第61届慕尼黑安全会议（Munich Security Conference MSC）将于本周晚些（2月14-16日）召开。美国非常重视，预计副总统万斯、国务卿卢比奥、国防部长赫格塞斯、俄乌事务特使凯洛格都将出席这次会议。有鉴于这次会议的焦点之一是俄乌战争以及停战和谈，美国知名智库战争研究所（the Institute for the Study of War ISW）刚刚发表了一篇专题评论文章：明斯克协议的教训 - 打破俄罗斯对乌克兰战争的循环往复，非常值得感兴趣的网友们一读。
Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russias War in Ukraine
February 11, 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lessons-minsk-deal-breaking-cycle-russias-war-ukraine?
这是其摘要部分：
有些和平协议带来了和平，另一些则带来了更多的战争。明斯克协议 II 旨在结束俄罗斯 2015 年对乌克兰的有限入侵，但却为 2022 年俄罗斯的全面入侵奠定了基础。美国必须从明斯克协议中吸取教训，否则将面临俄罗斯与北约直接冲突的风险，这将危及美国人的生命。
明斯克协议 II 是一项软弱的协议。它没有向入侵者俄罗斯提出任何要求。它加强了克里姆林宫的侵略性世界观，而这种世界观正是冲突的根源。它掩盖了俄罗斯的军事弱点。它给予了克里姆林宫以时间和空间来准备更大规模的入侵。西方本可以帮助乌克兰在 2015 年达成一项更强有力的协议。
明斯克协议 II 让俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔普京看到了希望，他可以在没有战争的情况下赢得乌克兰的胜利。俄罗斯在 2014 年试图通过军事手段控制乌克兰，但未能成功。明斯克协议 II 让普京有办法要求乌克兰 -- 一个独立国家--将其内部政策的控制权交给俄罗斯。普京并未能做到这一点，于是在 2022 年转向全面入侵。
明斯克协议 II 帮助普京将他对乌克兰投降的要求掩盖在虚假的和平呼吁背后。自 2014 年以来，西方一直未能呼吁和反击俄罗斯的真正要求。明斯克协议 II 强化了西方的幻想，即如果普京获得一些土地，或者西方节制对乌克兰的支持，或者更加努力地与普京谈判，他可能会简单地安定下来。这项协议还为那些了解克里姆林宫的目标但依然试图恢复与俄罗斯关系的人们提供了借口。
普京 2014 年的亲密顾问弗拉基米尔苏尔科夫 (Vladislav Surkov) 在 2024 年表示，明斯克协议 II使乌克兰的第一次瓜分合法化。苏尔科夫的话证实了俄罗斯摧毁乌克兰作为一个国家的目标，并利用明斯克协议来实现这一目标。他补充说，和平不过是以其他方式延续战争。
若现在再达成一项薄弱的协议，将会导致普京 2022 年的全面入侵合法化，并给普京带来希望，让他随着时间的推移获得更多利益。对普京来说，希望意味着更多的战争。更多的战争意味着更大的战争：一个为入侵付出很少或没有代价的被赦免的俄罗斯会想要得到更多，并将重建其得寸进尺的能力。一场更大的战争将意味着美国付出更高的代价、美国人的生命面临风险、以及灾难性升级的风险。
川普政府面临着一个历史性的机会，打破俄罗斯对乌克兰战争的循环往复，包括公开的战争和以和平为掩盖的战争。要做到这一点，美国必须从明斯克协议中吸取教训：
- 俄罗斯将寻求将其战争的责任和成本转移到别人的资产负债表上。
- 普京的要求是他的目标的替代品--控制乌克兰，让美国屈服于普京的要求，以建立有利于俄罗斯的世界秩序。
- 只要普京相信自己能比西方和乌克兰坚持得更久，他就会战斗。结束战争需要让普京失去在有生之年摧毁乌克兰这个国家的希望--无论是通过军事手段还是和平协议。
- 俄罗斯可以接受失败。
Executive Summary
Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russias limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.
Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader Russia. It strengthened the Kremlins aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.
Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine an independent state give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.
Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraines surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlins goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.
Vladislav Surkov, Putins close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II legitimized the first partition of Ukraine. Surkovs words confirm Russias goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so.[1] He added that peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.
Another weak deal today would validate Putins 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.
The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russias cycle of overt war and war through peace in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:
- Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone elses balance sheet.
- Putins demands are stand-ins for his goals controlling Ukraine and making the United States bend to Putins demands to create a world order that favors Russia.
- Putin will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime militarily or through a peace deal.
- Russia can accept failure.
