https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo24475328.html
Douglas A. Irwin
达特茅斯学院经济系社会科学 John Sloan Dickey 三世纪教授。他是 NBER 的研究员。
达特茅斯学院是美国新罕布什尔州汉诺威的一所私立常春藤联盟研究型大学。达特茅斯由 Eleazar Wheelock 于 1769 年创立，是美国独立战争前特许成立的九所殖民地学院之一。
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美国应该向其他国家开放贸易，还是应该保护国内产业免受外国竞争？这个问题一直是美国历史上激烈政治冲突的根源。詹姆斯·麦迪逊在《联邦党人文集》中指出，这种冲突是不可避免的，因为贸易政策涉及经济利益的冲突。贸易的赢家和输家之间的斗争一直很激烈，因为美元和工作都岌岌可危：根据选择的政策，一些行业、农民和工人将繁荣发展，而另一些行业、农民和工人将遭受损失。
道格拉斯·A·欧文的《商业冲突》是迄今为止美国贸易政策最权威、最全面的历史著作，清晰地描绘了塑造美国贸易政策的各种经济和政治力量。从一开始，贸易政策就分裂了美国——首先是托马斯·杰斐逊宣布对所有对外贸易实施禁运，然后是南卡罗来纳州因进口税过高而威胁脱离联邦。内战期间，贸易保护主义开始转向，随后不断受到政治攻击。然后，大萧条期间对斯姆特霍利关税的争议导致政策转向更自由的贸易，涉及最终产生世界贸易组织的贸易协定。欧文通过展示不同的经济利益如何按地理区域分组来理解这段动荡的历史，这意味着每一项拟议的政策变化都会在国会找到支持者和反对者。
在特朗普政府考虑对美国贸易政策进行重大改变之际，欧文全面的历史视角有助于阐明当前的辩论。《商业冲突》经过深入研究，富有洞察力和细节，为美国过去和现在的贸易政策提供了宝贵而持久的见解。
目录
简介
第一部分：税收
1. 争取独立的斗争，1763-1789 年
2. 新国家的贸易政策，1789-1816 年
3. 地区冲突和危机，1816-1833 年
4. 关税和平与内战，1833-1865 年
第二部分：限制
5. 关税改革的失败，1865-1890 年
6. 保护主义根深蒂固，1890-1912 年
7. 政策逆转和漂移，1912-1928 年
8. 霍利-斯穆特关税和大萧条，1928-1932 年
第三部分：互惠
9. 新政和互惠贸易协定，1932-1943 年
10. 建立多边贸易体系， 1943–1950
11. 新秩序和新压力，1950–1979
12. 贸易冲击和应对，1979–1992
13. 从全球化到两极分化，1992–2017
结论
道格拉斯·A·欧文 (Douglas A. Irwin) 著《商业冲突：美国贸易政策史》
https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/spring/summer-2018/clashing-over-commerce-history-us-trade-policy-douglas-irwin?
2018 年春/夏 • CATO JOURNAL
作者：丹尼尔·J·伊肯森 ??(Daniel J. Ikenson) 丹尼尔·J·伊肯森 ??(Daniel J. Ikenson) 赫伯特·A·施蒂费尔贸易政策研究中心前主任
在唐纳德·特朗普 (Donald Trump) 动荡的总统任期的前 16 个月里，贸易、关税和美国在全球的角色等主题经济问题在公众中占据了显著地位。尽管在 2017 年之前可能并不那么明显，但美国贸易政策的实施和后果——或许更重要的是围绕它的误解——长期以来一直激起人们的热情。
这对达特茅斯经济学教授道格拉斯·A·欧文来说并不是什么新鲜事，他关于美国贸易政策史的最新论文详细记录了“关税”如何引发激烈的政治、经济和宪法辩论，并一直是从共和国成立到现在部门冲突的持续根源。
据欧文说，《商业冲突：美国贸易政策史》一书是为了填补一个明显的空白而写的。上一部出版的美国贸易政策史主要著作是 1931 年出版的《美国关税史》第 8 版，作者是著名的哈佛贸易经济学家弗兰克·陶西格，他于 1916 年美国关税委员会（美国国际贸易委员会的前身）成立时成为该委员会的第一任主席。正如欧文在《冲突》中巧妙地展示的那样，自 1931 年以来，已经发生了许多贸易政策史。
但欧文并没有从陶西格离开的地方开始。他从殖民时期开始，以确保他的读者不仅了解美国贸易政策在塑造美国历史进程方面发挥了重要作用，而且了解英国的重商主义贸易政策
帝国的诸多政策——例如《航海法案》，禁止美国殖民地与其他国家之间的直接贸易，并要求所有货物必须通过英国运输——助长了日益高涨的反王室热情，最终爆发革命，并催生了一个国家的诞生。
在引言中，欧文引用了《联邦党人文集》第 10 号，詹姆斯·麦迪逊在其中指出，每个社会都存在着相互竞争的经济利益，他们对政府政策应该是什么有着截然不同的看法。麦迪逊在提到我们今天所说的贸易政策制定过程时指出：
