http://www.phil-commune.org/phpbb/viewtopic.php?t=1119
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind
Philosophy of mind
心灵哲学
Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness, and of the nature of their relationship with the physical body: the so-called "mind–body problem".[1]
心灵哲学是对心灵的本性、精神事件、精神功能、精神性质和认知、以及它们和物理身体的关系的本性（这被称为“心身问题”）的哲学性研究。
Dualism and monism are two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism asserts the separate existence of mind and body, and can be traced back to Plato[2] and Aristotle[3][4][5] in the West and the sankhya school of Hindu philosophy in the East[6] and was most precisely formulated in modern terms by René Descartes in the 17th century.[7] Monism, first proposed in the West by Parmenides and in modern times by Baruch Spinoza, maintains that there is only one substance; in the East, rough parallels might be the Hindu concept of Brahman or the Tao of Lao Tzu.[8]
二元论和一元论是两个主要的尝试解决心身问题的思想流派。二元论主张心灵和身体的分立存在，在西方可以追溯到柏拉图（Plato）和亚里斯多德（Aristotle），在东方可以追溯到印度哲学的数论派，在17世纪由笛卡儿（René Descartes）用现代的语言最为精确地表述了出来。一元论，在西方首次由巴门尼德（Parmenides）提出，现代有斯宾诺莎（Baruch Spinoza）提出，主张只有一种实体；在东方与此大致平行的观点是印度教的梵天概念和老子（Lao Tzu）的道。
Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, while property dualists maintain that the mind is a jumble of independent properties that emerge from the brain and cannot be reduced to it, but that it is not a distinct substance.[9] Physicalists argue that only the brain actually exists, idealists maintain that the mind is all that actually exists, and neutral monists adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of materialism (or physicalism), including behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism.[10]
实体二元论主张心灵是独立存在的实体，而属性二元论持有心灵是从大脑中显现出来的独立属性的混杂，它们不能被还原到大脑，但也不是独立的另一种实体。物理主义者主张只有大脑是真实存在的，理念主义者持有心灵是全部的真实存在，中立一元论主张有另一种中立实体，物质和心灵都是这种未知实体的属性。在20和21世纪最常见的一元论是各种的唯物主义（或者物理主义），包含行为主义，同一理论和功能主义。
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that only the brain exists.[10] Reductivists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by neuroscientific accounts of brain processes and states.[11], [12], [13] Non-reductionists argue that though the brain is all there is, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[14], [15] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues, but they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophers of mind continue to ask, "How can the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties be explained in naturalistic terms?"[16], [17]
最现代的心灵哲学家接受还原或者非还原的物理主义，在这两条不同道路上都持有只有大脑是存在的观点。还原主义者主张所有的精神状态和属性将最终由大脑处理和状态的神经理由来解释。非还原主义者主张虽然大脑是所有，用于描述和解释心灵的谓语和词汇是独立的并且不能被还原到语言或更低地还原到物理科学的层次。持续的神经科学的发展已经帮助澄清了这些问题中的一部分，但离解决还很远，现代心灵哲学家继续在问，“如何能够把精神状态和属性的主观品质和意向性（关于性）用自然主义的词汇来解释？”
Contents [hide]
1 The mind–body problem
2 Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
2.1 Arguments for dualism
2.2 Interaction dualism
2.3 Other forms of dualism
3 Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
3.1 Behaviorism
3.2 Identity theory
3.3 Functionalism
3.4 Nonreductive physicalism
3.5 Eliminative materialism
4 Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
5 Naturalism and its problems
5.1 Qualia
5.2 Intentionality
6 Philosophy of mind and science
6.1 Neurobiology
6.2 Computer science
6.3 Psychology
7 Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
8 Consequences of philosophy of mind
8.1 Free will
8.2 The self
9 See also
10 Notes and references
11 Further reading
12 External links
目录
1 心身问题
2 心身问题的二元论解决方案。
2.1 二元论的争议
2.2 相互作用的二元论
2.3 其它形式的二元论
3 心身问题的一元论解决方案
3.1 行为主义
3.2 同一理论
3.3 功能主义
3.4 非还原的物理主义
3.5 取消的物理主义
4 心身问题的语言学批判
5 自然主义及其问题
5.1 感受性质
5.2 意向性
6 心灵哲学和科学
6.1 神经生物学
6.2 计算机科学
6.3 心理学
7 大陆传统下的心灵哲学
8 心灵哲学的推论
8.1 自由意志
8.2 自我
9 参见
10 参考和注释
11 扩展阅读
12 外部链接
The mind–body problem
The mind–body problem is essentially the problem of explaining the relationship between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes.[1] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and that these stimuli cause changes in the states of our brain, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza will tend to cause that person to move their body in a certain manner in a certain direction in an effort to obtain what they want. But how is it possible that conscious experiences can arise out of an inert lump of gray matter endowed with electrochemical properties?[10] How does someone's desire cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the right manner? These are some of the essential puzzles that have confronted philosophers of mind at least from the time of René Descartes.[7]
