Joseph Stiglitz China Towards a new model of development

中国：迈向新发展模式

约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨*

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161443511.pdf

美国纽约哥伦比亚大学哥伦比亚商学院（最终版本于 2007 年 3 月 18 日收到）

本文认为，中国国情的变化需要中国经济发展模式的转变。 由于中国的国情与其他国家不同，中国的模式必然需要与其他国家不同。 文章围绕中心思想，广泛讨论了出口增长模式、创新、产权、税收政策、社会保险等有关中国经济发展的问题。

一、简介

中国向市场经济转型30年来的成功，在很大程度上取决于其战略和政策的适应性：随着一系列问题的解决，新的问题又出现了，而新的问题又随之而来。 必须制定新的政策和战略。 它也是基于社会创新。

由于中国面临的问题与其他国家所面临的问题不同，因此必须找到新的解决方案。1并且中国认识到不能简单地转移经济制度（即使这些制度在其他国家运作良好）；它必须要改变经济制度。 至少，它们必须进行调整。 不仅中国的国情和历史不同，而且其目标在很大程度上也不同。 这也是中国提出中国特色市场经济的原因之一。 即使是成功的中国机构也必须随着时代的变化而进行修改和调整。 乡镇企业本身是一种社会创新，对 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代初的成功至关重要，但它无法应对中国在全球经济中日益重要的参与者所面临的所有挑战。

去年，中国在公布“十一五”规划时重点关注了一些 过去的成功所带来的问题。 并不是每个人都从前几十年的快速增长中平等受益。 尽管在减贫方面取得了巨大成功，但不平等现象却大大加剧。

对市场的更大依赖意味着在某些方面，例如健康和教育，一些农村地区的生活水平可能已经恶化。 更广泛地说，阿马蒂亚·森 (Amartya Sen) 认为，1979 年时，中国和印度喀拉拉邦的预期寿命大致相同，这对全球失衡影响不大，甚至可能使情况变得更糟，因为这将使美国贸易融资问题变得更加严重。 10但中国面临着两难境地：如果它升值货币并补贴农民 — — 实际上是抵消美国和欧盟提供的补贴，那么它将夺走其他发展目标所需的稀缺资金， 包括对教育和健康的投资。

2.1 摆脱出口的替代措施

需要采取其他措施来纠正贸易失衡，但这些措施不会同时拉大城乡差距。 其中一项措施是出口税或减少出口退税，其进一步的优势是提供可用于其他社会目标的额外收入。

中国的许多出口产品都是能源密集型产品，其社会成本远远超出企业承担的成本。 提高能源价格并征收碳税和其他环境税（将在下文进一步讨论）将有助于调整经济结构 — — 包括帮助中国摆脱出口 — — 并再次提供可用于其他社会的额外收入 目标。

2.2 为什么要出口导向型增长

人们很自然地会问：为什么出口导向型增长对中国和许多其他东亚国家有效？ 摆脱出口主导型增长是否会对其增长产生不利影响？ 是否有其他方式可以满足它所满足的需求？

出口导向型增长之所以重要，有以下三个原因。 首先，它提供了基础创新。 发展中国家和发达国家的区别不仅仅是资源的差距，更是知识的差距。 正如格林沃尔德和斯蒂格利茨（Greenwald and Stiglitz，2006）指出的那样，由于多种原因，工业部门规模越大，知识的传播就越加强。 然后，在该部门学到的技能会逐渐传播到经济的其他部门。 其次，出口竞争激烈，竞争催生效率和创新。 成功需要达到国际标准，这也是最终延伸到整个经济的好处。 第三，在发展的早期阶段，生产能力可能超过消费能力，或者更准确地说，超过对正在生产的特定商品的需求的扩大。

虽然许多家庭和企业可能存在潜在需求，但只有当这些家庭和企业能够获得信贷时，这些潜在需求才会转化为有效需求。 但在发展的早期阶段，能够区分信用者和无信用者以及能够执行信用合同的金融机构（以及底层的法律基础设施）往往尚未发展起来。 12 向国外放贷融资更容易 外国人的消费高于国内的借贷。

事实上，中国近年来可以被视为一直在从事供应商融资：它借出了大部分资金，使其他地方的人能够购买其商品。 但是，当国内有如此多的迫切需求时，中国却帮助世界上最富有的国家过上入不敷出的生活，14这一点很奇特。

2.3 为什么今天的中国可以摆脱出口导向型增长

如今，出口拉动型增长所发挥的这些作用可以通过其他方式来实现。 中国正在建立广泛的创新体系（见下文）； 它已经“学会了如何学习”； 它不需要依赖出口来学习。 中国创造了充满活力的内部竞争，例如 乡镇企业和其他机构之间。 诚然，需要强有力的竞争法来确保国内竞争依然强劲，中国应该对那些主张建立大型“国家冠军企业”的人保持警惕，至少当这些国家冠军企业的建立威胁到国内竞争时 。 最后，中国在建立强大的国内金融体系方面取得了长足进步。 在现阶段，扩大国内信贷，特别是住房和抵押债务信贷，是很容易的。

2.4 刺激消费

尽管嘴上说要摆脱出口拉动型增长，但中国的贸易顺差实际上已经从2005年的1020亿美元增加到2006年的1775亿美元。家庭消费增加了，但增幅没有GDP快。 扩大消费不仅有助于中国摆脱对出口的依赖，而且有助于提高人民生活水平，而发展的目的就是提高人民生活水平。 问题是：为什么中国储蓄“过剩”？

有四种假设； 每个都发挥着作用，尽管有些可能比其他更重要。

首先是日益加剧的不平等。 富人的消费倾向通常低于穷人19，不平等的加剧将导致消费占 GDP 的比例降低。 因此，减少不平等程度的政策预计会增加消费。

第二是资本市场的不完善，特别是那些面临小企业和小企业的资本市场。

中型企业。 一些数据表明，城市地区小企业的数量有所下降；20 从历史上看，小企业与就业增长相关。 它们对于为过去没有机会的人提供新机会尤其重要。 许多人认为，小企业是充满活力的经济的核心——虽然大企业将产品推向市场，但它们依赖大量小企业来实现真正的创新。

因此，小企业数量的下降甚至停滞应该引起人们的关注。 小企业衰落的原因之一是缺乏获得资本的机会。 大型银行更喜欢向大型企业提供贷款。 在美国，小企业管理局有一项特殊的政府计划，通过吸收部分风险来鼓励向小企业提供贷款。 在缺乏资金的情况下，那些渴望成为小商人的人——或者那些已经在小企业做生意的人——必须以非常高的利率储蓄才能获得扩张所需的资金。 因此，改善信贷渠道将有助于降低总体储蓄率。 但增加消费的主要障碍不是缺乏信贷，而是缺乏有效的社会安全网、强大的公共卫生体系、有效的社会保障体系和良好的公共教育。 “预防性”储蓄抑制消费。

因此，这些改革将产生双重好处，使中国摆脱对出口（以及变幻莫测的国际市场）的依赖，同时提高生活水平。

储蓄占GDP比例高的最终原因是经常账户高盈余，以储备的大量增加为标志。 2006年，这些金额占GDP的7%。 与此同时，政府保持了强劲的财政状况。 但正如我们之前指出的，中国已经积累了足够的储备来应对市场的任何可能的变化。 鉴于健康和教育方面的高社会需求 — — 以及较高的私人储蓄率 — — 中国完全有能力承担适度的财政赤字（参见 Feldstein 2007）。

当然，可以通过扩大投资来减少对出口的依赖； 但在中国投资率如此之高的情况下，今天的问题不再是投资水平，而是投资配置。 令人担忧的是，存在着一系列不正当的激励措施——当地社区纷纷涌入鼓励投资，既为自己创造就业机会，又增加收入。 尤其是在房地产领域，人们担心短视投资者只关注短期资本收益而不是长期回报。

3、创新

新经济模式的核心是创新——提高稀缺资源的使用效率。 创新是内生的，是研发资源分配和试图学习如何“在前沿生产或采用有时提出的最佳实践”的有意识政策的结果。 但与所有资源一样，用于研究和学习的资源也是稀缺的。 人们可以针对不同的目标进行此类研究。 不幸的是，西方企业的研究过多地着眼于减少劳动力投入，而很少关注减少环境影响。问题在于，创新的社会回报与私人回报不同，这既是因为市场扭曲，也是因为获得专利的私人回报与社会回报显着不同。

3.1 对劳动力节约型创新的过度激励

例如，西方的高工资意味着减少劳动力投入可以获得高回报。 即使在失业率很高的国家，也会对节省劳动力的技术进行大量投资，从而加剧了失业问题。 对劳动力节约型创新的关注是许多国家面临日益严重的失业问题的原因。 如果生产率每年增长 5%，那么产出必须每年增长 5%，才能保持就业不变。

事实上，对于工业部门的企业主来说，失业率上升还有进一步的好处：失业率上升会压低工资，进一步降低生产成本。 然而，为了实现“和谐社会”，必须创造就业机会以匹配新进入劳动力市场的人。 就中国而言，随着劳动力从农村向城市迁移，城市创造就业的步伐需要更快。 更高的工资并不是一件坏事：发展的全部目的是增加工人的福祉。

3.2 资源节约型创新激励不足

出于同样的原因，由于美国公司不为碳排放支付任何费用 — — 无论全球经济承受多少成本 — — 他们没有动力去寻找减少碳排放的创新。 让企业全额支付其活动的边际社会成本（例如碳排放成本）将增强减少污染创新的动力。

此外，碳税还有另一个重要优势。 它可能会打破全球应对全球变暖的僵局。 关于这场即将发生的灾难的风险的科学证据不断增加。 英国斯特恩报告（2006 年）提出了一个令人信服的案例，即采取措施减轻风险的经济效益（考虑到所有风险）超过了成本。 24 京都议定书的排放目标是根据减排量确定的。 1990 年的排放水平。 不幸的是，没有人提出一套能够公平、公正地指导排放目标水平确定的、发展中国家和美国都能接受的原则。 由于共同政策的分配后果（每个国家都同意征收碳税，税率反映商定的全球碳排放社会成本）要有限得多，因此可能有希望达成全球协议。 25 此外， 对污染等不良品征税比对工作和储蓄等商品征税更有意义。

3.3 市场经济创新体系设计的基本问题

然而，市场经济中创新体系的问题更为深刻。 人们常常认为知识产权是市场经济创新体系的核心。 但专利制度提供的回报与社会回报并不一致。 创新的边际社会回报使创新比原本可以更快地实现。 但专利制度将（临时）财产权赋予第一个发现（或更准确地说，申请专利）创新的人。例如，考虑人类基因组的情况。 曾经有一个国际努力解码人类基因组。 当一些公司决定尝试“击败”公共资助的项目时，这项努力已经步入正轨。 如果他们比他们领先一小时，他们就获得了垄断的所有好处——尽管他们的边际社会贡献为零。

