Kissinger calls US, China main threat to world, humanity existence
18.05.2023 Region:World News
https://news.am/eng/news/760544.html
Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, in an interview ( https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/17/henry-kissinger-explains-how-to-avoid-world-war-three ) with The Economist, called the US and China the main threat to the existence of the world and humanity because they are pursuing a policy of conflict against each other.
Kissinger expressed hope that if the leaders of the US and China meet, rather than listing all their grievances, the American president would say to his Chinese counterpart, “Mr. President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity.” China and America, without formally announcing anything, would aim to practice restraint.
In his opinion, the current situation of relations between Washington and Beijing is extremely dangerous and reminds of the situation before the First World War, “where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”
According to him, as a result of a possible military conflict over Taiwan, both the island and the world economy will be eliminated, which will be deprived of sources of supply of microprocessors.
“Both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger,” Kissinger says. “We are on the path to great-power confrontation.”
He advised both sides to try to defuse tensions over Taiwan through more cautious rhetoric and the creation of advisory groups.
Kissinger emphasized that the US is obligated to check whether the current Chinese authorities are more radical than the previous ones, and continue to keep the balance in the world.
The White House should start a dialogue with Beijing, but this approach may fail, the US diplomat warned. Therefore, according to him, the US, at least, should be strong enough militarily to overcome the consequences of failure, Kissinger noted.
基辛格称美国和中国是世界和人类生存的主要威胁，因为它们奉行相互冲突的政策。
基辛格表示希望，如果美中领导人会面，美国总统不会罗列他们所有的不满，而是对中国领导人说：“先生。 总统先生，目前和平面临的两个最大威胁是我们两个。 从某种意义上说，我们有能力毁灭人类。” 中国和美国在没有正式宣布任何事情的情况下，将力求保持克制。
在他看来，华盛顿与北京目前的关系形势极其危险，让人想起第一次世界大战前的情况，“双方都没有太多的政治让步余地，任何对平衡的破坏都可能导致灾难性后果 ”
据他介绍，由于台湾可能发生军事冲突，台湾和世界经济都将被淘汰，微处理器的供应来源将被剥夺。
“双方都相信对方代表着战略危险，”基辛格说。 “我们正走在大国对抗的道路上。”
他建议双方通过更谨慎的言辞和成立咨询小组来缓和台湾问题上的紧张局势。
基辛格强调，美国有义务制衡当前的中国当局是否比以往更激进，并继续保持世界平衡。
这位美国外交官警告说，白宫应该与北京展开对话，但这种做法可能会失败。 因此，基辛格指出，据他说，美国至少应该在军事上足够强大以克服失败的后果。
基辛格&经济学人：美国不应一门心思搞垮中国，必须承认中国也要维护自身利益
【导读】 5月17日，经济学人网站刊发基辛格专访长文，题为“基辛格详解如何避免第三次世界大战”。
基于中美竞争、俄乌战争等国际政治现状，基辛格认为，中国作为当今世界上最重要的两个大国，各自确信对方是战略意义上的威胁，正逐步走向对抗。而在他看来，人类的命运恰恰取决于中美两国能否和睦相处；随着人工智能等科技的快速发展，留给中美双方寻找相处之道的时间窗口不到十年。
