}

军事工业复合体

军事工业复合体

维基百科,自由的百科全书

军事工业复合体(英语:Military-Industrial Complex,MIC),也称军事工业国会复合体(Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,MICC),中文简称军工复合体,是指一国军队军事工业政治经济利益过于紧密而成的共生关系[1]。军队过分仰赖私营军火企业提供军需,私人国防工业会以政治及经济手段(例如游说国会议员,指支持军工企业发展可为地方带来大量就业机会)确保政府提供足够预算,甚至为推销武器而鼓动政府高层发动战争,令该国的军事开支巨大。此名词最常被用于美国,由第34任美国总统德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔在1961年的总统告别演说中首创。

 
美国海军上将 Gary Roughead 于波音演讲 P-8波赛顿海上巡逻机 的采购

作为一个贬义词,军事工业复合体主要用于美国的情境,这共生关系由国防承包商(军事工业)、五角大厦(军队)以及美国政府立法部门行政部门)的要角所构成的联合垄断;此联合垄断关系为发“战争财”来获取暴利,因而常与公众利益相违背,发动或促进不需要(甚至有危害)的战争或军事行动,在国际关系上可能引发不必要的军备竞赛及武器扩散。军事工业复合体的贬义,主要来自于这种联合垄断的政经关系不受民主程序的监督、反省及控制。[2]

亚洲周刊专栏作家陈国祥认为,美国军力过度扩张,财政难以支撑,而且“国防军工企业永居优先的主导与分配地位,是两党政治的真正洗牌者”

起源

https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%86%9B%E5%B7%A5%E5%A4%8D%E5%90%88%E4%BD%93/1861546

早在上个世纪50年代,当时的美国总统德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔便在其著名的“告别演说”中,告诫美国民众警惕“军工复合体”这头“怪兽”带来的危害。然而,随着时间的推移,美国与欧洲特别是美国的军工复合体不仅没有受到限制,反而一直在背后操纵美欧国家的政治、外交、军事和军事战略。
所谓军工复合体,乃是指由军事部门、军工企业、部分国会议员和国防研究机构组成的庞大利益集团。由于军工复合体不仅涉及军方,还涉及到国防企业,更牵涉到国会,因而它的影响是极其深远的。

地位

军工复合体发展到今,深刻的影响着美国政府的决策及社会。一方面是它的魔影已渗透到老百姓的日常生活中,另外一方面,军工复合体迅速发展,也已使得各国国防经济运行很难离开私人企业。美国的实践证明,近年来在美国国防部的大型承包商中,位居前三位的依次为洛克希德·马丁公司波音公司诺思罗普·格鲁曼公司。其中,洛克希德·马丁公司主要生产军用飞机、导弹,是所谓的“纯”国防承包公司,诺思罗普·格鲁曼公司亦属于美国的“纯”国防承包公司,重点生产各种类型的导弹。而波音公司,实际上属于“半”国防承包公司,该公司主要生产民用飞机,但也接受美国国防部订货。据统计,仅仅在2007年,上述三大国防承包商便从美国国防部分别拿到了278亿美元、225亿美元和146亿美元的合同 [1]  。
 
除此之外,通用动力公司雷神公司、英国的BAE系统公司,也成为美国国防合同的主要接受者。
 
在欧盟,私人公司也是相关国家国防部的主要承包商。近年来,欧洲航空和宇宙公司(为欧盟主要国防承包商),不仅接受欧盟大国国防部订货,它还接受美国空军订货,成为典型的全球跨国军火公司;纵然欧洲空中客车公司,虽然该公司名为民用飞机公司,然而它也接受欧洲大国国防部军事订货。
 
仅仅在法国,该国的达索公司每年便从法国国防部接受数亿欧元的国防订货。法国的许多先进高技术武器大多来源于这家公司国防订货。说明,美欧国防部同私人公司的关系是何等的密切。事实上,离开了私人公司订货,美欧国防部便难以生存下去。
 
事件影响
 
军工复合体作为一个复杂的庞大机构,由于它同美欧军方与国会联系相当密切,因而它实际上操纵着美国与欧洲国家的防务政策。
 
这集中体现在以下一些方面:
 
首先,海陆空三军需要先进的武器,必须经国防部予以备案,然后再向国会军事拨款机构进行申请。而许多先进武器需要由国防科研机构加以研发。因而,上述部门和机构便形成一个密不可分的整体,谁也离不开谁。
 
