Liddell Hart, B. H. (1948/1979), The German Generals Talk: Startling Revelations from Hitler's High Command, New York: Quill (308 p.)
利德尔·哈特，英国军事战略家。参加过一战。是提倡坦克部队集中作战的第一人。这一先进的理论与一战以来发展的分散使用坦克的理论截然不同。可惜他太站在时代的前列，在英国不受重用，1927年以区区上尉军衔退役。但是墙内开花墙外香。利德尔·哈特可以说是德国闪电战的鼻祖，这一点古德里安等德军将领公开承认。凡尔赛条约禁止德军发展坦克。德军将领只能苦苦专研外军资料，他们发现利德尔·哈特的著作后如获至宝，相见恨晚。古德里安这位德国装甲兵之父亲自将这些著作翻成德文，然后将利德尔·哈特的理论联系实际并发扬光大，让德军能后来居上，取得辉煌的战果。
本书和利德尔·哈特的军事理论著作(最有名的是《战略》)不同，是对德军将领的访谈汇总。尽管他1927年后担任军事记者发表大量访谈文章，本书不是普通意义上的访谈。本书内容是对德军将领战败后当了战俘时期的审讯记录。当时很多将领命运未卜，不知是否会被扣上“战争罪”，十分愿意“老实交代”。再说有一些战前就认识利德尔·哈特，很多拜读过他的大作。利德尔·哈特比较亲德，碰到这些他的“知音”，没多大敌意。所以由他来参加审讯，德军将领抵触情绪较小，愿意敞开胸怀。更有人愿意借利德尔·哈特之笔，来一吐心声。由于来源于真实可信的第一手资料，本书能对德军将领刻画入木三分。
利德尔·哈特作为记者很注重时效性。本书发表于1948年，也就是终战以后，战俘甄别工作一结束，马上审讯，马上出书，基本没有耽误。这本“短平快”的书在当时大战初息，世人对德军既憎恨又好奇的时候有一定的“新闻”价值。缺点是当时一没时间，二没能力查找德国档案。当然这种档案研究是后辈学者的工作(比如1960年夏勒发表的《第三帝国的兴亡》写作时就查寻了海量的档案)。本书最大的贡献是在第一时间，在当事人健在也愿意配合的情况下为后辈历史学家提供了宝贵的素材。【本书有中文版《山的那一边：被俘德国将领谈二战》(2011年上海人民出版社)。我没看过，所以无法评论翻译质量。】
1 [THIS BOOK] This book is based on interrogations and interviews of German generals, who were POWs after WWII.
2 [GERMAN GENERALS (p. ix)] Few GER generals resembled the typical picture of an iron “Prussian” solider. Runstedt came nearest it . . . Many younger generals would have looked in their natural place at any conference of bank managers or civil engineers. They were essentially technicians, intent on their professional job, and with little idea of things outside it. It is easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked and handled them, and found them good instruments up to a point.
3 [AUTHOR'S INFLUENCE IN GERMANY (p. x)] Between the wars, as a military correspondent I kept a watchful eye on developments in EUR . . . This task was eased, directly and indirectly, by the extent to which my own military books were read in GER, some of the leading soldiers themselves undertaking the translation.
4 [AUTHOR'S SHARP OBSERVATION PREWAR] The warnings I gave about the Nazi menace, and the emphatic line I took in opposing the policy of “appeasement” is well known. I pointed out the ominous signs even before H came into power. At the same time it was evident to me that the GER General Staff had little influence with H compared with what it had exercised in the Kaiser's time, and that it tended to be more of a brake upon his aggressive plans than an impetus to them. . . But legends are persistent, delusions tenacious.
5 [HITLTER (p. 3)] H was far from being a stupid strategist. Rather, he was too brilliant—and suffered from the natural faults that tend to accompany such brilliance. He had a deeply subtle sense of surprise, and was a master of the psychological side of strategy...(p. 4) In RUS his defects became more potent than his gifts, and the debit balance accumulated to the point of bankruptcy.