为此，基辛格向有志于解决这一问题的领导人提出了若干重要建议。他提出，建立一个以规则为基础，且欧洲、中国和印度都能参与的世界秩序是可能的。这或许可以取得一个好的结果，至少不是灾难性结局。这是当今超级大国领导人的职责。
观察者网编译此文，仅供参考。
【访谈/经济学人&基辛格，翻译/观察者网 杨晗轶】
基辛格先生将于5月27日迎来百岁诞辰。目前在世的人，没有谁比他更有国际事务方面的经验。他最初是一名学者，研究19世纪的外交；后来担任美国国家安全顾问和国务卿；在卸任后的46年里，又屡屡给各个国家的君主、总统和首相担任顾问和特使。基辛格先生忧心忡忡地说：“（中美）双方都确信对方是战略意义上的威胁，我们正在走向大国对抗。”
4月底，《经济学人》与基辛格先生长谈八个多小时，讨论如何防止中美从角逐滑向战争。如今的基辛格身形佝偻、步履蹒跚，但头脑依然敏锐如针。他构思着接下来的两本书——一本关于人工智能（编者注：中文版《人工智能时代与人类未来》将由中信出版社出版发行。），一本关于联盟的本质——比起梳理过去，他对展望未来更有兴趣。
中美两国围绕科技和经济领先地位的竞争日益激烈，这令基辛格先生感到忧虑。在俄罗斯坠入中国影响力轨道、战争乌云笼罩欧洲东线的同时，他还担心人工智能即将极大程度地加剧中美对立。在世界范围内，势力均衡和战争的科技基础正在如此快速地发生变化，以至于各国在很多方面找不到任何既定原则去建构秩序。在这样的情况下，它们就可能诉诸武力。他说：“我们面临第一次世界大战前的经典局势，在政治上双方都没有多少让步的余地，均衡一旦被打破，都可能导致灾难性的后果。”
基辛格：如何避免第三次世界大战；截图来自经济学人
因为在越南战争中扮演的角色，基辛格先生被许多人斥为战争贩子，但他认为自己一生工作的重点恰恰在于避免大国冲突。在目睹纳粹德国血腥屠戮，导致自己13名近亲惨死之后，基辛格坚信，防止毁灭性冲突的唯一方法是冷静务实的外交，最好能得到共同价值观的巩固。
他说：“这是必须解决的问题，可以说我这一生都在努力尝试这样做。”在他看来，人类的命运取决于中美两国能否和睦相处。而随着人工智能的快速发展，留给双方寻找相处之道的时间，只剩下未来五到十年。
基辛格先生给有志（于解决这个问题）的领导人提出了一些开放性建议：“冷酷地认清你所处的位置。”本着这种态度，避免战争首先要分析中国为什么越来越躁动。尽管基辛格以对华和解的立场著称，但他也注意到，中国的许多思想家认为美国正在走下坡路，“因此，作为历史演变的结果，他们最终将取代我们。”
他认为中国领导层对西方政策制定者所说的基于规则的全球秩序怀有怨气，觉得这实际上是美国的规则、美国的秩序。中国领导层认为受到了侮辱，（这种秩序）是西方居高临下的交易，如果中国表现得好，就赐给中国一些优待——中国当然认为自己作为一个崛起的大国，有权获得优待。事实上，中国一些人认为指望美国平等相待是愚蠢的，永远不可能。
然而，基辛格先生也警告美国不要曲解中国的志向。在华盛顿，“人们说中国想要主宰世界……但中国其实只是想变得强大，并没有希特勒那种主宰世界的倾向，不论现在还是过去，这都不是中国人对世界秩序的想法。”
基辛格说，纳粹德国发动战争是无可避免的，因为希特勒需要战争，但中国不同。他跟从毛泽东以来的许多位中国领导人打过交道，对他们意识形态的坚定毫不怀疑，但认为这与他们对国家利益和国家能力的敏锐感知始终密不可分。
在基辛格先生眼里，中国的体制更偏向儒家而不是马克思主义。这让中国领导人在国家能力范围内最大程度地积蓄力量，然后取得成就，赢得尊重。中国领导人希望在国际体系中拥有对自身利益的最终裁决权，并获得外界承认。“如果中国取得了优势、真正可以利用的优势，会把它推向极致，把中国文化强加于他人吗？”他问。“我不知道。我的直觉是不会……但我相信我们有能力，通过外交和武力手段相结合，防止出现这种情况。”
面对中国的雄心，美国的自然反应一种是探究这种挑战，来寻求维持两个大国之间的均衡，另一种是在两国之间建立长期对话机制。中国“正在努力扮演全球性角色。我们必须处处评估双方对战略角色的构想是否兼容。”如果不兼容，那么是否动用武力就会成为一个问题。“中国和美国有没有可能避免全面战争的威胁，实现共存？我以前乃至现在，都认为有。”但他承认，双方不一定能和平共处。他说：“这条路也可能走不通，因此，我们的军事实力必须足够强，来承受共存的失败。”
当前紧迫的考验，是中美两国在台湾问题上的表现。基辛格回忆1972年尼克松首次访华时，只有毛泽东有权就台湾问题进行谈判。“尼克松每次提出某个具体话题时，毛泽东都会说，‘这些问题应该让周总理跟基辛格去讨论，我讨论哲学问题。’……但在谈到台湾时，他非常明确。他说：‘他们（台湾）是一批反革命分子……我们可以暂时不要台湾，再过一百年再去管它。’我们总有一天会解决这件事情，但距离很远。”
基辛格先生认为，尼克松和毛泽东之间就台湾问题达成的谅解本来是以百年为期，但只过了五十年，就被特朗普推翻了。他想在贸易问题上迫使中国让步，来夸大自己的强硬形象。拜登政府在政策上延续了特朗普的做法，只不过措辞更强调自由主义。
在台湾问题上，基辛格先生不希望选择这条（通往冲突的）道路，因为一场乌克兰式的战争会毁灭台湾，彻底破坏世界经济。战争还可能导致中国遭遇内部挫折，而国内动荡正是其领导人的心头大患。
和平的希望源于人们对战争的恐惧。麻烦的是双方都没有太多让步的余地。每位中国领导人都宣称台湾和中国（大陆）有不可分割的联系。但与此同时，“事情发展到这个地步，美国要在保全自己其他地区地位的情况下放弃台湾，并不是件简单的事情。”
基辛格先生根据自己在任期间的经验，提出了摆脱当前僵局的办法：先降温，然后逐步建立信心和工作关系。美国总统与其向中方罗列自己的不满，不如说：“主席先生，现在我们对和平构成了最大的威胁。从某种意义上说，我们有能力毁灭人类。”中国和美国可以在对外不做任何宣布的情况下，力求保持克制。
在决策方面，向来不喜欢官僚主义的基辛格先生希望看到中美成立顾问小组，保持通气，默契协作。双方都不会从根本上改变在台湾问题上的立场，但美国可以更谨慎地部署军事力量，尽量打消关于对其支持台湾独立的疑虑。
基辛格先生给有志于（维护中美和平）的领导者的第二条建议是：“制定可以获得人们支持的目标，并找到可描述的、能实现这些目标的办法。”中美两个超级大国需要通过“求同”来促进全球稳定，这样的领域有若干个，台湾只是第一个。
