Kesselring, Albert (1953/1997), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, London: Greenhill Books/Pennsylvania: Stockpole Books (319 p.)
我以前就听说凯赛林元帅率德军在意大利和优势盟军打成平手，但不知道他竟然是大名鼎鼎的隆美尔的顶头上司。凯赛林是德国空军创始人之一，1936年出任空军参谋总长（戈林的第二把手）。他在苏德战争中戏份不多，仅在1941年6月-11月率第2航空队支援中央集团军群从边境打到莫斯科。虽战果不小，作者没有渲染。从1941年11月起，凯赛林出任南线总司令，是本书重点泼墨之处。他为人低调，面带微笑。既要处理好和意大利这个水平有限又离心离德的盟友的关系，也要领导桀骜不驯，自高自大的明星将领隆美尔。1943年9月意大利公然投降，凯赛林一边要调兵遣将和英美军队对抗，一边要防止先前的盟军（意军）背后捅刀子。凯赛林率部且战且退，牵制了大量英美军队。1945年3月8日（莱茵河上雷马根大桥被美军突袭占领后），凯赛林出任西线总司令，接替了老将伦斯德。4月20日，凯赛林和邓尼茨临危受命，被希特勒任命分别统帅全部南部和北部的德军。
比较精彩的看点有：（1）1885年出生的凯赛林在1933年（48岁高龄）从陆军转到空军后，为专研空军业务学习驾驶飞机。从此他爱上了展翅飞翔，多次身先士卒，亲自驾机飞临敌阵（包括对伦敦和莫斯科的战斗侦察）。他的座机竟然被击落五次（！)(#1, #2, #3, #6)。（2）凯赛林尽管讲话比较客气，但他对意大利这个猪队友有客观的描述：意海军看到英皇家海军犹如老鼠见猫，斗胆放几炮就逃回港口。意空军仅能用于护航，地中海上空对敌空战这种“脏活累活”全部是德空军一肩挑。意军战略上鼠目寸光，竟然不听凯赛林忠告不愿出兵占领马耳他 (#18, #19)。（3）1942年11月3日在阿拉曼战役失败后凯赛林和隆美尔的争论。这和差不多同一时期曼施坦因和保卢斯的争论异曲同工。凯塞林下令隆美尔撤退，但被隆美尔拒绝，理由元首明令不许撤退。凯赛林“故意”下一道和元首的命令冲突的命令并愿意承担责任，让隆美尔为了十来万将士的性命选择违背元首的命令率部撤退时心理负担小一些。隆美尔知道自己是元首爱将，有元首亲自命令这把上方宝剑，所以“将在外只听君令而直接上级领导之命有所不受”。凯塞林说还好，他们的不愉快的争论结束后几小时元首来电同意退兵，所以没有酿成第二个斯大林格勒 (#21)。（4）1945年4-5月，在兵败如山倒的危难之际，凯塞林率部退至奥地利和德国南部的山区，由于希特勒已死，他不但要负责军务，还要负责政务和党务。一些地方官员和纳粹党徒叫嚣要上山打游击。凯塞林力挫群雄让他们死了这条心，乖乖投降。他还要求各级将领反复做好部队工作，维护部队纪律，以赢得战胜国的尊重 (#38, #39, #40)。（5）战败后凯塞林因下令在意大利枪杀数百名游击队员和平民被判死刑，他表示不满：“如果签了海牙公约的国家政府在战后将草寇追认为爱国英雄，那是对公约的极度践踏和对军队的合法权力【枪毙不穿制服的武装人员】的剥夺”(#28)。
读完对这位老将是否善终有点好奇，查了一下。和很多其他德军将领相比，凯赛林的下场不错。凯特尔和约德尔在纽伦堡审判后被绞死。隆美尔，克鲁格，莫德尔，和克雷布斯自杀。舒埃纳尔在苏联，东德，和西德先后被囚。柏林降将魏德林在苏联战俘营去世。书中说1947年凯赛林在威尼斯被英军判死刑。1948年改为无期徒刑，被罚劳动改造糊纸袋。本书成书于狱中，没有任何资料，全凭作者的记忆（他不记日记），在瞒着盟军当局的情况下秘密写成。当时不知道他会被释放，书稿从狱中被偷带出来。1952年他因健康原因获释。1953年本书以《一个战斗到底的战士》为标题出版。1960年凯赛林去世，享年74岁。
1 [BACKCOVER] These memoirs rank among the great military autobiographies, written during Kesselring's imprisonment after WWII. FM Albert Kesselring (1885-1960) was one of GER's most capable military strategists. Originally a Bavarian army officer, he transferred to the Luftwaffe in 1935 and became Göring's deputy, commanding air fleets during the invasion of FRA and the Battle of BRI. In 1941 he was appointed CIC South, sharing the direction of the North African campaign with Rommel. As CIC in ITA in 1943-44 his brilliant defense of the peninsula became legendary. In 1945, after the Ardennes offensive failed, Kesselring replaced von Rundstedt as CIC West.
