Manstein, Erich von (1955), Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General, Novato, CA: Presidio Press (paperback published in 1994, 573 p.)
这是一部我八十年代上高中时就拜读过的名著。三十多年后找到英文版再过了把瘾，记了不少笔记可与读者诸君分享。比较精彩的看点有：（1）1940年进攻法国从阿登山区奇袭而不是走一战时拂袖海岸的老路原来曼施坦因是始作俑者（#4，#5）。（2）1942年7月克里米亚大捷后他从中将集团军司令位置跳级直升元帅（一般会升上将指挥一个集团军群）（#8）。（3）1942年11月深受宠幸的曼施坦因受领了驰援斯大林格勒重任，出任新建顿河集团军群司令。包围圈内第6集团军划归曼施坦因指挥。他下令保卢斯突围，但被保卢斯婉拒，理由元首明令不许突围。曼施坦因“故意”下一道和元首的命令冲突的命令，让保卢斯为了数十万将士的性命选择违背元首的命令率部突围时心理负担小一些。令人扼腕的是保卢斯违抗直接上级领导的命令而对元首的命令表现出愚忠（#10，#11，#12）。（4）曼施坦因不但敢和元首当面争论顶撞，而且还大言不惭地建议元首放弃“瞎指挥”，在东线任命一名总司令（回忆录里没明说，但言下之意是这样一位足智多谋，胸有成竹的东线总司令非他本人莫属）。结果被元首一口回绝（#22）。
相隔30多年两次读同一本书，太有历史意义。读完对这位老将是否善终有点好奇，查了一下。和很多其他德军将领相比，曼施坦因的确是善终。凯特尔和约德尔在纽伦堡审判后被绞死。隆美尔，克鲁格，莫德尔，和克雷布斯自杀。舒埃纳尔在苏联，东德，和西德先后被囚。柏林降将魏德林在苏联战俘营去世。据Wikipedia报道，曼施坦因尽管于1949年因“战争罪”被英国在苏联压力下在英占区汉堡判了18年徒刑，他在1953年被提前释放。本书尽管开卷于狱中，出版于他获得自由后的1955年，马上变得洛阳纸贵，前部下（和其他很多前德国军人）扬眉吐气，人手一册。本书造就了曼施坦因一代枭雄的光辉形象。1973年曼施坦因于85岁高龄去世，被西德政府以军礼厚葬。（他的20岁的儿子，一名陆军中尉，于1942年在列宁格勒前线阵亡。）
1 [MY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MANSTEIN] I knew Manstein was most famous (1) for his conquest of Sevastapol, (2) for his (aggressive but failed) rescue of Sixth Army in Stalingrad, and (3) for his multiple battles around Kharkov. But I had no idea how his career progressed, and how he ended up.
2 [EARLY HISTORY] Erich v. Manstein was born in 1887, and wounded in 1914. In WWI, he was in Belgium, Poland, and France. In 1936, he had risen to major-general. In 1938, he commanded a division, and then as chief-of-staff of an army he took part in the occupation of Sudetenland.
3 [POLAND] In the Battle of Poland, he was chief-of-staff of Colonel-General v. Rundstedt's Southern Army Group. He acknowledged that Hitler did not interfere at all during the campaign.
4 [THE ORIGINATOR OF THE ATTACK ON FRANCE VIA ARDENNES] In late 1939, he went to the west as Rundstedt's Southern Army Group become Army Group A. He was instrumental in pushing the proposal for the attack on Western allies via Ardennes. OKH’s original plan was a 1940-version of Schlieffen Plan, with Army Group B pushing into Low Countries and Army Group A playing a secondary role. Given the (almost total) lack of elements of surprise of this plan, Manstein (supported by Rundstedt) submitted numerous memos and engaged in many conversations to drive home the point that Army Group A, with its armor driving through Ardennes, be the primary knife. He was even able to directly present to Hitler his views. Irritated, OKH (German High Command) pushed him out by promotion to command an infantry corps, 38 Army Corps, which played no role in the initial attacks on France.