但尽管在这些情况下，专利制度带来的好处为零，但给社会带来的成本却是巨大的。 知识是一种公共物品； 知识是“非竞争性的”。 当一个人向另一个人讲述一项知识时，它不会减损第一个人所知道的知识。

限制知识的使用是低效的。 但专利制度不仅限制了知识的使用，还赋予一方使用该知识的专有权——它造成了人为垄断，而垄断扭曲了资源配置。 就药品而言，危及的不仅仅是金钱，还有患者本身的生命。 垄断者可能会收取很高的价格，以致穷人买不起药品； 数千甚至数十万人可能因此不必要地死亡，特别是在公共卫生系统不完善的情况下。 由于该基因的专利由于该基因的所有者极有可能患有乳腺癌，因此坚持为每次检测支付大笔费用。 由此产生的 3,000 美元费用使得这项测试超出了任何没有医疗保险的人的承受范围，即使在美国这样的富裕国家，也有超过 5000 万美国人没有医疗保险。 结果是成千上万的人会不必要地死亡。

与专利制度相关的静态低效率的巨大成本的唯一理由是可能存在动态收益。 但如果知识产权制度设计不善，则成本将大于收益。 知识产权制度是由一整套详细的规定来定义的，这些规定描述了哪些内容可以申请专利（或版权）、新颖性标准、专利的有效期、专利的广度、专利授予的程序以及 质疑和执行机制。

事实上，设计不当的知识产权制度甚至会扼杀创新。 今天美国的担忧是其知识产权制度正在这样做。 日益增长的担忧正在引发一场关于美国知识产权制度改革的激烈辩论。26 至少，美国以外的人们应该认识到，人们从某些企业领导人和政府官员那里听到的口头禅是： 知识产权制度越强大越好——并不反映经济学家和学术知识产权律师的主流思维，他们并不受雇于从现行制度中获取大量利润的公司。

每个国家都必须建立适合本国国情的知识产权制度。27它必须平衡成本和收益； 总体而言，发达国家和发展中国家的做法明显不同。 这就是为什么发展中国家在世界知识产权组织要求建立一个以发展为导向的知识产权制度。 我们之前指出，发展中国家面临的主要挑战之一是缩小它们与较发达国家之间的知识差距。 设计不当的知识产权制度可能会让缩小这一差距变得更加困难。 令人担心的是，在影响下 许多国家正在采用美国式的知识产权制度，这种制度可能不适合美国，更不适合发展中国家 — — 而且就在美国本身可能意识到需要进行改革的时候 。

精心设计的创新体系由一系列工具组成，包括政府资助的研究（支持大学、专业实验室甚至企业的研究）、奖项和专利。 奖励制度提供奖励——奖励具有高社会价值的创新成果，例如治疗疟疾等重要疾病，奖励仿效药物——但随后，任何想要获得知识的人都可以获得这些知识。 使用它可能需要支付许可费。28当然，

专利制度是一种奖品——扭曲性垄断权力的奖品。 但是，专利制度的目的是限制知识的使用并提高价格，而奖励制度则利用市场经济和竞争的力量，保证知识尽可能低的价格和最大程度的传播，从而使知识的利益最大化。 被尽可能多的人享受。

中国需要有一个创新体系，与美国体系相比，该体系更加重视奖项和政府资助的研究，而不是对专利的重视，特别是因为创新需要针对广泛的社会目标，我认为 正如我之前指出的，重点应该是减少环境敏感资源的投入，而不是节省劳动力。

3.5 借鉴其他国家的经验教训

但即使是在知识产权制度方面，中国也应该从美国知识产权制度的缺陷中吸取适当的教训，这些缺陷在过去的一年里变得更加明显，因为我在中国发展的演讲中简要地谈到了这些问题。 论坛。 它不需要重复同样的错误。 例如，它需要仔细考虑程序问题（在专利授予之前对其提出质疑），认识到事实上存在导致过度专利的偏见。 私人有强烈的动机去尝试获得专利——人们可以将部分公共知识领域私有化； 但挑战专利可以提供公共利益，将本来属于私人领域的内容转变为公开的。 因此，挑战将会不足； 设计知识产权制度程序可以在一定程度上纠正这种不平衡。还有其他问题涉及专利范围和“新颖性”标准、什么可以申请专利、执行程序——“侵权”赔偿，即与现行美国制度相反的责任制度、版权期限，31 ETC。

TRIPs 协议规定所有成员国都有义务采用知识产权制度； 但即使在《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》内，成员国也拥有相当大的自由裁量权，中国利用这种自由裁量权来建立适合中国的知识产权制度非常重要。 虽然我在上面描述了这种知识产权制度设计的几个特点，但我想提请注意另一个特点：强制许可的使用。 TRIPs 为这些药物的发行提供了“灵活性”，允许生产仿制药，其售价仅为品牌药成本的一小部分。 包括中国在内的大多数国家都没有充分利用这些灵活性，而这些灵活性可以对本国公民的健康产生如此大的影响。
国家。

4. 建立市场经济体制

对创新体系的简短讨论阐明了中国发展新模式的几个重要主题。 首先，这一新模式的成功需要认识到中国目前追求的目标与至少许多市场经济体的核心目标（仅关注国内生产总值的增长）之间的重要差异。 但还需要认识到，即使就这个狭隘的目标而言，西方市场模式也常常失败，而且不同的西方国家采取了一系列方法。 西方那些特别关注更广泛社会目标的人本身也经常对已经采取的一些特定制度安排持批评态度。 举个例子，美国最近改革了破产法，其方式可能会对那些因无法控制的原因而无法偿还债务的人造成严重不利，因为
例如，由于一场严重的疾病。 至少，这是一个有争议的变化，反对者认为这可能会加剧社会困境。

其次，我们必须认识到，“一刀切”几乎永远不会奏效，将美国知识产权制度等制度安排移植到中国将是一个错误。 总是需要一些适应； 但在许多情况下，由于情况和目标的不同，适当的制度安排差异很大，以美国模式为例是错误的。

第三，市场经济有多种形式； 美国模式

在许多方面，它与斯堪的纳维亚模式、欧洲大陆模式或日本模式显着不同。 这些国家的历史、社会背景和明确的社会目标各不相同。 斯堪的纳维亚模式更加强调社会团结和社会正义，更加关注穷人。尽管增长强劲，但斯堪的纳维亚国家在更广泛的社会福祉指标（例如联合国开发计划署的人类发展指标）方面取得了比美国高得多的绩效水平。

他们的创新能力也很强，新技术的渗透率再次跻身世界前列。

第四，许多关于制度设计问题的讨论（例如关于制度设计问题的讨论）产权）不是基于对特定西方国家这些制度的实际特征和运作的理解，而是基于学术理想化——一些极端团体可能提倡的制度版本，但在实践中永远不会被采用 。 例如，虽然一些自由市场经济学家主张基本私人的退休保险计划，但美国一再拒绝将其公共社会保障体系部分私有化的想法，最近一次是在布什总统一月份提出将社会保障部分私有化的提议之后。 2005. 政府提供的行政成本要低得多，提供了私人市场通常无法提供的风险保险（例如通货膨胀风险），并且可以实现其他方式难以实现的再分配目标（减少贫困和减少代际不平等）（见 ，例如 Orszag 和 Stiglitz 2001, 17–56）。

第五，制度安排的细节往往至关重要（或者正如英国 有句格言说，"细节决定成败”）。 我们在之前关于知识产权的讨论中看到了这一点。 美国知识产权制度的许多问题都在于细节，例如知识产权如何执行、专利的广度以及如何授予专利。 简单地说“一个人应该拥有强大的知识产权”的讨论不会走得太远。

第六，特别是因为细节如此重要，善意的政策往往会产生意想不到的后果。 在解决一个问题的过程中，会产生新的、意想不到的问题。

下面，我就当前存在的几个问题进行简要的评论

根据刚才讨论的总体原则，正在将其作为实施中国第十一个五年计划的一部分进行讨论。 有助于实施中国经济发展新模式的制度和政策设计将是这一努力成功的核心，在有限的时间内，我只能再举几个例子。

5、产权

中国一直在讨论制定产权法律框架。 有人认为，需要的是“强有力的产权”，而强有力的产权是市场经济成功的基础。 事实上，有些人甚至认为政府所需要做的就是加强产权保护。

但即使这样的表述也没有很好地体现先进工业国家的产权制度。 产权总是受到限制； 例如，知识产权所有者仍然不能以“滥用”的方式使用知识产权，例如 正如美国、欧盟和其他地方的法院一再提醒微软的那样，以反竞争的方式。36 在美国，一棵有濒危鸟类筑巢的树的所有者不能砍倒这棵树。 在英国各地，步行者都享有通行权，可以享受乡村风光。

财产权总是伴随着责任。 例如，拥有一块土地的人有责任确保该土地不被用作有毒废物堆放场，如果被用作有毒废物堆放场并且因此导致下面的地下水受到污染，则该财产的所有者 清理混乱的责任，尽管这不是他造成的。

权利和责任的平衡以及限制的性质

社会赋予这些权利和责任是产权制度安排设计的核心。 这是一个复杂的问题，简单化的讨论只是说我们必须确保安全的财产权，这无助于增进我们对需要做什么或如何做的理解。

5.1 平衡

许多人对财产权的强调——忽视了责任的重要性——与议程设置上的另一种不平衡并行。 有时对其他权利的关注太少，例如 工人权利或消费者权利。 事实上，这些权利在某些方面更为基本，因为财产权只是工具性的，也就是说，其重要性是因为它们的后果，例如，对经济效率的影响，从而间接对社会福祉的影响； 而这些其他权利直接影响公民的福祉。

对工人权利或消费者权利的讨论凸显了权利的联系和责任，以及定义个人（或公司）之间以及与政府之间关系的权利和责任的性质。 因此，企业对消费者负有责任，例如 关于他们生产的产品的安全和质量。 工人权利有助于确定公司对其工人的责任。

这就是为什么任何强调"和谐"的议程都必须平衡地讨论财产权和工人或消费者的权利，平衡地讨论责任和权利。

5.2 意外后果

加强产权的动机之一是地方政府出于开发目的从农民手中夺走土地，而没有“公平”的补偿。这显然是一个需要解决的问题。 但设计不当的产权法可能会允许个人以土地为抵押借款，然后，如果他无法偿还，就会失去土地所有权。 其结果可能是产生大量无地工人。 这不仅会产生巨大的社会后果，甚至可能对经济效率产生不利影响。