2 [FOREWORD by Kenneth Macksey, who authored a biography of K] Arguably, K was one of, if not the greatest, German military leader of WWII... He was, along with one lessor BRI contemporary, the only officer to hold very high command without a break throughout the war... K neither sought nor received the public adulation lavished on such “propaganda marvels” as Guderian and Rommel. Yet his charisma was strong and his achievements outstanding... These memoirs were written secretly, from memory (he kept no diary) while in a grim prison, under the threat of execution for war crimes (which had been committed by default rather than premeditation).
Like others among the cream of the GER High Command, he performed a perilous balancing trick, attempting faithfully to serve his country, in the knowledge that it was embarked upon a suicide course, while subtly retaining the ear of men who deeply mistrusted him... A bold airman who had learned to fly at as late as age as 48, who flew many operational missions to see things for himself and who was shot down five times.
3 [FROM ARMY TO LUFTWAFFE (p. 25)] In 1933, K (a new colonel) was discharged from the army and transferred to the Air Ministry (the future Luftwaffe) as Administrative Director.
4 [NO NAZI PARTY INTERFERENCE (p. 27)] No attempt was made by any of the leading politicians to bring us into the National Socialist fold. To them we were soldiers, and that was enough. Having taken the oath of allegiance, we were trusted implicitly.
5 [KESSELRING'S EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS (p. 31)] From the first day Hermann Goering had a clear conception of the end he had in view: to create an air force that would be decisive in EUR... (p. 33) K's inspection of factories at Heinkel, Arado, Junkers, Dornier, Argus, Daimler, Focke-Wulf, Siebel, BMW, Bosch, and IG Works.
6 [FROM CHIEF OF STAFF TO POLAND (p. 35)] In 1936 K became Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe. (p. 37) In 1938, Chief of Air Fleet 1, Berlin, and led air attacks on POL ... and awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross [Wikipedia reported that he was shot down by the POL air force, but the book didn't mention it].
7 [BATTLE OF FRANCE (p. 51)] In Jan 40, Chief of Air Fleet 2, West... The hand-in-glove coordination of the Army Group B and Air Fleet 2 was classical.
8 [BATTLE OF BRITAIN (p. 63)] For the Battle of BRI, I personally carried out the reconnaissance... (p. 68) The air battle for ENG suffered from the muddle-headedness of Sea-lion. It was clear to every discerning person, including Hitler, that ENG could not be brought to her knees by the Luftwaffe alone... (p. 69) ENG writers exaggerated the strength of GER forces. Churchill speaks of 1,700 aircraft... we only had 700-900.