5 [WON THE DEBATE BUT WAS GIVEN NO CREDIT] In the great strategy debate, Hitler eventually supported Manstein's ideas—after Manstein had already left HQ Army Group A. Neither Hitler nor OKH gave Manstein any credit for proposing such a daring but brilliant idea. (p. 127) On 10 May 1940 Manstein learned of the start of the campaign on the radio. “The reader will appreciate that I was not feeling exactly grateful to the body which banished me into the German hinterland at the very moment when the plan for which I had struggled so long and so doggedly was coming to fruition in the west.”
6 [IN FRANCE, NOT MUCH FIGHTING, BUT PREPARING TO INVADE BRIATAIN] Manstein's 38 Corps was placed under command of Army Group A, and he happily served under Rundstedt again. As a second echelon unit, his corps advanced from the Somme to the Loire. (p. 147) “The wheel had turned. The road from Compiègne 1918 to Compiègne 1940 had been a long one. Where would it take us from here?” . . . 38 Corps trained as a first echelon unit for landing in Britain. . . What is very shocking to me is Manstein's disclosure that Hitler had no long-term strategic plan beyond the victory over France, which came too quickly. The (air) Battle of Britain was fought by default, without much strategizing.
7 [COMMANDER OF A PANZER CORPS IN ARMY GROUP NORTH] In March 1941 Manstein was made commander of 56 Panzer Corps. As a spearhead of Army Group North, M led an armored dash from East Prussia to Lake Ilmen.
8 [COMMANDER OF ELEVENTH ARMY, CONQUERING THE CRIMEA, AND BEING PROMOTED TO FIELD-MARSHAL] In September 41 as Colonel-General Manstein was promoted to command Eleventh Army, which conquered the Crimea and smashed the Russian counterlandings at Kerch. After the fall of Sevastopol in July 42 he was promoted Field-Marshal.
9 [MINOR FIGHTING IN ARMY GROUPS NORTH AND CENTER] In Aug 1942, Eleventh Army was transferred to attack Leningrad. It fought the battle of Lake Ladoga and smashed a Russian army. Then instead of charging toward Leningrad, Eleventh Army was transferred to the relatively quiet front of Army Group Centre. (In Oct 1942, his 20-yr-old son, a lieutenant, was killed in the Leningrad front.)
10 [COMMANDER OF THE NEW DON ARMY GROUP] In late November 1942 when Sixth Army had already been stuck in Stalingrad, Manstein (celebrating his 55th birthday) received orders to set up the new “Don Army Group” for the explicit mandate to rescue Paulus. Don Army Group would be positioned between Army Group A (Caucasus, commanded by Hitler himself!) and B (Don-Volga), whose shaky front needed to be stabilized.
11 [HITLER'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (p. 273)] “My appointment as commander of Don Army Group brought me for the first time under Hitler's direct orders as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht/OKW) and the Army (Heer/OKH). . . (p. 274) Hitler undoubtedly had a certain eye for operational openings, as had been shown by the way he opted for Army Group A's plan in the west. Indeed, this is often to be found in military amateurs—otherwise, history would not have recorded so many dukes and princes as successful commanders. In addition, Hitler possessed an astounding retentive memory and an imagination that made him quick to grasp all technical matters and problems of armaments. He was amazingly familiar with the very latest enemy weapons and could reel off whole columns of figures on both our own and the enemy's war production . . . (p. 275) What he lacked, broadly speaking, was simply military ability based on experience—something for which his “intuition” was no substitute.”
12 [HITLER IS TOO RIGID (p. 279)] “Obstinate defence of every foot of ground became the be all and end all of Hitler's leadership. After the Wehrmacht had won such extraordinary successes in the first years of war by dint of operational mobility, Hitler's reaction when the first crisis occurred in front of Moscow was to adopt Stalin's precept of hanging on doggedly to every single position. It was a policy that had brought the Soviet leaders so close to the abyss in 1941 that they finally relinquished it when the Germans launched their 1942 offensive.”
13 [STATIC VERSUS MOBILE OPERATIONS] (p. 279) “Yet because Soviet counter-offensive in the winter of 1941 had been frustrated by the resistance of our troops, Hitler was convinced that his ban on voluntary withdrawal had saved the Germans from a Napoleonic defeat. . . But only in mobile operations could the superiority of the German staffs and fighting troops shine.”
14 [HITLER DOES NOT REALLY CARE ABOUT THE SOLDIERS (p. 281)] “Despite the pains Hitler took to stress his own former status as a front-line soldier, I still never had the feeling that his heart belonged to the fighting troops. Losses were merely figures which reduced fighting power.”