六、税收政策

在发展的早期阶段，中国感到需要吸引外资； 它担心国内缺乏企业家、资金和技术。 但这一切都已经改变，给予外国人比国内企业家普遍优惠的税收待遇已经没有什么意义了。 事实上，也有一些相反的观点：国内创业扩张的溢出效应可能更大，因此应该给予国内企业一些优惠。 此外，许多国外企业面临的税收制度是对外国企业缴纳的税款给予税收抵免，因此提高外国企业的税率可能对激励作用不大，而只是构成从外国政府到中国政府的再分配。

但均衡税率可能还不够。 重要的是细节——规定，例如，关于折旧和其他费用。 许多西方公司善于避税，即使法定税率为25%、30%或更高，也不纳税。在市场经济条件下，税收政策在资源配置中发挥着重要作用。

前面讨论的新模式的三个目标包括：(a) 保护环境并减少资源利用率； (b) 从出口导向型增长转向基于国内消费和投资的增长； (c) 纠正日益严重的不平等现象。 基于消费的增值税不考虑环境，是累退的（按照通常的定义，因为低收入个人消费了其收入的较大部分）； 并抑制消费。 因此，虽然税收对于其他关心鼓励储蓄的经济体来说可能有意义，但对中国来说意义不大。 38 正如我之前指出的，真正有意义的是对碳排放征税，以及设计碳排放税。 鼓励回收的税收结构。 给定由于担心过度的房地产投资，并且考虑到设计有效解决该问题的行政措施的困难，对房地产（以及其他投机活动）征收高额资本利得税也是有道理的。

还有其他税收改革可以促进中国的结构调整

根据新经济模式。 在拥挤的城市地区，私家车的成本很高，因此应承担高额税收。 当前的税收结构可能对服务业不利，从流转税转向增值税既可以提高效率，又可以鼓励该行业的发展。

最后，中国将需要额外的公共收入来为其社会、环境、和发展议程。 中国显然可以收集更高的比例税收占 GDP 的比重，而不对其增长产生不利影响。 斯堪的纳维亚国家已经表明，即使非常高的税率也与快速增长和高税率相一致。

创新水平。 这些高税率有助于解释为什么在更广泛的衡量标准上在社会福祉方面，这些国家的表现优于其他国家。 事实上，增加税收污染可以为政府带来收入，改善环境，并增强
长期增长。

同样，我们早些时候指出，中国不再需要继续发展其经济储备。 但提高汇率会产生一些不利影响，包括降低农民收入。 抵消美国和欧洲的巨大影响农业补贴将转移其他社会和发展所需的资源目标。 出口税（或至少取消增值税出口退税）将：相比之下，两者都减少了贸易逆差并产生了额外的收入。

7. 金融市场

金融市场由于其重要性而在任何市场经济中都发挥着关键作用在资源配置方面。 金融市场不仅仅是储户之间的中介和投资者。 他们收集和处理信息，确定谁值得信用，哪些投资最有可能产生高（风险调整后）回报并强化信用合同。 但我研究的主旨是表明市场失灵是普遍存在的当信息不完善且政府在其中发挥重要作用时金融市场。 如今很少有人质疑政府监管银行的必要性和证券市场； 唯一的争论是监管的形式和范围。

政府监管既可取又可取的原因有很多必要的。 了解这些动机有助于制定政策。 第一个，已经值得注意的是，在信息不完善的市场中，市场失灵是普遍存在的——并且信息不完善是金融市场的核心。 第二是存在感巨大的外部性，在东亚危机中尤为明显。 不良借贷
人们常常将危机归咎于做法——但这场危机触及了受影响地区的每个人国家，而不仅仅是贷款人和借款人。

政府监管需要针对四个目标：(a) 确保安全、金融体系的健全和稳定，认识到许多经济因素资本主义自诞生以来的显着波动与弱点有关或金融体系的其他故障； (b) 保护消费者（借款人、投资者）反对滥用行为——在存在许多滥用行为的情况下尤其重要不知情和缺乏经验的投资者； (c) 确保竞争，认识到即使当金融机构众多时，市场可能会出现这样的情况：例如，向中小企业提供贷款方面的竞争有限特定地点； (d) 确保获得信贷，特别是服务不足的部门的信贷组。为了实现这些目标，政府需要采取一系列措施工具，包括基于市场的干预措施和行政措施。 例如，为确保银行不从事风险过高的贷款，基于风险的资本充足率要求和存款保险费可以作为基于市场的一部分措施。

7.1 获得信贷

在这里，我只想谈四个方面。39 首先是市场本身，经常无法提供信贷（或至少以合理的价格提供充足的信贷）条款）向某些类别的潜在借款人提供。 这就是为什么即使在像美国这样高度发达的金融市场，政府已经进行了干预在金融市场上促进抵押贷款、学生贷款、中小企业信贷、服务欠缺社区信贷和农村信贷。 论据为在中国目前的发展阶段，这种干预措施更加引人注目。

如果中国要取得成功，增加这些领域的信贷流动尤为重要其目标是缩小巨大的收入差距； 这是一个例子一种既能促进增长又能促进平等的政府行动 — — 并且可能甚至有助于经济结构调整远离出口。

在美国（和许多其他国家），干预措施已经采取了多种不同的形式，中国可能会受益于广泛使用工具组合：成立专业银行和贷款机构； 这对服务不足的社区和部门施加贷款要求（参见美国社区再投资法要求）； 或提供部分担保或补贴有限。 印度提出了要求，其效果是增加农村和更偏远地区的分支机构以及信贷的可用性。 如果设计得当，这些要求可以符合世贸组织的义务。 否则有是一种诱惑，特别是对外资银行来说，从事“撇脂”行为，提供例如，对大企业的信贷充足，但对国内中小型企业的信贷却很少。 事实上，最近的一些研究表明，在许多国家，外资银行实际上导致了对这些企业信贷的整体减少。

也许中国应该做的最重要的事情是鼓励本地中小型银行。 正如我在其他地方所说的，提供的关键是信用就是信息； 当地银行更有可能对当地情况有相对充分的了解（中小型）公司（Stiglitz 和 Greenwald 2002）。 当然，中国需要同时增强对中小企业的监管能力
银行。

7.2 资本和金融市场自由化的风险和回报

第二是认识到资本或金融市场自由化本身可能不会导致更快的增长，但可能导致更大的经济不稳定。 即使是国际货币基金组织，其 2003 年的研究（Prasad 等，2003）承认资本市场自由化已经给许多发展中国家带来了没有回报的风险。 结果令人惊讶——与经济“理论”相反——但它仅仅与基于经济理论的相反完美的信息和无限生命的个体。 更真实的模型，基于信息不完全，40 与实证结果完全一致。 其含义很明显：中国在开放金融和资本市场时必须格外小心。遗憾的是，我今天没有时间更详细地描述适当的设置政策； 但复杂性和风险强烈支持渐进主义政策。 这尤其如此，因为对于投资者、监管机构和金融公司来说，都有一个学习过程。

第三是认识到不同目标之间可能存在重要的权衡。

例如，可以通过要求确保银行系统的安全性和健全性银行仅持有短期政府票据； 但如果这样做的话，银行就不会能够履行其主要职能之一：提供信贷机会。

7.4 适应不断发展的中国市场经济

第四是认识到中国经济快速发展的特点金融市场需要适应性强的监管政策。 例如，作为其一部分加入世贸组织协议后，将会有外国金融公司进入。 此前，金融体系履行了许多社会职能。 对于某些人来说可能是不可能的其中这些将通过金融系统41以及更高的透明度来实现，例如 隐性补贴可能是一种附带好处。 在其他情况下，可以采用以下方法这些目标一旦实现就必须改变； 例如，为了中小型企业有充分获得信贷的机会，CRA 等法规
可能必须施加之前讨论的要求。

中国不断发展的市场经济的一个重要方面是新经济模式，更加注重国内消费。 正如我们之前指出的，出口拉动型增长在中国早期经济增长中发挥如此关键作用的原因之一发展的意义在于它使国家的生产能力能够更快地扩大比扩大总需求的能力——确保投资的能力支出将得到充分利用，并且有能力确保可能的消费者获得信贷将能够或愿意偿还。 今天，加强金融机构提供消费贷款（包括抵押贷款）的能力增强。 但中国应该吸取其他国家的教训：金融机构有时会掠夺对不知情的消费者收取过高的利率，这可能在消费者缺乏债务经验的情况下尤其如此。

此外，他们的贷款常常超出个人的偿还能力，这可能会导致压力就消费者而言，当足够多的人无法偿还时，压力对整个金融体系的影响。 中国需要强有力的消费者保护立法严格执行，并以有利于债务人的破产法为后盾贷款人更有动力进行尽职调查，以确保借款人拥有
还款能力。

八、社会保险

现在人们普遍认识到，中国储蓄率如此之高的原因之一是比率是缺乏足够的社会保险；42 公共部门存在不足提供教育、健康和退休计划。 公众对这些措施的支持力度更大计划将有助于实现新经济模式的两个关键部分：帮助中国摆脱出口导向型增长并努力减少公民之间的福祉差异，但设计一个良好的社会保险制度并不容易，尤其是在高度发达的情况下。

具有竞争力的全球经济。 正如我之前指出的，斯堪的纳维亚国家已经表明提供强有力的社会保险计划（包括强有力的公共教育系统）实际上可以为一个国家提供竞争优势。 参加比赛全球市场需要一支健康、受过良好教育、能够适应环境的劳动力队伍变化的速度之快。承担风险对于成功至关重要，强大的社会安全网加上高水平的就业机会可以增强人们的能力和意愿个人承担风险。

关于国际贸易的优点——提供的收益——有很多讨论通过更大的市场。 但建立强大的国家所带来的经济收益经济规模更大。 强大的国民经济需要劳动力流动； 和劳动力流动需要国家社会保险制度。

此外，过去，中国和其他地方的公司从事两种不同的业务活动——生产和提供社会服务。 参与全球竞争市场需要分离这些职能，这意味着政府必须发挥更大的作用。 正如我们之前指出的，经济和社会发展状况良好不能由政府提供至少基本水平的社会保险的原因市场单独。 幸运的是，中国的快速增长意味着应该有资源由此开始创建一个强大的全国性社会保险计划。

9. 宜居城市

此前我曾多次讨论过创建宜居城市的重要性。城市。 中国正在快速城市化。 44 越来越多的中国人口将生活在城市地区，这些城市地区的设计方式将产生巨大的影响，生活质量、整体经济效率和环境中国经济增长的影响。 市场力量本身不会导致创造宜居城市，并且对某些政府官员有内在的激励措施以及为私营部门企业家创造城市扩张和设计与宜居城市的基本原则背道而驰的城市空间。 这是各国政府现在就采取行动尤其重要，并具有明确的长期目标土地使用模式的后果：今天做出的决定，例如 相对于该道路网络的设计将在未来几十年产生影响。

