辛恩：欧央行秘密救市告终
本文来源于《财经网》 2011年05月04日
汉斯·沃纳·辛恩为慕尼黑大学经济和财政学教授，德国Ifo经济研究所主席
慕尼黑——
为何希腊，爱尔兰，葡萄牙纷纷在欧盟的保护伞下寻求救援？为何西班牙也接踵而至，即将采取类似行动？
对于多说人来说，答案不言自明。因为国际市场不再打算为这四国提供经济援助。而这只说对了一半。实际上，国际市场在过去的三年里并未给这四个国 家提供多少援助。而欧洲中央银行才是背后的救助者。尽管长期以来一直被媒体忽视，但是从其所谓的“目标”账户上可以看出，欧央行所采取的很多援助措施并不 为人所知。
而今，欧央行计划终止该援助政策，并敦促欧盟各国成员接替此项重任。
通常，一个国家的收支往来账户赤字（贸易赤字减去其他国家的转移支付）多来自外国私人资本。然而，在一个货币联盟里，如果外来私人资本不足，那么中央银行则应用贷款来填补空缺。2007年中旬便有过一次，当时银行同业拆放市场已经崩溃。
而葡萄牙，爱尔兰，希腊，西班牙这四国所属的中央银行则大印钞票，并将这些钱借给私有银行。从而，用以填补收支往来账户赤字造成的空缺。而这些 货币则输入到一些出口型的国家，并在那些国家作为常规货币进行流通。这些出口国家的央行则为此采取应对措施，减少发放用以国内经济发展的新钱。因而，这些 国家央行所发放的贷款则被导向了这四国，而这其中最典型的就是德国央行。
而欧央行的行为本身并不具有通胀导向，因为其发放的贷款在整体份额上并不会对欧盟造成影响。但是，这四个国家的贷款主要源自于各出口国家的央行，因而这一政策则等同于一个强制性的资金输出。
而欧央行的“替代性借款”则通过所谓的目标账户表现出来。而这一账户则用于衡量一个国家与其他国家经济交易之中的出超和入超状况。由于该账户包 含有货物以及债权的国际支付，因而，一个国家的目标账户有赤字记录，那么这就意味着通过欧央行而获取的外国贷款；反之，出超则意味着通过欧央行发放贷款。
而差额并没有出现在欧央行的资产负债报表上。尽管其总额为零，但是在各国国有央行资产负债报表上这些差额则有深入的体现，具体表现在对于欧央行的有息借款以及敦促其还贷。
直到2007年，目标账目已经接近零，但实际上，从那时起目标账目每年都以1000亿欧元的数额在增长。
比如，德意志联邦银行的目标账户从2006年的50亿欧元飙升至2011年3月的3230亿欧元。而与之相对的是葡，爱，希，西这四国的债务额 已经于去年年末达到3400亿欧元。值得注意的是，这四国从2008到2011年的累计收支往来账户赤字几乎与其债务值一样——准确的说是3650亿欧 元。
如果欧央行未能填补这些赤字的空缺，那么这四国则将通过寻求资金来支付其净进口带来的空缺，这必定是一大难题。如果这四国最终能实现此目标，那 么高贷款利息将会促使其“勒紧腰带”，实行紧缩政策。那么这四国现在的收支往来账户赤字将有所减少，以希腊和葡萄牙为例，这两个国家的赤字已经超过其国内 生产总值的10%。
但我们也不应将这四个国家在经济危机中欠下的巨额债务归咎于欧央行。为防止其经济衰退，有时候我们的确需要采取一些不同寻常的措施。但是，要知 道这并不是一种自成一格的货币政策，而是救市措施。而今世界经济水平有了较大的恢复，那么现在是时候摒弃这种政策了，尤其是在欧央行自身资金几近耗尽的状 况下。
去年年末，欧央行在欧盟地区的资金总额为1.07万亿欧元，而3800亿欧元已经耗费在这四个国家的贷款之中。因而，如果还要维持现有状态，继续为这四个国家提供贷款，那么在六到七年内，欧央行的基础货币将被耗费一空。
为了从此项政策中脱身，欧央行希望卢森堡救援机构，欧洲金融稳定机制或是欧洲稳定机制来接替自己。一些国家甚至呼吁发布欧洲债券。但是这只是延 长了欧盟对于这四个国家的援助，继续提供资金来填补收支往来账户赤字。如今这已经是第四个年头，也许还能持续个两三年。但是到了那个时候，我们可能面临的 是欧盟的衰退，或者另一个新构建的联盟机构，而在这个联盟中，这些赤字将由各国的捐款来解决。
如果欧盟继续将卢森堡基金保留，用以解决真正棘手的问题，那么情况也许会有所好转。同时，欧央行规定这四个国家的央行在提供贷款时要求贷款方提 供更高的担保。限定目标差额最额度带来的促进因素使得这些国家愿意去执行这一规定。尽管该限定不会彻底清除现有的赤字，但是可以将赤字减少到私人资金能够 解决的范围内。
较之新的工资政策，设定最高贷款额度相对来说更为可行。它能更好的将现有的赤字制约在一定范围内。而工资政策只适用于中央计划经济体系。
或许这四个国家会好奇意大利是如果渡过难关的。即便其需要支付利率风险贴水，加之面临财政赤字。马里奥·德拉基（今秋接管欧央行的有力竞争者） 在整个经济危机中很好地将意大利央行的借款控制在合理的范围内。尽管颇具诱惑力，但是意大利并没有选择债台高筑。而是选择更为理性的节制紧缩。
汉斯·沃纳·辛恩为慕尼黑大学经济和财政学教授，德国Ifo经济研究所主席
The ECB's Secret Bailout Strategy
05-04 15:07
So financing a continued PIGS current-account deficit of about €100 billion a year would consume the entire stock of base money within another six or seven years.
