如何不对抗通货膨胀
作者：约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨 2023 年 1 月 26 日
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-inflation-fed-interest-rates-high-costs-dubious-benefits-by-joseph-e-stiglitz-2023-01
仔细观察美国的经济状况可以证明通胀主要是由供给侧中断和需求模式转变驱动的。 鉴于此，进一步加息几乎不会产生任何影响 — — 并且会导致其自身产生深远的问题。
纽约 — — 尽管指数良好，但现在判断通胀是否已得到抑制还为时过早。 尽管如此，最近的价格飙升还是得出了两个明显的教训。
首先，经济学家的标准模型 — — 尤其是假设经济始终处于均衡状态的主导模型 — — 实际上毫无用处。 其次，那些自信地声称需要五年的痛苦才能将通货膨胀从体系中挤出来的人已经被驳斥了。 通货膨胀大幅下降，2022 年 12 月经季节性调整的消费者价格指数仅比 6 月份高 1%。
有大量证据表明，通胀的主要来源是与大流行相关的供应冲击和需求模式的转变，而不是总需求过剩，当然也不是大流行支出造成的任何额外需求。 任何对市场经济有信心的人都知道，供给问题最终会得到解决； 但没有人知道具体时间是什么时候。
毕竟，我们从未经历过大流行导致的经济关闭然后迅速重新开放的情况。 这就是为什么基于过去经验的模型被证明是无关紧要的。 尽管如此，我们仍可以预期，消除供应瓶颈将起到通货紧缩的作用，即使这不一定会立即或完全抵消早期的通胀过程，因为市场向上调整的趋势比向下调整的速度更快。
政策制定者继续平衡做得太少和做得太多的风险。 加息的风险显而易见：脆弱的全球经济可能陷入衰退，引发更多债务危机，因为许多负债累累的新兴和发展中经济体面临强势美元、出口收入下降和利率上升的三重打击。 这将是一场嘲讽。 美国拒绝分享 COVID-19 疫苗的知识产权，已经让人们不必要地死亡，之后又故意采取了一项可能会让世界上最脆弱的经济体陷入困境的政策。 对于一个与中国发动新冷战的国家来说，这很难说是一个制胜策略。
更糟糕的是，我们甚至不清楚这种方法是否有任何好处。 事实上，加息可能弊大于利，因为企业投资解决当前供应限制的成本会更高。 美联储的货币政策紧缩已经限制了住房建设，尽管增加供应正是降低通货膨胀最大来源之一：住房成本所需要的。
此外，房地产市场的许多价格制定者现在可能会将较高的经营成本转嫁给租房者。 在更广泛的零售和其他市场中，较高的利率实际上会导致价格上涨，因为较高的利率会促使企业相对于今天较高价格带来的好处来减记失去客户的未来价值。
可以肯定的是，深度衰退会抑制通胀。 但我们为什么要邀请它呢？ 美联储主席杰罗姆·鲍威尔和他的同事们似乎喜欢为经济欢呼喝彩。 与此同时，他们在商业银行业的朋友们却像土匪一样大吃大喝，因为美联储正在为超过 3 万亿美元的银行准备金余额支付 4.4% 的利息 — — 每年带来超过 1,300 亿美元的丰厚回报。
为了证明这一切的合理性，美联储指出了常见的问题：失控的通胀、工资价格螺旋式上升以及不受控制的通胀预期。 但这些妖怪在哪里呢？ 通货膨胀不仅在下降，而且工资的增长速度比价格的增长速度要慢（意味着没有螺旋式上升），而且预期仍然受到控制。 五年、五年的远期预期率徘徊在略高于 2% 的水平上 — — 几乎没有任何变化。
一些人还担心我们不会足够快地回到 2% 的目标通胀率。 但请记住，这个数字是凭空而来的。 它没有经济意义，也没有任何证据表明，如果通货膨胀在 2% 到 4% 之间变化，会给经济带来高昂的代价。 相反，考虑到经济结构性变革的需要和物价下行刚性，略高的通胀目标是值得推荐的。
一些人还会说，通胀之所以保持温和，正是因为各国央行已表明了对抗通胀的决心。 每当我的狗伍菲对着飞过我们房子的飞机吠叫时，他可能都会得出同样的结论。 他可能认为他已经把它们吓跑了，不吠叫会增加飞机坠落到他身上的风险。
人们希望现代经济分析能够比伍菲所做的更深入。 仔细观察正在发生的事情以及价格下降的地方，就会支持结构主义的观点，即通货膨胀主要是由供给侧中断和需求模式的变化驱动的。 随着这些问题得到解决，通胀可能会继续下降。
是的，现在准确判断通货膨胀何时能够得到完全抑制还为时过早。 没有人知道什么新的冲击正在等待着我们。 但我仍然把钱放在“Team Temporary”上。 那些认为通货膨胀将在很大程度上自行解决（并且缓解供应限制的政策可以加速这一过程）的人仍然比那些主张成本明显高且持续但收益可疑的措施的人更有说服力。
How Not to Fight Inflation
NEW YORK – Despite favorable indices, it is too soon to tell whether inflation has been tamed. Nonetheless, two clear lessons have emerged from the recent price surge.