中国已经从计划模式转向市场体系。 但在这个举动中脱离规划并走向市场，可能无法充分升值市场的限制。 在土地利用方面尤其如此。 在大多数西方国家，城市规划至关重要——自然产生的外部性也太大而不容忽视通过简单的价格体系来处理复杂的问题。 少数几个尝试过的城市没有规划可以提醒人们为什么城市规划如此重要。 为了确定，分区也可能成为规划设计和拨款过程中腐败的根源。变化； 除了实施强有力的善政政策之外，别无选择。

10.信息系统

运转良好的经济体需要良好的信息； 但有系统的市场失败。 个人通常有动机不透露相关信息，或更糟糕的是，提供扭曲的信息。 我的大部分理论工作都致力于了解不完美信息对企业运作造成的问题现代经济。我也强调了良好会计制度的重要性某些利益冲突以及不当激励所带来的危险哪些股票期权系统可能会产生。

我最近的一些研究与信息问题有关

这些问题出现在组织内部和公共部门（例如，参见 Stiglitz 2003b）。政府也需要获得良好的信息才能做出正确的决策。 那里是政府官员不向公民或他们应该报告的人披露正在发生的事情的动机。 当然，需要有强有力的法律来避免利益冲突，就像世界上也需要这样的法律一样。

私营部门。

正如成功的私营部门管理者已经了解到，有一个需要有多种信息渠道，公共部门也是如此。 一个充满活力、负责任的媒体可以是这样的渠道之一。 为了使其有效，它必须具有访问权限相关信息，这就是为什么要制定知情权法（“信息自由法”）竟然如此重要。 当然，媒体也必须承担责任。 设计适当诽谤法很重要。 不幸的是，此类法律经常被滥用，在某些情况下各国已经损害了积极而充满活力的新闻界所带来的好处。

11. 结束语

我在这里指出，中国的情况已经发生了变化，这就需要一个不同的模式——而且由于中国的情况与其他国家不同，中国的模式不可避免地需要与其他国家不同。

大约三十年前，中国走上了新的道路。 它谈到了一个务实的“摸着石头过河”的政策。 其背后的实用主义中国取得巨大成功的部分原因是这种方法。

现在中国已经过了大半条河，那河的另一边是什么？侧面更清晰。 更清楚的是，市场经济有许多不同的形式——许多不同的地方可以在河的另一边着陆。 中国现在可以看到
可以对其采取的方向产生很大的影响。 什么样的市场它选择的经济将影响它将创造什么样的社会。

即使中国摸着石头过河，创造了一个市场符合中国独特国情和目标的新经济模型。 中国的“十一五”规划体现了这种新的经济模式。 在本文中，我试图阐述这一新经济的一些经济基础模型并提出它对政策设计可能产生的一些影响机构。

致谢

本文是中国发展高层论坛讲话的修改稿，北京，2007 年 3 月。感谢莫吉提出的有益的意见和建议，以及多年来与 Larry Lau、Justin Yifu Lin、David Dollar 的对话，谢伏瞻、周启仁以及中国历次会议的其他与会者发展论坛。 林毅夫对此草案提供了详细的评论，对此我我特别感激。

笔记

1. 一个例子是中国在从现行价格体系转型过程中采用双轨价格体系正在规划价格更加市场化。
2、过去二十年，2.2亿中国人摆脱了绝对贫困，占发展中国家减贫人口的75%。
3. 衡量不平等的标准之一是基尼系数。 中国基尼系数上升从0.16（改革前）到0.47（2005年后）。 相比之下，美国的基尼系数为 0.466，日本为 0.249，斯堪的纳维亚国家为 0.3 左右。 看http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2005/1010/064.html。
4. 参见他的演讲“人类发展与健康”（Sen 2006）。 森还指出，喀拉拉邦预期寿命高于中国除城市群外的所有省份比如北京、上海。 婴儿死亡率与 1979 年相当； 现在喀拉拉邦是是中国的三分之一。
5. 事实上，考虑到中国的低水平，中国的表现也许应该受到赞扬。健康支出——估计占 GDP 的 2% 至 3%（参见 http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/environmental-governance/variable-642.html）。 （相比之下，美国约 15% 的 GDP 用于医疗保健。

6. 这在美国尤为明显，近年来，GDP 一直在增长，而中位数家庭收入一直在下降——即使只看收入，今天大多数美国人情况比五年前更糟； 但如果考虑到健康不安全感的增加——超过 4660 万人没有医疗保险，这个数字每年都在持续上升今年——生活水平的恶化更加明显。 参见美国人口普查局（2006）。

7. 我的讨论特别集中于所谓的“市场失灵”，例如环境外部性，市场本身可能无法带来有效的结果。

8. 温家宝总理呼吁关注能源和污染物的严重短缺：2006年单位GDP能耗下降1.2%，成绩斐然尤其是与前三年4.9%、5.5%、0.2%的增幅相比——目标是单位GDP能耗下降4%。 （温，2007）。 尽管如此，中国的应当注意到在提高能源效率和减少排放方面取得的成就：1990年和2002年，中国单位GDP二氧化碳排放量增加了50%以上，而世界平均水平下降不到20%。 参见王孟奎等人。 （2007）。

9. 尽管中国改变了经济模式，但它继续关注更广泛的目标不仅仅是国内生产总值的增长，即生活水平的公平和可持续的提高。 措施绿色 GDP 和联合国开发计划署的人类发展指数 (HDI) 可能比人均国内生产总值 (GDP) 提供更好的成功衡量标准资本。

10. 例如，美国只需将纺织品采购从中国转移到孟加拉国或柬埔寨; 这些国家更有可能花费由此产生的增加收入在他们自己的国家； 如果他们确实决定持有更多外汇储备，

China Economic Journal
Vol. 1, No. 1, February 2008, 33–52
China: Towards a new model of development
Joseph E. Stiglitz*

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161443511.pdf

The Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, USA
(Final version received 18 March 2007)
This essay argues that changes in China’s circumstances require a different model for the Chinese economic development. Because China’s circumstances are different from that of other countries, the model for China inevitably needs to be different from that of elsewhere. In line with the central ideas, the essay discusses extensive issues regarding China’s economic development such as export growth model, innovation, property rights, tax policy, social insurance, etc.

1. Introduction
China’s success over the past 30 years, since it began its transition to a market economy has been based, in no small measure, on the adaptability of its strategies and policies: as each set of problems was solved, new problems presented themselves, for which new policies and strategies had to be devised. It has also been based on social innovation.

Because the problems confronting China were different from those that confronted other countries, new solutions had to be found.1 And it recognized that it could not simply transfer economic institutions (even when they had worked well in other countries); at the very least, they had to be adapted. Not only did the circumstances and history of China differ, but so, too, to a large extent did its objectives. These were among the reasons that China talked of a market economy with Chinese characteristics. And even successful Chinese institutions had to be modified and adapted as times changed. The Township and Village enterprises, itself a social innovation so central to the successes of the 1980s and early 1990s, could not meet all the challenges that China faced as it became an increasingly important player in the global economy.

Last year, China, in announcing its 11th Five-Year Plan, focused on some of the
problems that its past successes had presented. Not everyone had benefited equally from the rapid growth of early decades; and though there was enormous success in reducing poverty, inequality had grown enormously.

The greater reliance on markets had meant that in some dimensions, such as health and education, living standards in some rural areas probably had deteriorated. More broadly, Amartya Sen4 has argued that while in 1979, the life expectancy of China and India’s state of Kerala were roughly the same,little for global imbalances, and might even make matters worse, since it would make the problem of financing the US trade deficit more difficult;10 but China faced the dilemma: if it appreciated the currency, and subsidized its farmers – to, in effect, countervailing the subsidies provided by the US and the EU, it would take away scarce money needed for other developmental objectives, including investments in education and health.

2.1 Alternative measures for moving away from exports

There is a need for other measures to correct the trade imbalances that would not
simultaneously increase rural urban differentials. One such measure is an export tax or reduced export rebates, which have the further advantage of providing additional revenues that could be directed at other social objectives.

Many of China's exports are energy intensive, with societal costs that go well beyond the costs borne by firms. Raising the price of energy and imposing a carbon tax and other environmental taxes (to be discussed further below) would help adjust the structure of the economy – including helping China move away from exports – and again provide additional revenues that could be directed at other social objectives.

2.2 Why export-oriented growth

It is natural to ask: Why did export-led growth work for China and for so many of the other East Asian countries? Will the move away from export led growth adversely affect its growth? Are there other ways in which the needs it satisfied can be met?

Export-led growth was important for three reasons. Firstly, it provided the basis
of innovation. What separates developing and developed countries is not just a gap in resources, but a gap in knowledge. As Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006) point out, for a variety of reasons the transmission of knowledge is enhanced the larger the size of the industrial sector. The skills learned in that sector then gradually are transmitted to the rest of the economy. Secondly, there is intense competition in exports, and competition spurs efficiency and innovation. Success requires meeting international standards, again a benefit that extends eventually throughout the economy. Thirdly, in the early stages of development, the capacity to produce may outstrip the capacity to consume, or more accurately, the expansion of the demand for the particular goods that are being produced.

While there may be latent demands by many households and firms, these latent demands are translated into effective demands only if these households and firms can get access to credit. But in the earlier stages of development, financial institutions (and the underlying legal infrastructure) that can discriminate between those who are creditworthy and those that are not and that can enforce credit contracts often have not developed.12 It is easier to lend abroad to finance foreigners’ consumption than to lend at home.

Indeed, China can be viewed in recent years as having been engaged in vendor finance: it has lent much of the money that has enabled those elsewhere to buy its goods. But there is something peculiar about China helping the richest country in the world to live beyond its means,14 when there are so many pressing needs at home.

2.3 Why China today can move away from export-led growth

Today, these functions that export-led growth has served can be accomplished in other ways. China is establishing a broad innovation system (see below); it has 'learned how to learn'; it does not need to rely on exports for learning. China has created vibrant internal competition, e.g. among TVEs and other establishments. To be sure, there is a need for strong competition laws to ensure that domestic competition remains strong, and China should be wary of those arguing for the establishment of large 'national champions' , at least when the establishment of those national champions threatens domestic competition. Finally, China has made great strides in creating a strong domestic financial system. It would be easy, at this stage, to expand domestic credit, especially for housing and collateralized debt.

2.4 Stimulating consumption

In spite of the talk about moving away from export led growth, China’s trade surplus has actually increased from 102 billion US dollars in 2005 to 177.5 billion US dollars in 2006. Household consumption has increased, but it has not increased as fast as GDP. Expanding consumption would not only help China move away from its dependence on exports, but would contribute to rising living standards – and the objective of development is raising living standards. The question is: Why has China had 'excessive'savings?