美国财政部长珍妮特·耶伦在近期一次演讲中建议，此类领域应该包括气候变化和经济。基辛格先生对两者都持怀疑态度。尽管他“完全赞成”在气候问题上采取行动，但他怀疑这对建立信心或帮助两个超级大国达成平衡没有太大作用。至于经济方面，危险在于贸易议程已经被对华鹰派劫持，他们不愿给中国任何发展的空间。
这种一竿子到底的态度，非常不利于总体上寻求改善关系。如果美国想找到与中国共存之道，就不应该以政权更迭为目标。在基辛格先生的思想中，有个从早年贯穿至今的主题。他说：“任何稳定的外交，都必须有一点19世纪的元素。而19世纪的世界建立在这样一个命题的基础上，那就是国家之间尽管彼此竞争，但它们的存在本身并无争议。”
一些美国人认为，中国只要被击败，就会变得民主、和平。然而，尽管基辛格也更愿意看到中国实行民主体制，但他仍然认为，这种期待是没有历史先例证明的一厢情愿。共产主义政权一旦垮台，更可能出现的情况是中国爆发内战，恶化为意识形态冲突，然后加剧全球不稳定局面。他说：“迫使中国解体不符合我们的利益。”
美国不应该一门心思搞垮中国，而是必须承认中国也需要维护自身利益。乌克兰就是一个好例子。
中国国家主席习近平不久前与乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话，这是自去年2月俄乌战争爆发以来双方的首次直接联系。许多观察人士认为这通电话只是空洞的姿态，旨在安抚欧洲人的情绪，他们抱怨中国与俄罗斯过于亲近。但基辛格先生认为，此举显示了中国严肃的意图，将使围绕战争的外交复杂化，但也许这恰恰是超级大国之间建立互信的机会。
基辛格在分析俄乌问题之前，先谴责了俄罗斯总统普京。他说：“最终来看，这肯定是普京的一个灾难性判断错误，”但西方并非没有责任。“我认为对乌克兰开放北约成员资格的决定非常错误。”这样做会破坏稳定，把北约提供安全保护的承诺悬挂在乌克兰面前，却又没有计划去落实，导致乌克兰防御薄弱，而又必然激怒普京和俄罗斯人。
5月16日至17日，中国政府欧亚事务特别代表李辉访问乌克兰，同乌外交部长库列巴举行会谈。图自美联社
当前的任务是结束战争，不要为下一轮冲突留下隐患。基辛格表示，他希望俄罗斯尽可能地放弃它2014年征服的领土，但现实情况是，在任何停火协议中，俄罗斯恐怕至少会保留塞瓦斯托波尔（克里米亚最大的城市，也是俄罗斯主要的黑海海军基地）。这样的解决方案会让俄罗斯吐出一部分利益，但也保留一部分，最终结果是俄罗斯和乌克兰都不满意。
在基辛格看来，这样的方案给未来的对抗埋下了种子。他说：“在我看来，欧洲人现在的说法非常危险，因为他们说‘我们不希望他们（乌克兰）加入北约，太冒险了。因此，我们要把他们武装起来，给他们最先进的武器。’”他的结论十分直白：“我们现在已经把乌克兰武装到了一定地步，它将有欧洲最好的武装，以及最缺乏战略经验的领导人。”
西方要在欧洲实现长久的和平，需要两次想象力的跳跃。首先是让乌克兰加入北约，通过北约来约束和保护它。其次是欧洲与俄罗斯寻求和解，来稳定东部边界。
面对这两个目标，许多西方国家都会畏手畏脚，这是可以理解的。如果中国牵涉进来，它作为俄罗斯的朋友和北约的对手，会使欧洲感到更加棘手。中国的首要利益是看到俄罗斯完好无损地从乌克兰战争中脱身。不仅因为中俄之间有“无上限”的合作伙伴关系，更是因为莫斯科一旦垮台，中国会陷入麻烦，因为中亚会产生权力真空，填补它的可能是一场“叙利亚式的内战”。
在中乌领导人通话之后，基辛格认为中国可能将自己定位为俄乌之间的调解人。作为美国联中抗苏政策的设计者之一，他对中国和俄罗斯能否很好地合作保持怀疑。诚然，它们都对美国抱有戒心，但它们彼此也有一种本能的不信任。
基辛格表示，中国人已通过围绕乌克兰的外交来表达其国家利益。尽管他们不会支持摧毁俄罗斯，但他们承认乌克兰应该保持独立，并且警告不要使用核武器。他们甚至可能接受乌克兰加入北约的愿望。他说：“中国这样做的部分原因是，他们不想与美国发生冲突，他们在尽可能地构建自己的世界秩序。”
中美第二个需要对话的领域是人工智能。他说：“我们正处于一个初级阶段，未来机器可能带来全球瘟疫或其他大流行病，给人类造成毁灭的不仅有核问题，任何领域都可能。”
他表示，即使是人工智能专家也不知道它的力量究竟有多大（从这次访问来看，给基辛格浓重、沙哑的德国口音进行录音转写仍然超出了人工智能的能力）。但基辛格认为，人工智能将在五年内成为安全领域的关键因素，其颠覆性潜力堪比活字印刷术，而正是后者传播思想引发了16、17世纪的一系列毁灭性战争。
“我们生活在一个破坏性空前的世界中”，基辛格警告道。尽管原则上人类要介入机器学习的反馈循环，但人工智能还是可能成为全自动的、不可阻挡的武器。“纵观军事历史，由于地理和精确度的限制，过去一直做不到消灭所有对手。（而今）这些限制不存在了。每个敌手都100%暴露在攻击下。”
人工智能不能被废除。因此，中美两国需要在一定程度上对其潜力进行军事利用，将其转化为一股威慑力量。但反过来，它们也可以限制人工智能构成的威胁，就像通过军备控制谈判限制核威胁一样。他说：“我认为我们必须就技术对彼此的冲击展开交流，必须开始朝军备控制一点点迈进，双方都向另一方展示有关（人工智能）能力的可控材料。”
他认为，谈判本身就有助于建立互信，使两个超级大国有信心保持克制。要诀在于领导人有足够的定力和智慧，能理解为什么不能把人工智能推向极致。“如果你完全靠通过实力达成目的，你很可能会毁灭世界。”
基辛格给领导人的第三条建议是“不管你内政目标是什么，都应将其与所有这些联系起来”。至于美国领导人，要去学习如何更加务实，提高领导力素质，以及最重要的，革新政治文化。
在基辛格眼里，印度是实用主义思维的典范。他记得一位印度前高官在某次活动中解释说，外交政策的基础应该是以解决具体问题为导向的非永久性联盟，而不是将国家固定捆绑在大型多边结构中。
美国不习惯这种交易式外交理念。一个主题贯穿了基辛格的国际关系史著作《大外交》，即美国坚持将其所有重大的对外干预行为描绘成“昭昭天命”的表达，按照自我形象去将世界塑造为自由、民主、资本主义的社会。
基辛格认为这种坚持必然导致一个问题，即道德原则通常凌驾于利益之上，哪怕它产生的结果不令人满意。他承认人权很重要，但不同意将其置于政策的核心位置。区别在于一种是把道德原则强加于他人，一种是说它会对（外交）关系造成影响，但对方怎么做，决定权还是在自己手上。