First, economists’ standard models – especially the dominant one that assumes the economy always to be in equilibrium – were effectively useless. And, second, those who confidently asserted that it would take five years of pain to wring inflation out of the system have already been refuted. Inflation has fallen dramatically, with the December 2022 seasonally adjusted consumer price index coming in just 1% above that for June.
There is overwhelming evidence that the main source of inflation was pandemic-related supply shocks and shifts in the pattern of demand, not excess aggregate demand, and certainly not any additional demand created by pandemic spending. Anyone with any faith in the market economy knew that the supply issues would be resolved eventually; but no one could possibly know when.
After all, we have never endured a pandemic-driven economic shutdown followed by a rapid reopening. That is why models based on past experience proved irrelevant. Still, we could anticipate that clearing supply bottlenecks would be disinflationary, even if this would not necessarily counteract the earlier inflationary process immediately or in full, owing to markets’ tendency to adjust upward more rapidly than they adjust downward.
Policymakers continue to balance the risk of doing too little versus doing too much. The risks of increasing interest rates are clear: a fragile global economy could be pushed into recession, precipitating more debt crises as many heavily indebted emerging and developing economies face the triple whammy of a strong dollar, lower export revenues, and higher interest rates. This would be a travesty. After already letting people die unnecessarily by refusing to share the intellectual property for COVID-19 vaccines, the United States has knowingly adopted a policy that will likely sink the world’s most vulnerable economies. This is hardly a winning strategy for a country that has launched a new cold war with China.
Worse, it is not even clear that there is any upside to this approach. In fact, raising interest rates could do more harm than good, by making it more expensive for firms to invest in solutions to the current supply constraints. The US Federal Reserve’s monetary-policy tightening has already curtailed housing construction, even though more supply is precisely what is needed to bring down one of the biggest sources of inflation: housing costs.
Moreover, many price-setters in the housing market may now pass the higher costs of doing business on to renters. And in retail and other markets more broadly, higher interest rates can actually induce price increases as the higher interest rates induce businesses to write down the future value of lost customers relative to the benefits today of higher prices.
To be sure, a deep recession would tame inflation. But why would we invite that? Fed Chair Jerome Powell and his colleagues seem to relish cheering against the economy. Meanwhile, their friends in commercial banking are making out like bandits now that the Fed is paying 4.4% interest on more than $3 trillion of bank reserve balances – yielding a tidy return of more than $130 billion per year.
To justify all this, the Fed points to the usual bogeymen: runaway inflation, a wage-price spiral, and unanchored inflation expectations. But where are these bogeymen? Not only is inflation falling, but wages are increasing more slowly than prices (meaning no spiral), and expectations remain in check. The five-year, five-year forward expectation rate is hovering just above 2% – hardly unanchored.
Some also fear that we will not return quickly enough to the 2% target inflation rate. But remember, that number was pulled out of thin air. It has no economic significance, nor is there any evidence to suggest that it would be costly to the economy if inflation were to vary between, say, 2% and 4%. On the contrary, given the need for structural changes in the economy and downward rigidities in prices, a slightly higher inflation target has much to recommend it.
Some also will say that inflation has remained tame precisely because central banks have signaled such resolve in fighting it. My dog Woofie might have drawn the same conclusion whenever he barked at planes flying over our house. He might have believed that he had scared them off, and that not barking would have increased the risk of the plane falling on him.
One would hope that modern economic analysis would dig deeper than Woofie ever did. A careful look at what is going on, and at where prices have come down, supports the structuralist view that inflation was driven mainly by supply-side disruptions and shifts in the pattern of demand. As these issues are resolved, inflation is likely to continue to come down.
Yes, it is too soon to tell precisely when inflation will be fully tamed. And no one knows what new shocks await us. But I am still putting my money on “Team Temporary.” Those arguing that inflation will be largely cured on its own (and that the process could be hastened by policies to alleviate supply constraints) still have a much stronger case than those advocating measures with obviously high and persistent costs but only dubious benefits.