There are four hypotheses; each plays a role, though some may be more important than others.

The first is growing inequality. With consumption propensities among the rich
typically lower than among the poor,19 an increase in inequality will result in a lower ratio of consumption to GDP. Policies that reduce the degree of inequality would, accordingly, be expected to increase consumption.

The second is capital market imperfections, especially those facing small- and
medium-sized businesses. Some data suggests that the number of small businesses in urban areas have declined;20 historically, small businesses are associated with job growth. They are especially important in providing new opportunities for those that in the past had none. Many contend that small businesses are at the heart of a dynamic economy – while large businesses bring products to market, they depend on a host of small businesses for the real innovations.

A decline, or even stagnation, in the number of small businesses should, accordingly, be a cause of concern. One of the reasons that has been posited for the decline in small businesses is lack of access to capital. Large banks prefer lending to large businesses. In the United States, there is a special government program through the Small Business Administration to encourage lending to small businesses, through absorption of some of the risk. In the absence of access to funds, those who would aspire to be small businessmen – or those already in small businesses – have to save at a very high rate to have the funds they need to expand. Hence, improving access to credit would help lower the overall savings rate. But the major barrier to increasing consumption is not lack of credit, but the lack of an effective social safety net, a strong public health system, an effective social security system, and good publicly provided education. 'Precautionary' savings depresses consumption.

These reforms would thus yield a double benefit, freeing China from its dependence on exports (and the vagaries of international markets) as it improves standards of living.

The final reason for a high ratio of savings to GDP is the high current account
surplus, symbolized by the large additions to reserves. In 2006, these amounted to 7% of GDP. At the same time, the government has maintained a strong fiscal position. But as we noted before, China has accumulated enough reserves to meet any plausible variability in the market place. Given the high social needs in health and education – and its high private savings rate – China could well afford to have a modest fiscal deficit (see Feldstein 2007).

Less reliance on exports could, of course, be achieved by expanded investment; but with China’s investment rate as high as it is, the issue today is not so much the level of investment but its allocation. The worry is that there is a perverse set of incentives at play – with local communities rushing in to encourage investment, both to generate jobs and revenues for themselves. Especially in real estate, there is a concern that short-sighted investors are focusing on short-term capital gains rather than long-term returns.

3. Innovation
At the centre of the new economic model is innovation – increasing the efficiency with which scarce resources are used. Innovation is endogenous, the result of allocation of resources to R& D and conscious policies attempting to learn how to produce 'at the frontier or adopt the best practices as it is sometimes put'.  But resources devoted to research and learning are, like all resources, scarce. One can direct such research at different objectives. Unfortunately, Western firms have directed their research too much at reducing the input of labour, and too little at reducing environmental impacts.

The problem is that the social returns to innovation differ from the private returns, both because of distortions in markets and because the private returns to obtaining a patent differ markedly from the social returns 

3.1 Excessive incentives for labour-saving innovations

For instance, high wages in the West mean that there is a high return to reducing labour input. Even in countries where the unemployment rate is high, there are large investments in labour-saving technologies, exacerbating the unemployment problem. The focus on labour-saving innovations is the reason that so many countries face growing problems of unemployment. If productivity increases at 5% a year, output has to increase at 5% a year just for employment to remain constant.

Indeed, for the owners of the firms in the industrial sector, there is a further benefit from the increasing unemployment: the higher unemployment rate serves to depress wages, lowering the cost of production further. For a ‘harmonious society’, however, jobs have to be created to match new entrants into the labour force. In the case of China, the pace of urban job creation needs to be even greater, as labour migrates from the rural to the urban sector. And higher wages are not a bad thing: the whole purpose of development is to increase the wellbeing of workers.

3.2 Insufficient incentives for resource saving innovation

By the same token, because American firms do not pay anything for carbon emissions –regardless of the cost imposed on the global economy – they have no incentive to look for innovations that reduce carbon emissions. Making firms pay the full marginal social costs of their activities – the cost, say, of carbon emissions – would enhance incentives for pollution reducing innovation.

A carbon tax would have, in addition, one further important advantage. It could break the global impasse on what to do about global warming. The scientific evidence about the risks of this impending calamity has been mounting. The UK Stern Report (2006) made a convincing case that the economic benefits – taking into account all the risks – of doing something to mitigate the risks outweighed the costs.24 The Kyoto protocol was based on emission targets determined on the basis of reductions from the 1990 levels of emissions. Unfortunately, no one has come up with a set of principles that would guide the determination of emission target levels in a fair and equitable way, which would be acceptable to both the developing countries and the US. Because the distributional consequences of a common policy – each country would agree to impose a carbon tax, at rates reflecting the agreed upon global social cost of carbon emissions – are much more limited, there may be some hope of a global agreement.25 Besides, it makes so much more sense to tax bads – like pollution – rather than goods, like work and savings.

3.3 Fundamental problems in designing an innovation system in a market economy

The problem with the innovation system in market economies is, however, deeper. It is often suggested that intellectual property is at the centre of the market economy's innovation system. But the rewards provided by the patent system do not accord well with social returns. The marginal social return to innovation is making the innovation available sooner than it otherwise would have been. But the patent system gives the (temporary) property right to the first person to discover (or more accurately, to patent) the innovation.

For instance, consider the case of the human genome. There was an international
effort to decode the human genome. This effort was on track when some firms decided to try to 'beat' the publicly funded project. If they beat them even by one hour, they got all the benefits of the monopoly – even though their marginal social contribution was nil.

But while in these cases, the benefits are nil, the cost of the patent system to society is huge. Knowledge is a public good; knowledge is ‘non-rivalrous’. When one person tells a piece of knowledge to another, it does not detract from what the first person knows.

Restricting the use of knowledge is inefficient. But the patent system not only restricts the use of knowledge, it also gives the exclusive right to the use of that knowledge to one party – it creates an artificial monopoly, and monopolies distort resource allocations. In the case of medicines, what is at stake is not only money, but lives themselves. Monopolists may charge a price so high that the poor cannot afford the medicine; thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of individuals may die unnecessarily as a result, especially when there is an inadequate public health system. As a result of the patent on the gene that
shows a strong likelihood of breast cancer, the owner of the gene insists on a large payment for every test performed. The resulting $3,000 fee puts the test out of the range of anyone without health insurance, and even in a rich country like America, more than 50 million Americans do not have health insurance. The result is that thousands of people will die unnecessarily.

The only justification for this enormous cost of static inefficiency associated with the patent system is that there may be dynamic gains. But if the intellectual property regime is not well designed, the costs will outweigh the benefits. An intellectual property regime is defined by a whole set of detailed provisions, which describe what can be patented (or copyrighted), the standards of novelty, the life of the patent, the breadth of the patent, the process by which patents are granted and challenged, and the enforcement mechanism.

Indeed, a poorly designed intellectual property regime can even stifle innovation. The worry today in America is that its intellectual property regime is doing just that. The increasing concerns are leading to an active debate about the reform of the intellectual property regime in the US.26 At the very least, those outside the United States should recognize that the mantra that one hears from certain corporate leaders and government officials – that the stronger the intellectual property regime, the better – does not reflect the mainstream of thinking among economists and academic intellectual property lawyers who are not in the employ of the corporations that derive so much of their profits from the current regime. 

Every country has to have an intellectual property regime that is appropriate to its own circumstances.27 It has to balance the costs and the benefits; and in general, the way that is done will differ markedly between developed and developing countries. That is why at the World Intellectual Property Organization, the developing countries have demanded a development-oriented intellectual property regime. We noted earlier that one of the main challenges facing developing countries is reducing the gap in knowledge that separates them from more developed countries. A poorly designed intellectual property regime may make it more difficult to close that gap. The worry is that under the influence of
TRIPs, many countries are adopting American-style intellectual property regimes, which, as badly suited as they may be for America, are even more ill-suited for developing countries – and just at a time when America itself may be realizing that reform is needed.

A well-designed innovation system consists of a portfolio of instruments, including government-financed research (supporting research at universities, specialized laboratories, and even corporations), prizes, and patents. A prize system provides a reward – a large prize for innovations of high social value, such as a cure for an important disease like malaria, a small prize for a me-too medicine – but then the knowledge is made available to anyone who wants to use it with perhaps a licensing fee.28 Of course, the patent system is a prize – the award of a distortionary monopoly power. But while the patent system is designed to restrict the use of knowledge and raise prices, the prize system uses the power of the market economy and competition to ensure the lowest possible prices and the greatest dissemination of the knowledge, so that the benefits of the knowledge are enjoyed by as many people as possible.

China needs to have an innovation system that puts greater emphasis on prizes and government-funded research, and less emphasis on patents than does, say, the US system, especially because the innovation needs to be directed at a broad range of social objectives that I noted earlier – as I argued, the focus should be on reducing inputs of environmentally sensitive resources, not on saving labour.

3.5 Learning lessons from other countries

But even when it comes to the intellectual property regime, China should learn the appropriate lessons from the deficiencies in America’s intellectual property regime, which have become even clearer during the past year, since I talked about these issues briefly in my talk before the China Development Forum. It does not need to repeat the same mistakes. It needs to think carefully, for instance, about procedural issues (challenging patents before they are issued), recognizing that there is in fact a bias leading to overpatenting. There are strong private incentives to try to get a patent – one can privatize part of the public domain of nowledge; but challenging a patent provides a public good, a conversion of what otherwise would have been in the private domain, making it publicly available. There will, accordingly, be an undersupply of challenges; designing the intellectual property regime procedures can go a little way to redressing this imbalance.

There are other issues concerning the scope of the patent and the standards of 'novelty', what can be patented, enforcement procedures – compensation for 'trespass', i.e. a liability system as opposed to the current American system, the duration of copyrights,31 etc.

The TRIPs agreement puts obligations on all member countries to adopt an intellectual property regime; but even within TRIPs, member countries have considerable discretion, and it is important that China use that discretion to create an intellectual property regime that is appropriate for China. While I have described several features of the design of such an intellectual property regime above, I want to draw attention to one other feature: the use of compulsory licenses. TRIPs provided for ‘flexibilities’ for the issuance of these, allowing the production of generic medicines, which can sell for a fraction of the cost of brand name medicines. Most countries, including China, have not made full use of these flexibilities, which can make such a difference to the health of the citizens of the
country.

4. Creating the institutions for a market economy

This brief discussion of the innovation system illustrates several important themes of the New Model for China’s development. Firstly, success in this New Model will require recognizing the important differences between the objectives that China is now pursuing, and those that are at the centre of at least many of the market economies, focusing exclusively on an increase in GDP. But it will also require recognizing that even in terms of that narrower objective, Western market models often fail, and that there are a range of approaches taken within different Western countries. Those in the West who are concerned with broader social objectives in particular are themselves often critical of some of the particular institutional arrangements that have been adopted. To take an example, the US recently reformed its bankruptcy law in ways that may significantly disadvantage those who cannot repay what they owe for reasons beyond their control, for
instance as a result of a serious illness. At the very least, it is a contentious change that its opponents believe may contribute to an increase in social distress.

