制裁几乎总是失败：这是欧盟和美国应该从遏制俄罗斯和中国的徒劳尝试中汲取的教训
https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/01/sanctions-nearly-always-fail-that-is-the-lesson-the-eu-and-the-united-states-should-take-from-their-vain- 试图遏制俄罗斯和中国/
俄罗斯联邦出口的大部分石油都在逃避西方对其实施的价格上限制裁。
作者：拉尔夫·舍尔哈默 2024 年 1 月 29 日
就西方利用经济治国手段作为国际政治工具的能力而言，去年已经显示出明显的缺陷。 几乎所有旨在削弱潜在对手的计划要么失败了，要么效果不如预期。
让我们从俄罗斯开始：为了耗尽莫斯科发动乌克兰战争的财政资源，G7国家对俄罗斯石油实施了每桶60美元的价格上限。 此举旨在维持全球能源供应稳定，同时限制俄罗斯的战争能力。 然而，尽管有这些意图，英国《金融时报》的报道表明，几乎没有俄罗斯石油的销售量低于这一上限，从而削弱了该政策的有效性。
由于并非所有七国集团成员都一致遵守上限，情况变得更加复杂。 例如，日本获得了豁免，允许其在 2024 年 6 月 28 日之前以超过 60 美元门槛的价格进口俄罗斯原油 — 这凸显了维持盟友之间团结一致的挑战。
此外，实行价格上限无意中刺激了石油黑市活动的激增，这表明各国为确保获得这一重要资源将不遗余力。 美国已采取措施强制执行价格上限，针对原油贸易商和航运实体，但这些措施的整体效果仍然值得怀疑。
总之，虽然七国集团对俄罗斯石油价格上限的设计目的是限制俄罗斯的收入来源，但国际石油贸易的现实和能源的战略重要性使得该上限的效果不如预期。
Substack 最受欢迎的博客背后的团队 Doomberg 告诉《布鲁塞尔信号》，整个概念从一开始就存在缺陷。 大宗商品出口国不能因出口限制而受到削弱，因为它们可以通过价格弥补数量损失。 正确的策略是向市场注入大量能源，从而导致全球价格和俄罗斯经济崩溃。
普京积累的财务缓冲正在得到很好的利用，包括购买欧洲和美国的高科技。 去年，俄罗斯从美国和欧洲公司进口了价值超过 10 亿美元的先进微芯片。 利用土耳其、沙特阿拉伯或中亚国家等第三国可以让俄罗斯继续获得所需的技术，这表明莫斯科并不像看上去那么孤立。
同样，美国切断中国半导体技术供应的战略似乎也令人失望。 荷兰公司 ASML 是世界上唯一一家生产制造复杂半导体所需机械的生产商，该公司受到美国和荷兰之间一项限制对中国出口的秘密协议的约束。 ASML 凭借其光刻机在推动半导体行业发展方面发挥了重要作用，这对于生产计算机芯片至关重要。
虽然 ASML 最先进的技术极紫外 (EUV) 光刻技术自 2019 年以来已被禁止向中国出口，但该公司第二先进的机器浸入式深紫外 (DUV) 系统最初并未受到此类限制。 这些 DUV 系统利用深紫外光来打印构成微芯片基础的微小特征，并且对于实现芯片制造的重大进展至关重要。
然而，全球需求低迷导致 ASML 游说荷兰政府增加出口，而且效果正在显现：尽管有出口管制，ASML 的 DUV 光刻机还是促进了中国芯片制造的显着突破。 中芯国际利用ASML的设备成功生产出了7纳米芯片。 中国制造此类先进芯片的能力的曝光引起了华盛顿的担忧，因为这表明中国的半导体行业可能已达到难以限制的自给自足水平。
正如经常发生的那样，制裁变成了美国前国务卿乔治·舒尔茨所说的“浪费资产”。 他描述了这样一个事实：对某些商品施加限制只会促使目标国利用自己的技术能力开发这些商品。 当被问及制裁的历史时，能源专家阿纳斯·阿尔哈吉 (Anas Alhaji) 告诉《布鲁塞尔信号报》，故事几乎总是一样的：“最终，他们总是伊尔。”
Sanctions nearly always fail: That is the lesson the EU and the United States should take from their vain attempts to curtail Russia and China
The majority of oil exported by the Russian Federation is avoiding price-cap sanctions imposed upon it by the West. (EPA-EFE/REHAN KHAN)
The last year has shown significant shortcomings when it comes to West’s ability to use economic statecraft as a tool in international politics. Almost all schemes developed to weaken potential opponents have either failed or were less effective than expected.