6 [CHAPTER TITLE: THE MOULD OF SEECKT (p. 10)] Seeckt was CIC of the Reichswehr, the small army of 100,000 during interwar yrs. He preserved the DNA. . . (p. 19) The General Staff was essentially intended to form a collective substitute for genius, which no army can count on producing at need.
7 [NORWAY (p. 36)] The invasion of NOR in April 1940 was the first of H's aggressive moves that was not premeditated... He was led into it unwillingly, more by fear than by desire... On Feb 18 the BRI destroyer Cossack pushed into NOR waters and boarded the GER supply ship Altmark to rescue captured British seamen. It made H think that if Churchill was ready to violate NOR neutrality for the rescue of a handful of prisoners, he would be more willing to do so to cut off the iron-ore supplies from Narvik that were vital to GER.
8 [OKH VS. OKW (p. 43)] The Polish, Western, and Balkan campaigns were conducted by OKH—with comparatively little interference from OKW... The division of spheres and interests between OKW and OKH was a grave weakness in the GER planning.
9 [ROMMEL (p. 49)] had become a hero of the (English) Eighth Army before Monty arrived on the scene—the term “a Rommel” was coined as a synonym for a good performance of any kind. This admiration carried a subtle danger to morale, and when Monty took over command special efforts were made to damp the “Rommel legend” as well as to create a counter-legend around “Monty”... Rommel was worshipped by many ITA soldiers.
p. 50 In the field of tactics, Rommel was often brilliant in ruse and bluff... When attacking with tanks, despite his heavy losses, he created an impression that tanks were converging from all sides. That produced a BRI collapse. (p. 51) While extremely daring he was also subtle. A repeated feature was the way he used his tanks as a bait, to lure the BRI tanks into traps that were lined with anti-tank guns—thus skillfully blending the defensive with the offensive. These “Rommel tactics” became increasingly adopted by all armies as the war advanced... (p. 54) In July 1944, Rommel's car was attacked by low-flying Allied planes. He fractured his skull. The scene of the crash was the aptly-named village of Sainte Foy de Montgomery.
[CHAPTER TITLE: SOLDIERS IN THE SHADOW]
10 [HALDER (p. 56)] Chief of the General Staff, ran the operation in RUS in 1942... (p. 57) In Sept 1942 Halder was replaced by Zeitzler, formerly Chief of Staff in the West.
11 [ZEITZLER (p. 57)] Less of a strategist than his predecessor, Zeitzler was an outstandingly resourceful organizer of strategic moves, with an exceptional grasp of what could be done with mechanized forces... In Sept 1942, after the repulse of the Dieppe landing, Z became Chief of the General Staff, a dazzling jump for a young major-general... H not only preferred a younger general who understood mechanized warfare, he also hoped that he could better control the more junior general... But after the initial period of being dazzled, Z quickly grasped the stupidity of H's Stalingrad campaign, and urged withdrawal of Sixth Army... (p. 59) Friction was frequent... Z was driven to tender his resignation, but H brushed that aside... After the Stalingrad surrender, Z managed to induce H to sanction withdrawals... Z had to fight his battles alone, for Keitel and Jodl always backed H... (p. 60) In July 1944, having had his resignation rejected several times, Z went sick in protest. H took his revenge by discharging Z from the Army.
12 [GUDERIAN (p. 60)] To replace Z, Guderian's appointment shocked many members of the General Staff, who regarded G as a one-sided enthusiast for his specialty and a “bull” on the battlefield, lacking the strategic sense and balanced view required in a Chief of the General Staff. Older than Z, G, despite attaining the crowning position of his career, was in reality doubly checked—by an atmosphere of professional mistrust around him and by Hitler on top of him. G had been Inspector-General of the Panzer Forces ... (p. 61) This apostle of the new offensive gospel seems to have shown more insight than his master into the defensive requirement of the situation... (p. 63) In March 1945, after G's efforts to seek peace reached H's ears, he was dismissed.
13 [MANSTEIN (p. 63)] The ablest of all the GER generals was probably Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein. That was the verdict of most of those with whom I discussed the war, from Runstedt downwards. He had a superb strategic sense, combined with a greater understanding of mechanized weapons than any of the generals who did not belong to the tank school itself. He did not lose sight of the importance of improving alternative weapons and defense. He was responsible, shortly before the war, for developing the armored assault-gun, which proved invaluable later... He was the source of the brain-wave that produced the defeat of FRA—the idea of the tank-thrust via the Ardennes...