是否应该通过限制外国制造业来鼓励国内制造业，以及在多大程度上鼓励国内制造业？这些问题将由土地所有者和制造业阶级以不同的方式决定，而且可能两者都不会只考虑正义和公共利益。…… 开明的政治家能够调整这些相互冲突的利益，并使它们都服从于公共利益，这是徒劳的。
然而，欧文的广泛论点是，尽管存在这些激烈的争论以及由这种自身利益冲突产生的摩擦和冲突，但美国贸易政策在整个国家历史上表现出了非凡的稳定性。欧文将这种稳定性归因于经济利益的地理连续性（例如宾夕法尼亚州的钢铁生产、肯塔基州的烟草种植、南卡罗来纳州的纺织制造业）和三权分立（麦迪逊的杰作），这使得艰难的政策变化不太可能发生。“生产者利益、工会、倡导团体、公共知识分子，甚至总统都可以随心所欲地要求、抗议、谴责和抱怨，”欧文写道，“但要改变现有政策，需要国会多数票和行政部门的批准。如果投票不一致，现有政策就不会改变。”
事实上，欧文认为，美国贸易政策在历史上仅发生过两次实质性转变，这两次都是为了应对导致政治重新调整的外部冲击——内战和大萧条。在这两次冲击所划定的三个时期中，政策的连续性基本占了上风。但冲击本身预示着美国贸易政策目标的全面变化。欧文简述道，这三个时期的目标按时间顺序依次为“收入、限制和互惠”。
从 1787 年建国到内战，关税的主要目的是为一个几乎没有其他资金来源的温和联邦政府的运作筹集资金。这个时代早期的大部分争论都是围绕着“仅用于收入”的关税应该有多高的问题。一些人担心过高的关税会挤压外国人的收入，从而减少美国商品出口的市场。其他人则担心联邦政府投入过多资金会助长其扩张并侵犯各州的管辖权。事实上，这些担忧是 1828 年令人憎恶的关税和 1832 年南卡罗来纳州废除危机冲突的核心。关于后一个问题，欧文带着一丝自豪指出，贸易政策非常重要，足以成为美国第一次重大宪法危机的催化剂。
虽然关税在当时偶尔被用来保护国内工业，但直到内战后，赤裸裸的保护主义才成为关税的主要动机。内战结束后，共和党崛起，共和党代表北方工业利益，几十年来，他们一直在反对南方农业利益的反对，要求得到保护。在 1865 年至 1932 年的大部分时间里，共和党控制着国会和白宫，限制进口制造业以保护美国日益增长的工业企业成为关税的主要目的。我们今天所熟知的游说业起源于这个时代。
欧文在描述 1883 年制定《杂种关税法》的立法过程时，引用了当时一位记者的话：
游说者像一群秃鹰一样涌入华盛顿，在那个冬天挤满了所有的酒店，以雇佣他们的各种相互冲突的利益的名义拉扯着政治家……两院的委员会成员都在忙于应对漫长的日程安排，以及游说者对糖、铁、羊毛、玻璃、大理石和其他数百种行业的无耻和无休止的要求。
除了少数例外，支持关税的共和党人一直影响着贸易政策，直到 20 世纪 30 年代初。随着 1930 年《关税法》（欧文称之为“斯姆特-霍利”或“霍利-斯姆特关税”）的灾难性影响波及全球，民主党重新掌权华盛顿，关税的主要功能变得更加崇高：互惠。根据欧文的论文，从 1934 年《互惠贸易协定法》到美国政府成立，关税已成为美国经济的支柱。
从 1947 年的《关税与贸易总协定》到最终于 1995 年成立世界贸易组织的多轮关贸总协定谈判，再到奥巴马总统任期，关税的主要目的都是促使外国政府进行互惠贸易自由化。
欧文还著有其他五本书，涵盖贸易政策史的不同方面和主题，其中包括《逆潮流而动：自由贸易思想史》，在这本书中，他巧妙地评估并驳斥了对亚当·斯密关于专业化和自由贸易首要地位的理论的严峻挑战。但《冲突》无疑是欧文最雄心勃勃的作品。
这本书涵盖了 250 年的贸易政策，共 693 页文本和 185 页注释和参考资料，并不适合胆小的人。但它也不会像欧文承认的那样“让人昏昏欲睡”，一些历史学家认为冗长的关税大部头是这样的。本书内容全面，细节丰富，以历史应有的方式呈现，也就是说，它以事实、客观和引人入胜的叙述方式呈现。坦率地说，那些渴望更实质性地讨论贸易政策的人会发现，这本书是一个避难所，可以让他们远离如今有线新闻和社交媒体上那些喧闹、往往缺乏事实的交流。
本书涵盖了许多子主题，包括国会将其部分宪法权力下放给行政部门背后的紧张局势和理由。当欧文开始写这本书时，他不可能知道这个主题在 2018 年会如此热门——特朗普总统似乎在通过援引陈旧的法规征收关税来测试该权力的极限。书中对一些长期存在的、具有历史意义的问题进行了深入分析——例如关税是帮助还是阻碍了美国的发展，关税政策是否是内战的原因，以及斯姆特霍利关税法案是否导致了大萧条。同样，本书还描述了历史上许多有助于塑造美国贸易政策的人物的观点和动机：富兰克林、汉密尔顿、杰斐逊、丹尼尔·韦伯斯特、科德尔·赫尔。亨利·克莱倡导“美国体系”的保护主义，让人想起典型的现代经济民族主义者。詹姆斯·波尔克的财政部长罗伯特·沃克坚持认为，对外贸易壁垒不是我们自己设立壁垒的借口，让人想起弗雷德里克·巴斯夏和米尔顿·弗里德曼。
如果说读完《冲突》后有什么主要问题挥之不去，那就是欧文是否准备好在后续版本中进行实质性修订。虽然这并没有挑战他关于美国贸易政策一直受到三个原则（税收、限制、互惠）指导的广泛论点，但似乎有理由假设，在特朗普总统的领导下，美国正在告别互惠时代，进入一个新的“R”时代：报复时代。
