哈佛教授：美国一手好牌但未必能赢
外界将当前的美中关系比作冷战，哈佛大学教授奈伊（Joseph Nye）认为，这种类比具有误导性，但仍不排除爆发新冷战的可能性。他也指出，美国应避免在意识形态层面妖魔化中国；如果美中关系是一场纸牌游戏，可以说美国已经拿到一手好牌，但如果打得不好，一样会输。
以提出“软实力”闻名全球的哈佛大学教授奈伊，2日于美国“评论汇编”（Project Syndicate）撰文，该文中文版后刊于中美交流基金会旗下平台“中美聚焦”的微信公众号。
奈伊认为，一些分析人士将当前的美中关系比作冷战，原因是它也正变成一场长期战略竞争。但这种类比有误导性。冷战期间，美苏之间几乎没有贸易或对话，也没有在气候变化或流行病等问题上的生态相依关系。美国同中国的情况与美苏几乎相反。美国的任何遏制战略都将受到一个事实的限制，即中国的主要贸易伙伴国家数量远超美国。
奈伊表示，这种类比于冷战的遏制战略会适得其反，但这一事实并不排除爆发新冷战的可能性，“我们仍有可能不小心走上这条路”。所以，与当前进行恰当历史类比的时间点不是1945年，而是1914年。当时，所有大国预计会发生短暂的第三次巴尔干战争，结果却迎来了第一次世界大战。
奈伊强调，20世纪10年代早期的政治领导人不够重视日益强大的民族主义，如今的政策制定者最好不要重蹈覆辙。他们必须对中国日益高涨的民族主义和美国的民粹民族主义，以及这两种力量之间危险的相互作用保持警惕。考虑到中国的外交特点，以及长期以来美中围绕台湾问题的僵持与冲突，我们所有人应当对未来局势意外升级的可能性感到担忧。
澳洲前总理陆克文（Kevin Rudd）认为，西方的目标不应该是“全面战胜”中国，而应该是管控与中国的竞争。奈伊对此指出，良策就是避免妖魔化中国，而是将美中关系框定为“竞争性共存”。从长期看，在一个传统上、经济上和生态上相互依存的时代，如果中国变得更好，这将是西方管控大国关系战略一个意想不到的收获。
奈伊直言，一个好的战略必须基于审慎的整体评估。低估会滋生自满，高估则会产生恐惧——两种行为都可能导致误判。中国已成为世界第二大经济体；但其人均收入仍不到美国的四分之一，而且还面临著一系列内部挑战，也没有多少盟国。如果美国、日本和欧洲协调政策，仍将占据世界经济的最大部分，从而保持维护一个基于规则的国际秩序的能力，进而影响中国的行为。美日欧盟长期联盟是应对中国崛起的关键。
奈伊说，短期而言，考虑到中国采取更加果断的外交政策，我们可能不得不花费更多的时间在双边关系“竞争”的一侧。但是，如果我们保持盟友关系，避免意识形态妖魔化和误导性的冷战类比，我们就能够取得成功。
奈伊形容，如果美中关系是一场纸牌游戏，可以说美国已经拿到一手好牌。但如果打得不好，即使是一手好牌也会输。从1914年的历史背景来看，最近的气球事件应该提醒我们为什么需要护栏。
Peak China?
From an American perspective, it is just as dangerous to underestimate Chinese power as it is to overestimate it. While hysteria creates fear, discounting China’s recent progress and future ambitions could lead the United States to squander its own long-term advantages.
CAMBRIDGE – The failure of China’s zero-COVID policy is leading to a reassessment of Chinese power. Until recently, many expected China’s GDP to surpass that of the United States by 2030 or soon thereafter. But now, some analysts argue that even if China achieves that goal, the US will surge ahead again. So, have we already witnessed “peak China”?
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It is just as dangerous to overestimate Chinese power as it is to underestimate it. Underestimation breeds complacency, whereas overestimation stokes fear; but either can lead to miscalculations. A good strategy requires a careful net assessment.