他说：“我们试过（把道德原则）强加于苏丹，看看现在的苏丹吧。”确实，膝跳反应式地坚持做正确的事，可能为不计后果的政策带来借口。基辛格认为，尽管人们觉得现实主义会主动使用武力，但那些想用权力改变世界的人，往往是理想主义者，现实主义者只是本能地加入其中。
随着中国实力日益增长，印度被认为是一股重要的制衡力量。可是印度自己的问题也越来越严重，宗教宽容度下降，司法偏见加深，媒体被噤声。虽然基辛格没有直接这么说，但如何对待印度，将考验美国外交到底能有多务实。另一个考验来自日本。如果基辛格的预测变成现实，即日本在五年内成为拥核国家，美日关系将充满危机。研究19世纪外交的基辛格知道，是均势外交维持了欧洲的大体和平，他希望美国能汲取英法的经验，从战略上思考亚洲的力量平衡。
领导力也很重要。长期以来，基辛格一直相信个人的力量。比如高瞻远瞩的富兰克林·罗斯福，他让长期奉行孤立主义的美国为一场在他看来不可避免的战争做好准备。比如让法国相信未来的夏尔·戴高乐，激励了一代人的约翰·肯尼迪；又比如德国统一的总设计师奥托·冯·俾斯麦，他的统治灵活而克制——可惜在他被逐出政坛后，德国陷入了战争狂热。
基辛格承认，在新闻和社交媒体不眠不休的今天，很难再按他的风格开展外交。他说：“今天没有哪个总统会给特使像我当年那么大的权力。”但他认为，我们不应该为前方是否有出路而苦恼。“我敬重的那些领导人，从来不问这样做难不难。他们问的是‘有没有必要？’”
他回忆起尼克松时期的助理温斯顿·洛德。“那时我们出兵干预柬埔寨，他想辞职。我跟他说，‘你可以走，去举个标语在这儿游行。你也可以留下来帮我们解决越南战争。’他最后决定留下来……我们需要的是做出这种决定的人，那些生活在这个时代，想为这个时代做点什么的人，而不是顾影自怜的人。”
领导力反映了一个国家的政治文化。与许多共和党人一样，基辛格也担心美国的教育过于关注美国历史上的黑暗时刻。他说：“要有战略眼光，就要对你的国家有信仰。”如今，人们已不再对美国的价值抱有共识。
基辛格还抱怨媒体缺乏分寸和判断力。当他在任时，新闻媒体对他怀有敌意，但仍可以跟他进行对话。他说：“他们把我逼疯了，但那是他们的分内工作……并没有对我不公平。”相比之下，今天的媒体缺乏反思的动力。“我的意思是报道需要平衡适度，并从制度上保证这一点。这应该是媒体的目标。”
洛杉矶时报：还有什么是民主党人和共和党人不争斗的？
然而，堕落得最厉害的，是政治本身。基辛格进入华盛顿政界时，两党政要经常一起用餐。他跟民主党总统候选人乔治·麦戈文关系友好。但今天，一党的候选人跟另一党的国安顾问交好，已经不太可能。尼克松下台后，接替他的福特总统是那种不会对政敌玩阴招的人。但今天，任何手段都被认为是可以接受的。
基辛格说：“我认为特朗普和现在的拜登把（敌意）推到了最高点。”他担心一旦出现类似水门事件的情况，会导致大规模的暴力，而美国又缺少优秀的领导人。他感叹道：“我看不出拜登有鼓舞人心的力量……希望共和党能推出更好的人选。这不是伟大的历史时刻，”他说。“这不是历史上的伟大时刻，但（不迎难而上）另一条路就是（美国）彻底退位。”
基辛格认为，美国迫切需要长期的战略思考。“这是我们必须解决的重大挑战。如果我们不这样做，就真的会应验失败的预言。”
5月20日，G7广岛峰会场边会，拜登被记者问及美债问题，对澳大利亚记者发怒：“闭嘴好吗？”
既然一方面时间紧迫，另一方面美国缺乏领导力，那么中美和平相处的前景如何？
“我们都得承认，我们身处一个新世界，”基辛格说，“因为无论我们怎么做，都可能出错。没有现成的道路可循。”但即便如此，他表示仍然心怀希望。“看我这一生，那么多困难都过来了，有理由（对未来）保持乐观。困难是挑战，别老把它看作障碍。”
他强调，人类已经取得了长足的进步。虽然这种进步往往发生在可怕的冲突之后——例如三十年战争、拿破仑战争和第二次世界大战，但中美竞争可能有所不同。历史表明，当两个这种类型的大国相遇时，一般都以爆发军事冲突告终。“但现在的情况并不一般，”基辛格说，“因为相互保证毁灭和人工智能的存在。”
“我认为建立一个以规则为基础，且欧洲、中国和印度都能够参与的世界秩序是可能的。这已经涵盖了相当大一部分人类……所以从实际的角度出发，它可以取得好的结果——至少可以不导致灾难性后果。”
这是当今超级大国领导人的职责。基辛格解释道：“康德说过，实现和平要么靠人类相互理解，要么通过灾难吸取教训。他认为和平可以靠理性，但没法保证这一点。这或多或少也是我的想法。”
因此，世界领导人们肩负着沉重的责任。他们需要现实主义来面对前方的危险；需要远见去认识到，解决方案在于各国力量达到平衡；需要克制以避免最大限度地使用进攻力量。基辛格说：“这是前所未有的挑战和巨大的机遇。”
人类未来的命运取决于能否做到这几点。在基辛格百岁寿辰到来的前几周，当我们对谈进行了四个多钟头时，他招牌式地眨了眨眼补充道：“无论做不做得到，我都看不到了。”
Henry Kissinger explains how to avoid world war three
America and China must learn to live together. They have less than ten years
In beijing they have concluded that America will do anything to keep China down. In Washington they are adamant that China is scheming to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. For a sobering analysis of this growing antagonism—and a plan to prevent it causing a superpower war—visit the 33rd floor of an Art Deco building in midtown Manhattan, the office of Henry Kissinger.