By Hans-Werner Sinn
MUNICH – Why did Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have to seek shelter under the European Union’s rescue umbrella, and why is Spain a potential candidate?
For many, the answer is obvious: international markets no longer want to finance the “PIGS.” But that is only half true. In fact, international markets have not financed any of them to a considerable extent for the past three years; the European Central Bank has. The so-called “Target” accounts, hitherto ignored by the media, show that the ECB has been much more involved in rescue operations than is commonly known.
But now the ECB no longer wants to do it, and is urging eurozone members to step in.
Normally, a country’s current-account deficit (trade deficit minus transfers from other countries) is financed with foreign private capital. In a currency union, however, central-bank credit may play this role if private capital flows are insufficient. This is what happened in the eurozone when the interbank market first broke down in mid-2007.
The PIGS’ own central banks started to lend newly printed money to their private banks, and this money was then used to finance the current account deficit. These funds went to the exporting countries, where they circulated as part of normal transactions. The exporting countries’ central banks responded by reducing their emissions of fresh money to be lent to the domestic economy. In effect, central-bank money lending in exporting countries, above all in Germany, was diverted to the PIGS.
The ECB’s policy was not inflationary, because the aggregate stock of central-bank money in the eurozone was unaffected. But, as PIGS’ central-bank lending came at the expense of central-bank lending within the eurozone’s exporting countries, the policy amounted to a forced capital export from these countries to the PIGS.
The amount of the ECB’s “replacement lending” is shown by the so-called Target2 account, which measures the deficit or surplus of a country’s financial transactions with other countries. As the account includes international payments for both trade in goods and financial claims, a deficit in a country’s Target account indicates foreign borrowing via the ECB, whereas a surplus denotes foreign lending via the ECB.
The balance is not reported on the ECB’s balance sheet, since it is zero in the aggregate, but it does show up on the respective balance sheets of the national central banks as interest-bearing claims against, and liabilities to, the ECB system. Until mid-2007, the Target accounts were close to zero, but since then, they have grown by about €100 billion per year.
For example, the Bundesbank’s Target claims ballooned from €5 billion in 2006 to €323 billion by March 2011. The counterpart to these claims were the PIGS’ liabilities, which had grown to about €340 billion by the end of last year. Interestingly, the PIGS’ cumulative current-account deficits from 2008 through 2010 were of roughly the same order of magnitude – €365 billion, to be precise.
Had the ECB failed to finance these deficits, the PIGS would have had a hard time finding the money to pay for their net imports. If they succeeded at all, high interest rates would have induced them to tighten their belts, and their current-account deficits, which in the case of Greece and Portugal exceeded 10% of GDP, would have diminished.
One should not criticize the ECB for propping up the PIGS’ current accounts during the global crisis. Unconventional measures were necessary to prevent their economies from collapsing. But it should be clear that this was not a sui generis monetary policy; it was a bailout. Now that the world economy has largely recovered from the crisis, it is time to end this policy – not least because the ECB is running out of ammunition.
By the end of last year, the aggregate stock of central-bank money in the euro area was €1.07 trillion euros, and €380 billion euros was already absorbed by ECB credit to the PIGS. So financing a continued PIGS current-account deficit of about €100 billion a year would consume the entire stock of base money within another six or seven years.
To exit this policy, the ECB wants the EU’s Luxembourg rescue facility, EFSF or ESM to take over, and some countries even call for the issuance of eurobonds. But this would simply prolong community financing of the PIGS’ current-account deficits, now in its fourth year, for another couple of years. In the end, either the euro will collapse, or a transfer union will be established in Europe, in which the current-account deficits will be financed with inter-country donations.
It would be better if the EU kept the Luxembourg fund for real emergency measures, and if the ECB instructed its member institutions in the PIGS to demand significantly better collateral for their lending operations. Tight national caps on Target balances could provide the right incentive to comply. Such a cap would not eliminate current-account deficits, but it would reduce deficits to the flow of private capital willing to finance them.
Setting a cap on Target accounts is a fundamentally more appropriate policy to keep current-account deficits in check than the wage policies contemplated by the new Pact for the Euro. Wage policies are appropriate only for centrally planned economies.
Perhaps the PIGS should ponder how Italy handled itself. Even though it had to pay interest premiums and was running a current-account deficit, Mario Draghi (the leading contender to take over the ECB this autumn) kept his central bank’s lending under tight control throughout the crisis. Although it must have been sorely tempted, Italy did not accumulate Target deficits. It opted for virtuous abstention.
Hans-Werner Sinn is Professor of Economics and Public Finance, University of Munich, and President of the Ifo Institute.