其次,不管是国防企业,还是科研机构,他们需要大量拨款,势必雇佣有关人员。而从国防部门退休人员,便成为上述企业与研究机构的争夺对象。因为,这些退休人员同国防部的关系特别密切,不少人都是国防部原来的要员。让他们参与公司或研究机构,可为企业和研究部门获得更多实惠。
 
再次,为了从国会得到更多拨款,国防企业和国防研究机构通常还要在国会外展开院外活动,加强对国会议员的影响力,而这些国会议员不仅从国防企业及研究机构得到大量好处,还要为所选取的军事基地和国防科研部门与企业提供大量就业机会而获得选票。因此,这些议员为本地区的国防企业和研究机构向国会争夺预算拨款而费尽心机。
 
最后,通过人事安排,达到最终控制防务政策的目标。在人事安排上,国防公司领导人被安排到国防部重要部门;国防部退休人员安排到国防公司担任要职。这是一种双向的人员流动。比如,美国现任副总统切尼,曾在老布什政府任期终结后卸任国防部长职位,以后又担任了国防工业公司——哈利伯顿公司的高层职位。通过人事往来的双向流动,促使国防企业通过各种关系直接参与美欧主要国家的防务政策制定。
 
不言而喻,军工复合体的结果便是,国防企业代表直接进入国家权利机关,利用手中权力在防务政策中为集团谋求利益。况且,军工复合体还利用各种途径,进一步左右美欧国家政府的安全决策。
 
发展形式
 
“到2020年,美国拥有的先进隐形战斗机数量将是中国的20倍,中国是否将对美国构成直接的威胁?”2010年5月8日,美国国防部长罗伯特·盖茨通过一连串的反问,严厉批评了“军工铁三角”为了拿到巨额订单,对美国所面临的威胁进行不实渲染。罗伯特·盖茨还表示将大幅缩减五角大楼的官僚成本。
尽管这个集团曾经高效地将权力、资本和技术集中,快速推进了美国军队现代化,但是目前已经走向了极端。由于军队要先进的武器装备和更高的待遇,军工企业要更多的订单,美国国会议员想让他选区内的军工企业提供更多的就业机会,这些相互关联的利益需求决定军工铁三角成为了一个靠军备竞赛发财的特殊利益集团。1961年,美国总统德怀特·戴维·艾森豪威尔在著名的告别演说中曾警告过“军工铁三角”这头“怪兽”将损害美国国家利益。近半个世纪过去了,这头“怪兽”不仅愈加强大,而且打着“爱国”、“公众安全”等口号,挟持了美国政府
 
盖茨表示,军工铁三角的危害之一表现在催生了国防官僚主义,通过在国防各环节层层设卡,“铁三角”将捞取更多油水。盖茨举例称,前线要增加一名军犬饲养员,要通过五角大楼5个部门审核。自“9·11”事件以来,五角大楼预算几乎翻番。而在军事支出中,五角大楼行政费用几乎占到40%。盖茨表示,他准备在提交的2012年国防预算中将管理和运行费用调低2到3个百分点,力争节省100亿至150亿美元的行政开支。
 
盖茨还批评“铁三角”过分夸大美国面临的威胁。“在美军已经拥有3200架各种战术飞机的情况下,我们是否应继续强化力量?当前美国拥有和在建的作战舰艇数量比其他13个海军大国的舰艇总数还要多,这是否意味着美国还处在危险当中?到2020年,美国拥有的先进隐形战斗机的数量是中国的20倍,中国是否将对美国构成直接的威胁?”盖茨通过一连串的反问,表达出对军工铁三角的愤怒。
 
盖茨承认,和军工铁三角开战是一个艰巨的任务,他已经下决心同国会展开激烈斗争。但美国联合通讯社分析认为,盖茨要打破军工铁三角,面临的阻力很大。该利益集团已经渗透进美国军政界的方方面面,像前副总统理查德·布鲁斯·切尼、前国防部长唐纳德·亨利·拉姆斯菲尔德都曾经在军火公司任职,盖茨本人当初能够进入前总统乔治·沃克·布什的视野,也与军工铁三角的推荐有密切关联。要打破铁三角,意味着同整个美国政坛为敌,阻力可想而知。

The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II  

https://www.amazon.ca/Long-War-History-National-Security/dp/0231131593?

by Andrew Bacevich ; April 23 2009

Essays by a diverse and distinguished group of historians, political scientists, and sociologists examine the alarms, emergencies, controversies, and confusions that have characterized America's Cold War, the post-Cold War interval of the 1990s, and today's "Global War on Terror." This "Long War" has left its imprint on virtually every aspect of American life; by considering it as a whole, The Long War is the first volume to take a truly comprehensive look at America's response to the national-security crisis touched off by the events of World War II.

