王赓武，CBE（1930年－）为研究现代中国史、民族主义、海外华人、华人移民的权威历史学家及教育家。
做为海外华人研究的主要奠基开拓者，王赓武的研究方法和成果具有影响力。
在国际关系理论研究中，王赓武认为中国天下观念更有包容性，中国版图的问题、主权的问题非常复杂，为避免狭隘民族的概念及政策的问题，主张古代中国向来有的天下观，与民族国家的概念是矛盾的，但可以和理想的国家之间互相照顾、互相支持秩序结合 。 澳大利亚首任驻华大使费思棻曾半开玩笑地说，王赓武可以当好中国总理。
王赓武祖籍江苏泰州，1930年出生于印度尼西亚泗水，旋即随双亲迁居马来西亚。1955年获硕士学位。1957年获英国伦敦大学博士学位。1957年起先后任马来亚大学历史系讲师、教授兼系主任、文学院院长。1968年任澳大利亚首都堪培拉的澳洲国立大学远东历史系主任与太平洋研究院院长。曾任澳洲人文科学院院长、亚洲历史学家国际协会主席、澳中理事会主席、香港演艺发展局主席等职。并任新加坡国立大学东亚研究所所长、《南洋学报》主编多年。
王赓武在1986年至1995年期间担任香港大学校长。其前任者为黄丽松教授，继任者为郑耀宗教授。荣获日本国福冈亚洲文化奖。
目前为中华民国中央研究院院士及新加坡国立大学特级教授。于2007年成为新加坡国立大学有史以来第三位任命为大学教授的学者.
中国和日本发生另一次战争的危险，在最近数星期敲响了警钟。一些人把目前的状况同第一次世界大战前的情形相提并论。中国的强硬态度让一些人想起了20世纪初，自大的德国和日本及它们的帝国主义野心。这些都具误导性。许多标题是要警告中国停止在南中国海和东海的行为，并遵守现有的国际体系——或像以前的德国和日本一样，被视为对国际秩序的威胁。
现代国际关系体系，是在上个世纪从其北大西洋基础发展出来的。在其巅峰时期，英国、法国和美国主宰了体系。20世纪早期，德国两次想要分享体系里的权力。但它的挑战被击退，实力最终也在两次世界大战后被摧毁。
在亚洲，日本领导人尝试从体系里分一杯羹，让他们可以主导亚洲与西太平洋岛屿，但最后同样被打败。今天，他们估计日本未来的地位，必须依赖同样的国际体系，来对抗崛起的中国。
在1940年代后正在进行革命的俄国，可以说是尝试破坏大西洋体系的另一个强国。在冷战时期，它的努力遍及全球，但过度扩张最终削弱了它挑战美国的能力。
今天，美国看来认为唯一有能力同它竞争的国家是中国，其他亚洲国家则多年来一直受到西方殖民地官员的影响。无论如何，去殖民地化后，没有任何新兴国家可以像以前的德国或日本一样行事。它们接受现有的国际体系，并乐意使用它来达到自己的目的。普遍的支持，让体系可以声称它是普及全球的。
中国的传统体系在亚洲是最后一个崩溃的。很幸运的，列强之间的对抗让它免受肢解。中国的两次革命——1911年及1949年——皆是受到欧洲模式的启发，让中国走上参与西方所建立体系的道路。此外，1978年后，邓小平巧妙地利用体系来帮助中国进行经济改革，这造成中国自此以后对体系的高度依赖。
中国人现在发现，作为体系正式会员得付出高昂代价。在它提供的经济利益背后，是一个引导今天的外交和战略思维及行动的法律与分析架构。中国明智而有系统地维护这个架构，但其重点主要是塑造一个让中国可以发展的环境。没有什么证据显示，中国会参与超越这个目标的活动。中国领导人认识到，他们没有一个替代体系来持续未来的发展。他们知道中国不是德国或日本，并仔细地研究如何避免重蹈它们的覆辙。然而，一些区域和区域外的分析家还是抱怀疑态度，担心中国会走上德国和日本扩张势力的老路。
有鉴于此，中国必须重新考虑它对待目前国际体系的方式。国家自豪感和强烈的责任感，让它必须维护其主权和中国的特性。但当国家也面对贪污、不公正、环境恶化和人民日益不满情绪的国内问题时，要在和平的空间里发展，可能会变得更加艰难。
从中国历史来看，在内乱和外患都存在时，国家便有危险。中国可能比它预期的更早面对同样的情况。但这再也不是每一次个别处理与某个小邻国的问题。中国领导人面对的，是大多数国家愿意接受的强有力及以法律为根本的体系。
直到现在，中国都能使用体系来满足自己的利益。但体系要求的比中国愿意付出的更多。游戏要求中国遵守被定为通用的原则，其中有些是中国领导人还不能接受的。
这是中国面对的挑战。国际体系的监护人预计，崛起的中国将不愿意更开放和自由，这意味着当中国更强大时，要让它遵守他们的规则将更困难。不管适当与否，利用德国和日本为例子，可以帮助他们把中国描绘成对世界秩序的潜在威胁。
日本正是在这样的情况下，加入对中国日益强大实力同样感到担忧的阵营，鼓励美国的亚洲“重心”战略或重新平衡。中国领导人知道这对中国形象和它在区域未来角色构成的危险。若中国领导人和外交官不能反驳把中国列为德国和日本模式的作法，将会出现更多抑制中国的战略，而这将打乱中国仍然需要的经济发展。
区域面对的问题，不是中国实力的崛起，或人们认为中国正在犯的错误，而是源自一些国家要中国遵守一个还需要美国来执行的体系的紧迫感。因此，重要的不只是中国自身的主动，也要看美国愿意做些什么来赋予体系更多权利，及它对中国在世界维护其特殊地位的需要有多少了解。
原载《海峡时报》。作者是新加坡国立大学教授及李光耀公共政策学院董事会主席。叶琦保译。
Getting China to play by the rules
THE danger of another Sino-Japanese war has set alarm bells ringing for the past several weeks. Comparisons have been made to the start of World War I. China's assertiveness has reminded some of upstart Germany or Japan and their imperial ambitions earlier in the 20th century. All these are misleading. What many of the headlines are trying to do is to warn China to back off from what it is doing in the South and East China seas and conform to the current international system - or be treated as a threat to world order the way Germany and Japan had been.
