反华鹰派推动北约向亚洲扩张可能会摧毁西方军事联盟
https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2023/08/04/nato-expand-asia-china-russia/
作者：拉迪卡·德赛、迈克尔·哈德森； 2023-08-04
政治经济学家拉迪卡·德赛 (Radhika Desai) 和迈克尔·哈德森 (Michael Hudson) 与地缘政治分析师佩佩·埃斯科瓦尔 (Pepe Escobar) 一起讨论战争鹰派将北约扩展到亚洲以遏制中国的努力可能会如何摧毁西方军事联盟。
北约拓展亚洲 佩佩·埃斯科巴尔 拉迪卡·德赛 迈克尔·哈德森
政治经济学家拉迪卡·德赛 (Radhika Desai) 和迈克尔·哈德森 (Michael Hudson) 与地缘政治分析师佩佩·埃斯科瓦尔 (Pepe Escobar) 一起讨论战争鹰派将北约扩展到亚洲以遏制中国的努力可能会如何摧毁西方军事联盟。
您可以在此处找到更多地缘政治经济时间剧集。
成绩单
RADHIKA DESAI：大家好，欢迎来到第 15 期地缘政治经济时间，这是一个讨论我们这个时代的政治和地缘政治经济的节目。 我是拉迪卡·德赛。
迈克尔·哈德森：我是迈克尔·哈德森。
拉迪卡·德赛：今天我们再次请到杰出的流动记者佩佩·埃斯科瓦尔。 欢迎，佩佩。
佩佩·埃斯科巴： 谢谢。 很高兴再次与你们在一起。
拉迪卡·德赛：今天我们将继续上一期地缘政治经济课开始的讨论，题为“北约越界：对俄罗斯的战争，对中国的战争”。
上次我们讨论了维尔纽斯峰会离开北约的方向，以及峰会暴露出的联盟内部分歧； 对俄罗斯的代理人战争进展如何； 以及拜登联合所谓民主国家反对所谓独裁国家的计划如何如此关键地依赖于这场战争的结果，从目前的迹象来看，这对乌克兰来说并不好，对北约来说也不利。
然后我们继续讨论欧洲和其他美国盟友能够维持北约团结的外观多久，就在我们说话的时候，这种团结正在破裂，最后我们讨论了粮食协议（黑海粮食倡议）是如何破裂的。
现在，讨论已经使我们能够将我们的框架扩展到欧洲之外，并将世界视为一个整体，因为，正如我们的讨论中非常清楚的那样，你无法理解谷物交易的破裂，除非你将其放在更大的范围内。 帝国主义长期以来试图剥夺世界大多数国家的粮食安全，这是一个残酷的历史背景。
因此，今天我们将继续讨论，重点关注北约从北大西洋公约组织转变为北大西洋公约组织、南大西洋公约组织和太平洋公约组织的危险，因为拜登将导致对中国发动一场不断扩大和深化的混合战争 涉及贸易、技术、外交和军事方面，但越来越接近某种军事战争。
因此，我们再次围绕几个问题进行讨论，所以我将首先提出第一个问题：
美国在所谓印太地区对华的更广泛意图和战略是什么？
最近发生的事件对该地区意味着什么？ 我想到的是中国和俄罗斯高级官员访问平壤以纪念朝鲜战争停战70周年等活动。
我想到的是西方国家对中国与所罗门群岛（众多太平洋岛国之一）最近达成的协议的歇斯底里。
美国最近宣布向台湾提供新的一揽子军事援助，这基本上将通过某种总统令来完成，所使用的军事缩编计划与拜登总统为助长乌克兰战争而使用的相同。
总体而言，我认为该地区的紧张局势正在加剧，这要归功于几年前 AUKUS 的宣布，以及所谓的四国联盟（或新兴联盟，无论你怎么称呼它）的重新启动。 美国、韩国、日本和印度。
当然，北约最近宣布将中国视为威胁。
美国的战略并不容易理解，因为一方面似乎在努力通过最近安东尼·布林肯、珍妮特·耶伦等美国高官的来访来推动对话，另一方面， 美国的行动继续加剧各方面的紧张局势。
那么，迈克尔，你为什么不先向我们介绍一下你对此事的看法呢？
迈克尔·赫德森：嗯，今天距离美国被赶出阿富汗才两年，我们看到乌克兰的失败再次重演。
因此，美国和北约失去了乌克兰，但他们希望继续战斗，因为拜登表示，这是一场针对中国的战斗，需要二十年，也许三十年。
因此看来太平洋甚至北极可能成为美国新的干扰区。
现在，特别是俄罗斯和中国正在与朝鲜合作开发港口，以开展从太平洋经北极到北欧的新贸易。 所以美国在军事上正在失败，但看起来是这样
几年后就会失去欧洲。
而美国自20世纪90年代以来的战略计划就是将华沙条约组织纳入北约。 它已经做到了，但现在看来它做得有些过头了。 最终的代价可能是失去以德国、法国和意大利为首的西欧。
我们已经看到，在过去的几天里，自从我们上次广播以来，随着经济和就业的下降，我们看到整个欧洲发生了骚乱。
还有人讨论，以巴斯夫公司为首的德国化学工业将何去何从？ 他们宣布不会在德国进行任何进一步的资本投资。 他们表示，他们面临着将工厂迁往美国的压力。 他们已经在中国设有工厂。
那么，像拉脱维亚、爱沙尼亚和立陶宛的人口自1990年以来减少了约三分之一一样，德国工业人口放弃国家后会去哪里呢？
