面对美国和欧盟保护主义抬头，中国经济取得成功
https://english.news.cn/20240404/3c9664cd50bb47ffb43cabd105056109/c.html
Jeffrey Sachs 2024年4月4日 新华社
西方媒体充斥着对中国经济的不祥预感。我们经常被告知，中国的快速增长已经结束，中国的数据被操纵，中国的金融危机迫在眉睫，中国将在过去的四分之一世纪中遭受与日本同样的停滞。 这是美国的宣传，而不是现实。是的，中国经济面临着阻力—主要是美国造成的。然而，中国能够—而且我相信将会—克服美国造成的阻力，继续走经济快速发展的道路。
基本事实是，2023年中国国内生产总值（GDP）增长5.2%，而美国为2.5%。按人均计算，增长差距更大：中国为5.4%，而美国为2%。2024年，中国将再次大幅超过美国。 尽管美国媒体发表了激烈的言论，但并没有出现严重的增长危机。是的，中国在变得更加富裕的过程中正在放缓，但其增长速度仍然比美国和欧洲快得多。
问题是肯定存在的，但主要来自美国，而不是来自中国经济内部。
首先是认知问题。美国正在推动对中国的负面叙述。事实上，我们最近了解到，美国前总统唐纳德·特朗普从2019年开始就责成中央情报局在社交媒体上散布有关中国经济的恶意宣传。中央情报局的一项具体策略是唱衰中国重要的“一带一路”倡议。
其次，美国保护主义抬头。从2000年到2020年的20年里，中国忙于建设新型绿色数字产业：掌握电动汽车、5G、电池供应链、太阳能组件、风力涡轮机、第四代核电、长距离电力传输和 其他尖端技术。与此同时，白宫和国会掌握在石油、天然气和煤炭游说团体手中，因此没有针对新能源技术的战略。最后，美国总统乔·拜登和国会同意保护美国工业，让美国有时间收复部分失地。
第三，还有美国维持美国对中国“主导地位”的”大战略”。对于美国安全机构来说，与中国进行诚实的竞争还不够。美国政府还对中国经济设置障碍。美国会不遗余力地破坏中国经济，这似乎令人难以置信，但它确实这样做了。2015年3月，美国高级外交官、前大使罗伯特·布莱克威尔 (Robert Blackwill) 在与合著者阿什利·泰利斯 (Ashley Tellis) 共同发表于外交关系委员会的一篇文章中阐述了这种做法。在我看来，这篇文章是华盛顿对华新政策的公开启动，奥巴马、特朗普和拜登总统都遵循了这一政策。
为了理解美国的游戏计划，值得详细引用布莱克威尔和特利斯的观点：
自成立以来，美国始终奉行一项宏伟战略，重点是获取并保持对各种竞争对手的卓越实力，首先是北美大陆，然后是西半球，最后是全球......
由于美国将中国“融入”自由国际秩序的努力现已对美国在亚洲的主导地位产生了新的威胁，并最终可能对美国的全球实力构成相应的挑战，因此华盛顿需要一项新的以中国为中心的大战略 平衡中国实力的崛起，而不是继续协助其崛起。
这些构成替代性平衡战略核心的变化必须源于这样一种明确认识：保持美国在全球体系中的主导地位应该仍然是美国二十一世纪大战略的中心目标。
面对中国实力的崛起，要维持这一地位，除其他外，还需要振兴美国经济，培育那些赋予美国相对于其他国家不对称经济优势的颠覆性创新；在美国的朋友和盟友之间建立新的优惠贸易安排，通过有意识地排除中国的工具来增加彼此的利益；重建一个涉及美国盟友的技术控制制度，阻止中国获得军事和战略能力，使其能够对美国及其伙伴造成“高杠杆战略伤害”；共同增强美国在中国周边的朋友和盟友的权力政治能力；尽管中国反对，但提高美国军队在亚洲边缘地区有效投射力量的能力—所有这些
同时继续以符合其对美国国家利益重要性的多种方式与中国合作。
布莱克威尔和泰利斯的这些言论之所以引人注目，有两个原因。首先，他们毫不含糊地明确阐述了美国的“大战略”；保持美国在全球体系中的“首要地位”，包括对中国的“首要地位”。其次，他们早在2015年3月就列出了美国在过去十年中奉行的实际政策。
考虑一下布莱克威尔和泰利斯推荐的五项政策。
首先，重振美国经济。好吧，这很公平。美国需要整顿其经济秩序。
其次，与亚洲建立新的美国贸易安排，”有意识地将中国排除在外”。这是一个荒谬的想法，因为中国是亚洲最大的经济体，但奥巴马试图（并失败）建立跨太平洋伙伴关系协定来排除中国，而特朗普和拜登都对中国公然推行保护主义，特别是以单边关税的形式 增长违反了世界贸易组织（WTO）的承诺。
第三，重建“技术控制制度”，限制中国获得高科技。目前这种情况正在进行中，最引人注目的是对向中国出口先进半导体技术的新限制。
第四，在中国边境建立政治军事联盟。 这就是美国与AUKUS（澳大利亚-英国-美国）、四方（澳大利亚-印度-日本-美国）和美国-日本-菲律宾三方的战略。
第五，“不顾中国的反对”，在亚洲边缘地区建设美军。澳大利亚、日本、菲律宾和其他地方也发生了这种情况。
美国的“首要地位”目标被危险地误导了。由于中国的人口是美国的四倍，美国经济规模保持超过中国的唯一途径就是中国的人均国内生产总值继续低于美国的四分之一。没有理由发生这种情况。 如果真是这样，这将意味着中国遭受巨大苦难，全球活力也将遭受巨大损失。