心身问题
心身问题是解释心灵、精神过程和身体状态、过程之间关系的本质性问题。我们的知觉经验依赖于从外界到达我们各种感觉器官的各种刺激，并且这些刺激导致了我们大脑状态的变化，最终导致我们感受到了一个让我们高兴或不高兴的感觉。某个人对一片比萨的渴望将导致这个人向一个特定的方向以特定的方式移动他的身体来力图得到他所想要的东西。但现在感觉经验是如何能够从一个被赋予了电化学属性的无生命的灰白物质中产生呢？而某人的愿望又是如何导致了某个神经细胞的激发并且他的肌肉精确以正确的方式收缩？一些本质性的谜题至少从勒奈·笛卡儿时代开始就摆在了心灵哲学家的面前了。
Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[9]
二元论者对心身问题的解决方案
二元论是一系列的关于心灵和物质关系的观点，这些观点从宣称精神现象在一定角度上不是物理性的开始。
One of the earliest known formulations of mind-body dualism existed in the eastern sankhya school of Hindu philosophy (c. 650 BCE) which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakrti (material substance).[6] In the Western philosophical tradition, we first encounter similar ideas with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who maintained, for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.[2], [3]
最早被人们知道的明确表达出来的心身二元论存在于早期的印度哲学的数论学派（公元前650年），他们把世界划分成原人（心灵/灵魂）和原质（物质实体）。在西方哲学传统中，我们首先在柏拉图和亚里斯多德的作品中遇到相似的想法，他们出于不同的理由也持有人们的“智能”（心灵或灵魂的一种功能）不与物理身体同一以及不能由物理身体来解释的观点。
However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-physical substance.[7] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. Hence, he was the first to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it still exists today.[7]
然而，最为著名的二元论当算勒奈·笛卡尔，说的是心灵是一种非物质的实体。笛卡尔是首次清晰地用知觉和自我意识来确定出心灵和并将其与大脑的区分开来，心灵是智能的所在地。因此，是他第一个把心身问题用现在依然在用的方式清晰地表达出来。
Arguments for dualism
The main argument in favour of dualism is simply that it appeals to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-philosophically-trained people. If asked what the mind is, the average person will usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity, and they will almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic or simply unintelligible.[9] The majority of modern philosophers of mind reject dualism, suggesting that these intuitions, like many others, are probably misleading. We should use our critical faculties, as well as empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions and determine if there is any real basis to them.[9]
二元论的争议
支持二元论的说法简单说来就是它投合大量的没有哲学训练的人们的常识直觉。如果问心灵是什么，正常人将通常以对他们自己、他们的个性、他们的灵魂或者其他这样的对象的确认作为回答。并且他们也几乎都将拒绝心灵简单地只是大脑或者反过来（大脑只是心灵）的说法，觉得那种舞台上只有一种存在论的对象的状况是太机械了或者仅是太让人莫名其妙了。现代心灵哲学的主流拒绝二元论，说这些直觉，和其他的许多直觉一样，很容易令人误解。我们要使用我们批判的能力，还有科学里的经验证实，来检验这些假设并决定是否有什么东西真的是基于它们的。
Another very important, more modern, argument in favor of dualism consists is the idea that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties.[18] Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events obviously do not. For example, what does a burned finger feel like? What does blue sky look like? What does nice music sound like? Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia (or raw feels).[18] There is something that it is like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on; there are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[19]
另一个非常重要的，更现代的，支持二元论的想法是精神的和物质好像有着非常不同也许是互相矛盾的属性。精神事件有着相当主观性的品质，而物理事件明显不是如此。比如， 一个烧过的手指的感觉是什么样的？蓝天看起来是什么样的？美好的音乐听起来如何？心灵哲学家称精神事件的主观方面为感受性质（或生感觉）。存在着一些东西似乎可以感到疼，看到一点点地蓝色，等等；在这些精神事件中包含着感觉性质。用断言来说是感受性质似乎特别难以还原到如何物质的东西上去。
Interaction dualism
Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.[7] In the 20th century, its major defenders have been Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles.[20] It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.[9] Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Fred has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing which has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on) and he also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties, according to Descartes.[7]
相互作用的二元论
相互作用的二元论，或者只是相互作用论，是二元论的某种特定形式，首先由笛卡尔在沉思录中提出的。在20世纪，它的主要拥护者有卡尔·波普尔和John Carew Eccles。它是如此的观点：精神状态，比如信仰和愿望，有原因地地和物理状态相互作用。笛卡尔的最著名的关于这一点的论据可以被总结如下：佛瑞德有一个清晰和独特的关于他的心灵的观点，作为一个思想着的没有空间广延性（比如，他不能用长度，重量，高度等等来测量）的东西，并且他也有关于他的身体的清晰和独特的观点，他的身体是有用空间广延性的，可以用量衡量的，不能思考的。随之而来的想法就是：按笛卡尔的说法，心灵和身体是不一样的，由于他们有着根本上不同的属性。
At the same time, however, it is clear that Fred's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have causal effects on his body and vice-versa: a child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes him yell (physical event) which provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the mother (mental event) and so on.