Secondly, one has to recognize that ‘one size fits all policies’ almost never work and that transplanting institutional arrangements such as America’s intellectual property regime to China would be a mistake. Some adaptation is always required; but in many cases, given the differences in circumstances and objectives, the differences in the appropriate institutional arrangements are so large that it would be a mistake to begin with, say, the American model as a template.

Thirdly, there are many different forms of a market economy; the American model
is, in many ways, markedly different from the Scandinavian model, the continental European Model, or the Japanese model. These countries differ in their history, their social context, and their articulated social objectives. The Scandinavian model puts more emphasis on social solidarity and social justice and exhibits more concern for the poor.

The Scandinavian countries have succeeded in achieving much higher levels of performance in terms of broader indicators of societal wellbeing (such as the UNDP's Human Development Indicator) than the United States, even though their growth has been robust.

They have also been highly innovative, with the penetration of new technologies again scoring towards the top in the world.

Fourthly, many of the discussions of institutional design issues (such as those on
property rights) are based not on an understanding of the actual features and workings of those institutions in particular Western countries, but on an academic idealization – a version of those institutions that some extreme groups might advocate, but that would never have been adopted in practice. For instance, while some free market economists have advocated a basically private retirement insurance program, the United States has repeatedly rejected the notion of even partially privatizing its public social security system, most recently following the proposals of President Bush to partially privatize social security in January 2005. Government provision entails far lower administrative costs, provides insurance against risks (like the risk of inflation) that private markets typically do not provide, and can achieve redistributive objectives (reducing poverty and reducing intergenerational inequality) that are otherwise difficult to realize (see, e.g. Orszag and Stiglitz 2001, 17–56).

Fifthly, the details of institutional arrangements are often critical (or as the English
aphorism has it, ‘the devil is in the details’). We saw this in our earlier discussion of intellectual property rights. Many of the problems of America's intellectual property regime lie in details, about how intellectual property rights are enforced, the breadth of patents, and how patents are granted. A discussion that simply says,'One should have strong intellectual property rights' doesn't take one far.

Sixthly, especially because the details are so important, there are often  unintended consequences of well-intentioned policies. In solving one problem, new, unanticipated problems are created.

In the following paragraphs, I comment briefly on several issues that are currently
being discussed as part of the implementation of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, in light of the general principles just discussed. The design of the institutions and policies which will help implement the New Model of China’s Economic Development will be at the heart of the success of this endeavour, and in the limited amount of time, I can only touch upon a few further examples.

5. Property rights

China has been discussing the adoption of a legal framework for property rights. Some argue that what is needed is ‘strong property rights’, and that strong property rights are the basis of the success of the market economy. Indeed, some go so far as to suggest that all the government needs to do is to enforce strong property rights.

But even the formulation of this does not capture well property rights systems in the advanced industrial countries. Property rights are always restricted; for instance, owners of intellectual property rights still cannot use those in ways which are 'abusive', e.g. in an anti-competitive manner, as Courts in the US, EU, and elsewhere have repeatedly reminded Microsoft.36 In the United States, an owner of a tree on which an endangered species of bird has nested cannot cut the tree down. Throughout the UK, there are rights-of-way that allow walkers to enjoy the countryside.

And property rights are always accompanied by responsibilities. A person who owns a tract of land, for instance, has the responsibility to make sure that it is not used as a toxic waste dump, and if it is and if as a result ground water underneath is polluted, the owner of the property has the responsibility of cleaning up the mess, even though he did not create it.

The balance of rights and responsibilities and the nature of the restrictions which
society imposes on those rights and responsibilities are at the heart of the design of institutional arrangements for property rights. It is a complex matter, and simplistic discussions that simply say we must ensure secure property rights do little to advance either our understanding of what needs to be done or how to do it.

5.1 Balance

The emphasis of many on property rights – ignoring the importance of responsibilities – is paralleled by another imbalance, in the setting of the agenda. Too little attention is sometimes paid to other rights, e.g. workers’ rights or consumer rights. Indeed, these rights are, in some ways, more fundamental because property rights are only instrumental, that is, of importance because of their consequences, for instance, for economic efficiency and therefore, indirectly, to societal wellbeing; while these other rights affect directly the wellbeing of citizens.

Discussions of workers' rights or consumer rights highlight the linkage of rights
and responsibilities, and the nature of rights and responsibilities in defining relationships among individuals (or corporations) with each other and with the government. Thus, firms have responsibilities to consumers, e.g. with respect to the safety and the quality of what they produce. Workers' rights help define firms' responsibilities to their workers.

That is why any agenda emphasizing 'harmony' must have a balanced discussion of property rights and of the rights of workers or consumers, and a balanced discussion of responsibilities as well as rights.

5.2 Unintended consequences

One of the motivations for strengthening property rights arises from local government taking land away from farmers for development purposes, without 'fair' compensation. 

This is clearly a problem that needs to be redressed. But poorly designed property rights laws could allow individuals to borrow against the land, and then, if he cannot repay, lose title to the land. The result could be the creation of large numbers of landless workers. Not only could this have large social consequences, but it could even have adverse consequences on economic efficiency.

6. Tax policy

In earlier stages of development, China felt it needed to attract foreign investment; it worried that there was a shortage of entrepreneurs, capital, and technology at home. But this has all changed, and it makes little sense to give foreigners in general preferential tax treatment over domestic entrepreneurs. Indeed, there are arguments going in the contrary direction: spill-overs from the expansion of domestic entrepreneurship may be greater, so that some preferences should be given to domestic firms. Moreover, many foreign
firms face tax systems where tax credits are given for foreign taxes paid, so that raising tax rates on foreign firms may have little effect on incentives, and simply constitute a redistribution from foreign governments to China's government.
But equalizing tax rates may not suffice. What matters are the details – provisions,
for instance, concerning depreciation and other expenses. Many Western companies are adept at tax avoidance, paying no taxes even though the legislated rate is, say, 25%, 30%,or higher.

In a market economy, tax policies play an important role in resource allocation.
Three of the objectives of the New Model discussed earlier include: (a) protecting
the environment and reducing resource utilization; (b) moving away from export-led growth to growth based on domestic consumption and investment; and (c) redressing the growing inequalities. The consumption-based VAT pays no attention to the environment, is regressive (in the usual definition, since lower income individuals consume a larger fraction of their income); and discourages consumption. Thus, while the tax might make sense for other economies, which are concerned with encouraging savings, it makes little sense for China.38 What does make sense, as I noted earlier, are the imposition of taxes on carbon emissions, and the design of tax structures which encourage recycling. Given
worries about excessive real estate investment, and given the difficulties of designing administrative measures that deal with the problem effectively, it also makes sense to have high capital gains taxes on real estate (as well as other speculative activities).

There are other tax reforms that could facilitate China’s structural adjustment
according to the New Economic Model. There are large costs associated with private cars in congested urban areas, and they should accordingly bear high taxes. The current tax structure may disadvantage services, and shifting from a turnover tax to a VAT would both increase efficiency and encourage the development of this sector.

Finally, China will need additional public revenues to finance its social, environmental,
and developmental agenda. China could clearly collect a substantially higher fraction
of GDP in taxes, without adversely affecting its growth. The Scandinavian countries
have shown that even very high tax rates are consistent with rapid growth and high
levels of innovation. These high tax rates help explain why, on broader measures of
social wellbeing, these countries outperform other countries. Indeed, increasing taxes on
pollution could generate government revenues, improve the environment, and enhance
long-term growth.
Similarly, earlier we noted that China no longer needs to continue to build up its
reserves. But increasing its exchange rate would have several adverse effects, including
lowering the incomes of farmers. Offsetting the effect of America and Europe’s huge
agricultural subsidies would divert resources needed for other social and developmental
objectives. An export tax (or, at a minimum, eliminating export rebates of VAT) would,
by contrast, both reduced the trade gap and generate additional revenues.
7. Financial markets
Financial markets play a key role in any market economy, because of their importance
in allocating resources. Financial markets do more than intermediate between savers
and investors. They gather and process information, determine who is credit worthy,
which investments are most likely to yield high (risk adjusted) returns, and enforce credit
contracts. But the thrust of my research was to show that market failures are endemic
when information is imperfect, and that there is an important role for government in
financial markets. Few today question the necessity of government regulation of banks
and securities markets; the only debate is about the form and extent of the regulation.
There are a number of reasons that government regulation is both desirable and
necessary. An understanding of these motivations helps shape policies. The first, already
noted, is that market failures are endemic in markets where information is imperfect – and
information imperfections are at the heart of financial markets. The second is the presence
of large externalities, so evident in the East Asia crisis. Bad lending and borrowing
practices are often blamed for the crisis – but the crisis touched everyone in the affected
countries, not just the lenders and borrowers.
Government regulation needs to be directed at four objectives: (a) ensuring the safety,
soundness, and stability of the financial system, recognizing that many of the economic
fluctuations that have marked capitalism since its beginnings are related to weaknesses
or other failures of the financial system; (b) protecting consumers (borrowers, investors)
against abusive practices – especially important in a context where there are many
uninformed and inexperienced investors; (c) ensuring competition, recognizing that even
when there are many financial institutions, the market may be such that there may be
limited competition in, say, the supply of loans to small or medium sized firms in a
particular locale; and (d) ensuring access to credit, especially of underserved sectors and
groups.
In accomplishing these objectives, the government will need to employ a portfolio of
instruments, both market-based interventions and administrative measures. For instance, to ensure that banks do not engage in excessively risky lending, risk-based capital adequacy
requirements and deposit insurance premiums may be used as part of market based
measures.
7.1 Access to credit
Here, I want to touch on only four aspects.39 The first is that markets, by themselves,
often fail to provide credit (or at least provide an adequate supply of credit at reasonable
terms) to certain categories of potential borrowers. That is one of the reasons why even
in highly developed financial markets like the United States government has intervened
in financial markets to promote mortgages, student loans, credit for small- and mediumsized businesses, credit for underserved communities, and rural credit. The argument for
such interventions in China, at its current stage of development, is even more compelling.
Increasing the flow of credit in these areas is particularly important if China is to succeed
in its objective of reducing the large disparities in income; and this is an example of a
kind of government action that can both enhance growth and equality – and that may
even help the structural adjustment of the economy away from exports.
In the United States (and many other countries), interventions have taken on a
number of different forms, and China would probably benefit from using a wide
portfolio of instruments: the creation of specialized banks and lending agencies; the
imposition of lending requirements to underserved communities and sectors (cf. the US
Community Reinvestment Act requirements); or the provision of partial guarantees or
limited subsidies. India has imposed requirements the effect of which is to increase
branches – and the availability of credit – in rural and more remote areas. Such requirements, if properly designed, can be made consistent with WTO obligation. Otherwise there
is a temptation, especially of foreign banks, to engage in ‘cream skimming’, providing
ample credit for large firms, but little credit, for instance, for domestic small- and mediumsized firms. Indeed, some recent studies suggest that in many countries, the entry of
foreign banks has actually led to an overall decrease in credit to these enterprises.
Perhaps the most important thing that China should do is to encourage the entry of
small- and medium-sized local banks. As I have argued elsewhere, the key to providing
credit is information; local banks are more likely to be relatively well informed about local
(small- and medium-sized) firms (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2002). Of course, China needs
simultaneously to develop the capacity to regulate and supervise small- and medium-sized
banks.
7.2 Risks and rewards of capital and financial market liberalization
The second is to recognize that capital or financial market liberalization, by itself, may not
lead to faster growth, but may contribute to greater economic instability. Even the IMF, in
its 2003 study (Prasad et al. 2003), has recognized that capital market liberalization had
brought risk without reward in many developing countries. It found the result surprising –
contrary to economic ‘theory’ – but it was contrary only to an economic theory based
on perfect information and infinitely lived individuals. More realistic models, based on
imperfect information,40 are fully consistent with the empirical findings. The implication
is clear: China must take extreme care as it liberalizes its financial and capital markets.
Regrettably, I do not have time today to describe in greater detail the appropriate set
of policies; but the complexity and risks strongly support a policy of gradualism. This
is especially true because there is a learning process, both for investors, regulators, and financial firms.