On May 27th Mr Kissinger will turn 100. Nobody alive has more experience of international affairs, first as a scholar of 19th-century diplomacy, later as America’s national security adviser and secretary of state, and for the past 46 years as a consultant and emissary to monarchs, presidents and prime ministers. Mr Kissinger is worried. “Both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger,” he says. “We are on the path to great-power confrontation.”
At the end of April The Economist spoke to Mr Kissinger for over eight hours about how to prevent the contest between China and America from descending into war. These days he is stooped and walks with difficulty, but his mind is needle-sharp. As he contemplates his next two books, on artificial intelligence (ai) and the nature of alliances, he remains more interested in looking forward than raking over the past.
Mr Kissinger is alarmed by China’s and America’s intensifying competition for technological and economic pre-eminence. Even as Russia tumbles into China’s orbit and war overshadows Europe’s eastern flank, he fears that ai is about to supercharge the Sino-American rivalry. Around the world, the balance of power and the technological basis of warfare are shifting so fast and in so many ways that countries lack any settled principle on which they can establish order. If they cannot find one, they may resort to force. “We’re in the classic pre-world war one situation,” he says, “where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”
Study war some more
Mr Kissinger is reviled by many as a warmonger for his part in the Vietnam war, but he considers the avoidance of conflict between great powers as the focus of his life’s work. After witnessing the carnage caused by Nazi Germany and suffering the murder of 13 close relatives in the Holocaust, he became convinced that the only way to prevent ruinous conflict is hard-headed diplomacy, ideally fortified by shared values. “This is the problem that has to be solved,” he says. “And I believe I’ve spent my life trying to deal with it.” In his view, the fate of humanity depends on whether America and China can get along. He believes the rapid progress of ai, in particular, leaves them only five-to-ten years to find a way.
Mr Kissinger has some opening advice to aspiring leaders: “Identify where you are. Pitilessly.” In that spirit, the starting-point for avoiding war is to analyse China’s growing restlessness. Despite a reputation for being conciliatory towards the government in Beijing, he acknowledges that many Chinese thinkers believe America is on a downward slope and that, “therefore, as a result of an historic evolution, they will eventually supplant us.”