同时，然而，显然佛瑞德的精神状态（愿望，信仰等等）因果性地影响他的身体，反之亦然：一个小孩碰到一个烫火炉（物理事件）导致了疼痛（精神事件）使得他大叫（物理事件），这激发了她妈妈的恐惧感和保护欲（精神事件）等等。
Descartes' argument obviously depends on the crucial premise that what Fred believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Most modern philosophers doubt the validity of such an assumption, since it has been shown in modern times by Freud (a third-person psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than he does), by Duhem (a third-person philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than he does), by Malinowski (an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than he does), and by theorists of perception (experiments can make one see things that are not there and scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than he can), that such an idea of privileged and perfect access to one's own ideas is dubious at best.[21]
笛卡尔的论据明显地依赖于关键的前提：佛瑞德相信他心灵中“清晰和独特”的观点不可避免地是真的。大多数现代哲学家怀疑这一个假定，由于现代的人们已经看到的许多新的成果。弗洛伊德的第三人称的受过心理训练的观察者能够理解比某人自己更好地理解他的无意识的动机，Duhem的一个第三人称的科学哲学家能够比某人更好地知道他的探索时使用的方法，Malinowski的一个人类学家能够比某人自己更好地知道他的传统和习惯，还有感知理论说明实验可以使得某人看见不在那里的东西，科学家可以比某人自己能够的更好地描述他的感觉）。这样的认为一个人对自己的观念有优先的和完美的访问性的想法受到人们最多的怀疑。
Other forms of dualism
Other important forms of dualism which arose as reactions to, or attempts to salvage, the Cartesian version are:
其它形式的二元论
其它重要的二元论形式还有如下，它们作为对笛卡尔版本的反响或挽救尝试而出现。
1) Psycho-physical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another, but run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.[22] This view was most prominently defended by Gottfried Leibniz. Although Leibniz was actually an ontological monist who believed that only one fundamental substance, monads, exists in the universe and everything else is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.[23]
1）身心平行论，或者简单称为平行论，是这样一种观点：有着不同的存在论状态的心灵和身体并不在因果性上互相影响，但以平行的方式一起运行（心灵事件和心理事件间有因果交互作用，大脑和大脑事件间有因果交互作用），看起来像是互相影响着。这个观点主要的支持者有哥特弗里德·莱布尼兹。虽然莱布尼兹实际上是一个存在论上的一元论者，他相信只有一种基础实体——单子——存在于宇宙中，以及其它的所有东西都可以还原成它，但是他还是持有在精神和物质之间从因果关系上看有明显的不同的观点。他坚持上帝事先安排了事物，这样心灵和身体就可以相互的协调一致。这被称为先定的和谐。
2) Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche which asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events or between physical and mental events are not really causal at all. While body and mind are still different substances on this view, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.[24]
2）偶因论是马勒伯朗士支持的观点，这个观点断言所有的物理事件之间或者物理事件和精神事件之间的因果关系并非因果性的。虽然在这个观点中身体和心灵依然是不同的实体，原因（无论精神的还是物理的）通过上帝在各个具体场合的干预行为而关联于它们的效果。
3) Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley.[25] Fundamentally, it consists in the view that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.[22] The view has been defended most strongly in recent times by Frank Jackson.[26]
3）副现象论是一种首先由赫胥黎清晰提出的学说。根本地说它坚持精神现象在因果上是无效用的。物理事件能够导致其它的物理事件并且物理事件可以导致精神事件，但精神事件不能导致任何事情，这是由于它们只是以物理世界为原因的惰性的副产品（比如副现象）。这个观点近期有Frank Jackson进行了有力地辩护。
4) Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.[9] These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. This position is espoused by David Chalmers and has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years.[27]
4）属性二元论提出但物质以恰当的方式组织（比如以活着的人体的方式组织），精神现象就会涌现。因此，它是涌现唯物主义的子分支。这些涌现的属性有一个独立的存在论状态并且不能还原到或者解释到它们所从出的物理基底上。这个阵营有David Chalmers支持，在近几年正在复兴。
Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
In contrast to dualism, monism states that there is only one fundamental substance. Today the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalistic.[10] Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.[28] However, a variety of formulations are possible (see below). Another form of monism is that which states that the only existing substance is mental. Such idealistic monism is currently somewhat uncommon in the West.[10]
心身问题的一元论解决方案
与二元论正相反，一元论宣称只有一种基本物质。今天在西方哲学最普遍的一元论形式是物理主义。物理主义的一元论断言唯一存在的物质是物理性的，这点在某种意义上被我们最好的科学所澄清。关于此有许多种可能的表达方式（见下）。另一个可能的一元论形式说的是那唯一存在的实体是精神。这样的唯心主义的一元论现在在西方不很常见。
Phenomenalism, the theory that all that exists are the representations (or sense data) of external objects in our minds and not the objects themselves, was adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century.[29] It lasted for only a very brief period of time. A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance which is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza[8] and popularized by Ernst Mach[30] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism. In the following discussion, only physicalistic monisms are considered. (See also: idealism.)
