelectric plant also is now operational [12]. The Chinese were also involved in refurbishing the Herat Cement Plant [13].
In July 2001 a Taliban delegation led by their Commercial Attaché to Pakistan, spent a week in China as guests of the government. Whilst the Chinese Commerce Ministry declined to accord them the requisite diplomatic protocol, it did facilitate their interaction with a group of Chinese industrialists and businessmen in order to explore business and investment opportunities [14]. The Chinese were dealing with the Taliban right up to the day of the WTC attacks. Indeed a new protocol on commercial relations was inked on the day of the attack [15]. The warmth of the China-Taliban relations can be gauged by annual felicitations conveyed by Mullah Omar (via Radio Shariat) on the occasion of China’s National Day since 1999, and by Osama bin Laden public proclamations of the need to cultivate ties as recently as August 2001 [16].
Notes
[1] ‘China Refutes US Reports on China-Taliban Ties’ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland September 16, 2001 http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk
[2] Ahmed Rashid ‘Taliban temptation’, Far Eastern Economic Review March 11, 1999.
[3] Tara Shankar Sahay ‘Taliban-China deal puzzles diplomats’ Rediff February 12, 1999.
[4] ‘Bin Ladin Calls for Taliban-China Good Relations to Reduce US Influence’ Ausaf (in Urdu) August 14, 2001. via FBIS
[5] China paid Laden for access to Cruise missiles AFP March 9, 2001.
[6] John Pomfret ‘China Strengthens Ties With Taleban by Signing Economic Deal’ Washington Post September 13, 2001.
[7] Munawar Hasan 'Taliban team to visit China to boost The Nation July 4, 2001. See also David Murphy and Susan V. Lawrence ‘Beijing Hopes to gain from US raids’ Far Eastern Economic Review October 4, 2001 and Dan Birstow 'China flirts with an independent pro-active Afghan policy' Central Asia Analyst January 3, 2001.
[8] Pomfret, ibid.
[9]‘China Firm Trades with Taliban’ Far Eastern Economic Review March 15, 2001.
[10] See ‘Afghanistan’ Energy Information Administration U.S. Department of Energy 2001.
[11] ‘US strikes targets around Kandahar’ AFP November 7, 2001.
[12] DOE, ibid,
[13] Pomfret, ibid.
[14] Munawar Hasan, ibid.
[15] Pomfret, ibid.
[16] Ausaf op. cit. and various broadcasts of Radio Shariat.