Contributors consider topics ranging from grand strategy and strategic bombing to ideology and economics and assess the changing American way of war and Hollywood's surprisingly consistent depiction of Americans at war. They evaluate the evolution of the national-security apparatus and the role of dissenters who viewed the myriad activities of that apparatus with dismay. They take a fresh look at the Long War's civic implications and its impact on civil-military relations.

More than a military history, The Long War examines the ideas, policies, and institutions that have developed since the United States claimed the role of global superpower. This protracted crisis has become a seemingly permanent, if not defining aspect of contemporary American life. In breaking down the old and artificial boundaries that have traditionally divided the postwar period into neat historical units, this volume provides a better understanding of the evolution of the United States and U.S. policy since World War II and offers a fresh perspective on our current national security predicament.

<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/bace13158
1. INTRODUCTION
  1.  (pp. vii-xvi)
    Andrew J. Bacevich
     

    Growing up in the Midwest during the 1950s and early 1960s, I came to understand the narrative of contemporary history and the narrative of the Cold War as one and the same. That the Cold War provided the organizing principle of the age was self-evident, even to a young boy. Catch the headlines on WGN, read the Chicago Tribune, flip through an occasional issue of Time or Life, and the rest was easy: the era’s great antagonisms—the United States vs. the Soviet Union, West vs. East, Free World vs. Communist bloc—told you pretty much everything you needed to...

  2. 1. LIBERATION OR DOMINANCE? THE IDEOLOGY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
     (pp. 1-52)
    Arnold A. Offner
     

    In September 2002 President George W. Bush’s administration published “The National Security Strategy of the United States” (NSS), an unusually strong ideological statement explaining the U.S. government’s intent to combine American principles and power to effect American goals under the rubric of a new “American internationalism.”¹ The Bush NSS rests on four concepts. First is the belief that America’s unequaled power, sustained by its emphasis on freedom and constitutional government, imposes special responsibility on the United States to move the world toward similar political-economic models. Second is the view that the Cold War security strategies of containment and deterrence of...

  3. 2. VARIATIONS ON THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR
     (pp. 53-98)
    James Kurth
     

    During the last third of the twentieth century, military strategists and historians developed the idea that there was a distinctive American strategic culture or “way of war.” There was general agreement that the American way of war was characterized by a reliance upon such American advantages as (1) overwhelming mass, i.e., a pronounced advantage in men and material; (2) wide-ranging mobility, i.e., a pronounced advantage in transportation and communication; and (3) high-technology weapons systems, i.e., a comparative advantage in capital investment versus manpower.¹

    Parallel to these three military qualities were a political feature and an international one. The political feature...

  4. 3. THE POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL AGE
     (pp. 99-136)
    George H. Quester
     

    World War II set the stage for the evolution of American conventional war thinking in two very different ways. The first was the way in which it had been fought, with an unprecedented reliance on air power and on amphibious operations, with each of these innovations inevitably changing how Americans and anyone else thought about normal or “conventional” war.¹ The second was the way it was so abruptly ended, when in August of 1945 American atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, producing a surrender that most had not have expected until 1947 at the earliest.²

    The very phrase “conventional...

  5. 4. SHIELD AND SWORD U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINE SINCE 1945
     (pp. 137-206)
    Tami Davis Biddle
     

    The Second World War ineluctably altered the position of the United States in the world. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States was still a careful and often reluctant player in international politics; by 1945 the Americans had taken a major role in the defeat of Germany, had brought Japan to its knees, and had developed the most daunting military arsenal the world had ever seen. The preeminent symbol of America’s new role was the long-range bomber coupled with the atomic bomb. This pairing, which enabled monstrous destructive power to be delivered anywhere...

  6. 5. ELUSIVE BARGAIN: THE PATTERN OF U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II
     (pp. 207-264)
    Andrew J. Bacevich
     

    History, the American statesman Henry L. Stimson once observed, “is often not what actually happened but what is recorded as such.” This difference between reality and record does not emerge by accident. It reflects the interests of those in a position to influence the recording.