9 [BRITISH SHOOT DOWN GERMAN AIR AMBULANCES (p. 70)] RAF shot down our air ambulances over the Channel, marked with the Red Cross and protected by international law [Churchill in a footnote expressed: “We did not recognize this means of rescuing enemy pilots who had been shot down in action, in order that they might come and bomb our civilian population again... All GER air ambulances were shot down on definite orders approved by the War Cabinet.”]
10 [COMMENTING ON CHURCHILL'S VIEWS (p. 72)] According to Churchill's Finest Hour, GER invasion was prevented by “the GER failure to gain command of the air.” I agree with C's view... (p. 80) As the Allies did later, we had overestimated the effects obtainable by bombing... At Nuremberg I was questioned about the Coventry raid. I explained that Coventry was marked on the target maps with an exact location of all its armament factories as the English “Little Essen”... I may remind the reader that the GER govt wished to have air warfare banned by international law... I can also say unequivocally—confirmed by ENG war historians—that the first raids on open cities were flown by the RAF.
11 [ONLY A FEW DAYS OF LEAVE (p. 81)] A few days' leave at the turn of 1940-41 was the only one I had during the whole war.
12 [NIGHT FIGHTERS (p. 82)] K was“father of the night fighters.”
13 [DON'T BLAME THE LUFTWAFFE FOR THE SEA-LION (p. 83)] It is historically undemonstrable that Sea-lion had to be abandoned because the Luftwaffe was not up to its task... The fact was that because of the lack of a plan for Sea-lion the Luftwaffe was thrown in as a stop-gap to bridge the interval until the curtain rose on the next act—RUS.
14 [FROM BARBAROSSA TO MOSCOW (p. 85)] In Barbarossa, K was to lead an Air Fleet to support Army Group Center (Bock), and they had worked together in POL... (p. 89) I instructed my air force and flak generals to consider the wishes of the army as my orders, without prejudice to their subordination to me, unless serious air interests made compliance seem impracticable or detrimental.
15 [BECOMING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTH (p. 103)] In Feb 1941, formation of GER Africa Korps... In Sept 1941 appointed CIC South... Arrived in Rome in Nov 1941 to become Rommel's boss… (p. 104) Half-measures would get us nowhere. So, ignoring H's instructions, I waived my claims to an overall command, but insisted in return on an even closer and more confidential cooperation on the ITA side than had originally been contemplated.
16 [BRITAIN RULES THE WAVES AND SKIES (p. 105)] Across the Mediterranean, every day showed more plainly the naval and air supremacy of the BRI in these waters... Malta had assumed decisive importance as a strategic key-point, and my primary objective was to safeguard our supply lines by smoking out the hornets’ nest... My secondary task, at Marshall Cavallero's request, was to iron out the recurrent basic differences between the GER and ITA commanders in the field.
17 [ITALIAN OFFICERS EAT WELL (p. 108)] While GER field-kitchens were besieged by the ITA soldiers, I was entertained in an ITA officers' mess tent that the regulation fare there was much better than the food served in my own staff mess.
18 [ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE WIMPS (p. 114)] As a “fine-weather fleet,” ITA navy's doubtful seaworthiness called for increased air protection, and that, with the limited strength of the Axis air forces in the Med, imposed ridiculous demands of the Luftwaffe... If the ITA fleet came within extreme range of the RN and a few shots were actually exchanged, it had to break off the engagement at dusk because of its inability to fire in the dark, and run for the nearest port—Taranto or Messina.
p. 114 I only hope I have done my best to paint the situation objectively. I have no desire to offer offensive criticism. I value too deeply the comradeship shown me by the ITA, and I had too many opportunities to watch their devoted work... ITA fighters could be used only for purely protective purposes only... The danger zones over the Med were flown by GER fighters, including Ju 88's and Me 110's of the night-fighter formations... (p. 116) From a tactical standpoint, the use of airmen to protect convoys was unproductive for the most part, involving waste of precious flying hours.