Clashing over Commerce A History of US Trade Policy 832 pages
https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo24475328.html
Douglas A. Irwin
The John Sloan Dickey Third Century Professor in the Social Sciences in the Department of Economics at Dartmouth College. He is a research associate of the NBER.
Dartmouth College is a private Ivy League research university in Hanover, New Hampshire, United States. Established in 1769 by Eleazar Wheelock, Dartmouth is one of the nine colonial colleges chartered before the American Revolution.
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Should the United States be open to commerce with other countries, or should it protect domestic industries from foreign competition? This question has been the source of bitter political conflict throughout American history. Such conflict was inevitable, James Madison argued in The Federalist Papers, because trade policy involves clashing economic interests. The struggle between the winners and loser from trade has always been fierce because dollars and jobs are at stake: depending on what policy is chosen, some industries, farmers, and workers will prosper, while others will suffer.
Douglas A. Irwin’s Clashing over Commerce is the most authoritative and comprehensive history of US trade policy to date, offering a clear picture of the various economic and political forces that have shaped it. From the start, trade policy divided the nation—first when Thomas Jefferson declared an embargo on all foreign trade and then when South Carolina threatened to secede from the Union over excessive taxes on imports. The Civil War saw a shift toward protectionism, which then came under constant political attack. Then, controversy over the Smoot-Hawley tariff during the Great Depression led to a policy shift toward freer trade, involving trade agreements that eventually produced the World Trade Organization. Irwin makes sense of this turbulent history by showing how different economic interests tend to be grouped geographically, meaning that every proposed policy change found ready champions and opponents in Congress.