现象主义，这个理论说所有存在着的是外部对象在我们心灵中的表象（或者感觉资料），而不是那些对象自身。这个理论被罗素和20世纪的许多逻辑实证主义者所采纳。它持续了很短的一段时间。第三种的可能性是接受基本实体的存在，这种基本实体既不是物质的也不是心灵的。心灵和物质都是这种中立实体的属性。这样的观点在19世纪被斯宾诺莎所采用，并由马赫推广。这种中立的一元论，就如它的名字一样，类似于性质二元论。在下面的讨论中，只有物理主义一元论被考虑在内。（参见唯心主义）
Behaviorism
Main article: Behaviorism
Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.[10] In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of introspectionism.[28] Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and are not generalizable. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, science is simply not possible.[28] The way out for psychology was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.[31]
行为主义
参见主体文章：行为主义
在20世纪的大部分时间里，特别是前半个世纪，行为主义支配了心灵哲学。在心理学领域，行为主义作为对内省主义的不充分性的反应而发展了起来。一个人自己的内部精神生活的内省性的报告不会为了精确性而受制于精心的检测，而且也是不可归纳的。行为主义争辩说，没有了可概括性和第三人称实验的可能性，那很简单地科学在此也就没有了可能性。心理学可取的道路就只是去除内部精神生活的观念（因此也就是去除一种存在论的独立心灵）并把注意力放在可观察行为的描述上。
Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.[28] This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. But what are mental states if they are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports? The answer of the behaviorist is that mental states do not exist but are actually just descriptions of behavior and/or dispositions to behave made by external third parties in order to explain and predict others' behavior.[32]
和这些心理学的发展并行的，一个哲学上的行为主义（有时被叫做逻辑行为主义）发展了起来。它以强烈的实证主义为特征，这种想法一般把关于内部精神生活的不可验证的陈述当作无意义的。但如果没有个人能够进行内省报告的内部状态，那什么是精神状态呢？行为主义的回答是精神状态并不存在，它实际上就是由外部的第三人为了解释或预见他人行为而做出的行为与/或行为倾向的描述。
Philosophical behaviorism is considered by most modern philosophers of mind to be outdated.[1] Apart from other problems, behaviorism implausibly maintains, for example, that someone is talking about behavior if she reports that she has a wracking headache.
哲学性的行为主义被大多数的现代心灵哲学家认为是过时了的。行为主义持有的这样的看法：如果她某人报告说她头痛得厉害，那么他只是在谈论她的行为。先不管其它问题，单是这就让人难以置信。
Identity theory
Main article: Type physicalism
Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by John Smart[13] and Ullin Place[33] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavior, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".[13]
同一理论
参见主体文章：类型物理主义
类型物理主义（或称为类型同一理论）是由John Smart和Ullin Place作为对行为主义的缺点的直接响应而发展起来的。这些哲学家如此推理：如果精神状态是一些物质性的东西，而不是行为，那么精神状态就可能和大脑的内部状态是同一的。简单地说：一个精神状态M只是大脑的状态B。精神状态“想要一杯咖啡”也从而只是“在大脑特定区域的特定神经的激发”。
Despite a certain initial plausibility, the identity theory faces at least one heavy challenge in the form of the thesis of multiple realizability, which was first formulated by Hilary Putnam.[15] It seems clear that not only humans, but also amphibians, for example, can experience pain. On the other hand, it seems very improbable that all of these diverse organisms with the same pain are in the same identical brain state. If this is not the case however, then pain cannot be identical to a certain brain state. Thus the identity theory is empirically unfounded.[15]
虽然一开始看起来似乎有道理，同一理论也至少在其采用的多重真实理论方式上面临着一个严重的挑战，这由Hilary Putnam首次明确提出。似乎很清楚的是不只是人类，比如两栖类，也能够体验到疼痛。另一方面，各种不同的有相同的痛感的生物体都处于同一的大脑状态，这似乎也不大可能。这样同一理论就经验看来没有依据。
But even if this is the case, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one "mental" state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental states and types of brain state. The type-token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r,e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.[34] Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.[35] Despite the problems faced by the type identity theory, however, there is a renewed interest in it these days, primarily due to the influence of Jaegwon Kim.[13]
但即使情况是如此，这并不导致说各种类型的同一理论必须被抛弃。按照标记同一理论，一个特定的大脑状态一定关联于人的唯一的“精神”状态是一个事实，但这并不必须意味着在精神状态的类型和大脑状态的类型之间一定要有一个完全的对应关系。类型和标记之间的差别可以用简单的例子演示出来：词“green”包含了四种类型的字母（g，r，e，n），其中字母e出现了两次（两个标记，两次发生），一个跟着另一个。记号同一的观点说的是只有精神状态的特定发生是和特定物理事件的发生、标记是同一的。反常的一元论（见下）和大多数其它的非还原论的物理主义是标记同一理论。不管类型同一理论面临的问题，最近由于Jaegwon Kim的影响，又获得了人们的兴趣。
Functionalism
Main article: Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Functionalism was formulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.[15] Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind.[36] At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism which analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.[37] Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman.
功能主义
参见主体文章：功能主义（心灵哲学）
功能主义是由Hilary Putnam和Jerry Fodor作为对同一理论的不充分性的响应而提出来的。Putnam和Fodor从一个经验的计算性的心灵理论角度看待精神状态。几乎在同一时间或者稍后一些，D.M. Armstrong和David Kellogg Lewis提出了一个版本的功能主义，其中把民族心理学中的精神概念用功能角色来分析。最后，维特根斯坦的意义即使用的观点导致了一种版本的作为意义理论的功能主义，这个方向由Wilfrid Sellars和Gilbert Harman进一步推进。
What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are essentially characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism quantifies over, or abstracts away from, the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.[36]
所有这些不同的功能主义共享的理论是：精神状态本质地以其和其它精神状态、感觉输入、行为输出的因果关系为特点。这也就是说，功能主义是从一个精神状态的物理实现细节中，通过使用非精神性的功能属性来刻画，从而量化或者说是抽象出来的。比如，一个肾按科学的方法来刻画其特点就在于它在过滤血液和维持一定的化学平衡上的功能性角色。从这个观点看，肾是否是由器官组织还是由塑料纳米管、硅芯片组成的并不重要：是它所扮演的角色和它和其它器官之间的关系界定了它是一个肾。
Nonreductive physicalism
Many philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind–body relations:
1. Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states.
