美国为何衰败 中国是世界的希望
经济和政治潮流是否正在从美国转向中国？
威廉·莫洛尼 William Moloney 是科罗拉多基督教大学百年学院保守派思想高级研究员，曾就读于牛津大学和伦敦大学，并在哈佛大学获得博士学位。 他是前科罗拉多州教育专员。April 4, 2023
概括
1...威廉·莫洛尼：自朝鲜战争结束以来，中国已经有70年没有派出军队参战了。
2...莫洛尼表示，中国实力的增强和美国实力的衰落并没有被忽视，美国的敌人和盟友最近都采取了大胆的独立举措，这在几年前似乎是不可想象的，莫洛尼写道。
3...他说，如果一些欧洲人在美国人身上看到的不仅仅是一丝傲慢，他们认为自己应该忠诚地、毫无疑问地追随美国卷入另一场亚洲冲突——这一次面对的对手比塔利班强大得多，这也不是没有道理的。 。
有趣的是，当今世界军事院校中研究最广泛的战争专著之一，是由一位生活在 27 世纪前的中国将军撰写的。 孙子（公元前 544-496 年）《孙子兵法》中最著名的引述是：“最高的兵法是不战而屈人之兵”，但还有许多其他格言值得我们遵循。 那些能够预测中国意图并将该国战略与美国战略进行对比的人的利益。 特别重要的是，“谁想赢，首先要考虑成本”及其推论，“没有一个国家从长期战争中受益的例子”。
自朝鲜战争结束以来，中国已有70年没有派出军队参战。 相比之下，美国在同一时期几乎一直直接或通过代理人处于战争状态。 除了极少数例外，中国和俄罗斯一样，历来只在与其有长期种族和/或文化联系的边境地区展示军事实力。 美国与其帝国前身英国一样，经常寻求将其军事意志强加于世界偏远角落。
美国再次像其英国前辈一样，凭借其巨大的经济实力，长期以来一直能够发挥非凡的全球影响力，而直到最近，中国——在现代从来不是一个富裕或经济占主导地位的国家——一直更加谨慎 ，更喜欢摇动它的军刀而不是使用它们。
如今，正当中国经济和军事实力突飞猛进、全球影响力迅速扩大之际，美国却日益受到长期战争累积效应的拖累，并被英国历史学家保罗·肯尼迪在1987年描述的“帝国主义”所削弱， 过度伸展。”
中国实力的增强和美国实力的衰落并没有被忽视，美国的敌人和盟友最近都采取了大胆的独立举措，这在几年前似乎是不可想象的。 中国成功地促成了伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的和解，随后俄罗斯又赞助了沙特与另一个宿敌叙利亚之间的会谈，这扰乱了美国建立打击伊朗支持的恐怖主义共同战线的努力。 在心存不安的美国盟友中，日本为了维护自己的国家利益，直言不讳地拒绝履行对俄罗斯的能源制裁，这令华盛顿震惊；法国总统马克龙在访问中国时发表讲话，暗示北约在加强防务方面可能没有统一战线 台湾的。
美国两党政界人士对马克龙言论过度表达愤慨，却无视了这样一个事实：法国总统表达的情绪可能是许多欧洲公民的共同观点，欧洲外交关系委员会 2019 年的一项民意调查显示，受访者显示，法国总统表达的情绪可能是许多欧洲公民的共同观点。 当时他们坚信，他们的国家应该在美国和中国之间的任何冲突中保持中立。 显然，团结欧洲人反对历史上对邻近国家构成威胁的俄罗斯是一回事，但为与遥远的中国发生潜在的军事冲突争取支持则是完全不同的主张，因为中国与中国没有侵略历史，而且对欧洲经济至关重要。 每个欧洲国家。
值得注意的是，欧洲对美国领导力的质量和可靠性日益怀疑，特别是考虑到最近对美国从阿富汗灾难性撤军的做法没有征求意见、措手不及的痛苦记忆。 因此，如果一些欧洲人在美国人身上看到的不仅仅是一丝傲慢，他们认为自己应该忠诚地、毫无疑问地跟随美国卷入另一场亚洲冲突——这一次面对的是比塔利班强大得多的对手，这也不是没有道理的。
美国的长期朋友们还担心的是，今天的美国似乎是一个被日益恶性的自相残杀政治深深困扰的国家——用亚伯拉罕·林肯的永恒名言来说，“一个内部分裂的家庭”——因此对与盟友进行合理的对话不太敏感 看得更清楚一点。 马克龙可能就是这样一位值得尊重而不是谴责的朋友。
Are economic and political tides turning away from America and toward China?
by William Moloney, Opinion Contributor - 04/20/23
Summary
1... William Moloney: China has not sent its armies to war in 70 years, since the end of the Korean War.
2... Moloney says the waxing of Chinese power and the waning of America’s has not gone unnoticed and U.S. enemies and allies alike have recently undertaken bold independent initiatives that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago, Moloney writes.
3... He says it is hardly unreasonable if some Europeans see more than a touch of arrogance in Americans who think they should loyally and unquestioningly follow the United States into yet another Asian conflict — this time against an adversary vastly more formidable than the Taliban.
It is interesting that one of the most widely studied treatises on war in the world’s military academies today was written by a Chinese general who lived 27 centuries ago. The best-known quotation from “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) is, “[The] supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” but there are many other maxims that should merit the interest of those who would divine the intentions of China and contrast the strategy of that country with that of the United States. Of particular relevance is,“Who wishes to win must first consider the cost” and its corollary, “There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged war.”
China has not sent its armies to war in 70 years, since the end of the Korean War. In contrast, the United States, over the same period, has been at war directly or by proxy almost constantly. With rare exception, China, like Russia, has historically flexed its military muscle only in areas on its borders with which it has longstanding ethnic and/or cultural ties. The United States, like its imperial predecessor, Great Britain, has regularly sought to impose its will militarily in far-flung corners of the world.
Now, at the very moment when China’s economic and military might is surging and its global influence rapidly expanding, the United States is increasingly being weighed down by the cumulative effect of prolonged war and weakened by what British historian Paul Kennedy described in 1987 as “imperial overstretch.”
The waxing of Chinese power and the waning of America’s has not gone unnoticed and U.S. enemies and allies alike have recently undertaken bold independent initiatives that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago. China’s success in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia — soon followed by Russia’s sponsoring talks between Saudis and another longtime foe, Syria — has unhinged U.S. efforts to build a common front against Iran-backed terrorism. Among disquieted U.S. allies, Japan stunned Washington by asserting its own national interest by bluntly refusing to honor energy sanctions against Russia, and then French President Emmanuel Macron made remarks while visiting China that signaled there may be no united NATO front in efforts to bolster the defense of Taiwan.
The intemperate expressions of indignation over Macron’s remarks by U.S. politicians of both parties blithely overlooks the fact that the French president is voicing sentiments likely shared by the many European citizens, as revealed by a 2019 poll done by the European Council on Foreign Relations that showed respondents strongly believed then that their countries should remain neutral in any conflict between the United States and China. Clearly, it is one thing to rally Europeans against a nearby and historically threatening Russia, but an entirely different proposition to enlist support for potential military conflict with distant China, with whom there is no history of aggression and which is vitally important to the economies of every European country.