15 [HITLER IS NO NAPOLEON (p. 282)] “Hitler did possess a number of the qualities indispensable to a supreme commander: a strong will, nerves that would stand up to the most serious crises, an undeniably keen brain and a certain talent in the operational field combined with an ability to recognize possibilities of a technical nature. If he could compensate for his lack of training and experience in the military sphere—particularly as regards strategy and grand strategy—by utilizing the skills of his chief-of-staff, quite an efficient military leadership might have emerged. But this was precisely what Hitler would not accept. . . (p. 283) He wanted to be another Napoleon, who had only tolerated men under him who would obediently carry out his will. Unfortunately he had neither Napoleon's military training nor his military genius.”
16 [OKH VERSUS OKW (p. 283)] “Eventually only the Eastern front remained as an OKH (Herr) responsibility, and all other theaters OKW (Wehrmacht) responsibility. . . It was inevitable that OKW and the General Staff of the army (OKH) should clash. Hitler probably created clashes deliberately so that he alone at all times would have the decisive say.”
17 [THE SPECIAL FORTE OF GERMANY MILITARY LEADERSHIP (p. 284)] “It has always been the special forte of German military leadership that it relies on commanders at all levels to show initiative and willingness to accept responsibility.”
18 [MANSTEIN IS PAULUS'S SUPERIOR (p. 294)] I knew Manstein would endeavor to relieve the Stalingrad siege. But had no idea Sixth Army was under his command within Don Army Group.
19 [SETTING UP DON ARMY GROUP HQ (p. 294)] OKH order for Manstein to set up HQ Don Army Group reached him 21 Nov 1942. He took a train, thought about his tasks, and consulted with OKH and Army Group B commander v. Kluge (on his train stop to go to Rostov). . . (p. 311) Manstein formally took over command responsibility 27 Nov 1942.
20 [STALINGRAD (p. 336)] As Manstein's forces—primarily Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army—punched through, getting very close to Stalingrad, Manstein ordered Paulus to break out. However, Paulus refused, citing (1) lack of fuel and (2) Hitler's direct order to hold. . . (p. 337) Hitler in fact did agree to let Sixth Army to attack southwest, but he still insisted that Stalingrad be held. . . Manstein deliberately gave Paulus an order contradicting Hitler's, hoping Paulus would be less stressed when choosing to disobey Hitler's order in order to save his troops. . . On 31 Jan 1943, Paulus (4 corps, 20 divisions, over 200,000 men) surrendered. . . On 5 Feb, Manstein went to see Hitler, who accepted all responsibility for the tragedy of Stalingrad and blamed Goring a little for over-reporting Luftwaffe's capabilities.
21 [KURSK (p. 420)] 12 Feb 43 Don Army Group was renamed Southern Army Group, which absorbed the former Army Group B. . . (p. 448) Manstein was commander of Southern Army Group, who launched Operation Citadel (Kursk) in July 1943—in collaboration with Central Army Group (v. Kluge). In mid-July when the Kursk battle was at its climax and Manstein's Southern forces were making stronger progress, Hitler called both him and Kluge in to call off the campaign. The Allies had landed in Sicily (!).
22 [ARGUING WITH HITLER] Manstein had some balls. Not only did he repeatedly argue with Hitler face-to-face on operational matters (essentially granting him the freedom to withdraw from untenable positions), he also suggested that Hitler relinquish his direct interference and leadership over the military matters, especially on the eastern front. Instead, a unified command be set up and an overall commander be appointed for the eastern front. Manstein never said in the book he was it. But Hitler knew this, and responded by saying: “I have a hard time commanding my field-marshals. Do you think Goring (Reichsmarshal) will listen to you?”
23 [LAST BATTLES AS COMMANDER ARMY GROUP SOUTH (p. 544)] On 30 March 1944, when Manstein's tired forces were pushed back on the Polish frontier (his HQ in Lwow), Manstein was dismissed. Hitler maintained courtesies, and ordered Col-Gen Model (from Northern Army Group) to take over Southern Army Group, which would be renamed North Ukrainian Army Group. (On the same day v. Kleist of Central Army Group was dismissed too, to be replaced by Gen. Schörner.) Manstein was never employed again.