2. All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.[28]
非还原性的物理主义
许多哲学家对于心身关系坚定地持有两个本质性的信念：
1.物理主义是对的并且精神状态必须是物理状态。
2.所有的还原主义者的提议都是不能令人满意的：精神状态不能被还原到行为、大脑状态或者功能状态上。
Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism[14] is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism.
因此，问题就来了，是否可以有非还原性的物理主义。Donald Davidson的反常的一元论就是一次想要阐明这样一种物理主义的尝试。
The idea is often formulated in terms of the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical.[38]
这个观点通常用随附理论的方式描述：精神状态随附在物理状态上，但又不能还原到物理状态。随附性描述了一种功能的依赖：可以在精神上有（原文是没但看起来像应是有？）变化而在物质上没有变化。
Eliminative materialism
Main article: Eliminative materialism
If one is a materialist but believes that all reductive efforts have failed and that a non-reductive materialism is incoherent, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism. Eliminative materialists maintain that mental states are fictitious entities introduced by everyday "folk psychology".[11] Should "folk psychology", which eliminativists view as a quasi-scientific theory, be proven wrong in the course of scientific development, then we must also abolish all of the entities postulated by it.
取消的物理主义
参见主体文章：取消的物理主义
如果一个人是唯物主义者但相信所有还原的努力都已经失败了，以及一个非还原的唯物主义是条理不通的，那么一个人接受一个最终的、更激进的立场是：取消的唯物主义。取消的唯物主义持有的观点是：精神状态是由“民族心理学”介绍进来的假想的实体。“民族心理学”被取消主义者看成是一种准科学的理论，它应该在科学的发展过程中被证明是错误的吗？而后我们就必须废除所有由它假定的实体。
Eliminativists such as Patricia and Paul Churchland often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and ontologies which have arisen in the course of history.[11], [12] For example, the belief in witchcraft as a cause of people's problems turned out to be wrong and the consequence is that most people no longer believe in the existence of witches. Witchcraft is not explained in terms of some other phenomenon, but rather eliminated from the discourse.[12]
取消主义者，比如Patricia和Paul Churchland经常那些引用其它的、错误地广受欢迎的在历史中涌现出来的理论和存在论。比如，魔法中作为人们遇到的各种问题原因的信念，现在被当成错误的而被排除出去了，其后果是大多数人们不再相信女巫的存在了。魔法并不被解释成其它的现象，而是从人们的谈话中被取消了。
Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
Each attempt to answer the mind–body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.[39] Such philosophers reject the mind–body problem as an illusory problem. Such a position is represented in analytic philosophy these days, for the most part, by the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinian tradition of linguistic criticism.[40] The exponents of this position explain that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that humans can be described in different ways - for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.[40] This is the case for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a pure conceptual confusion.[40]
对心身问题的语言学上的批判
每种回答心身问题的努力都面临不小的问题。一些哲学家说这是由于这个问题中有一些底层的概念混淆。这样的哲学家把心身问题看成是一个幻想出来的问题而加以拒绝。现在在很大程度上，分析哲学通过由维特根斯坦的追随者和维特根斯坦的语言批判传统代表了这个立场。这个立场的代表者解释说：问精神和生物状态之间如何相互结合是错误的。他们宁可更简单地接受人可以在不同的方式上被描述的观点，比如，可以以精神的方式或以生物学词汇的方式。如果一个人尝试用其中另一方的词汇来描述某方，或者精神性的词汇被用在了错误的上下文中，这都会导致幻想性的心身问题的出现。举个例子，比如一个人在大脑中去搜寻精神状态。简要说来，大脑对精神性词汇来说是一个错误的上下文、用词环境，也由此这个对精神状态的搜寻就是一个范畴错误或者说是一个纯粹的概念混淆。
Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker.[39] However, Hilary Putnam, the inventor of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind–body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.[41]
今天，这样的立场经常被维特根斯坦的解释者所采纳，比如Peter Hacker。然而，普特南（Hilary Putnam），功能主义的发明者，也采用这个立场：心身问题是一个幻想出来的问题，要按维特根斯坦的方式被解决掉。
Naturalism and its problems
The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the fundamental problem that the mind has certain properties that no material thing possesses. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can emerge from a material thing nevertheless. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental."[28] What are the crucial problems that this project must attempt to resolve? The most well-known are probably the following two:[28]
自然主义及其问题
物理主义的基础是心灵是物质（或物理）世界的一部分。这样的立场面临的基本问题是：心灵有着物质的物体所不具有的特定的性质。由此物理主义必须解释这些性质如何能够从一个物质的东西中涌现出来的。提供这样一个解释的方案经常借助于“精神的植入”。什么是这些方案必须尝试去解决的至关重要的问题呢？最广为人知的可能就是如下的两个：
Qualia
Main article: Qualia
Many mental states have the property of being experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.[19] For example, it is obviously characteristic of the mental state of pain that it hurts. Moreover, your sensation of pain may not be identical with mine, since we have no way of measuring how much something hurts or describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Where does such an experience (quale) come from? Nothing indicates that a neural or functional state can be accompanied by such a pain experience. Often the point is formulated as follows: the existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. Why do many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness? It seems impossible to explain.[18]
感受性质
参见主体文章：感受性质
许多精神状态有着被不同个人以不同方式主观性地体验着的性质。比如，受伤时有着明显个性化的关于疼痛的精神状态。此外，你的疼痛的体验不会和我的相同一，由于我们没有一个方式可以来衡量一个东西被伤害得如何厉害，或者精确地描述他对伤害的感觉。这的一个经验（感受性质）从何而来？没有什么能够指定那样的一个神经或功能状态会伴随着这样的一个疼痛经验。这个观点经常被表述如下：他们的或者他们身体中的大脑事件的存在不能解释为何他们伴随有这些对应的感受性质的经验。 为何许多大脑过程的发生都有一个伴随的意识中的经验性方面？这看来不可能被解释。
Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.[28] This follows from the logic of reductive explanations. If I try to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), I also have to explain why the phenomenon has all of the properties that it has (e.g., fluidity, transparency).[28]In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way.
