当前经济政策分析
当前经济政策分析
ylx2008 发表评论于
你到说说德国为何要紧缩？
美国能印票子，不是有奴才买单么？
美国的物价是很低的，天朝的物价？
美国能印票子，不是有奴才买单么？
美国的物价是很低的，天朝的物价？
ylx2008 发表评论于
MONTREAL - There’s actually a simple solution to the unending agonies of the eurozone debt crisis.
But if it’s simple, it’s not easy: the problem is persuading Germany, the zone’s dominant economic power, to accept it.
And if Germans have learned one lesson from their tumultuous economic path over the past century, it’s that this solution – inflation in Germany – is a deadly danger to be avoided at all costs.
Yet any lasting solution to the eurozone’s torment will almost have to include some extra German inflation.
That’s the least painful way to begin equalizing its very high competitiveness with lower levels in countries like Spain, Italy and even France.
That psychological sticking point is why, despite temporary upticks in European markets and the euro’s value, this crisis is likely to drag on and worsen before it is resolved.
Peter Berezin, a former International Monetary Fund economist, lays out his vision for the resolution of this continent-wide financial catastrophe in the latest issue of Montreal’s Bank Credit Analyst investment publication, which he edits,
The European Central Bank eventually “will end the turmoil through one simple action,” he says.
That would be by setting a limit on borrowing costs for eurozone governments – maybe six per cent for a 10-year-bond – and defending it by pledging to buy enough government bonds to keep their interest rate from rising above this level.
This would immediately improve the financial situation of countries like Spain, where borrowing costs have already exceeded this level and could well be headed higher.
Of course, it would also spark primal German fears about currency debasement through the monetizing of government debt. Monetizing is just another way to say that the eurozone would print as many euros as needed in order to buy up its own members’ bonds, creating the spectre of serious inflation.
Germany’s aversion to inflation isn’t arbitrary.
The country’s hyperinflation of the 1920s destroyed savings, caused terrible suffering and is widely believed to have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party.
But even virtue can be carried too far. Countries that have monetized some of their own debt, like the U.S. and the U.K., are in far better financial shape than most of the eurozone’s members today.
What’s more, their borrowing costs remain low, suggesting that investors aren’t worried about being inflated into big losses.
That’s because their economies are still sluggish, with far too little consumer demand and far too much surplus labour to support harmful levels of inflation.
Monetization can’t be carried too far or continued forever, but when a country is in this condition, the real danger is deflation and depression, not inflation.
This is very clear in the eurozone. The whole region is slipping back into recession under the burden of a harsh German-inspired austerity regime that has forced countries to slash spending even as their economies desperately needed support.
The next step, observers like Berezin believe, will be the default of Greece under its crushing debt load, either forcing it out of the eurozone or into a shadow area where it subsists on a combination of euros and locally issued currency.
About this time, Berezin guesses, Germany’s leaders will finally realize that it’s better to bend their principles than to undergo a complete eurozone collapse.
In a collapse, after all, German banks might never be repaid the euro loans they had made in Spain and Italy. Instead, they’d be lucky to get devalued pesetas and liras. At the same time, euro deposits held by German banks would now be denominated in expensive deutschmarks.
“A recipe for bank failure, if ever there was one,” Berezin says.
That’s not all. Germany’s export-driven economy depends heavily on selling to eurozone partners. But these exports would be devastated if they were produced in an expensive currency for sale to countries with cheap currencies. Exporters could be bankrupted.
So under pressure from business leaders, Germany’s political class, which is already having second thoughts about austerity, would swallow hard and approve of easy money, perhaps late this year. This would bring precious relief to Europe’s weaker economies, but at least a few years of higher inflation in Germany, whose vigorous economy would be overstimulated.
But the result over the coming decade could be a resurgent European economy, with big gains for investors who now hold the region’s securities. At least that’s the likely outcome. Berezin admits that people don’t always do what’s in their best interest, so there’s maybe a 25-per-cent chance that the euro really does crumble.
jbryan@montrealgazette.com
© Copyright (c) The Montreal Gazette
But if it’s simple, it’s not easy: the problem is persuading Germany, the zone’s dominant economic power, to accept it.
And if Germans have learned one lesson from their tumultuous economic path over the past century, it’s that this solution – inflation in Germany – is a deadly danger to be avoided at all costs.
Yet any lasting solution to the eurozone’s torment will almost have to include some extra German inflation.
That’s the least painful way to begin equalizing its very high competitiveness with lower levels in countries like Spain, Italy and even France.
That psychological sticking point is why, despite temporary upticks in European markets and the euro’s value, this crisis is likely to drag on and worsen before it is resolved.
Peter Berezin, a former International Monetary Fund economist, lays out his vision for the resolution of this continent-wide financial catastrophe in the latest issue of Montreal’s Bank Credit Analyst investment publication, which he edits,
The European Central Bank eventually “will end the turmoil through one simple action,” he says.
That would be by setting a limit on borrowing costs for eurozone governments – maybe six per cent for a 10-year-bond – and defending it by pledging to buy enough government bonds to keep their interest rate from rising above this level.
This would immediately improve the financial situation of countries like Spain, where borrowing costs have already exceeded this level and could well be headed higher.
Of course, it would also spark primal German fears about currency debasement through the monetizing of government debt. Monetizing is just another way to say that the eurozone would print as many euros as needed in order to buy up its own members’ bonds, creating the spectre of serious inflation.
Germany’s aversion to inflation isn’t arbitrary.
The country’s hyperinflation of the 1920s destroyed savings, caused terrible suffering and is widely believed to have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party.
But even virtue can be carried too far. Countries that have monetized some of their own debt, like the U.S. and the U.K., are in far better financial shape than most of the eurozone’s members today.
What’s more, their borrowing costs remain low, suggesting that investors aren’t worried about being inflated into big losses.
That’s because their economies are still sluggish, with far too little consumer demand and far too much surplus labour to support harmful levels of inflation.
Monetization can’t be carried too far or continued forever, but when a country is in this condition, the real danger is deflation and depression, not inflation.
This is very clear in the eurozone. The whole region is slipping back into recession under the burden of a harsh German-inspired austerity regime that has forced countries to slash spending even as their economies desperately needed support.
The next step, observers like Berezin believe, will be the default of Greece under its crushing debt load, either forcing it out of the eurozone or into a shadow area where it subsists on a combination of euros and locally issued currency.
About this time, Berezin guesses, Germany’s leaders will finally realize that it’s better to bend their principles than to undergo a complete eurozone collapse.
In a collapse, after all, German banks might never be repaid the euro loans they had made in Spain and Italy. Instead, they’d be lucky to get devalued pesetas and liras. At the same time, euro deposits held by German banks would now be denominated in expensive deutschmarks.
“A recipe for bank failure, if ever there was one,” Berezin says.
That’s not all. Germany’s export-driven economy depends heavily on selling to eurozone partners. But these exports would be devastated if they were produced in an expensive currency for sale to countries with cheap currencies. Exporters could be bankrupted.
So under pressure from business leaders, Germany’s political class, which is already having second thoughts about austerity, would swallow hard and approve of easy money, perhaps late this year. This would bring precious relief to Europe’s weaker economies, but at least a few years of higher inflation in Germany, whose vigorous economy would be overstimulated.
But the result over the coming decade could be a resurgent European economy, with big gains for investors who now hold the region’s securities. At least that’s the likely outcome. Berezin admits that people don’t always do what’s in their best interest, so there’s maybe a 25-per-cent chance that the euro really does crumble.
jbryan@montrealgazette.com
© Copyright (c) The Montreal Gazette
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