    When it comes to the history of U.S. civil-military relations since the end of World War II, the gap between actual events and the story woven from those events looms especially large. It does so because that gap has served and continues to serve an important function. What we might term the approved interpretation of...

  7. 6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE UBIQUITOUS AND ENDLESS
     (pp. 265-301)
    Anna Kasten Nelson
     

    The national security state was created by the Cold War, sustained and enlarged by that war, and further refined by the Gulf War in the Middle East. It is now the handmaiden of the “war” on terrorism, using the structure created by the Cold War more than fifty years ago to fight terrorism. The national security state has grown even more pervasive in recent years, tainting our republican institutions, defying congressional oversight, and alienating our former allies.

    In the national security state the perceived need for security from the nation’s enemies, known or unknown, influences every part of national life....

  8. 7. INTELLIGENCE FOR EMPIRE
     (pp. 302-334)
    John Prados
     

    Americans today take it for granted that the United States maintains a vast array of agencies and entities that collect, process, and disseminate information, and carry out such other activities as are ordered by the president. In fact, the origins of this so-called “intelligence community” are relatively recent. It grew like topsy under pressure of war—World War II that is. Many analysts trace the beginnings of the U.S. intelligence community to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, to our determination never again to be taken by surprise as we were on that Sunday morning in December 1941. Another school...

  9. 8. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX LOBBY AND TROPE
     (pp. 335-370)
    Alex Roland
     

    The military-industrial complex was both a historical phenomenon and a political trope. The phenomenon was a lobby that campaigned intensely in the United States to promote increased military spending and arms production. It flourished for a quarter of a century during the Cold War. The trope gained currency in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era. It, too, is best understood in a Cold-War context.¹

    Both meanings of the term are captured by the Oxford English Dictionary. It defines “military industrial” as

    (orig. U.S.), of or relating to a nation’s armed forces and to its industries (esp. those producing military...

  10. 9. PAYING FOR GLOBAL POWER ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POSTWAR U.S. MILITARY SPENDING
     (pp. 371-404)
    Benjamin O. Fordham
     

    In the summer and fall of 1950 the administration of President Harry S Truman entered into uncharted fiscal territory, committing the United States to very high levels of military spending on an open-ended basis. The rationale for this move was set forth in NSC 68, one of the foundational documents of U.S. postwar national security policy, completed just a few months before the start of the Korean War. In spite of the undeclared war in Korea, both military planners and their critics understood that the successive supplemental spending proposals that nearly quadrupled the fiscal 1951 military budget were not short-term...

  11. 10. THE CHANGING MORAL CONTRACT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
     (pp. 405-455)
    James Burk
     

    Military service is sometimes thought of in instrumental terms. Service members receive the “king’s shilling” and in exchange the state may use them as soldiers to fight wars. Once enrolled for pay, as Thomas Hobbes observed, soldiers are obliged to go into battle and not run away, at least not without the state’s permission, no matter how much they may want to do so.¹ Put in the language of current social science, the instrumentalist view thinks about military service in terms of a “principalagent” model, in which the state is the principal and those in the military are the principal’s...

  12. 11. AMERICAN INSECURITY DISSENT FROM THE “LONG WAR”
     (pp. 456-516)
    Charles Chatfield
     

    American leaders have always prided themselves on seeing the United States as a beacon to civilization. Early in their experience, however, Americans came down from their City on a Hill and pressed across the continent, then beyond the seas and around the globe. Relentlessly they carried forward the distinctive forms of political democracy and market economy with which they rationalized their achievement and elevated it to a Cause, imbued with liberty and justice for all.

    Interest and principle have ever been entwined in U.S. policy and rhetoric. Foreign policy has been both advanced and challenged on practical and principled grounds;...

  13. 12. THE “GOOD” WAR NATIONAL SECURITY AND AMERICAN CULTURE
     (pp. 517-550)
    William L. O’Neill
     

    This essay is concerned mainly with how the mass media—and especially film and television—treat war and the military. Although popular music and fiction have exercised considerable influence, no song, however widely played, and no book, regardless of sales, has anything like the reach and impact of the moving image. War movies have been an important genre since 1942, when Hollywood signed up for the duration, and became ubiquitous with the advent of cable television. TV shows on World War II, especially service comedies, are almost as old as the medium itself. Since cable channels began multiplying in the...

  14. LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
     (pp. 551-554)
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