However, Mr Kissinger also warns against misinterpreting China’s ambitions. In Washington, “They say China wants world domination…The answer is that they [in China] want to be powerful,” he says. “They’re not heading for world domination in a Hitlerian sense,” he says. “That is not how they think or have ever thought of world order.”
In Nazi Germany war was inevitable because Adolf Hitler needed it, Mr Kissinger says, but China is different. He has met many Chinese leaders, starting with Mao Zedong. He did not doubt their ideological commitment, but this has always been welded onto a keen sense of their country’s interests and capabilities.
Mr Kissinger sees the Chinese system as more Confucian than Marxist. That teaches Chinese leaders to attain the maximum strength of which their country is capable and to seek to be respected for their accomplishments. Chinese leaders want to be recognised as the international system’s final judges of their own interests. “If they achieved superiority that can genuinely be used, would they drive it to the point of imposing Chinese culture?” he asks. “I don’t know. My instinct is No…[But] I believe it is in our capacity to prevent that situation from arising by a combination of diplomacy and force.”
One natural American response to the challenge of China’s ambition is to probe it, as a way to identify how to sustain the equilibrium between the two powers. Another is to establish a permanent dialogue between China and America. China “is trying to play a global role. We have to assess at each point if the conceptions of a strategic role are compatible.” If they are not, then the question of force will arise. “Is it possible for China and the United States to coexist without the threat of all-out war with each other? I thought and still think that it [is].” But he acknowledges success is not guaranteed. “It may fail,” he says. “And therefore, we have to be militarily strong enough to sustain the failure.”
The urgent test is how China and America behave over Taiwan. Mr Kissinger recalls how, on Richard Nixon’s first visit to China in 1972, only Mao had the authority to negotiate over the island. “Whenever Nixon raised a concrete subject, Mao said, ‘I’m a philosopher. I don’t deal with these subjects. Let Zhou [Enlai] and Kissinger discuss this.’…But when it came to Taiwan, he was very explicit. He said, ‘They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries. We don’t need them now. We can wait 100 years. Someday we will ask for them. But it’s a long distance away.’”
Mr Kissinger believes that the understanding forged between Nixon and Mao was overturned after only 50 of those 100 years by Donald Trump. He wanted to inflate his tough image by wringing concessions out of China over trade. In policy the Biden administration has followed Mr Trump’s lead, but with liberal rhetoric.
Mr Kissinger would not have chosen this path with respect to Taiwan, because a Ukrainian-style war there would destroy the island and devastate the world economy. War could also set back China domestically, and its leaders’ greatest fear remains upheaval at home.
“It is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere”
The fear of war creates grounds for hope. The trouble is that neither side has much room to make concessions. Every Chinese leader has asserted his country’s connection to Taiwan. At the same time, however, “the way things have evolved now, it is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere.”
Mr Kissinger’s way out of this impasse draws on his experience in office. He would start by lowering the temperature, and then gradually build confidence and a working relationship. Rather than listing all their grievances, the American president would say to his Chinese counterpart, “Mr President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity.” China and America, without formally announcing anything, would aim to practise restraint.
Never a fan of policymaking bureaucracies, Mr Kissinger would like to see a small group of advisers, with easy access to each other, working together tacitly. Neither side would fundamentally change its position on Taiwan, but America would take care over how it deploys its forces and try not to feed the suspicion that it supports the island’s independence.
Mr Kissinger’s second piece of advice to aspiring leaders is: “Define objectives that can enlist people. Find means, describable means, of achieving these objectives.” Taiwan would be just the first of several areas where the superpowers could find common ground and so foster global stability.
In a recent speech Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, suggested that these should include climate change and the economy. Mr Kissinger is sceptical about both. Although he is “all for” action on the climate, he doubts it can do much to create confidence or help establish a balance between the two superpowers. On the economy, the danger is that the trade agenda is hijacked by hawks who are unwilling to give China any room to develop at all.
That all-or-nothing attitude is a threat to the broader search for detente. If America wants to find a way to live with China, it should not be aiming for regime change. Mr Kissinger draws on a theme present in his thought from the very beginning. “In any diplomacy of stability, there has to be some element of the 19th-century world,” he says. “And the 19th-century world was based on the proposition that the existence of the states contesting it was not at issue.”
Some Americans believe that a defeated China would become democratic and peaceful. Yet, however much Mr Kissinger would prefer China to be a democracy, he sees no precedent for that outcome. More likely, a collapse of the communist regime would lead to a civil war that hardened into ideological conflict and only added to global instability. “It’s not in our interest to drive China to dissolution,” he says.
Rather than digging in, America will have to acknowledge China has interests. A good example is Ukraine.
China’s president, Xi Jinping, only recently contacted Volodymyr Zelensky, his Ukrainian counterpart, for the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine in February last year. Many observers have dismissed Mr Xi’s call as an empty gesture designed to placate Europeans, who complain that China is too close to Russia. By contrast, Mr Kissinger sees it as a declaration of serious intent that will complicate the diplomacy surrounding the war, but which may also create precisely the sort of opportunity to build the superpowers’ mutual trust.