Contrary to the current conventional wisdom, China is not the world’s largest economy. Measured in terms of purchasing power parity, it became larger than the US economy in 2014. But PPP is an economist’s device for comparing estimates of welfare; even if China someday surpasses the US in total economic size, GDP is not the only measure of geopolitical power. China remains well behind the US on military and soft-power indices, and its relative economic power is smaller still when one also considers US allies such as Europe, Japan, and Australia.
To be sure, China has been expanding its military capabilities in recent years. But as long as the US maintains its alliance and bases in Japan, China will not be able to exclude it from the Western Pacific – and the US-Japan alliance is stronger today than it was at the end of the Cold War. Yes, analysts sometimes draw more pessimistic conclusions from war games designed to simulate a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But with China’s energy supply exposed to US naval domination in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, it would be a mistake for Chinese leaders to assume that a naval conflict near Taiwan (or in the South China Sea) would stay confined to that region.
China has also invested heavily in its soft power (the ability to get preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment). But while cultural exchanges and aid projects could indeed enhance China’s attractiveness, two major hurdles remain. First, by indulging in ongoing territorial conflicts with neighbors such as Japan, India, and Vietnam, China has made itself less attractive to potential partners around the world. Second, the Communist Party of China’s domestic iron grip has deprived China of the benefits of the vibrant civil society that one finds in the West.
That said, the scale of China’s economic reach will remain important. The US was once the world’s largest trading power and bilateral lender. But now, nearly 100 countries count China as their largest trading partner, while only 57 have such a relationship with the US. China has lent $1 trillion for infrastructure projects through its Belt and Road Initiative over the past decade, while the US has cut back aid.
Moreover, China’s economic success story undoubtedly enhances its soft power, especially vis-a-vis other developing and emerging markets. And its ability to grant or deny access to its domestic market gives it hard-power leverage, which its authoritarian politics and mercantilist practices allow it to wield freely.
Where does that leave us in assessing the overall balance of power? Importantly, the US still has at least five long-term advantages. One is geography. The US is surrounded by two oceans and two friendly neighbors; China, by contrast, shares a border with 14 other countries and is engaged in territorial disputes across the region.
The US also has an energy advantage. Over the past decade, the shale revolution transformed it into a net energy exporter, whereas China has become ever more dependent on energy imports.
Third, the US derives unrivaled financial power from its large transnational financial institutions and the international role of the dollar. Only a small fraction of total foreign-exchange reserves is denominated in renminbi, while 59% are held in dollars. Though China aspires to expand the renminbi’s global role, a credible reserve currency depends on it being freely convertible, as well as on deep capital markets, an honest issuing government, and the rule of law. China has none of these, making the renminbi unlikely to displace the dollar in the near term.
Fourth, the US has a relative demographic advantage. It is the only major developed country that is currently projected to hold its place (third) in the global population ranking. Seven of the world’s 15 largest economies will have a shrinking workforce over the next decade, but the US workforce is expected to increase by 5%. China, meanwhile, will suffer a 9% decline in its working-age population – which already peaked in 2014 – and India will surpass it in terms of population this year.
Lastly, America has been at the forefront in the development of key technologies (bio, nano, and information) that are central to this century’s economic growth. China, of course, is investing heavily in research and development, so that its technological progress no longer depends solely on imitation. It has managed to become competitive in fields such as artificial intelligence, where it hopes to be the global leader by 2030. US efforts to deprive China of the most advanced semiconductors may slow this progress, but they will not end it.
All told, the US holds a strong hand. But if it succumbs to hysteria about China’s rise or complacency about its “peak,” it could play its cards poorly. Discarding high-value cards – including strong alliances and influence in international institutions – would be a serious mistake.
One important issue to watch will be immigration. Around a decade ago, I asked former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew whether China would surpass the US in total power any time soon. He said it would not, because America can draw upon and recombine the world’s talents in ways that simply are not possible under China’s ethnic Han nationalism.
For now, Americans have ample reason to feel optimistic about their place in the world. But if the US were to abandon its external alliances and domestic openness, the balance could shift.
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