19 [ITALY'S BLUNDER: MALTA (p. 123)] ITA's missing her chance to occupy Malta at the start of hostilities will go down to history as a fundamental blunder... (p. 125) With the decision to push forward as far as the Nile (insisted by Rommel), Operation Malta (insisted by K) was shelved.
20 [WAS KESSELRING TO BE BLAIMED FOR EL ALAMEIN? (p. 132)] As the postwar literature has laid the blame for El Alamein on my shoulders, I declare unequivocally that as CIC South and Chief of Air Command I was not Rommel's superior. R was subordinate to Marshal Bastico and he in turn to the Comando Supremo. At the same time R felt himself responsible to OKW... [p. 141: I had to make the best of a bad job] I do not seek to dispute my share of the responsibility as advisor, in so far as R was at all accessible to advice. Hindenburg once said that he was occasionally held responsible for victories, but always for defeats. These words apply to me in this and many other cases.
21 [BIG FALLOUT WITH ROMMEL (p. 135)] After the failure at El Alamein, on 3 Nov 1942 K and R met in Africa. Hitler sent a cable that he did not agree with the “cowardly evasion” and the line in the sand must be drawn. R stopped withdrawals in order to fight and die in obedience to orders. I told him there could be no question of any such folly, that H's orders must be ignored as it would result in the extinction of AFR KORPS. I also told him I would accept the responsibility for not carrying out the order... H agreed in a few hrs, but precious time was wasted... (p. 136) A very strenuous period was made intolerable by R's attitude and exorbitant demands... (p. 152) In March 43 R left Tunis on a well-earned leave. I was glad to recommend him for the Knight's Cross with Diamonds, but my efforts to obtain the highest ITA decoration were unsuccessful.
22 [OVERALL MISTAKES IN AFRICA/MEDITERRANEAN (p. 156)] Tunisia was the climax of a misconceived strategy. The main error lay in a total misunderstanding of the importance of the AFR and MED theaters. The second mistake was the insufficient protection of our sea transport. The third handicap was the difficulties of waging coalition war. The fourth was our attitude to FRA, whose AFR colonies H incomprehensibly regarded as taboo.
23 [MISSOULINI'S ARREST AND ITS AFTERMATH (p. 169)] On 25 July 1943, when the news of Mussolini's arrest reached me, I at once asked for an audience with the King... The next day His Majesty assured me that there would be no change as to the prosecution of the war. He had to dismiss Mussolini because the Fascist Grand Council had insisted and M had lost the goodwill of public opinion... (p. 171) [K accepted the King's words and official assurance, but H regarded him as an “Italophile” going native, starting to distrust K]... (p. 172) The sinister behavior of the ITA was thus responsible for H's moving Army Group B into northern ITA... (p. 173) After the fall of Mussolini CIC South become subordinate only to the King... I continued to carry out my business with the ITA with friendly impartiality.
24 [ITALY'S SURRENDER (p. 176)] (The day of the surrender: 8 Sept 1943) In the AM my HQ was bombed by allies. We found a map in one of the bombers shot down on which my HQ was exactly marked. Evidently the King and Badoglio had permitted the attack... In the PM Jodl rang up to ask if the radio announcement of ITA's surrender was correct... (p. 177) When the situation was clarified it was too late for me to act: the royal family and the govt had fled.
25 [ARGUING WITH HITLER (p. 207)] In July 1944, H demanded that withdrawals stop. K went to argue: “After Stalingrad and Tunis can you afford to lose two more armies? I beg to doubt it...” H reluctantly agreed.
26 [NO ROLE IN THE JULY 1944 CONSPIRACY TO KILL HITLER (p. 209)] Up to the news on 20 July 1944, I knew nothing of the conspiracy.
27 [SUMMARY OF THE ITALY CAMPAIGN (p. 222)] The battle for ITA was not only justified but also even imperative ... In the end the front collapsed with heavy losses... But the ITA theater pinned down Allied forces which, if they had been engaged in decisive fronts, might have powerfully influenced events in the east or the west adversely for GER... As it was till nearly the end of the war the south of GER was spared the sufferings of war in every aspect, the effect of our resistance in ITA was immeasurable.