Mr Kissinger begins his analysis by condemning Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. “It was certainly a catastrophic mistake of judgment by Putin at the end,” he says. But the West is not without blame. “I thought that the decision to…leave open the membership of Ukraine in nato was very wrong.” That was destabilising, because dangling the promise of nato protection without a plan to bring it about left Ukraine poorly defended even as it was guaranteed to enrage not only Mr Putin, but also many of his compatriots.
The task now is to bring the war to an end, without setting the stage for the next round of conflict. Mr Kissinger says that he wants Russia to give up as much as possible of the territory that it conquered in 2014, but the reality is that in any ceasefire Russia is likely to keep Sevastopol (the biggest city in Crimea and Russia’s main naval base on the Black Sea), at the very least. Such a settlement, in which Russia loses some gains but retains others, could leave both a dissatisfied Russia and a dissatisfied Ukraine.
In his view, that is a recipe for future confrontation. “What the Europeans are now saying is, in my view, madly dangerous,” he says. “Because the Europeans are saying: ‘We don’t want them in nato, because they’re too risky. And therefore, we’ll arm the hell out of them and give them the most advanced weapons.’” His conclusion is stark: “We have now armed Ukraine to a point where it will be the best-armed country and with the least strategically experienced leadership in Europe.”
To establish a lasting peace in Europe requires the West to take two leaps of imagination. The first is for Ukraine to join nato, as a means of restraining it, as well as protecting it. The second is for Europe to engineer a rapprochement with Russia, as a way to create a stable eastern border.
Plenty of Western countries would understandably balk at one or other of those aims. With China involved, as an ally of Russia’s and an opponent of nato, the task will become even harder. China has an overriding interest to see Russia emerge intact from the war in Ukraine. Not only does Mr Xi have a “no-limits” partnership with Mr Putin to honour, but a collapse in Moscow would trouble China by creating a power vacuum in Central Asia that risks being filled by a “Syrian-type civil war”.
Following Mr Xi’s call to Mr Zelensky, Mr Kissinger believes that China may be positioning itself to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. As one of the architects of the policy that pitted America and China against the Soviet Union, he doubts that China and Russia can work together well. True, they share a suspicion of the United States, but he also believes that they have an instinctive distrust of one another. “I have never met a Russian leader who said anything good about China,” he says. “And I’ve never met a Chinese leader who said anything good about Russia.” They are not natural allies.
The Chinese have entered diplomacy over Ukraine as an expression of their national interest, Mr Kissinger says. Although they refuse to countenance the destruction of Russia, they do recognise that Ukraine should remain an independent country and they have cautioned against the use of nuclear weapons. They may even accept Ukraine’s desire to join nato. “China does this, in part, because they do not want to clash with the United States,” he says. “They are creating their own world order, in so far as they can.”
The second area where China and America need to talk is ai. “We are at the very beginning of a capability where machines could impose global pestilence or other pandemics,” he says, “not just nuclear but any field of human destruction.”
He acknowledges that even experts in ai do not know what its powers will be (going by the evidence of our discussions, transcribing a thick, gravelly German accent is still beyond its capabilities). But Mr Kissinger believes that ai will become a key factor in security within five years. He compares its disruptive potential to the invention of printing, which spread ideas that played a part in causing the devastating wars of the 16th and 17th centuries.
“There are no limitations. Every adversary is 100% vulnerable…[We live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness”
“[We live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness,” Mr Kissinger warns. Despite the doctrine that a human should be in the loop, automatic and unstoppable weapons may be created. “If you look at military history, you can say, it has never been possible to destroy all your opponents, because of limitations of geography and of accuracy. [Now] there are no limitations. Every adversary is 100% vulnerable.”
ai cannot be abolished. China and America will therefore need to harness its power militarily to a degree, as a deterrent. But they can also limit the threat it poses, in the way that arms-control talks limited the threat of nuclear weapons. “I think we have to begin exchanges on the impact of technology on each other,” he says. “We have to take baby steps towards arms control, in which each side presents the other with controllable material about capabilities.” Indeed, he believes that the negotiations themselves could help build mutual trust and the confidence that enables the superpowers to practise restraint. The secret is leaders strong and wise enough to understand that ai must not be pushed to its limits. “And if you then rely entirely on what you can achieve through power, you’re likely to destroy the world.”
Mr Kissinger’s third piece of advice for aspiring leaders is to “link all of these to your domestic objectives, whatever they are.” For America, that involves learning how to be more pragmatic, focusing on the qualities of leadership and, most of all, renewing the country’s political culture.
Mr Kissinger’s model for pragmatic thinking is India. He recalls a function at which a former senior Indian administrator explained that foreign policy should be based on non-permanent alliances geared to the issues, rather than tying up a country in big multilateral structures.
Such a transactional approach will not come naturally to America. The theme running through Mr Kissinger’s epic history of international relations, “Diplomacy”, is that the United States insists on depicting all its main foreign interventions as expressions of its manifest destiny to remake the world in its own image as a free, democratic, capitalist society.
The problem for Mr Kissinger is the corollary, which is that moral principles too often override interests—even when they will not produce desirable change. He acknowledges that human rights matter, but disagrees with putting them at the heart of your policy. The difference is between imposing them, or saying that it will affect relations, but the decision is theirs.