首要地位不应该是美国的目标，也不应该是中国的目标，更不应该是任何国家的目标。 大国唯一明智的目标是共同繁荣、共同安全以及针对环境可持续性与和平等共同挑战进行全球合作。
美国的策略—利用贸易、技术、金融和军事政策来阻止另一个国家——对美国来说并不新鲜。 当然，这是美国在20世纪50年代至1980年代“遏制”苏联的游戏计划。它在20 世纪80年代末再次推出，以阻止美国盟友日本的快速增长，因为日本在工业领域的竞争中胜过美国。 美国迫使日本同意“自愿”出口限制和日元估值过高。 由此，日本经济增速大幅下滑，陷入长期金融危机。
然而，中国不是日本。它更大、更强大，而且不屈服于美国。与20世纪90年代的日本不同，当美国推行贸易和技术政策以减缓中国经济增长时，中国不需要也不会袖手旁观。
要理解中国的政策选择，请回想一下国民收入账户恒等式：GDP 等于 C+I+G+X-M。 即中国的GDP可被消费，C； 投资了，我； 由政府消费，G； 出口，X； 或用于替代进口，M； 中国的出口可以销往美国和欧洲，也可以销往世界其他地区。
近年来，美国和欧洲市场对中国出口越来越封闭。2023年，美国从中国进口了4270亿美元的商品，低于2022年的5360亿美元。从中国进口占美国GDP的比例来看，2018年为2.6%，但2023年已降至仅1.6%。这是特朗普和拜登领导下的美国保护主义的结果。
现在，这是中国面临的政策选择。 随着中国商品和服务生产持续增长，而对美国出口下降，中国面临整体商品供应过剩的局面。 如果不采取政策措施来抵消，供应过剩将降低GDP，甚至可能导致中国经济衰退。
美国要求中国增加消费以抵消出口下降。例如，中国可以通过减税来刺激消费。美国建议的问题在于，中国可能会像美国那样转向更低的增长和更高的预算赤字。
中国的第二个选择是增加国内投资，例如加速中国向零碳经济的转变。增加国内投资来抵消部分对美国出口的减少是有好处的。
第三个选择是刺激政府消费。该政策也可能导致经济增长放缓和预算赤字上升。
第四个选择是增加对发展中国家的出口。该方法有一个功德无量。 如果美国市场关闭，欧洲市场也关闭（随着欧洲保护主义变得更加严重），那么中国可以将出口转移到新兴市场。 其中一些会自动发生。由于美国从中国的购买量减少，而从越南的购买量增加，那么越南将从中国购买更多的中间产品来加工并出口到美国。
然而，一些出口的重新定位将需要中国采取新的政策。新兴经济体的购买力普遍低于美国和欧洲。是的，新兴经济体希望购买中国提供的产品—太阳能组件、风力涡轮机、5G等等—但需要更多贷款才能做到这一点。中国要想大幅增加对新兴经济体的出口，就必须增加对这些经济体的贷款和外国直接投资，例如通过扩大“一带一路”倡议以及亚洲基础设施投资银行和新开发银行的贷款。
中国决策者可能会抵制增加对新兴经济体的贷款，因为其中一些经济体已经陷入债务困境。然而，新兴经济体普遍具有很高的增长潜力。他们的债务并不太高—只要债务有足够长的偿还期（到期日）。新兴经济体主要需要时间实现增长，从而能够偿还中国的贷款。
这是我自己对中国经济形势的总结。 中国经济供给侧持续快速增长。 中国的潜在GDP继续以每年5%或更快的速度增长。此外，产出的质量很高，而且还在不断提高。中国是世界其他国家所需的低成本商品生产国：零碳能源系统、5G数字网络和高质量的基础设施（如快速城际铁路）。
中国的问题不是供给侧，而是需求侧。中国面临需求限制，主要是因为美国对中国向美国市场出口设置壁垒，而欧洲似乎也可能效仿美国。尽管中国有可能通过增加国内消费来抵消出口放缓的影响，但最好还是通过扩大“一带一路”等重要项目来增加对新兴经济体的出口。为了谨慎地这样做，中国必须增加对新兴经济体的长期贷款。
我不否认中国经济还面临其他挑战，比如房地产暂时投资过度，或者一些地方政府过度借贷。 但我认为这些问题是短期的、周期性的，而不是长期的、结构性的。当然，还有一些领域需要进一步改革，例如户口制度。然而，在这方面，此类改革挑战仍在持续，而且很可能得到成功解决。
我希望看到中国继续快速增长，是的，以当前市场价格和汇率计算，中国的国内生产总值超过美国，这符合一个人口比美国多四倍的国家的要求。我注意到，就购买力而言，中国在2017年就已经超过了美国（根据国际货币基金组织的数据），而美国并没有遭遇什么可怕的事情。
中国经济的发展不仅惠及中国，也惠及世界。中国提出了从现代疟疾治疗方法（青蒿素）到低成本零碳能源系统和低成本5G系统等有效的新技术。 我们应该为中国持续快速发展加油。 我们应该抛开幼稚的“至上”观念，采取成人的相互尊重、和平共处、全球合作的理念来保护地球。世界不想要也不需要单一的主导国家。事实上，这在当今世界根本不可行。 对于世界经济来说，绝对最好的解决方案是中国、美国和欧洲保持开放的贸易和共同商定的产业政策。然而，如果美国和欧洲对中国采取强烈的保护主义态度，那么中国的最佳应对措施就是加快与新兴经济体的成功且不断发展的贸易和金融关系。
China's economic success in face of growing U.S., EU protectionism
Jeffrey D. Sachs | April 4, 2024 | Xinhua