14 [KLUGE (p. 67)] FM von Kluge was the only survivor of the original army commanders with whom H embarked on war in 1939. In POL, FRA, and RUS (1941) he commanded the Fourth Army... After Bock was put on the shelf in 1942, Kluge succeeded him in command of the Central Army Group. There he created a well-woven defense that withstood successive RUS assaults during the next two yrs ... In July 1944 Kluge was to relive Rundstedt as CIC West... When his mission failed and he was replaced by Model in autumn 1944, Kluge swallowed poison in fear that his knowledge of the July 1944 plot—despite his lack of commitment to the cause—would cause him greater trouble and pain.
15 [THE CAUSE OF GERMAN ARMOR SUCCESS (p. 95)] according to von Thoma, the second most famous German tank leader behind Guderian—he was captured at El Alamein in autumn 1942:
(a) The concentration of forces in cooperation with bombers
(b) Exploiting the success of this movement on the roads during the night
(c) Enemy's insufficient anti-tank defense and our own air superiority
(d) Armored divisions carried enough petro for 150-200 km—supplemented, if necessary, with supply of petrol to the armored spearheads by air drop
(e) Carrying rations sufficient for 3 days in the tanks, 3 more days in the regimental supply column, and 3 more days in the divisional supply column
(p. 96) In POL and FRA, tank forces advanced about 30 miles a day, fighting included. In RUS (41), some achieved 15 miles a day over 20 days. The record was 60 miles a day.
16 [NEW TANK TACTIC (p. 97)] In RUS, a new tactic: Armor would break through the front at night, and then go into hiding in woods behind the front. The RUS meantime would close the gap. In the morning GER infantry would attack, and the RUS defenders would be attacked by armor from the rear.
17 [FRANCE (p. 105)] “Truth is stranger than fiction”... FRA was overcome by an offensive in which few of the higher executants had any faith... The “miracle at Dunkirk”? (p. 106) The answer is that H's intervention saved them—when nothing else could have. A sudden order from him over the phone stopped the armored forces just as they were in sight of Dunkirk.
18 [OKH LEADERS PLOT A COUP 1939–1940: VERY SHOCKING INFORMATION TO ME (p. 107)] Most generals, victorious over FRA, would have been horrified to hear that 6 months earlier they had nearly been ordered to march on Berlin instead of on Paris... (p. 110) OKH leaders, Brauchitsch and Halder, thought if H would not moderate his “gamble” on FRA (in H’s own words), they should order the army in the West to turn about and march on Berlin to overthrow H. But Fromm, CIC Home Forces, argued that troops would not obey such orders—because they had too much trust in H.
19 [GET READY TO ATTACK FRANCE: 11 TIMES (p. 111)] Between Nov 1939 and Apr 1940 the armies received the order to “fall in” (to be ready to attack in 48 hrs) on eleven occasions. They were all cancelled, leading generals to think H was merely bluffing. Then the 12th order came in May 1940, and events took their fatal course.
20 [CDG'S LEGENDARY TANK ATTACK WAS NOT A BIG DEAL (p. 130)] Re: de Gaulle's 4th Armored Division's attack, Kleist: “It did not put us in any such danger as later accounts have suggested. Guderian dealt with it himself without troubling me, and I only heard of it the day after.”
p. 130 GER advanced so fast... Kleist said: “We heard from French radio that General Giraud was appointed to take over their 6th Army on the Meuse. Just as I was reading it, the door opened and a handsome FRA general was ushered in. He introduced himself: “I am General Giraud.” He told me he was looking for his army, and then found himself in the midst of my forces far ahead of where he had expected them to be.”
21 [CHAPTER TITLE: MISFIRES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (p. 154)] (1) Cyprus was saved by the price the BRI made the GER pay for Crete. (2) Gibraltar was saved by Franco's reluctance to let the GER into ESP. (3) Malta was saved by H's distrust of the ITA navy.