The third is to recognize that there may be important trade-offs among various objectives.
For instance, one can ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system by requiring
banks to hold only short-term government bills; but if that were done, banks would not
be able to fulfil one of their main functions: providing access to credit.
7.4 Adapting to the evolving Chinese market economy
The fourth is to recognize that the quickly evolving nature of China’s economy and
financial markets will require adaptable regulatory policies. For instance, as part of its
WTO accession agreement, there will be entry of foreign financial firms. Previously, the
financial system performed a number of social functions. It may not be possible for some
of these to be accomplished through financial systems41 – and the greater transparency,
e.g. of hidden subsidies, may be an ancillary benefit. In other cases, the ways in which
these objectives are attained will have to be changed; for instance, in order for there to
be adequate access to credit by small- and medium-sized firms, regulations such as CRA
requirements discussed earlier may have to be imposed.
One important aspect of China’s evolving market economy is the New Economic
Model, which places greater emphasis on domestic consumption. As we noted earlier,
one of the reasons that export-led growth played such a critical role in China’s earlier
development was that it allowed the country’s productive capacity to expand more rapidly
than its capacity to expand aggregate demand – its ability to ensure that investment
expenditures would be well spent, and its ability to ensure that consumers who might
gain access to credit would be able or willing to repay. Today, strengthened financial
institutions have a greater capacity to provide consumer loans (including mortgages). But
China should learn the lesson of other countries: financial institutions sometimes prey
on uninformed consumers, charging them exorbitantly high interest rates, and this may
be particularly the case in situations where consumers have little experience in debt.
Moreover, they often lend beyond individual’s capacity to repay, which can lead to stress
on the part of consumers, and, when sufficiently large numbers are unable to repay, stress
on the financial system as a whole. China needs strong consumer protection legislation,
rigorously enforced, and backed up with a debtor-friendly bankruptcy law that gives
lenders greater incentives to engage in due diligence to ensure that borrowers have the
capacity to repay.
8. Social insurance
It is now widely recognized that one of the reasons that China has such a high savings
rate is the absence of adequate social insurance;42 there are inadequacies in the public
provision of education, health, and retirement programs. Stronger public support of these
programs will help achieve two of the critical parts of the New Economic Model: it will
help China in its move away from export-led growth and in its attempt to reduce the
disparities in wellbeing among its citizens.43
But designing a good social insurance system is not easy, especially in a highly
competitive global economy. As I noted earlier, the Scandinavian countries have shown
that providing a strong social insurance program (including a strong public education
system) can actually provide a country with a competitive advantage. Competing in
the global market place requires a healthy, well-educated labour force, able to adapt to
the fast pace of changes. With risk taking so essential to success, a strong social safety net – combined with high levels of employments – enhances the ability and willingness
of individuals to undertake risk.
There is much discussion about the virtues of international trade – the gains provided
by a larger marketplace. But the economic gains that result from creating a strong national
economy are even larger. And a strong national economy requires labour mobility; and
labour mobility requires a national social insurance system.
Moreover, in the past, firms both in China and elsewhere were engaged in two separate
activities – production and the provision of social services. Competing in the global
market place requires separating out these functions, and that means that the government
must take on an increased role. As we noted earlier, there are sound economic and social
reasons why the provision of at least a basic level of social insurance cannot be left to the
market alone. Fortunately, China’s rapid growth means that there should be the resources
with which to begin to create a strong, national social insurance program.
9. Liveable cities
On several previous occasions, I have discussed the importance of the creation of liveable
cities. China is rapidly urbanizing.44 An increasing fraction of China’s population will
live in urban areas, and how these urban areas are designed will have enormous effects,
on the quality of life, the efficiency of the overall economy, and on the environmental
impact of China’s growth. Market forces by themselves will not lead to the creation
of liveable cities, and there are built-in incentives both for certain government officials
and for private sector entrepreneurs for the creation of urban sprawls and the design of
urban spaces that are counter to the principles that should underlie liveable cities. It is
especially important for governments to take action now, with a clear view of long-term
consequences of land usage patterns: the decisions made today, e.g. with respect to the
design of road networks, will have consequences for decades to come.
China has moved away from the planning model to a market system. But in this move
away from planning and to the market, there may not be sufficient appreciation of the
limits of the market. This is especially so in land usage. In most Western countries, city
planning is critical – the externalities that naturally arise are too large to be ignored, too
complex to be dealt with by a simple price system. The few cities that have tried to do
without planning serve as a reminder of why city planning is so important. To be sure,
zoning can also be a source of corruption both in the design of the plan and in the granting
of variations; there is no alternative to implementing strong policies of good governance.
10. Information systems
Well-functioning economies require good information; but there are systematic market
failures. Individuals often have incentives not to reveal relevant information, or worse,
to provide distorted information. Much of my theoretical work has been devoted to
understanding the problems that imperfect information poses for the functioning of a
modern economy.45 I have stressed the importance of good accounting systems, as well
as the dangers posed by certain conflicts of interest as well as the perverse incentives to
which stock option systems may give rise.
Some of my more recent research has been concerned with information problems
which arise within organizations, and in the public sector (see, for instance, Stiglitz 2003b).
Governments, too, need to have good information in order to make good decisions. There
are incentives of government officials not to disclose what is going on, either to citizens or to those to whom they are supposed to report. There is, of course, a need to have strong laws to avoid conflicts of interest just as there is a need for such laws in the
private sector. And just as successful private sector managers have learned that there is a
need to have a variety of channels of information, so, too, in the public sector. A vibrant,
responsible media can be one such channel. For it to be effective, it has to have access
to relevant information, which is why right-to-know laws (‘freedom of information acts’)
can be so important. The press also, of course, must be responsible; designing appropriate
libel laws is important. Unfortunately, such laws have often been abused, and in some
countries have vitiated the benefits which would come from an active and vibrant press.
11. Concluding remarks
I have argued here that China’s circumstances have changed, and that requires a different
model – and because China’s circumstances are different from that of other countries, the
model for China inevitably needs to be different from that of elsewhere.
Some three decades ago, China set forth on a new course. It talked about a pragmatic
policy of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’. The pragmatism that underlies this
approach is partially responsible for China’s enormous success.
Now that China has gone more than half way across the river, what is on the other
side is clearer. It is clearer that there are many different forms of a market economy –
many different places to land on the other side of the river. China can now see that it
can make a great deal of difference the directions which it takes. What kind of market
economy it chooses will affect what kind of society it will create.
Even as China crosses the river by feeling the stones, creating a market that is
consistent with China’s distinct circumstances and objectives will require a New Economic
Model. China’s 11th Five-Year Plan reflected this New Economic Model. In this paper,
I have tried to lay out some of the economic foundations underlying this New Economic
Model and to suggest some of the implications it may have for the design of policies and
institutions.
Acknowledgements
This essay is a revised version of remarks given at the China Development Forum,
Beijing, in March 2007. I am indebted to Mo Ji for helpful comments and suggestions, as
well as to conversations over the years with Larry Lau and Justin Yifu Lin, David Dollar,
Xie Fuzhan, Zhou Qiren, as well as other participants in previous meetings of the China
Development Forum. Justin Lin provided detailed comments on this draft, for which I
am particularly grateful.
Notes
1. An example is China’s use of the dual price system in the transition from the prices that prevailed
under planning to more market-based prices.
2. In the past two decades, 2.2 hundred million Chinese people have overcome absolute poverty,
which accounts for 75% of the population of poverty reduction in developing countries.
3. One standard measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. China’s Gini coefficient increased
from 0.16 (before reform) to 0.47 (after 2005). By contrast, the US Gini coefficient
stands at 0.466, Japan’s at 0.249, and the Scandinavian countries at around 0.3. See
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2005/1010/064.html.
4. See his lecture ‘Human development and health’ (Sen 2006). Sen also points out that Kerala’s
life expectancy is higher than that in every province of China, except for the urban conglomerates
such as Beijing and Shanghai. Infant mortality rates were comparable in 1979; now Kerala’s is
one third that of China’s.
5. Indeed, China perhaps should be given credit for having done as well as it has, given its low
expenditures on health – estimated to be between 2% to 3% of GDP (see http://earthtrends.
wri.org/text/environmental-governance/variable-642.html). (By contrast, the US spends approximately 15% of its GDP on health.
6. So evident in the United States, where in recent years, GDP has been increasing, while median
household income has been falling – even looking just at income, most Americans today are
worse off than they were five years ago; but if account is taken of the increased health insecurity –
with more than 46.6 millions without health insurance, a number that continues to rise every
year – the deterioration in standards of living is even more marked. See US Census Bureau
(2006).
7. In particular, my discussion focused on the so-called ‘market failures’, instances such as environmental externalities where markets by themselves may not lead to efficient outcomes.
8. Premier Wen Jiabao called attention to the critical shortfall in energy and pollutants: While
energy consumption per unit of GDP dropped by 1.2% in 2006 – an impressive achievement,
especially compared to the increases of 4.9%, 5.5%, and 0.2% in the previous three years –
the target was to reduce energy consumption per unit GDP by 4%. (Wen, 2007). Still, China’s
achievements in increasing energy efficiency and reducing emissions should be noted: between
1990 and 2002, China increased its CO2 emissions per unit GDP by more than 50%, while the
world average decreased by less than 20%. See Wang Mengkui et al. (2007).
9. Even as China has changed its economic model, it has continued to focus on broader objectives
than just increasing in GDP, i.e. equitable and sustainable increases in living standards. Measures
like green GDP and the UNDP’s HDI may provide a better measure of success than GDP per
capita.
10. The US would simply shift purchasing textiles, for instance, from China to Bangladesh or
Cambodia; these countries are more likely to spend the increased income thereby generated
in their own countries; and if they did decide to hold more foreign reserves, it is more likely