“We tried [imposing them] in Sudan,” he notes. “Look at Sudan now.” Indeed, the knee-jerk insistence on doing the right thing can become an excuse for failing to think through the consequences of policy, he says. The people who want to use power to change the world, Mr Kissinger argues, are often idealists, even though realists are more typically seen as willing to use force.
India is an essential counterweight to China’s growing power. Yet it also has a worsening record of religious intolerance, judicial bias and a muzzled press. One implication—though Mr Kissinger did not directly comment—is that India will therefore be a test of whether America can be pragmatic. Japan will be another. Relations will be fraught if, as Mr Kissinger predicts, Japan takes moves to secure nuclear weapons within five years. With one eye on the diplomatic manoeuvres that more or less kept the peace in the 19th century, he looks to Britain and France to help the United States think strategically about the balance of power in Asia.
Big-shoe-fillers wanted
Leadership will matter, too. Mr Kissinger has long been a believer in the power of individuals. Franklin D. Roosevelt was far-sighted enough to prepare an isolationist America for what he saw as an inevitable war against the Axis powers. Charles de Gaulle gave France a belief in the future. John F. Kennedy inspired a generation. Otto von Bismarck engineered German unification, and governed with dexterity and restraint—only for his country to succumb to war-fever after he was ousted.
Mr Kissinger acknowledges that 24-hour news and social media make his style of diplomacy harder. “I don’t think a president today could send an envoy with the powers that I had,” he says. But he argues that to agonise about whether a way ahead is even possible would be a mistake. “If you look at the leaders whom I’ve respected, they didn’t ask that question. They asked, ‘Is it necessary?’”
He recalls the example of Winston Lord, a member of his staff in the Nixon administration. “When we intervened in Cambodia, he wanted to quit. And I told him, ‘You can quit and march around this place carrying a placard. Or you can help us solve the Vietnam war.’ And he decided to stay… What we need [is] people who make that decision—that they’re living in this time, and they want to do something about it, other than feel sorry for themselves.”
Leadership reflects a country’s political culture. Mr Kissinger, like many Republicans, worries that American education dwells on America’s darkest moments. “In order to get a strategic view you need faith in your country,” he says. The shared perception of America’s worth has been lost.
He also complains that the media lack a sense of proportion and judgment. When he was in office the press were hostile, but he still had a dialogue with them. “They drove me nuts,” he says. “But that was part of the game…they weren’t unfair.” Today, in contrast, he says that the media have no incentive to be reflective. “My theme is the need for balance and moderation. Institutionalise that. That’s the aim.”
Worst of all, though, is politics itself. When Mr Kissinger came to Washington, politicians from the two parties would routinely dine together. He was on friendly terms with George McGovern, a Democratic presidential candidate. For a national security adviser from the other side that would be unlikely today, he believes. Gerald Ford, who took over after Nixon resigned, was the sort of person whose opponents could rely on him to act decently. Today, any means are considered acceptable.
“I think Trump and now Biden have driven [animosity] over the top,” Mr Kissinger says. He fears that a situation like Watergate could lead to violence and that America lacks leadership. “I don’t think Biden can supply the inspiration and…I’m hoping that Republicans can come up with somebody better,” he says. “It’s not a great moment in history,” he laments, “but the alternative is total abdication.”
America desperately needs long-term strategic thinking, he believes. “That’s our big challenge which we must solve. If we don’t, the predictions of failure will be proved true.”
If time is short and leadership lacking, where does that leave the prospects for China and the United States finding a way to live together in peace?
“We all have to admit we’re in a new world,” Mr Kissinger says, “for whatever we do can go wrong. And there is no guaranteed course.” Even so he professes to feel hope. “Look, my life has been difficult, but it gives ground for optimism. And difficulty—it’s also a challenge. It shouldn’t always be an obstacle.”
He stresses that humanity has taken enormous strides. True, that progress has often occurred in the aftermath of terrible conflict—after the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic wars and the second world war, for example, but the rivalry between China and America could be different. History suggests that, when two powers of this type encounter each other, the normal outcome is military conflict. “But this is not a normal circumstance,” Mr Kissinger argues, “because of mutually assured destruction and artificial intelligence.”
“I think it’s possible that you can create a world order on the basis of rules that Europe, China and India could join, and that’s already a good slice of humanity. So if you look at the practicality of it, it can end well—or at least it can end without catastrophe and we can make progress.”
That is the task for the leaders of today’s superpowers. “Immanuel Kant said peace would either occur through human understanding or some disaster,” Mr Kissinger explains. “He thought that it would occur through reason, but he could not guarantee it. That is more or less what I think.”
World leaders therefore bear a heavy responsibility. They require the realism to face up to the dangers ahead, the vision to see that a solution lies in achieving a balance between their countries’ forces, and the restraint to refrain from using their offensive powers to the maximum. “It is an unprecedented challenge and great opportunity,” Mr Kissinger says.
The future of humanity depends on getting it right. Well into the fourth hour of the day’s conversation, and just weeks before his birthday celebrations, Mr Kissinger adds with a characteristic twinkle, “I won’t be around to see it either way.” ■
This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline "How to prevent a third world war"
