索罗斯说“习近平是开放社会最危险对手”，也许是，也许不是。索罗斯是倡导“公开社会”的，说这话，也不奇怪。不过现在全世界一团糟，最大的罪魁祸首之一正是索罗斯这帮权贵，他在达沃斯说出此话就是最大的讽刺。达沃斯是个社么地方？用大通（JP Morgan）老总戴门（Jamie Dimon）话就是：
达沃斯是巨豪教训小豪穷人艰辛的场所
“It is where billionaires tell millionaires what the middle class feels.”（路透社）
【附录】
阎学通在《外交事务》的文章和解读
Chinese Power in a Divided World
By Yan Xuetong
30 December, 2018
In early October 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence delivered a searing speech at a Washington think tank, enumerating a long list of reproaches against China. From territorial disputes in the South China Sea to alleged Chinese meddling in U.S. elections, Pence accused Beijing of breaking international norms and acting against American interests. The tone was unusually blunt—blunt enough for some to interpret it as a harbinger of a new Cold War between China and the United States.
Such historical analogies are as popular as they are misleading, but the comparison contains a kernel of truth: the post–Cold War interregnum of U.S. hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to return, with China playing the role of the junior superpower. The transition will be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, affair, as China’s rise sets the country on a collision course with the United States over a number of clashing interests. But as Washington slowly retreats from some of its diplomatic and military engagements abroad, Beijing has no clear plan for filling this leadership vacuum and shaping new international norms from the ground up.
What kind of world order will this bring? Contrary to what more alarmist voices have suggested, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese world will not be a world on the brink of apocalyptic war. This is in large part because China’s ambitions for the coming years are much narrower than many in the Western foreign policy establishment tend to assume. Rather than unseating the United States as the world’s premier superpower, Chinese foreign policy in the coming decade will largely focus on maintaining the conditions necessary for the country’s continued economic growth—a focus that will likely push leaders in Beijing to steer clear of open confrontation with the United States or its primary allies. Instead, the coming bipolarity will be an era of uneasy peace between the two superpowers. Both sides will build up their militaries but remain careful to manage tensions before they boil over into outright conflict. And rather than vie for global supremacy through opposing alliances, Beijing and Washington will largely carry out their competition in the economic and technological realms. At the same time, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will likely spell the end of sustained multilateralism outside strictly economic realms, as the combination of nationalist populism in the West and China’s commitment to national sovereignty will leave little space for the kind of political integration and norm setting that was once the hallmark of liberal internationalism.
WHAT CHINA WANTS
China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council.
It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like.
At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part.
Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent.
Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space.
NEW RULES?
Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China.
In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms.
Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical.
To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries.
Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea.
Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of Chinaas an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership.
BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE
Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the risk of a direct war between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war.
Proxy wars, however, cannot be ruled out, nor can military skirmishes among lesser states. In fact, the latter are likely to become more frequent, as the two superpowers’ restraint may embolden some smaller states to resolve local conflicts by force. Russia, in particular, may not shy away from war as it tries to regain its superpower status and maintain its influence in eastern Europe and the Middle East. Faced with calls to reform the UN Security Council, fraying powers such as France and the United Kingdom may seek to buttress their claim to permanent membership in the council through military interventions abroad. In the Middle East, meanwhile, the struggle for regional dominance among Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia shows no signs of abating. Across the globe, secessionist conflicts and terrorist attacks will continue to occur, the latter especially if competition between China and the United States reduces their cooperation on counterterrorism measures.
In the economic realm, export-driven economies, such as China, Germany, and Japan, will ensure the survival of a global liberal trade regime built on free-trade agreements and membership in the World Trade Organization—no matter what path the United States takes. On other matters of global governance, however, cooperation is likely to stall. Even if a future U.S. administration led a renewed push toward multilateralism and international norm setting, China’s status as a junior superpower would make it difficult for the United States to sustain the strong leadership that has traditionally spurred such initiatives in the past. Differences in ideology and clashing security interests will prevent Beijing and Washington from leading jointly, but neither will have enough economic or military clout to lead on its own. To the extent that multilateral initiatives persist in such a world, they will be limited to either side’s respective sphere of influence.
China’s emphasis on national sovereignty, together with Western societies’ turn away from globalism, will deal an additional blow to multilateralism. The European Union is already fraying, and a number of European countries have reintroduced border controls. In the coming decade, similar developments will come to pass in other domains. As technological innovation becomes the primary source of wealth, countries will become ever more protective of their intellectual property. Many countries are also tightening control of capital flows as they brace for a global economic slump in the near future. And as concerns over immigration and unemployment threaten to undermine Western governments’ legitimacy, more and more countries will increase visa restrictions for foreign workers.
Unlike the order that prevailed during the Cold War, a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will be shaped by fluid, issue-specific alliances rather than rigid opposing blocs divided along clear ideological lines. Since the immediate risk of a U.S.-Chinese war is vanishingly small, neither side appears willing to build or maintain an extensive—and expensive—network of alliances. China still avoids forming explicit alliances, and the United States regularly complains about free-riding allies. Moreover, neither side is currently able to offer a grand narrative or global vision appealing to large majorities at home, let alone to a large number of states.