that they would hold a larger fraction of their reserves in the euro than in the dollar, which is
increasingly seen as a weak and weakening currency. For further elaboration on this, see Stiglitz
(2006b).
11. For an extended discussion of the advantages of export taxes over exchange rate revaluation,
see Lau and Stiglitz (2005).
12. This is particularly true because the financial sector in China is dominated by the four big state
banks. Only about 1% of the firms in China, mainly the large firms, have borrowed money from
banks. Due to the underdevelopment of small- and medium-sized banks which typically provide
credit to local, small- and medium-sized firms, small- and middle-sized enterprises and family
farms often do not receive financial services from banks and need to finance their investment
through their own savings, one of the factors contributing to China’s high savings rate.
13. The lending is done at the country level, though the purchases of the goods have occurred at
the level of individual firms and households.
14. It is even more peculiar to think of China having helped finance America’s huge fiscal deficit,
arising partly from the Iraq War, partly from the tax cut – for the richest people in the richest
country in the world.
15. I would argue, accordingly, that Korean Chaebols should not be a model of China’s business
organization.
16. Although it will still be important for China to guard itself against abusive lending practices,
and to adopt bankruptcy laws which do not reward financial institutions for making bad loans.
There is concern that recent changes in bankruptcy law in the United States have done just
that, and are contributing to stresses among lower- and even middle-income individuals, who
already face problems of stagnant incomes. These problems have been compounded by the fact
that more than 50 million Americans do not have health insurance; some studies suggest that
a significant fraction of individuals who are forced into personal bankruptcy have confronted
major medical expenses. There are important lessons from these experiences for China. China
is also expanding uncollateralized consumer debt, e.g. credit cards. The experience of Korea
provides a cautionary note, which Chinese regulators say they have taken into account.
17. One must be wary of these numbers. Some analysts argue that it represents a gross overestimate
of the ‘true’ trade surplus because a portion, possibly a substantial portion, of the sharp increase
in trade surplus is due to over-invoicing export and under-invoicing import by the trading
companies for the purpose of gaining from the anticipated RMB revaluation. Two ways to
discourage this practice are: (a) for the Chinese government to make it clear that the appreciation will not exceed, say 3–4% per year; and (b) for capital gains taxes to be imposed, at high rates,
especially on short term capital gains associated with currency appreciation. By contrast, some
argue that the large bilateral trade surplus with the US understates that surplus because some of
the imports to the US from places like Hong Kong are really of goods made largely in China.
18. For instance, according to the Economist Intelligent Unit (xxxx?), GDP in 2006 is estimated
to have grown at 11.1%, but rural and urban household consumption at only 8.6% and 7.6%
respectively (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007).
19. Technically, what is required is that the marginal propensity to consume out of income of the
rich is lower than that of the poor.
20. According to the 2004 Economic Census (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006), the
number of small industrial and commercial enterprises was 39.2 million; by 2006, the number
was reduced to 25.7 million.
21. Some have argued that China should rely on a privately financed healthcare system. No country
has succeeded in establishing a fundamentally private healthcare system that both is efficient
and provides adequate care for the poor. America has among the most privatized healthcare
systems among the advanced industrial countries; healthcare expenditures as a percentage of
GDP is the highest in the world, and healthcare outcomes are far poorer than those in other
advanced industrial countries of comparable income. Standard theories of asymmetric information (particularly focusing on adverse selection) explain why private provision of healthcare
insurance is inefficient, marked in particular by high transaction costs. Some of the recent
‘reforms’ encouraging private insurance have exacerbated problems of ‘cream skimming’, and
are probably contributing to the increasing problems of lack of coverage.
22. As always, there is some debate about the numbers. Some argue that GDP and savings are
both overstated, because included in real estate investment is the value of land (there are often
large capital gains associated with real estate developments; value of the capital gain on the
land should be treated as a transfer payment, but typically is not). Others argue that there
is underreporting of services; an earlier correction lead to a marked decrease in the savings
ratio; some argue that there is still some underreporting. Finally, some believe that there is
overreporting of exports and underreporting of imports, as part of circumvention of short-term
capital controls. In this view, a substantial part of the current account surplus is speculative
capital flows. Taking this into account would again lower the domestic savings rate.
23. Even within the advanced industrial countries, there are huge disparities between best and
average practices, implying there is typically considerable scope for increases in overall
efficiency.
24. I argued similarly in my book Making globalization work, Chapter 8 (Stiglitz 2006b).
25. With each country keeping the revenue from the carbon tax, the distributional consequences arise
from the differences in the deadweight losses associated with the imposition of the carbon tax
relative to the imposition of alternative taxes. In many cases, the switch towards a carbon tax
would actually be welfare enhancing. Even for countries that have already optimized their tax
structure, the social cost is measured by the difference in the Harberger triangles, and the differences
in the social cost are related to the differences in these differences, which are likely to be small.
26. There are several reasons why a poorly designed patent system may impede the pace of
innovation. Knowledge is the most important input into the production of knowledge; by making
knowledge less accessible, the pace of innovation will be reduced. This can be partially mitigated
by disclosure requirements; interestingly, some advocates of strong intellectual property rights
have argued that disclosure violates their property rights. As we shall explain later, all rights
are associated with responsibilities, and one of the responsibilities long associated with good
intellectual property regimes is a responsibility of full disclosure.
Another reason is that intellectual property can lead to increased monopolization, and it has
long been recognized that monopolies have less of an incentive to innovate than do competitive
markets. The ability of a monopolist like Microsoft to squash successful innovators like Netscape,
who innovated in the area of browsers, and RealNetwork, which innovated in the area of media
players, almost surely has an enervating effect on innovation – another reason why countries
need strong anti-trust laws.
Still a third problem arises from ‘patent thickets’, the uncertainties that innovators face that
their innovation will trespass on the intellectual property on others.
27. The fact that there is no single best IP system is exhibited by the conflicts of views over the use
of labelling, where many European countries arguing for tight protection of the use of labelling
(e.g. of names like Parma ham) and the US, which more often copies these labels from other countries, arguing on the other side. For China, the development of strong trademark protection
is important in providing incentives for the development of brand name reputations associated
with the production of high quality goods.
28. The prize system works best when there are well-defined objectives – a cure for a disease, a
light long-lived battery for running a car, a more fuel efficient engine. The Royal Society of
Arts in the UK has long advocated and used prizes for stimulating innovation.
29. For a fuller discussion of the prize system, and the problems with the patent system, see my
recent book Making globalization work, Chapter 5 (Stiglitz 2006b).
30. There are a host of examples of this. Developing countries have been particularly concerned
with ‘biopiracy’, the patenting of traditional knowledge. Among the oft-cited examples are the
patents granted by the US for basmati rice, the healing properties of turmeric, and neem oil.
31. For instance, the dynamic benefits of extending the lifetime of copyright (especially for
copyrights already granted) to 70 years beyond the lifetime of the author almost surely were
less than the static costs.
32. One of the reasons is that the US and the drug companies often put enormous pressure on
countries not to issue these compulsory licenses.
33. There is broad consensus within these countries about the desirability of their model, though, as
usual, there are differences in views concerning ‘fine tuning’ of the system. Thus, the recently
elected government in Sweden has called for some reduction in social benefits – but even with
those reductions, the level of social protection will be far stronger than, say, in the United States.
34. These ‘transaction costs’, of course, provide much of the motivation: they represent an important
source of income to financial markets.
35. This view is often associated with Ronald Coase (1960), and has been popularized by Hernando
De Soto (2000). It was suggested, for instance, that even problems of externalities could be
handled efficiently; ‘all’ one had to do was to determine who had the property rights over air.
In fact, however, Coase’s ‘conjecture’ about the role of property rights has been shown to have
limited applicability: there has to be essentially perfect information and zero transaction costs.
With transactions costs and imperfect information, Coasian bargaining will in general lead to
inefficient resource allocations. But even were Coase’s conjecture correct, in some sense, it
would leave open the difficult question of the assignment of property rights, which could have
large distributional consequences.
36. Earlier, in the 1950s, AT&T agreed in response to anti-trust action against it to make its patents
available to others.
37. As a result of exacerbating the significance of agency costs, e.g. associated with tenancy
relationships. See, e.g. Braverman and Stiglitz (1989, 185–201). Mild restrictions on property
rights – for instance, allowing workers to borrow against the produce of the land, but not against
the land itself – can reduce the likelihood of these undesirable outcomes.
38. There are important administrative issues concerning the point of collection, which I do not
have time to address here.
39. For a discussion of implications of imperfect information for monetary policy, see Stiglitz
(2004a, 2006a).
40. And individuals with finite lives. See, e.g. Stiglitz (2004b). For a discussion of why financial
market liberalization may not be desirable, see, e.g. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003).
41. For instance, subsidizing loss-making, state-owned enterprises.
42. Justin Lin has argued that this is far from the most important reason, simply because the
real reason that national savings is so high has to do with high corporate savings, not high
household savings. In fact, Chinese households’ saving is not particularly high compared to
other developing countries. For example, China’s household saving in 2005 was 16% of GDP,
and even at its peak, in 1996, it was only 20% of GDP, whereas India’s was 22%. What makes
China’s saving rate so high is the corporate saving, which is more than 20% of GDP.
43. Better private insurance would also reduce the need for precautionary savings; but especially in
the area of health, there cannot be reliance on private insurance. Private insurance will devote
excessive efforts to ‘cream skimming’, resulting in high transactions costs and large distortions.
44. For instance, the urbanization level increased from 36.2% to 43% in the five years from 2000 to
2005. The increased percentage of urbanization was larger than that in the 25 years from 1953
to 1978. See Wang et al. (2007).
45. See, for instance, my Nobel lecture, ‘Information and the hange in the paradigm in economics’
(Stiglitz 2002). My book Roaring Nineties (Stiglitz 2003a) provided a popular account of how these information imperfections had led to the bubble of the 1990s, and its subsequent crashing,
at such cost to the American economy.
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