The Western press is filled with stories of foreboding about the Chinese economy. We are told regularly that China's fast growth is over, that China's data are manipulated, that a Chinese financial crisis looms, and that China will suffer the same stagnation as Japan during the past quarter century. This is U.S. propaganda, not reality. Yes, the Chinese economy faces headwinds -- mainly created by the United States. Yet China can -- and I believe will -- overcome the U.S.-created headwinds and continue on its path of rapid economic development.
The basic fact is that China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at 5.2 percent in 2023, compared with 2.5 percent in the United States. On a per capita basis, the growth gap is even larger: 5.4 percent in China compared with 2 percent in the United States. In 2024, China will again significantly outpace the United States. There is no great growth crisis despite the fervid rhetoric in the U.S. press. Yes, China is slowing as it gets richer, but it is still growing considerably faster than in the United States and Europe.
There are problems to be sure, but the main ones come from the United States, not from inside China's economy.
First, there is the perception problem. The United States is pushing a negative narrative about China. We actually learned recently that former U.S. President Donald Trump tasked the CIA with spreading malicious propaganda about the Chinese economy on social media starting back in 2019. One specific CIA tactic was to bad-mouth China's important Belt and Road Initiative.
Second, there is the rise of U.S. protectionism. During the 20 years from 2000 to 2020, China was busy building up its new green and digital industries: mastering electric vehicles, 5G, battery supply chains, solar modules, wind turbines, fourth-generation nuclear power, long-distance power transmission, and other cutting-edge technologies. The White House and Congress, in the meantime, were in the hands of the oil, gas, and coal lobbies, and therefore without a strategy for the new energy technologies. Finally, U.S. President Joe Biden and Congress agreed to protect U.S. industries to give America time to recover some lost ground.