22 [AIR WAR IN AFRICA (p. 164)] In Oct 1942, according to Thoma, “I reckoned that you had 1200 aircraft while I was reduced to barely a dozen.” After his capture, he was astonished that Monty “seemed to know as much about our position as I did myself.” Then speaking of Monty's handling, “I thought he was very cautious, considering his immensely superior strength, but—he is the only FM in this war who won all battles.” (p. 165) “In modern mobile warfare, the tactics are not the main thing. The decisive factor is the organization of one's resources—to maintain the momentum.”
23 [RUSSIA (p. 166)] Here is the most startling of all. What saved RUS above all was, not her modern progress, but her backwardness. If the SOV regime had given her a road system comparable to that of the West, she would probably have been overrun in quick time.
24 [GERMAN TROOPS ALMOST REACH MOSCOW (p. 185)] GER troops could see the flashes of the AA guns over Moscow at night, and it fired their imagination—the city seemed so near... But the commanders felt they were not strong enough to push those last 40 miles... (p. 186) The 2nd Panzer Division penetrated far enough to get a sight of the Kremlin, but that was the nearest it came... (p. 187) Never again would any GER soldiers catch sight of the Kremlin, except as prisoners.
25 [HITLER DOES NOT MESS WITH THE NAVY (p. 193)] According to a frustrated general: “Only the admirals had a happy time in this war—as H knew nothing about the sea, whereas he felt he knew all about land warfare.”
26 [STALINGRAD NOT A MAIN OBJECTIVE (p. 199)] In 1942, the fact that Stalingrad was not a main objective will surprise most people.
27 [ARMY GROUP A IN CAUCASUS (p. 203)] Kleist's Army Group A's patrols reached the shores of the Caspian, and his main forces succeeded in taking Ordzhonokidze... But owing to shortage of petrol the lorries themselves were immobilized and petrol was brought forward on camels—an ironical revival of the traditional “ship of the desert.”... (p. 210) Kleist was promoted FM for his achievements in conducting the post-Stalingrad retreat from the Caucasus without serious loss.
28 [KLEIST ON RUSSIANS (p. 220)] “The men were first-rate fighters from the start, and we owed our success simply to superior training. They became first-rate soldiers with experience. They fought most toughly, had amazing endurance, and could carry on without most supplies other armies regarded as necessities. Their Staff were quick to learn from their early defeats, and soon became highly efficient.”
p. 224 “On Hitler's specific orders, an attempt was later made in the GER Army to inculcate the same mental toughness that prevailed in the Red Army. We tried to copy the RUS in this respect, while the RUS copied us, more successfully, in tactics.”
p. 226 “The RUS can carry on for as long as 3 weeks in this primitive way when advancing. You can't stop them, like an ordinary army, by cutting their communications, for you rarely find any supply columns to strike.”
28 [NORMANDY (p. 237)] H correctly guessed the Allied landing would come in Normandy... It would seem that H's much derided “intuition” was nearer the mark than the calculations of his ablest professional soldiers... The value of doing the “unexpected” was overlooked by the generals.
p. 244 Rundstedt: “Besides the interference of the Air Forces, the fire of your battleships was a main factor in hampering our counter-stroke. This was a big surprise, both in its range and effect.”
29 [AFTER THE BULGE, NO MORE BIG PLANS (p. 292)] After the Ardennes failure, H started a “corporal's war.” There were no big plans—only a multitude of piecemeal fights.
30 [CONCLUSION (p. 299)] The older professional leaders trained under the General Staff system tended to prove highly efficient, but lacking in genius... their immense abilities carried their own limitation. They tended to conduct war more in the manner of chess than as an art, unlike the old masters of war... H was quicker to spot the value of new ideas, new weapons, and new talent. He recognized the potential of mobile armored forces sooner than the General Staff did, and he backed Guderian.
p. 300 Sometimes the intuitive amateurs were justified by events. Sometimes the mathematically calculating professionals—the latter more, naturally, in the long run. But the jealousy between them, and the way it aggravated inevitable clashes of opinion, proved more fatal to GER than the actual errors of either side... The GER generals were the best-finished product of their profession—anywhere. They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers.