The modern system of international relations evolved during the past century from its base in the North Atlantic. At its peak, countries such as Britain, France and the United States dominated it. Earlier in the 20th century, Germany had twice wanted to share power in the system. But its challenges were repulsed and its power finally destroyed after two world wars.
In Asia, leaders in Japan tried to come up with their share of the system in order for them to dominate the Asian continent and the Western Pacific islands but they too were eventually defeated. Today, they calculate that their future place must depend on using the same global system to counter a rising China.
One could add revolutionary Russia after the 1940s as another power that also had a turn at trying to undermine the Atlantic system. Its efforts were global during the Cold War but its overreach ultimately undermined its ability to challenge the US.
Today, the US appears to think that the only country that has the capacity to compete with it is China. Other Asian countries are the products of years of tutelage under Western colonial officials. In any case, after decolonisation, none of the new nation states can act like Germany or Japan. They accept the existing international system and have readily used it to serve their own interests. Such support has strengthened the system's claim to universality.
China's traditional system was the last in Asia to fall. It was fortunate that rivalries among the Great Powers prevented it from being dismembered. Its two revolutions - in 1911 and 1949 - were both inspired by European models, and they put China on the road to participate in what the West had established. In addition, after 1978, Deng Xiaoping used the system cleverly to help China's economic reforms and this has ensured China's high level of dependence ever since.
The Chinese are now discovering that full membership of the system exacts a high price. Behind the economic benefits it provides is a structure of laws and analyses that guide diplomatic and strategic thinking and action today. China has been wise to attend to that structure systematically. But its focus has been largely on shaping an environment that will allow the country to develop. There is little evidence it would engage in activities that go beyond that goal. Chinese leaders realise that they do not have an alternative system to sustain future development. They know that their country is not Germany or Japan, and have carefully studied how to avoid the mistakes that led both to disaster. But there are analysts in the region and beyond who remain sceptical and still fear that China could follow the examples of the two expansionist powers.
Given such circumstances, China has to reconsider the way it handles the current international system. National pride and a deep sense of duty demand that it defend its right to remain sovereign and distinctively Chinese. But when the country is also beset by corruption, injustice, environmental degradation and growing discontent within, the struggle to develop in peace could become more difficult.
Chinese history has warned of dangers when both internal unrest or neiluan, and external turbulence, waihuan, are present. China may, sooner than it likes, face that condition again. But it is no longer a matter of dealing with smaller neighbours one at a time. What their leaders face is a powerful rule-based system that most countries are prepared to accept.
China has so far been able to use the system to serve its interests. But it is more demanding than what China has been ready to give in return. The game requires that it submit to principles that are being codified as universal, some of which Chinese leaders are not yet able to accept.
Here is China's challenge. The guardians of the international system project a rising China that is unwilling to be more open and free. They imply that when China becomes more powerful, it will be harder to make it play by their rules. Whether justified or not, using the German and Japanese analogies will help them suggest that China is a potential threat to world order.
It is in this context that Japan is joining those that are similarly concerned about China's rising power, to encourage the American pivot or rebalance in Asia. Chinese leaders are aware of this danger to its image and its future role in the region. If China's leaders and diplomats fail to counter the current efforts to paint the country onto the German and Japanese template, there will be even more strategies to contain China, strategies that would disrupt the economic progress it still needs.
The problem the region faces is not China's rise to power or even the mistakes that China is seen to be making. It stems from the sense of urgency among some countries to make China conform to a system that still needs American power to enforce its will. Thus it is not only China's own initiatives that really matter. It is also what the US is willing to do to further empower that system and how much it understands China's need to protect its distinctive place in the world.
The writer is a professor at the National University of Singapore, and chairman of the managing board of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