Third, there is the U.S. "Grand Strategy" to maintain U.S. "primacy" over China. For the U.S. security establishment, it's not good enough to compete with China on an honest basis. The U.S. government also puts obstacles in the way of China's economy. It seems incredible that the United States would go out of its way to undermine China's economy, and yet it actually does so. Such an approach was spelled out by a senior U.S. diplomat, former Ambassador Robert Blackwill, in March 2015, in an article for the Council on Foreign Relations published with co-author Ashley Tellis. The article, in my view, was the public launch of a new Washington policy towards China, one that has been followed by Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden.
It is worth quoting Blackwill and Tellis at length to understand the U.S. game plan:
Since its founding, the United States has consistently pursued a grand strategy focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals, first on the North American continent, then in the Western hemisphere, and finally globally...
Because the American effort to "integrate" China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia -- and could eventually result in a consequential challenge to American power globally -- Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.
These changes, which constitute the heart of an alternative balancing strategy, must derive from the clear recognition that preserving U.S. primacy in the global system ought to remain the central objective of the United States' grand strategy in the twenty-first century.
Sustaining this status in the face of rising Chinese power requires, among other things, revitalizing the U.S. economy to nurture those disruptive innovations that bestow on the United States asymmetric economic advantages over others; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends and allies to increase their mutual gains through instruments that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime involving U.S. allies that prevents China from acquiring military and strategic capabilities enabling it to inflict "high-leverage strategic harm" on the United States and its partners; concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China's periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition -- all the while continuing to work with China in diverse ways that befit its importance to U.S. national interests.
These statements by Blackwill and Tellis are remarkable for two reasons. First, they explicitly spell out America's "Grand Strategy" in no uncertain terms: to preserve America's "primacy" in the global system, including over China. Second, they listed -- already in March 2015 -- the actual policies pursued by the United States during the past decade.
Consider the five policies recommended by Blackwill and Tellis.
First, revitalize the U.S. economy. Okay, that's fair enough. The United States needs to get its economic house in order.
Second, create new U.S. trade arrangements with Asia that "consciously exclude China." That's an absurd idea, since China is the largest economy in Asia, yet Obama tried (and failed) to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership to exclude China, while both Trump and Biden pursued blatant protectionism against China, especially in the form of unilateral tariff increases in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments.
Third, recreate a "technology-control regime" to limit China's access to high-tech. That is currently underway, most notably with the new limits on the export of advanced semiconductor technology to China.
Fourth, build up political-military alliances on China's borders. This is the U.S. strategy with AUKUS (Australia-UK-United States), the Quad (Australia-India-Japan-United States), and the United States-Japan-Philippines Triad.
Fifth, build up the U.S. military along the Asian rimlands "despite Chinese opposition." This too is happening with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and elsewhere.
America's aim of "primacy" is dangerously misguided. Since China has four times the U.S. population, the only way for the U.S. economy to stay larger than China's would be for China to remain stuck at less than one-fourth of the U.S. GDP per person. There is no reason for that to happen. If it did, it would mean a lot of suffering in China and a great loss of global dynamism.
Primacy should not be the U.S. goal, or China's goal, or indeed the goal of any country. The only sensible goal for the major powers is mutual prosperity, common security, and global cooperation regarding common challenges such as environmental sustainability and peace.
The American playbook -- using trade, technology, financial, and military policies to stop another country -- is not new for the United States. It was, of course, the U.S. game plan to "contain" the Soviet Union during the 1950s-1980s. It was rolled out again in the late 1980s to stop the rapid growth of Japan, an American ally, because Japan was outcompeting the U.S. industry. The United States forced Japan to agree to "voluntary" export restraints and an overvalued Yen. Thus, Japan's economic growth plummeted and Japan entered a prolonged financial crisis.
China, however, is not Japan. It is far larger, more powerful, and not subservient to the United States. Unlike Japan in the 1990s, China need not and will not sit idly by as the United States pursues trade and technology policies to slow China's economic growth.
To understand China's policy choices, recall the national income account identity that GDP equals C+I+G+X-M. That is, China's GDP can be consumed, C; invested, I; consumed by the government, G; exported, X; or used to replace imports, M; China's exports can go to the United States and Europe or to the rest of the world.