28 [THE PARTISAN WAR (p. 233)] If during or after a war insurgents are officially recognized as patriots and heroes even by the govts of countries which have signed the Hague Convention, this means an utter contempt for treaties and the sabotage of every conception of right.
29 [BECOMING COMMANDER-IN-CHEF WEST (p. 237)] 8 March 1945, I was summoned to H, who appointed me CIC West. I was to relieve Runstedt. H said the fall of Remagen had finally necessitated a change of command in the west. We discussed GER dispositions: Central Army Group (Schoerner) in Czechoslovakia and Silesia—Ninth Army (Busse) stood firm on its left. Army Group South (Rendulic) to its right. Army Group Vistula (Heinrici) on the left of the Ninth Army. South-East Army Group (Loehr) in Yugoslavia.
30 [BATTLE OF REMAGEN (p. 239)] In the West, our 55 under-strength divisions were opposed by 85 full-strength Allied divisions... (p. 242) Remagen required an increasing flow of reinforcements and by itself almost swallowed up the replacements and supplies fed to CIC West, magnetically attracting everything right and left. This made regrouping, resting, and refurbishing of the other Army Groups more difficult, if not impracticable... (p. 243) The holding of the Rhine line hinged on Remagen... (p. 249) Remagen became the grave of Army Group B.
31 [AIRMEN FIGHT TO THE LAST DAY (p. 243)] Our airmen were doing their best. But they could not score even a moral victory. They had lost heart; enemy attacks on airfields and the unfavorable weather demoralized them... Symptoms of disintegration were perceptible behind the front, which gave cause for uneasiness... Yet my orders were categorical: “Hang on!”
32 [STRATEGIC DILEMMA (p. 249)] The best generals cannot make bricks without straw... At the suggestion of Army Group commanders I considered retiring the whole Rhine front. But I finally decided against it, as it would have been certain to degenerate into a rout.
33 [HQ IN A TRAIN (p. 254)] On 28 March 1945 I arrived at my new command post—a train in a railway tunnel east of Fulda.
34 [THE END OF ARMY GROUP B (p. 256)] 17 April 1945 the “Ruhr Fortress” was wiped out. Model, commander of Army Group B, killed himself... (p. 266) This sealed the fate of central GER.
35 [HOW GERMAN GENERALS LEAD (p. 259)] As CIC West I went to see Hitler 4 times in 6 weeks... My predecessor, Runstedt, rightly regarded himself as the heir to the tradition of the Supreme Command in WWI. He issued his orders from HQ, almost never visiting the front and rarely using the telephone. This system had undeniable advantages: the CIC was undisturbed and not exposed to the worrying impressions of the front. He was the remote High Priest... (p. 260) Convinced that the place of a commander is where a unit has had a reverse and a dangerous situation has arisen, I had chosen my battle HQ close to the front and often moved them... There were 3 Army Groups in CIC West's command. Their commanders had every right to insist on independence in their own sectors. I also had the firm intention to respect it, though in practice abnormal occurrences often made me interfere. I did not like doing this.
The Army Group commanders were WWI soldiers, distinguished General Staff officers, and leaders with exceptional experience. Divisional commanders varied... Under normal conditions some of them would have had to be changed... The cadre of generals when the GER army was limited to 100,000 men had been too small... A further difficulty was that Army Groups and even junior commands were in direct communication with the OKW and OKH. This might have satisfied the curiosity and the nerves of the High Command, but it thoroughly upset the routine of the superior staffs on the spot.