虽然在许多人看起来似乎科学最终将不得不解释这样的经验。这源于还原性解释的逻辑。如果我尝试还原性的解释一个现象（比如，水），我也不得不解释为何这个现象有它所有的那些性质（比如：流动性、透明性）。对于精神状态，这意味着需要一个解释，以一定的方式来解释为何他们有被解释的那些性质。
Intentionality
Intentionality is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.[17] This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.[42] It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[16]
意向性
意向性是精神状态具有的直接朝向（关于）和外部世界或者和外部世界处于关系中的能力。这个精神状态的性质使得他们具有了内容和语义上的指称物，并从而能被赋予真值。当人们想要把这些状态还原成自然过程的时候，出现了一个问题：自然过程并不是真的或假的，它们只是发生了。说一个自然过程是真的还是假的这没有意义。但精神观念或者判断是真的或者假的，那么精神状态（观念或判断）如何的是自然过程呢？把一个语义值分配给一个观点的可能性意味着这样的观念必须要是关于事实的。这样，比如，希罗多德是一个历史学家的观念提到了希罗多德以及他是一个历史学家的事实。如果这个事实是真的，那么这个观念是真的；否则，它是假的。但是这样的关系从何而来？在大脑里，那里只有电化学的过程并且那里好像和希罗多德没有任何关系。
Philosophy of mind and science
Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are not independent of bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.[1] There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, psychology, etc.[43]
心灵哲学和科学哲学
人类是物质的存在物，同样地，他们适用于自然科学的检验和描述。由于精神过程不是独立于身体过程的，自然科学提供的关于人类的描述在心灵哲学中也占有重要的地位。有许多科学学科研究与精神相关的过程。这样的科学包括：生物学，计算机科学，认知科学，控制论，语言学，医学，药理学，心理学，等等。
Neurobiology
The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.[44] The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."[43]
神经生物学
生物学的理论背景，和现代自然科学大体上说来一样，在基础上是唯物主义的。研究的对象首先是物理过程，物理过程被看成是精神活动和行为的基础。由于缺乏任何经验主义的驳斥它的基础假设：“一个人没有大脑状态的改变就没有精神状态的改变。”，生物学在解释精神现象上不断取得成功。
Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines which are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:[44]
Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation.[45]
Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.[45]
Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.[45]
Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.[43]
在精神生物学的领域内，有许多分支学科是涉及到精神和物理状态、过程之间的关系的：
感觉神经生理学研究感觉过程和刺激之间的关系。
认知神经科学研究精神过程和神经过程之间的关系。
神经心理学描述精神本能对特定大脑解剖组织的依赖关系。
最后，进化生物学研究人类神经系统的起源和发展，由于这是心灵的基础。也描述精神现象从它最原始阶段开始的个体发育和系统发育。
The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: neural correlate).[44] A very small number of neurobiologists, such as Emil du Bois-Reymond and John Eccles have denied the possibility of a "reduction" of mental phenomena to cerebral processes, partly for religious reasons.[20] However, the contemporary neurobiologist and philosopher Gerhard Roth continues to defend a form of "non-reductive materialism."[46]
神经科学的方法上的突破，特别是高科技的神经成像程序的引入，推动着科学家营建雄心勃勃的研究计划：一个主要的目标是描述和理解对应于那些精神功能（参见：“神经关系”）的神经过程。一个非常少的神经生物学家，比如Emil du Bois-Reymond和John Eccles已经拒绝了从精神现象到大脑过程的“还原”的可能性，这部分地是出于宗教的原因。然而，现代神经生物学家和哲学家Gerhard Roth在不断地为一种“非还原的唯物主义”辩护。
Computer science
Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers.[47] From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs which permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence ("AI").