In recent years, the U.S. and European markets have become increasingly closed to China's exports. In 2023, the United States imported 427 billion U.S. dollars of goods from China, down from 536 billion dollars in 2022. As a share of U.S. GDP, imports from China were 2.6 percent in 2018, but have declined to only 1.6 percent in 2023, as the result of U.S. protectionism under Trump and Biden.
Now, here then are the policy choices facing China. With the production of goods and services continuing to rise in China, and with exports to the United States falling, China faces an overall excess supply of goods. That excess supply will lower GDP and could even create a recession in China if policy measures are not taken to offset it.
The United States tells China to increase consumption to offset the fall in its exports. For example, China could cut taxes to stimulate consumption. The problem with the U.S. recommendation is that China would likely shift to lower growth and higher budget deficits, as in the United States.
A second option would be for China to increase domestic investments, for example to accelerate China's shift to a zero-carbon economy. There is some merit to boosting domestic investment to offset part of the reduction of exports to the United States.
A third option would be to boost government consumption. That policy too would likely entail slower growth and higher budget deficits.
A fourth option is to increase exports to the developing countries. That approach has a great deal of merit. If the U.S. market is closed, and the European market is closing (as Europe becomes more protectionist), then China can shift exports to the emerging markets. Some of that will happen automatically. As the United States buys less from China and more, say, from Vietnam, then Vietnam will buy more intermediate goods from China to process and export to the United States.
Some of the reorientation of exports, however, will require new Chinese policies. The purchasing power of the emerging economies is generally lower than in the United States and Europe. Yes, the emerging economies would like to buy what China has on offer -- solar modules, wind turbines, 5G, and the rest -- but will need more loans to do so. For China to sell substantially more to the emerging economies, it will have to boost loans and foreign direct investments to those economies, for example by expanding the Belt and Road Initiative and lending by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.
There may be some resistance among China's policy-makers to increasing loans to the emerging economies, since some of those economies are already debt-distressed. Yet, the emerging economies generally have a very high growth potential. Their debt is not too high -- as long as the debt has a long enough pay-back period (maturity). The emerging economies mainly need time to grow and thereby to be able to repay China for the loans.
Here, then, is my own summary of the economic situation in China. The supply side of China's economy continues to grow rapidly. China's potential GDP continues to rise at 5 percent per year or faster. Moreover, the quality of that output is high and rising. China is the world's low-cost producer of goods that the rest of the world needs: zero-carbon energy systems, 5G digital networks, and high-quality infrastructure (such as fast inter-city rail).
China's problem is not on the supply side, but on the demand side. China faces demand constraints mainly because the United States has put up barriers against China's exports to the U.S. market, and Europe seems likely to follow the United States in this. While China could potentially offset that slowdown in exports by increasing domestic consumption, it would be well advised to increase its exports to the emerging economies, in part by expanding important programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative. To do so prudently, China would have to increase its long-term lending to the emerging economies.
I don't deny that there are other challenges facing China's economy, such as some temporary over-investment in real estate, or some over-borrowing by some local governments. Yet, I believe that such problems are short-term and cyclical, not long-term and structural. There are also areas that need further reform, to be sure, such as the hukou (urban residence) system. Yet here too, such reform challenges are ongoing and very likely to be solved successfully.
I would like to see China continue its rapid growth, and yes, overtake the United States in GDP at current market prices and exchange rates, befitting a country that is four times larger than the United States in population. I note that in purchasing-power terms, China already overtook the United States in 2017 (according to IMF data) and nothing awful befell the United States.
China's economic growth benefits not only China but the whole world. China has brought forward new and effective technologies ranging from a modern cure for malaria (artemisinin) to low-cost zero-carbon energy systems and low-cost 5G systems. We should be rooting for China's continued rapid development. We should put aside childish ideas of "primacy" and adopt adult ideas of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and global cooperation to protect the planet. The world does not want or need a single dominant country. Indeed, that's not even feasible in our world today. The absolute best solution for the world economy would be for China, the United States, and Europe to maintain open trade and mutually agreed industrial policies. Yet if the United States and Europe turn strongly protectionist against China, then the best response for China is to hasten its successful and growing trade and financial relations with the emerging economies.