As the Trump administration considers making major changes to US trade policy, Irwin’s sweeping historical perspective helps illuminate the current debate. Deeply researched and rich with insight and detail, Clashing over Commerce provides valuable and enduring insights into US trade policy past and present.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Part I: Revenue
1. The Struggle for Independence, 1763–1789
2. Trade Policy for the New Nation, 1789–1816
3. Sectional Conflict and Crisis, 1816–1833
4. Tariff Peace and Civil War, 1833–1865
Part II: Restriction
5. The Failure of Tariff Reform, 1865–1890
6. Protectionism Entrenched, 1890–1912
7. Policy Reversals and Drift, 1912–1928
8. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff and the Great Depression, 1928–1932
Part III: Reciprocity
9. The New Deal and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, 1932–1943
10. Creating a Multilateral Trading System, 1943–1950
11. New Order and New Stresses, 1950–1979
12. Trade Shocks and Response, 1979–1992
13. From Globalization to Polarization, 1992–2017
Conclusion
Part I: Revenue
1. The Struggle for Independence, 1763–1789
2. Trade Policy for the New Nation, 1789–1816
3. Sectional Conflict and Crisis, 1816–1833
4. Tariff Peace and Civil War, 1833–1865
Part II: Restriction
5. The Failure of Tariff Reform, 1865–1890
6. Protectionism Entrenched, 1890–1912
7. Policy Reversals and Drift, 1912–1928
8. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff and the Great Depression, 1928–1932
Part III: Reciprocity
9. The New Deal and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, 1932–1943
10. Creating a Multilateral Trading System, 1943–1950
11. New Order and New Stresses, 1950–1979
12. Trade Shocks and Response, 1979–1992
13. From Globalization to Polarization, 1992–2017
Conclusion
Clashing Over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy by Douglas A. Irwin
SPRING/?SUMMER 2018 • CATO JOURNAL
Former Director, Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy StudiesDuring the first 16 months of Donald Trump’s tumultuous presidency, the subjects of trade, tariffs, and America’s role in the global economy have featured prominently in the public square. Although it may not have been as obvious before 2017, the conduct and consequences of U.S. trade policy—and, perhaps more so, the misconceptions surrounding it—have long stirred the people’s passions.
That’s not news to Dartmouth economics professor Douglas A. Irwin, whose latest treatise on the history of U.S. trade policy documents in exquisite detail how “The Tariff” has sparked bitter political, economic, and constitutional debate and has been a persistent source of sectoral conflict from the founding of the republic to the present.
Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy was written, according to Irwin, to fill a glaring void. The last major history of U.S. trade policy to be published was the 8th edition of A Tariff History of the United States in 1931, by Frank Taussig, the famous Harvard trade economist who became the first chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission (predecessor of the U.S. International Trade Commission) when it was created in 1916. As Irwin aptly demonstrates in Clashing, much trade policy history has transpired since 1931.
But Irwin doesn’t begin where Taussig left off. He starts in colonial times to make certain his readers understand not only that U.S. trade policy played a major role in shaping the course of U.S. history, but that the mercantilist trade policies of the British Empire—such as the Navigation Acts, which precluded direct trade between the American colonies and other countries and required all goods be channeled through England—contributed to the growing anti-Crown fervor that eventually erupted into revolution and the birth of a nation.
In the introduction, Irwin references Federalist 10, in which James Madison notes that in every society there exist competing economic interests with contrasting views about what government policy ought to be. Alluding to what we would call the process of trade policy formulation today, Madison observed:
Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy was written, according to Irwin, to fill a glaring void. The last major history of U.S. trade policy to be published was the 8th edition of A Tariff History of the United States in 1931, by Frank Taussig, the famous Harvard trade economist who became the first chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission (predecessor of the U.S. International Trade Commission) when it was created in 1916. As Irwin aptly demonstrates in Clashing, much trade policy history has transpired since 1931.
But Irwin doesn’t begin where Taussig left off. He starts in colonial times to make certain his readers understand not only that U.S. trade policy played a major role in shaping the course of U.S. history, but that the mercantilist trade policies of the British Empire—such as the Navigation Acts, which precluded direct trade between the American colonies and other countries and required all goods be channeled through England—contributed to the growing anti-Crown fervor that eventually erupted into revolution and the birth of a nation.
In the introduction, Irwin references Federalist 10, in which James Madison notes that in every society there exist competing economic interests with contrasting views about what government policy ought to be. Alluding to what we would call the process of trade policy formulation today, Madison observed:
Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good.… It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.
Irwin’s broad thesis, however, is that despite these bitter debates and the frictions and conflicts generated by this clashing of self-interests, U.S. trade policy has shown remarkable stability throughout the nation’s history. Irwin attributes that stability to a geographic continuity of economic interests (such as steel production in Pennsylvania, tobacco farming in Kentucky, textile manufacturing in South Carolina) and the separation of powers (Madison’s handiwork), which makes wrenching policy changes less likely. “Producer interests, labor unions, advocacy groups, public intellectuals, and even presidents can demand, protest, denounce, and complain all they want,” Irwin writes, “but to change existing policy requires a majority in Congress and the approval of the executive. If the votes are not lined up, the existing policy will not change.”