计算机科学
计算机科学关心的是信息的自动处理过程（或至少被赋予信息的物理符号系统），并依靠这样的过程而成其为计算机。从一开始，计算机程序员就能够开发出让计算机执行任务的程序，这样的任务对一个有机存在者来说是需要拥有心灵才能完成的。一个简单的例子是乘法运算。但很显然计算机并不使用心灵来做乘法。他们是否会在某一天拥有我们称为心灵的东西？由于对人工智能的研究，这个问题已经被提到了许多哲学讨论的议题中。
Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and a strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.[48] The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing test.[49] Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room which contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out be to indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind - intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle.[48]
在人工智能中，在一种谦虚的探索和一个更雄心勃勃的探索之间通常有一个分界：John Searle将这个分界的两方分别称为弱人工智能和强人工智能。按Searle的看法，成功模拟精神状态被排除在“弱人工智能”的目标之外，不去尝试将计算机变得有意识和感知等。关于强人工智能的目标可以回溯到一个计算机领域的先驱图灵（Alan Turing）。作为对“计算机能思考吗？”问题的一个回答，他提出了著名的图灵测试。图灵相信一个计算机能够被称得上“思考”如果他通过如下的测试：把它放在一个房间里，而在隔壁的房间里有一个人，有第三个人对这台计算机和这个人提一样的问题，计算机的响应测试后被认为是无法和人的响应区分开来。本质上来说，图灵关于机器智能的观点是取行为主义者的心灵模型的——智能就是智能所做的。图灵测试受到了许多批评，在其中最有名的可能是由Searle表述出来的中文屋思考实验了。
The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).[50]
关于计算机或者机器人的感受能力（感受性质）的可能性的问题还处在讨论中。一些计算机科学家相信人工智能专业还能对“心身问题”的解答做出新的贡献。他们提出基于所有计算机中软件和硬件的相互影响，可能有天能够发现有助于我们理解人类心灵和大脑（湿件）之间相互影响的理论。
[edit]
Psychology
Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.[51]
心理学
心理学是直接考察精神状态的科学。它一般使用经验主义的方法来考察具体的精神状态，像快乐，害怕或者困扰。心理学考察把这些精神状态间以及他们和有机体的输入、输出之间互相约束的规律，
An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.[43] This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind–body problem already described.
对此的一个例子是感知心理学。这个领域中的科学家发现了形式感知普遍规律。形式心理学的一条规律是：在相同方向上运动的物体会被感到是关联在一起的。这个规律描述了视觉输入和精神感觉状态之间的关系。然而，它没有对关于感觉状态的本性提出什么看法。心理学家发现的规律可以和所有已经描述的对心身问题的回答相兼容。
Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
Most of the discussion in this article has focused on the predominant school (or style) of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes also inaccurately described as Anglo-American philosophy).[52] Other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes (also misleadingly) subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy.[52] In any case, the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) tend to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis and more on directly understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some direct sense that does not involve the analysis of linguistic forms.[52]
大陆传统下的心理哲学
这篇文章中的大部分讨论是关注在现代西方文化中有支配性的哲学学派（或样式），他们通常被称为分析哲学（有时也不严格地被叫为英美哲学）。还存在着其他的学派，然而，它们有时（也是令人误解的）被包括在大陆哲学的大标签下。无论如何，在这个标签下的各个学派（现象学，存在主义，等等）和分析哲学的取向不同在前者更少地关注语言和逻辑分析，而更多地关注对人类存在和经验的直接理解。在关于心灵的讨论中，它们倾向于尝试抓住的思想和感觉经验的概念，采用一种直接的方式而不涉及语言形式的分析。
In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the subjective mind, the mind of an individual; the objective mind, the mind of society and of the State; and the Absolute mind, a unity of all concepts. See also Hegel's Philosophy of Mind from his Encyclopedia.[53]
在黑格尔（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel）的《精神现象学》中，黑格尔讨论了三种不同的心灵类型：主体性的心灵，一个个体的心灵；客体性的心灵，社会和国家的心灵；绝对的心灵，一个各种概念的统一。参见黑格尔的《哲学全书》中的“精神哲学”。
In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are Phenomenology and Existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see noema) and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences.[54] Existentialism, a school of thought led by Jean-Paul Sartre, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences.[55]
现代，两个从响应或者反对黑格尔传统发展起来的主要学派是现象学和存在主义。由胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl）建立的现象学关注于人类心灵的内容（意向相关项）和现象的过程如何塑造了我们经验。存在主义，一种由萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre）引领的学派，关注于经验的内容和心灵是如何处理经验的。
An important, though not very well known, example of a philosopher of mind and cognitive scientist who tries to synthesize ideas from both traditions is Ron McClamrock. Borrowing from Herbert Simon and also influenced by the ideas of existential phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, McClamrock suggests that man's condition of being-in-the-world ("Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein") makes it impossible for him to understand himself by abstracting away from it and examining it as if it were a detached experimental object of which he himself is not an integral part.[56]
虽然知道人不多，作为一个力图综合两种传统的心灵哲学家和认知科学家的例子的是Ron McClamrock。借鉴Herbert Simon，受到存在主义现象学家梅洛-庞蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）和海德格尔（Martin Heidegger）的影响，McClamrock提出了这样的看法：人的状况是“在世界之中存在”（"Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein"），但人们却想采用了从这种状况中抽离出来并检验它的方法来理解他自己，就好像这种状态是一个被分开的经验性对象，对它来说他不是一个整合而不可分的部分，这是不可能成功的。