36 [COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTH] (p. 265) The last time I saw H was 12 April 1945... (p. 267) In early April I became CIC South again, taking over ITA, YUG, and southern part of RUS front. In the north, Doenitz assumed similar responsibilities... But by then the enemy closed in on GER simultaneously from east and west... (p. 280) The BRI and US forces in southern GER were astonishingly passive. GER dispositions: (1) CIC South-West (Army Group C, ITA), (2) CIC South-East (Balkans, Loehr), (3) Army Group South (AUT, Rendulic), (4) Army Group Center (CZE, Schoerner). The only large formation behind the front and still intact was the newly created 12th Army (Wenck).
37 [WHY WE FOUGHT TILL THE END (p. 281)] It was no longer a question of fighting to obtain a generous peace. The absolute duty not to let our GER brothers-in-arms fall into the hands of the RUS was all that mattered now. For this reason, and this alone, we just had to fight it out to the bitter end.
38 [DOENITZ TAKES OVER (p. 283)] After H's death Doenitz took over. He immediately charted the course to obtain peace as speedily as possible... The Alpine massif was the rallying point for Army Groups South-West, South-East, C, and South.
39 [GUERILLA WAR? FORGET IT (p. 285)] With the south cut off from the north, my responsibilities, previously military only, were enlarged by political assignments. Some die-hard party and local officials demanded that fighting be continued. K talked them out of it. The obliteration of any idea of a guerilla war was achieved... An administration composed of men who were neither politicians nor suspects as National Socialists were now needed for the transition period until the occupying powers took over. They had to organize local voluntary defense squads against pillage during the period of “anarchy” and their replacement later by a local police force sanctioned by the occupying forces.
40 [SURRENDER (p. 290)] After the capitulation of CIC South-West on 3 May, I sent a message to Eisenhower offering the surrender... Ike replied that he would not enter into negotiations that did not involve all GER forces everywhere. I therefore asked OKW to take the further steps required, which was immediately done. The unconditional surrender became effective for Army Group G (under K's personal command) on 6 May. I had already announced the expected surrender on 2-3 May in order to avoid further fighting and useless bloodshed. I thanked the troops and appealed to them to maintain by their behavior the reputation of the GER armed forces. I explained that our unexceptionable military behavior was the only thing which could preserve the respect of the Allied soldiers, and that it would be of inestimable value to subsequent negotiations at a higher level.
(p. 290) On 6 May my HQ staff was the only group in the Alps which had not yet surrendered... I surrendered to General Max Taylor [later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], commanding the 101st Airborne Division. K was allowed to keep his weapons, medals, and Marshal's baton.
41 [FLIRTATION WITH THE IDEA OF SURRENER? (p. 291)] In autumn 1944, unknown to the OKW—though I later reported my action to Hitler—I had entered into discussions with American intermediaries in Switzerland... (p. 292) Flirtation with the idea of surrender softens morale and impairs the will to fight,
42 [THE NUREMBERG TRIALS ARE UNFAIR (p. 292)] The whole question brings us back to the old problem of the “political soldier”—for whom, I repeat, the GER armed forces had no place, the product of Gen Seeckt's training being the soldier whose “constitutional loyalty” was divorced from Party agitation. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg nevertheless sentenced these soldiers to death, and demanded instead an attitude capable of exerting a decisive influence on major foreign political questions, of removing criminal elements in critical domestic situations, or of overthrowing governments with criminal tendencies.
43 [MY TRIAL (p. 298)] My trial in 1947 at Venice... The court had one general and four BRI colonels. The bill of indictment had two charges of killing of hundreds of partisans and civilians... Von Mackensen, Malzer (both my surordinates), and I were sentenced to death... On 4 July 1948 the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment... My assigned prison job was gumming paper bags. My performance, for a 65-yr-old Field Marshal, was quite respectable. My colleagues were mostly “war criminals.”
44 [GERMAN SOLDIER BEHAVIOR AT SURRENDER (p. 314)] Our performance in the war was an achievement, as Liddell Hart confirms... I was especially proud of the generally model behavior of the GER soldier in 1945 when he surrendered. I consider his behavior a triumph of discipline, training, and harmony of command and troops.
