《经济学人》（The Economist）是我最喜欢、也是当今最有影响的的杂志之一。该杂志每周一期，貌似可以称为周刊。但不知为何，该杂志自称为 newspaper，而不是 magazine。我在这里称之为杂志，冒犯了人家的初衷。将就一下吧，Newspaper 通常翻译成报纸，把一个周刊说成是报纸有点不伦不类。
在该杂志上发表的所有文章都不署名。杂志有若干固定专栏，比如关于中国的专栏为 “Chaguan” （茶馆），亚洲的专栏为 “Banyan” （菩提树），英国政坛的专栏为“Bagehot”。Bagehot 是《经济学人》的首任主编。
探讨职场生涯的专栏为“Bartleby”。Bartleby 是美国著名作家 Herman Melville （Moby Dick 的作者）一短篇小说里的主角。 小说全名为 “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street”。Bartleby 可比当今”996工作制下”的职员悲惨多了，他一天24小时吃喝拉撒都在公司。该专栏用他来命名不言而喻。
股市专栏的名称是”Buttonwood” (梧桐树)。230年前（1792年5月17日），一些从事股票交易的经纪人在华尔街的一棵梧桐树下聚会，商订的一项协议，约定每日在梧桐树下聚会从事证券交易并订出了交易佣金的最低标准及其他及其他交易条款。这是纽约股票交易所的雏形。
最近读了一篇很有趣的文章，发表在最新一期的《经济学人》杂志股市专栏。这篇文章是该专栏写手（没署名）上任四年的最后一篇，算是临别赠言或感慨吧。
文章不长，全文附在最后。里面提到了 Reminiscences of a Stock Operator 这本书。这也是我最喜欢的一本书，读了不止一遍。这本书记述了一百多年前一位股市操盘手的股市沉浮。文中提到的 bucket shops，是那些与股市投机者对赌的小经纪公司 （庄家）。在那里，客户用保证金交易 （buying on margin），买卖股票时只交一小部分金额，不付全额，可谓一两拨千斤。客户的买单或卖单，并不传递到纽约股票交易所，而是与庄家对赌。如果客户赢了，那是赢庄家的钱；如果客户输了，那是输给庄家。
如果公平对赌，输赢的概率差不多 （假定股价随机波动）。但庄家有庄家的优势，比如扩大买卖差价（bid/offer spread）, 或提高对 保证金的要求 （margin call)。庄家甚至可以赶走那些赢多输少的客户。这种现象听起来耳熟，因为在拉斯维加斯赌场也时常出现。
遥想当年，股票价格信息靠电报传递的美国各地，用那种卷纸（谁还记得？）打印出来，然后由抄递员抄写在经纪公司的大厅的显著位置。Reminiscences of a Stock Operator的作者一开始就是干这种活的。不过他很快发现他对数字和股价规律（reading the tape) 特别有天赋。Reading the tape 就是现在我们所谓的技术分析 （technical analysis)。于是他就开户交易，与庄家对赌，随后越发不可收拾。。。。
不多说了。有兴趣的，可以把那本书找来读读。
一百多年后，股市已今非昔比。
但投资者的心理一点也没有没变。华尔街金融机构的贪婪--想尽一切办法从客户那里赚钱--也没有变。确实如此！
Finance & economics | Buttonwood
Jul 28th 2022
The Economist
Reminiscences of a financial columnist
There is nothing new on Wall Street
It is telling that one of the best books about financial markets was published almost a century ago. “Reminiscences of a Stock Operator”, by Edwin Lefevre, is a fictionalised account of the exploits of Jesse Livermore, a speculator. Livermore made a fortune selling the market short during the financial panic of 1907. He would repeat the trick in 1929. The book captures a particular time—of bucket shops, insider pools and dandy tips on Western Union or American Steel. But it is also timeless.
As this writer finishes a four-year stint as Buttonwood, the one tentative conclusion he draws from the experience is something that Livermore realised a century ago: there is nothing new on Wall Street. What happens today in the markets has happened before and will happen again. Every extreme of greed or fear has a precedent. Technology changes, but people do not.
The beginning for this Buttonwood was May 2018. At the time there was a good deal of optimism among American and European asset managers about business prospects in China. There was much talk about its “Wild West” stockmarket—with lots of retail trading on tips and a rapid turnover of shares. Rich-world entrants fancied they would add a dash of professionalism. But instead of China’s market becoming more American, the reverse happened. In 2020 there was a surge in new accounts at no-fee brokers, notably Robinhood, catering to small investors in America. A gaggle of social-media pundits emerged to mobilise this new army of speculators. They piled into tech darlings, such as Tesla, but also bombed-out stocks, such as GameStop, a video-games retailer.
This “meme-stock” craze seemed new, but it wasn’t. What it most resembled was the bucket shops of early-20th-century America, where Livermore first learned to read the markets. Here ordinary punters exchanged tips and could bet on the direction of favoured stocks for a tiny initial outlay. The Robinhood crowd, though they had better technology, had similar preferences. They were keen on call options on stocks that had the characteristics of long-odds bets. As with bucket-shop punts, these options mostly expire worthless, but can reap a spectacular profit if the share price surges.
Manias, scams and iffy schemes are recurring evils. “I used to think that people were more gullible in the 1860s and 1870s than the 1900s,” says the narrator of “Reminiscences”. But Livermore only had to pick up his newspaper to read about the latest Ponzi scheme or crooked broker. More recently, there has been the Wirecard fraud, the Archegos blow-up, the shell-company boom and any number of dodgy digital currencies.
This year has so far been a rejoinder to such excesses. As Livermore knew well, tighter money and a giddy stockmarket are a dangerous mix. His big short in 1907 was in response to signals from the money markets, which were “megaphoning warnings to the entire world”. But they were not the only warnings he ever heard. In the world of “Reminiscences”, bull markets are marked by the “calamity howling” of “old-stagers [who] said everybody—except themselves—had gone crazy”. Doom-mongers are forever with us. Indeed, there is a kind of punditry that echoes the millenarian sects of medieval Europe, the adherents of which believed they were living in the “last days”. It anticipates an endgame in which all excesses will be washed from the markets.
Perhaps such a reckoning is already in train. But it cannot be the endgame, because the game never ends. If history is anything to go by, a big bust would merely set the stage for another phase of play. Injuries heal with time. Memories of the last brutal bear market eventually fade. The unceasing contest between fear and greed resumes. The thoughtful investor has a lot to reckon with, and that won’t change either. There are constant judgments to be made about company managers, business strategy, economic policy, politics and geopolitics—as well as the opinions and likely reactions of other investors, who may or may not be as thoughtful.
And as Livermore knew well, any investor has also to fight the “expensive enemies within himself”. This endless wrestling with powerful emotions, such as hope, doubt and fear, is a big part of what makes Wall Street so fascinating. It has been a great privilege to watch the unfolding drama from this perch and to try to make sense of it all. The honour now passes to others. Thank you so much for reading.