Consequences of philosophy of mind
There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of death and its definitive character, the nature of emotion, of perception and of memory. Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.[1]
心灵哲学的推论
有无数的主题受到了心灵哲学中发展出来的观念的影响。关于此的明显的例子是死亡的本性和它的最终特性，情绪、感觉、记忆的本性。关于一个人是什么和他或她的同一性的由什么组成的问题也和心灵哲学有很大的关系。有两个和心灵哲学有关的主题引起了人们特别的注意，它们是：自由意志和自我。
Free will
Main article: Free will
In the context of the philosophy of mind, the question about the freedom of the will takes on a renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.[1] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this argumentation a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[57]
自由意志
参见主体文章：自由意志
在心灵哲学的文本环境中，关于意志的自由的问题再次得到了关注。至少对于唯物主义决定论者情况是这样的。按照他们的立场，自然规律完全决定了物理世界的过程。精神状态，以及同样的对于意志，也是物质的状态，这意味着人类的行为和决定也完全被自然规律所决定。这讨论延伸一步就是：人们，他们自己，不能决定他们要什么，他们做什么。由此推论，他们没有自由。
This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if she had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.[57] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume. [58]Nowadays, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett.[59]
在一方面，这个看法被相容论者所拒绝。采纳这个立场的人们提出，问题“我们是自由的吗？”只有在我们能够决定“自由”一词是什么意思后才能被回答。 “自由”的反面不是“受因果约束的”而是“强迫的”或者“强制的”。把自由定义成不确定的是合适的。一个自由的行为是一种行为者如果选择其它的的那他就可以做其它的状况。在这种意义下，即使决定论是真的，一个人也可以是自由的。哲学史上最重要的相容论者是休谟（David Hume）。现在，这个立场被诸如Daniel Dennett等所拒绝。
On the other hand, there are also many incompatibilists who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called originationism.[57] These philosophers affirm that the course of the world is not completely determined by natural laws: the will at least does not have to be and, therefore, it is potentially free. The most prominent incompatibilist in the history of philosophy was Immanuel Kant.[60] Critics of this position accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.[57]
在另一方面，也有许多非相容论者，它们拒绝这个观点，由于他们以一种被称为源起论的方式强烈地相信意志自由。这些哲学家强调世界的过程不完全是被自然规律决定的：至少意志不是如此，也由此它是潜在的自由的。哲学史上最突出的非相容论者是康德（Immanuel Kant）。这个立场的批评家谴责非相容论者在使用一个不前后一贯的自由概念。他们的观点如下：如果我们的意志不是被任何东西决定的，那么我们就是完全偶然地想要我们所想要的。那么如果我们所想要的完全是意外的，我们就不是自由的。所以如我们的意志不是被任何东西所决定，我们就不是自由的。
The self
The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self. If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, most modern philosophers of mind will affirm that no such thing exists.[61] The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the Christian idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, due to their physicalistic orientations, and due to a general acceptance among philosophers of the scepticism of the concept of 'self' by David Hume, who could never catch himself doing, thinking or feeling anything.[62] However, in the light of empirical results from developmental psychology, developmental biology and the neurosciences, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus - an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections - seems reasonable.[63]
自我
心灵哲学在自我的概念方面也有重要的推论。如果一个人用“自我”或者“我”一词来指一个本质上的、不变的他这个人的核心，大多数现代心灵哲学家回断言说没有这么一个东西存在。把自我看成是一个本质的不变的核心的观念源于基督教的非实质的灵魂的观念。这样的一种观念对现代的大多数哲学家来说是不可接受的，由于他们物理主义的取向，由于一个在哲学家中被大体上接受了的休谟对“自我”概念的怀疑论看法：一个人从不能捕捉到他自己正在做什么，想什么或者感到什么。然而，依照发展着的心理学、发展着的生物学和神经科学的经验主义的结果，那种有一个本质的，变化无常的，物质性的核心——一个分布于变化着的突触连接模式中的整合的代表系统——的看法也似乎是有道理的。
In view of this problem, some philosophers affirm that we should abandon the idea of a self.[61] For example, Thomas Metzinger and Susan Blackmore both practice meditation, claiming that this gives us reliable conscious experience of selflessness.[64] Philosophers and scientists holding this view frequently talk of the self, "I", agency and related concepts as 'illusory', a view with parallels in some Eastern religious traditions, such as anatta in Buddhism.[65] But this is a minority position. More common is the view that we should redefine the concept: by "self" we would not be referring to some immutable and essential nucleus, but to something that is in permanent change. A well-known defender of this position is Daniel Dennett.[61]
考虑到这个问题，一些哲学家断言我们应该抛弃自我的观念。比如，Thomas Metzinger和Susan Blackmore都践行过冥想，宣称这给我们关于无我的可靠的感知经验。持有这样观点的哲学家和科学家经常谈论自我，“我”，行为者和关于“幻”的概念，这个概念在东方宗教传统中也有接近的内容，比如佛教中的无我。但这是一个少数人的立场。更普遍的观点是我们要重新定义概念：用“自我”一词我们不应指某种不变的和本质的核心，而应指一些一直在变化着的东西。这个立场的一个有名的拥护者是Daniel Dennet。