Lets begin with Russia: In order to drain the financial resources that enable Moscow’s war in Ukraine, the G7 nations implemented a price cap of $60 per barrel on Russian oil. This measure was intended to maintain global energy supply stability while constraining Russia’s war capabilities. Despite these intentions, however, reports from the Financial Times indicate that almost no Russian oil has been sold below this cap, undermining the effectiveness of the policy. The situation is further complicated by the fact that not all G7 members have uniformly adhered to the cap. Japan, for instance, secured an exemption allowing it to import Russian crude oil at prices exceeding the $60 threshold until June 28, 2024 – highlighting the challenges in maintaining a cohesive front among allies.
Moreover, the imposition of the price cap has inadvertently spurred a surge in black market activities for oil, demonstrating the lengths to which nations will go to secure access to this vital resource. The US has taken steps to enforce the price cap, targeting crude traders and shipping entities, but the overall efficacy of these measures remains questionable.
In conclusion, while the G7’s price cap on Russian oil was designed with the goal of curtailing Russia’s revenue streams, the reality of international oil trade and the strategic importance of energy have rendered the cap less effective than hoped.
As the team behind Substack’s most read Blog, Doomberg, told Brussels Signal the entire concept was flawed from the beginning. A commodity exporter cannot be weakened with export restrictions, since they make up the loss in volume via price. The right strategy would have been to flood the market with energy, thereby collapsing global prices and the Russian economy.
The financial cushion Putin as accumulated is being put to good use, including buying European and US-American high-tech. Russia managed to import over $1 billion worth of advanced microchips from U.S. and European companies in the previous year. Using third countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or the nations of Central Asia allows Russia continued access to needed technology, and it demonstrates that Moscow is not as isolated as it seems.
In a similar fashion, the US strategy to cut off China from semiconductor technology seems to disappoint as well. The Dutch company ASML, which is the world’s only producer of the necessary machinery to make sophisticated semiconductors, was subject to a secret agreement between the US and the Netherlands to limit exports to China. ASML, has been instrumental in advancing the semiconductor industry with its photolithography machines, which are crucial for producing computer chips.
While ASML’s most advanced technology, extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography, has been banned from export to China since 2019, the company’s second-most advanced machines, the immersion deep ultraviolet (DUV) systems, were not initially subject to such restrictions. These DUV systems utilize deep UV light to print minuscule features that form the basis of microchips and have been pivotal in enabling significant progress in chip manufacturing.
A downturn in global demand, however, resulted in ASML lobbying the Dutch government for increased exports – and they are showing effects: Despite export controls, ASML’s DUV lithography machines have facilitated a notable breakthrough in Chinese chipmaking. Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), using ASML’s equipment, managed to produce a 7-nanometer chip. The revelation of China’s ability to manufacture such advanced chips has raised concerns in Washington, as it suggests that China’s semiconductor industry might be reaching a level of self-sufficiency that could be difficult to curtail.
Sanctions, as they so often do, turn into what the former US Secretary of State George Shultz called “a wasting asset.” He describes the fact that imposing restrictions on certain goods will only motivate the target-country to develop those goods with their own technological capabilities. When asked about the history of sanctions, the energy expert Anas Alhaji told Brussels Signal that the story is almost always the same: “In the end, they always fail.”