For some time to come, then, U.S.-Chinese bipolarity will not be an ideologically driven, existential conflict over the fundamental nature of the global order; rather, it will be a competition over consumer markets and technological advantages, playing out in disputes about the norms and rules governing trade, investment, employment, exchange rates, and intellectual property. And rather than form clearly defined military-economic blocs, most states will adopt a two-track foreign policy, siding with the United States on some issues and China on others. Western allies, for instance, are still closely aligned with the United States on traditional security matters inside NATO, and Australia, India, and Japan have supported the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, these states still maintain close trade and investment relations with China, and several of them have sided with Beijing in trying to reform the World Trade Organization.
This two-track strategy shows just how far down the road to bipolarity the world has already advanced. And the fundamental driver of this process—the raw economic and military clout on which American and, increasingly, Chinese dominance rests—will further cement Beijing’s and Washington’s status as the two global heavyweights in the coming decade. Whether or not the United States recovers from its Trumpian fever and leads a renewed push for global liberalism is, ultimately, of little consequence to the outcome: opposed in their strategic interests but evenly matched in their power, China and the United States will be unable to challenge each other directly and settle the struggle for supremacy definitively. As during the Cold War, each side’s nuclear warheads will prevent proxy conflicts from easily escalating into a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. More important still, China’s leadership is acutely aware of the benefits its country derives from the status quo, for now—it is chief among the conditions for China’s continued economic and soft-power expansion—and will avoid putting these benefits on the line anytime soon, unless China’s core interests are in the balance. Chinese leaders will therefore work hard to avoid setting off alarm bells in already jittery Western capitals, and their foreign policy in the coming years will reflect this objective. Expect recurring tensions and fierce competition, yes, but not a descent into global chaos.
台湾《中评社》翻译、解读
中国知名国际关系专家阎学通在美国权威外交杂志上撰文指出，美国霸权的冷战后过渡期已结束，两极分化必将回归，中国将扮演初级超级大国的角色。美中两极的世界不会是处于世界末日战争边缘，而会是两个超级大国之间不稳定的和平时代。中国不是要取代美国，仍将尽力避免与美国公开对抗乃至发生战争。
美国《外交事务》杂志2019年1／2月合刊推出“谁将掌管世界？美国、中国和全球秩序”的主题。清华大学国际关系研究院院长阎学通题为“不安的和平时代－－分裂世界中的中国力量”（The Age of Uneasy Peace Chinese Power in a Divided World）的长文，作为其中4篇主打文章之一发表。
两极世界回归