In fact, Irwin argues that U.S. trade policy substantively changed course only twice in our history, both times in response to exogenous shocks which led to political realignments—the Civil War and the Great Depression. Within each of the three periods delineated by these two shocks, policy continuity largely prevailed. But the shocks themselves heralded wholesale changes in the objectives of U.S. trade policy. In Irwin’s shorthand, the objectives of the three periods, chronologically, were “revenue, restriction, and reciprocity.”
From the Founding in 1787 until the Civil War, the main purpose of the tariff was to raise revenues for the operations of a modest federal government that had few other means of funding. Much of the early debate in this era was over the question of how high a tariff “for revenue only” should be. Some worried that too high a tariff would squeeze foreigners’ incomes, reducing the market for U.S. commodity exports. Others were wary that too much funding of the federal government would encourage its growth and encroachment into the jurisdiction of the states. Indeed, those concerns were very much at the heart of the conflicts over the 1828 Tariff of Abominations and the South Carolina Nullification Crisis in 1832. On the latter subject, Irwin notes—with a hint of pride—that trade policy was important enough to be the catalyst for America’s first significant constitutional crisis.
Although the tariff was used to protect domestic industry on occasion during this era, it wasn’t until after the Civil War that bald protectionism became the tariff’s primary motive. With the end of the Civil War came the ascent of the Republican Party, which represented northern industrial interests that for decades had been clamoring for protection over the objections of southern agrarian interests. For most of the period between 1865 and 1932, Republicans controlled Congress and the White House, and restriction of imported manufactures to protect America’s growing industrial concerns became the tariff’s main purpose. The lobbying industry as we know it today has its roots in this era.
Describing the legislative process surrounding the writing of the Mongrel Tariff of 1883, Irwin cites a reporter at the time who wrote:
In fact, Irwin argues that U.S. trade policy substantively changed course only twice in our history, both times in response to exogenous shocks which led to political realignments—the Civil War and the Great Depression. Within each of the three periods delineated by these two shocks, policy continuity largely prevailed. But the shocks themselves heralded wholesale changes in the objectives of U.S. trade policy. In Irwin’s shorthand, the objectives of the three periods, chronologically, were “revenue, restriction, and reciprocity.”
From the Founding in 1787 until the Civil War, the main purpose of the tariff was to raise revenues for the operations of a modest federal government that had few other means of funding. Much of the early debate in this era was over the question of how high a tariff “for revenue only” should be. Some worried that too high a tariff would squeeze foreigners’ incomes, reducing the market for U.S. commodity exports. Others were wary that too much funding of the federal government would encourage its growth and encroachment into the jurisdiction of the states. Indeed, those concerns were very much at the heart of the conflicts over the 1828 Tariff of Abominations and the South Carolina Nullification Crisis in 1832. On the latter subject, Irwin notes—with a hint of pride—that trade policy was important enough to be the catalyst for America’s first significant constitutional crisis.
Although the tariff was used to protect domestic industry on occasion during this era, it wasn’t until after the Civil War that bald protectionism became the tariff’s primary motive. With the end of the Civil War came the ascent of the Republican Party, which represented northern industrial interests that for decades had been clamoring for protection over the objections of southern agrarian interests. For most of the period between 1865 and 1932, Republicans controlled Congress and the White House, and restriction of imported manufactures to protect America’s growing industrial concerns became the tariff’s main purpose. The lobbying industry as we know it today has its roots in this era.
Describing the legislative process surrounding the writing of the Mongrel Tariff of 1883, Irwin cites a reporter at the time who wrote:
Lobbyists descended like a flock of buzzards upon Washington, crowding all the hotels that winter, pulling, tugging at the statesmen in the name of the all the diverse, conflicting interests that employed them, … as committeemen in both chambers wrestled with long schedules and with the unblushing and unending demands of lobbies for sugar, iron, wool, glass, marble, and a hundred other trades.
With a few small exceptions, pro-tariff Republicans held sway over trade policy until the early 1930s. As the disastrous effects of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the “Smoot-Hawley” or “Hawley-Smoot Tariff,” as Irwin calls it) were rippling across the globe, and the Democrats returned to power in Washington, the main function of the tariff became a nobler one: reciprocity. According to Irwin’s thesis, from the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act to the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, through the multiple GATT rounds culminating in the founding of the World Trade Organization in 1995, and through the Obama presidency, inducing foreign governments into reciprocal trade liberalization was the main purpose of the tariff.
