【中文标题】中国假定继承人的十个问题
【原文标题】Ten Questions for China's Heir Presumptive
【登载媒体】纽约时报
【原文作者】DAVID SHAMBAUGH
【原文链接】http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/opinion/ten-questions-for-chinas-heir-presumptive.html?_r=1&ref=china
中国副主席习近平下周的华盛顿之行，是一个绝佳的机会来近距离观察这个将在未来十年领导中国的人。
自从2007年被钦点为胡锦涛的继承人之后，习造访了多个国家，但在粉墨登场之机从未来到过美国（他上一次来访的身份是省级官员）。
这是习了解美国，也是美国认识他的好机会。他在中国之外少有人知，即使在国内也具有一些神秘色彩，观察人士将会努力寻找习的本土和国际政治导向。
以下是中国观察人士希望了解有关习近平的10个问题：
1，习会成为中国共产党的政治改革人士吗？
自从2009年以来，党的行为收敛了许多，很多改革举措被习的前任曾庆红叫停。习能够敢于直面阻碍改革的强大、保守的机构吗——国家安全部、军队、党的宣传体制和大型国有企业？还是说他会像胡锦涛一样对这些机构俯首称臣？在10月份举行的第18届党代表大会中，一些改革人士，如李源潮、汪洋、薄熙来、王沪宁和刘延东会被选入政治局常委吗？
2，习和下一任总理（竞争者包括副总理李克强和王岐山）会把口头上的“经济再平衡”落实在行动中吗？
过去两年里，很多官方发言都在呼吁，把国家的经济重点从沿海出口型转变为本地消费型，以形成中国可持续发展的经济基础。到目前为止，实际中的投资并未与此相吻合。
3，习有能力制定出针对西藏和新疆更加人性化的政策吗？那里的民族躁动情绪从2008年以来就不断上升，在本周达到顶峰。
政府安全部门的铁腕政策导致生命的逝去和更进一步的不安定局面，社会需要一种新的、柔和的手段。习具备足够强大的政治影响力来与当前残暴的体制抗衡吗？他能在焦躁不安的民族社团与中国政府间营造出一个和谐共存的局面吗？
4，习和党内机构能够有效控制激进的民族主义情绪吗？这种情绪现在已经让政府在与周边国家的领土争端中摆出比较极端的姿态，并且敢于“对抗”美国，在国际问题上咄咄逼人。
5，习有信心放松对主流媒体、社会媒体、互联网和教育的严格管制吗？
6，习有能力掌控军队吗？中国军方在近几年所展示出的令人担忧的动向激怒了临近的国家，而且，它的行动似乎独立于党的控制。
7，习会把口头上的外交政策落实在行动中吗？
在一个危险的世界里，北京需要有实际的行动，它那些老生常谈的口号已经越来越难令人相信了。一个值得欣慰的迹象是习在2009底在中央党校的讲话，他明确批判了国内和国际政策中滥用口号的现象，说要用实际行动来代替口号。
8，习将如何应对非洲、中东和拉丁美洲对中国疯狂掠夺资源的援助和贸易政策所表现出的强烈不满。
习和中国政府在国际政策上是否会扮演更积极、更支持的角色，而不是消极、阻碍的角色？中国还会继续与俄罗斯站在一起，在联合国安理会上违背大多数国家的意愿吗？就像叙利亚和伊朗问题，它更愿意成为大家眼中的问题还是解决方案？
10，习有足够的远见来事先培养与美国之间的关系吗？
当今世界上，再没有其它国家比得上这两个国家之间关系的重要性了，但目前的关系存在着诸多不信任现象。培养这样的关系，需要中国下一届领导人和美国总统首先在两个国家间建立起起码的信任。
习在访问美国期间不大可能直接回答这些问题。假以时日，我们就可以发现他是一个积极改变的“革新型”领导人，还是又一个安于现状的碌碌官员。
原文：
WASHINGTON — The visit by China’s vice president, Xi Jinping, to Washington this coming week offers a unique opportunity to take the measure of the man who will lead China for the next decade.
While Xi has traveled the world since being anointed Hu Jintao’s designated successor in 2007, he has not been to the United States during this grooming period (he did visit earlier as a provincial official).
This will be a good opportunity for Xi to familiarize himself with America and vice versa. As he is not well known outside of China and enigmatic even inside the country, observers will be looking for clues to Xi’s domestic and international orientation.
Here are 10 questions China watchers would like to know about Xi Jinping:
•1. Will Xi return to a politically reformist path for the Chinese Communist Party?
Since late 2009, the party has retrenched significantly — halting and rolling back reforms by Xi’s predecessor, Zeng Qinghong. Can Xi stand up to the powerful conservative institutions that have blocked reforms — the state security apparatus, the military, the party propaganda system and large state-owned enterprises — or will he be beholden to them, as Hu Jintao has been? Will reformers such as Li Yuanchao, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai, Wang Huning and Liu Yandong be promoted to top Politburo positions along with Xi at the 18th Party Congress in October?
• 2. Can Xi and the next prime minister (the contenders are reportedly Vice Prime Ministers Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) turn the rhetoric of economic “rebalancing” into reality?
Many official speeches have been made over the past two years calling for a reorientation of the economy away from the export sector and the coastal regions to domestic consumption and the interior as the basis for a new and more sustainable growth model for China. To date the reality of investment has not matched the rhetoric.
•3. Will Xi be able to devise a more humane policy toward Tibet and Xinjiang, where ethnic unrest has steadily risen since 2008 and has spiked in recent weeks?
Government security forces have responded with a heavy hand, resulting in loss of life and heightened instability. A new, softer approach is needed. But will Xi have the political strength to stand up to the repressive apparatus and put in place conditions for a more stable coexistence between restive ethnic groups and the Chinese state?
•4. Can Xi and the party apparatus reign in the nationalism that is pushing the government to take extreme positions on territorial disputes with China’s neighbors, to “stand up” to the United States and behave aggressively internationally?
• 5. Will Xi be sufficiently confident to all the relaxation of tightened controls on mainstream media, social media, the Internet and educational institutions?
•6. Can Xi reign in the military, which has demonstrated a worrisome tendency in recent years to undertake actions that provoke China’s neighbors and, seemingly, act independently of civilian party control?
•7. Will Xi authorize a foreign policy that is more about substance than rhetoric?
China’s diplomatic platitudes have become increasingly incredulous in a dangerous world where real action is needed from Beijing. One hopeful indicator in this regard is a speech Xi gave at the Central Party School in late 2009, in which he explicitly criticized the pervasive tendency toward sloganeering in domestic and foreign policy, arguing that slogans needed to be replaced by substance and hard work.
•8. How will Xi handle the growing discontent across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America over China’s rapacious and mercantilist energy, aid and trade policies?
•9. Will Xi and the Chinese government begin to take more active and less passive, more supportive and less obstructionist, roles in global governance? Will China continue to stand with Russia in the United Nations Security Council against the will of the majority of other nations on issues like Syria and Iran — and become part of the solution instead of part of the problem?
•10. Will Xi have the strategic foresight to invest in advancing the relationship with the United States?
There is no more important relationship for either country in the world today, yet strategic mistrust permeates the current relationship. Advancing the relationship requires the active engagement of China’s next leader — and the American president — to build strategic trust between the two great nations.
As Xi’s visit is not likely to provide answers to these 10 questions, time will tell if he is a “transformational” leader who embraces and shapes positive changes for China at home and abroad, or whether he is another risk-averse apparatchik.