文章开首阎学通即指出，彭斯最新针对中国的讲话被解读为中美新冷战的前兆。这种历史类比虽具有误导性，但很流行。这种比较包含一个核心真理：美国霸权的冷战后过渡期已经结束，两极分化必将回归，中国将扮演一个初级超级大国的角色。中国崛起使中国在一系列利益相违的问题上与美国发生冲突，这一过渡将是动荡的，甚至可能是暴力的。但随着华盛顿逐渐从一些外交和军事行动中撤出，北京方面并没有明确的计划来填补这一领导真空，并从头塑造新的国际准则。
阎学通认为，美中两极的世界不会是处于世界末日战争边缘的世界。这在很大程度上是因为中国未来的雄心远比西方外交政策机构通常认为的要小。中国不是要取代美国，成为世界上首屈一指的超级大国。中国外交政策在未来十年将主要专注于保持中国经济持续增长的必要条件，这可能会推动中国领导人与美国和主要盟友避开公开对抗。即将到来的两极分化将是美中两个超级大国之间不稳定的和平时代。双方都将加强军事力量，但在紧张局势升级为全面冲突之前，仍将谨慎管理。北京和华盛顿将在经济和技术领域展开竞争，而不是通过对立联盟来争夺全球霸主地位。
阎学通同时认为，美中两极分化很可能意味着在严格的经济领域之外的持久多边主义的终结。由于西方民族主义者的民粹主义与中国对国家主权的承诺相结合，曾经是自由国际主义标志的政治一体化和规范设定将没有多少空间。
中国到底要什么？
阎学通表示，中国在世界舞台上日益增长的影响力，不仅与中国自身的经济崛起有关，也与特朗普领导下的美国放弃全球领导地位有关。特朗普主义的全球影响已经以几年前似乎不可想象的方式，把一些国家推向中国。中国政府最优先考虑的是建立在自由贸易基础上的自由经济秩序。美国的关税可能会带来阵痛，但这既不会改变中国政府的根本动机，也不会预示着中国将总体放弃全球自由贸易。恰恰相反，由于中国的出口对其经济和政治成功至关重要，人们应该预期中国政府会加倍努力，争取并保持进入外国市场的机会。
阎学通指出，鉴于中国对全球经济的这种热情，西方所称的中国“修正主义”形象具有误导性。北京依赖全球贸易关系网络，因此不愿与美国发生直接对抗。中国领导人担心，这种对抗可能会切断中国进入美国市场的渠道，导致美国的盟友联合起来反对中国。在未来几年里，中国外交政策将以谨慎而非武断或咄咄逼人为基调。中国会小心翼翼地避免与美国发生战争的紧迫问题，例如与南海、网络安全和太空武器化等。
两极世界新规则？
阎学通认为，中国领导人担心美中两极世界的战略意涵。美国领导人不愿放弃自己在全球食物链顶端的地位，可能会竭尽全力避免不得不迁就中国。北京并不急于成为华盛顿担心和嘲笑的唯一对象，他们更愿意看到一个多极化的世界，在这个世界里，其他挑战迫使美国与中国合作。不幸的是，今天可能迫使两国合作的共同威胁清单很短。
更糟糕的是，一些潜在的冲突点仍然存在，其中最主要的是台湾。北京和台北之间本来就很紧张的关系近年来恶化。台湾现政府质疑“一个中国”原则，可能会推动“法理台独”。然而，台湾“独立公投”可能触动北京的红线，并促使北京采取军事行动。如果美国以帮助台湾作为回应，很容易演变成一场美中之间的全面战争。为了避免这种危机，北京方面决心通过政治和经济手段，将任何“台独”愿望扼杀在萌芽状态。
阎学通指出，中国在处理巩固国际秩序的准则时，重点有所不同。一个更强大的中国将推动在国际法中更加强调国家主权。目前中国仅仅是发出信号支持自由经济秩序，而不是更多的政治一体化。北京仍然担心外来干涉，特别是涉及香港、台湾、西藏、新疆、新闻自由和网络监管等问题。因此，中国认为国家主权，而不是国际责任和准则，是国际秩序应立足的根本原则。即使在未来10年成为一个新的超级大国，中国也将奉行比美国在其权力巅峰时期更少的干涉主义外交政策。
阎学通预期，中国影响力的增强，可能还会带来一些尝试，以推动借鉴中国古代哲学传统和治国方略理论的世界秩序愿景。有一个词在北京流传甚广：“王道”。这个词代表了一种观点，即中国是一个开明、仁慈的霸权国家，其权力和合法性来自于它满足其他国家安全和经济需求的能力。作为交换，它们必须默许中国的领导。
两极性在实践中
考虑到核升级的长期阴影，阎学通认为，中美之间发生直接战争的风险仍然很小，即使两国之间的军事、技术和经济竞争加剧。双方建立更有效的反导防御系统的努力，都不足以使它们完全不受核反击的影响。然而，不能排除代理人战争，也不能排除较小国家之间的军事冲突。事实上，后者可能会变得更加频繁，因为这两个超级大国的克制可能会鼓励一些较小的国家用武力解决当地冲突。
在经济领域，出口驱动型经济体，如中国、德国和日本，将确保建立在自由贸易协定和世界贸易组织成员基础上的全球自由贸易体制的存续。在全球治理的其他问题上，合作可能会停滞不前。即使未来的美国政府再次推动多边主义和国际准则的制定，中国作为一个初级超级大国的地位，也将使美国难以维持以往的强大领导地位。意识形态上的分歧和安全利益的冲突将阻止北京和华盛顿共同领导，但两国都没有足够的经济或军事实力独自领导。中国对国家主权的强调，加上西方社会对全球主义的回避，将对多边主义构成额外打击。
阎学通分析，与冷战期间盛行的秩序不同，美中两极秩序将由灵活的、具体问题的联盟来塑造，而不是僵化的、按意识形态划分的对立集团。因为美中战争风险小，双方似乎都不愿建立或维持一个广泛且昂贵的联盟网络。中国仍然避免形成明确的联盟，美国也经常抱怨盟友搭便车。此外，双方目前都无法提出一个宏大的叙事或全球愿景来吸引国内的大多数人，更不用说吸引许多国家了。
阎学通相信，在未来一段时间内，美中两极不会是意识形态驱动的、事关全球秩序根本性质的生存冲突，而将是一场围绕消费市场和技术优势的竞争，在有关贸易、投资、就业、汇率和知识产权的规范和规则的争论中展开。大多数国家不会形成明确界定的军事经济集团，而是采取双轨外交政策，在一些问题上站在美国一边，在另一些问题上站在中国一边。
最后阎学通指出，世界走向两极进程的根本驱动力——美国和中国日益占据主导地位的原始经济和军事影响力，将在未来十年进一步巩固北京和华盛顿作为两个全球大国的地位。美国是否从“特朗普热”中复原，再次领导推动全球自由主义，对最终的后果影响很小。两国战略利益相悖，但他们势均力敌，使得中美两国无法直接挑战对方，解决明确的霸权之争。与冷战期间一样，双方的核弹头将防止代理人冲突轻易升级为两个超级大国之间的直接对抗。更重要的是，中国领导层敏锐地意识到中国从现状中获益，就目前而言，现状是中国持续经济和软实力扩张的首要条件之一，并且将避免在短期内将这些利益置于危险境地。因此中国领导人会努力避免在已经不安的西方国家首都拉响警钟，而他们未来几年的外交政策将反映出这一目标。预计紧张局势和激烈竞争会重现，但不会陷入全球混乱。