Irwin is the author of five other books covering different aspects and themes of trade policy history, including Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, in which he masterfully assesses and dispenses with formidable challenges to Adam Smith’s theories about the primacy of specialization and free trade. But Clashing is easily Irwin’s most ambitious undertaking.
Covering 250 years of trade policy in 693 pages of text and 185 pages of notes and references, the book is not for the fainthearted. But neither is it “narcolepsy engendering,” as Irwin admits some historians consider lengthy tariff tomes to be. It is comprehensive in coverage, rich in detail, and presented as history ought to be, which is to say factually, objectively, and with an engaging narrative. And, frankly, those hungering for a more substantive discussion about trade policy will find the book a welcome refuge from the boisterous, often fact-starved exchanges witnessed nowadays on cable news and social media.
The book covers many subthemes, including the tensions and rationales behind Congress’s delegation of some of its constitutional authority over trade policy to the executive branch. Irwin could not have known when he began writing the book how topical that subject would be in 2018—with President Trump seemingly testing the limits of that authority by invoking dusty statutes to levy tariffs. Persistent, historically relevant questions—such as whether the tariff helped or hindered U.S. development, whether tariff policy was a cause of the Civil War, and whether Smoot-Hawley caused the Great Depression—are all given thorough analysis in the book. Likewise, the book describes the views and motives of many figures from history who helped shape U.S. trade policy for better or worse: Franklin, Hamilton, Jefferson, Daniel Webster, Cordell Hull. Henry Clay, with his advocacy of “The American System” of protection, evokes the typical modern day economic nationalist. Robert Walker, Treasury Secretary to James Polk, in his insistence that foreign trade barriers are no excuse for our own, evokes Frederic Bastiat and Milton Friedman.
If there is any major question that lingers after reading Clashing, it is whether Irwin is prepared to accommodate substantive revisions in subsequent editions. Although not a challenge to his broad thesis that U.S. trade policy has been guided by the three Rs (Revenue, Restriction, Reciprocity), it seems reasonable to posit that, under the direction of President Trump, the United States is departing the era of reciprocity and entering, perhaps, a new R: the era of Retribution.
Irwin is the author of five other books covering different aspects and themes of trade policy history, including Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, in which he masterfully assesses and dispenses with formidable challenges to Adam Smith’s theories about the primacy of specialization and free trade. But Clashing is easily Irwin’s most ambitious undertaking.
Covering 250 years of trade policy in 693 pages of text and 185 pages of notes and references, the book is not for the fainthearted. But neither is it “narcolepsy engendering,” as Irwin admits some historians consider lengthy tariff tomes to be. It is comprehensive in coverage, rich in detail, and presented as history ought to be, which is to say factually, objectively, and with an engaging narrative. And, frankly, those hungering for a more substantive discussion about trade policy will find the book a welcome refuge from the boisterous, often fact-starved exchanges witnessed nowadays on cable news and social media.
The book covers many subthemes, including the tensions and rationales behind Congress’s delegation of some of its constitutional authority over trade policy to the executive branch. Irwin could not have known when he began writing the book how topical that subject would be in 2018—with President Trump seemingly testing the limits of that authority by invoking dusty statutes to levy tariffs. Persistent, historically relevant questions—such as whether the tariff helped or hindered U.S. development, whether tariff policy was a cause of the Civil War, and whether Smoot-Hawley caused the Great Depression—are all given thorough analysis in the book. Likewise, the book describes the views and motives of many figures from history who helped shape U.S. trade policy for better or worse: Franklin, Hamilton, Jefferson, Daniel Webster, Cordell Hull. Henry Clay, with his advocacy of “The American System” of protection, evokes the typical modern day economic nationalist. Robert Walker, Treasury Secretary to James Polk, in his insistence that foreign trade barriers are no excuse for our own, evokes Frederic Bastiat and Milton Friedman.
If there is any major question that lingers after reading Clashing, it is whether Irwin is prepared to accommodate substantive revisions in subsequent editions. Although not a challenge to his broad thesis that U.S. trade policy has been guided by the three Rs (Revenue, Restriction, Reciprocity), it seems reasonable to posit that, under the direction of President Trump, the United States is departing the era of reciprocity and entering, perhaps, a new R: the era of Retribution.