当你观察这一切在地缘政治上的表现时，就会发现波罗的海和中欧在经济上并不重要。 他们的人口正在减少。
只有波兰具有军事价值，因为它梦想恢复 16 世纪的状态，当时它控制着斯堪的纳维亚半岛和波罗的海的大部分地区。
所以美国一直在坚持，要么你支持我们，要么反对我们。 即将到来的突破可能会让西欧进入俄罗斯和上海合作组织的轨道。
当他们最终做出决定时，如果他们真的决定了，“哎呀，我们不应该失去与俄罗斯的贸易。 现在我们被告知停止与中国的贸易。 也许我们不应该这么做”。 如果他们改变决定，这将是不可逆转的。
你可以说，同样受到压力的南半球国家 — — 事实上，全球大多数国家 — — 他们被迫做出选择，要么选择工业经济正在萎缩的美国，要么选择“支持美国”。 与不断扩大的金砖国家+以及上海合作组织合作。
那么，未来几年这些国家将在哪些方面进行重组呢？
美国可以让英国成为附属国。 我认为，英国的命运将对那些采用美国式金融资本主义而不是社会主义工业化和公共服务作为人权的国家发出警告。
PEPE ESCOBAR： Michael 向我们介绍了大局，对吧？ 我想重点关注过去几天发生的事情，这是一件巨大的事情，我想说，对于地球上的大多数人来说，这是完全不可预见的，那就是俄罗斯将朝鲜、朝鲜重新提升到一个非常重要的地位。 影响力巨大的全球南方力量。
因此，我们接待了[俄罗斯]国防部谢尔盖·绍伊古，就像平壤的米克·贾格尔一样。 他受到了真正的摇滚明星般的欢迎，整个过程，包括与金正恩的私人接见，显然还有朝鲜整个领导层的欢迎。
当然，泄露的是许多军事协议和加强军事合作的可能性。
没有泄漏的是其中最好的部分，因为这是地缘经济部分。
俄罗斯人到底想对平壤做什么？ 他们希望将平壤与韩国、首尔融为一体。 当然，这将意味着俄罗斯在两者之间发展某种中间人的外交。 他们有可能做到这两点，因为他们在首尔也受到尊重。
符拉迪沃斯托克东部经济论坛已经讨论过这一点。 这些讨论，至少是三四年前在符拉迪沃斯托克开始的。 他们的目的基本上是建设一条横贯朝鲜的铁路，这条铁路将与西伯利亚大铁路连接起来，将朝鲜和俄罗斯远东地区连接起来，然后一直穿越欧亚大陆。
假设您是首尔的三星商人。 你看着它，说：“哇，我不再需要使用货轮了； 只要修建一条铁路，我就可以直接进入俄罗斯远东地区巨大的发展中市场，更不用说通过俄罗斯进入整个欧亚大陆了。” 非常非常简单。
我想说，在中国的投入下，它迟早会成为一条高铁。 考虑到中国人已经在俄罗斯投资高铁，并且考虑到如果将西伯利亚大铁路复制成中国人将修建的横贯西伯利亚高铁，这条横贯韩国的高铁将由中国人建造。 铁路也可以由中国投入和技术投入来建设。
并通过中国丝路基金、金砖国家开发银行、俄罗斯银行等提供融资。这可能是东欧亚大陆风格的金融重组。
所以他们当然正在讨论这个问题，并且将会重新讨论这个问题，他们将在九月初于符拉迪沃斯托克举行的下一届东方经济论坛上更深入地讨论这个问题。 所以，从字面上看，它指日可待。
因此，现在发生的这种情况非常非常重要，因为这是一种
序言他们将在下一届东方经济论坛上讨论什么。 所以大家对这个安排都很满意。
朝鲜，因为他们被带回了欧亚大陆部分地区贸易的前沿。 朝鲜和韩国之间达成某种地缘经济协议的可能性。
俄罗斯，开发远东，将远东与朝鲜一体化。
当然还有中国，因为这也整合了欧亚大陆的这一部分，这个欧亚大陆北部的框架。
它是金砖国家的一部分。 它是上海合作组织的一部分。 我想说，这给我们留下了朝鲜迟早融入欧亚经济联盟的可能性。
这太棒了，因为我看到这种情况至少发生在两个阶段。
第一阶段，欧亚经济联盟与朝鲜达成自由贸易协定，就像与古巴或东南亚越南的自由贸易协定一样。
他们还正在与印度尼西亚合作，与印度尼西亚达成欧亚经济联盟自由贸易协定。 他们也可以对朝鲜做同样的事情。
太棒了，这绕过了美国的制裁，因为基本上是 EAEU，俄罗斯占 EAEU 火力的 80%。 他们可以设计一种涉及朝鲜的完全绕过美元的结算机制。
欧亚经济联盟向东北亚扩张，这一点非常重要。 中国人也会喜欢它，因为他们也可以，即使他们不是欧亚经济联盟的一部分——不要忘记普京和习近平已经说过，而且指令已经在那里了——“一带一路”倡议 、“一带一路”和欧亚经济联盟，它们必须趋同。
这将是“一带一路”倡议与欧亚经济联盟融合的完美范例。
这就是为什么，在我看来，绍伊古扮演的米克·贾格尔的这次访问，在地缘经济和地缘政治上都可以推断出这一点。 我想说，西方主流媒体甚至没有提及或几乎没有提及它，这也不足为奇。
拉迪卡·德赛：这绝对是真的。
我的意思是，人们想得越多，事实就是美国的战略在该地区停止发挥作用只是时间问题。
首先，我的意思是，美国可以将北约扩展到太平洋的想法不会被推翻，因为太平洋地区历史上一直专注于自身的经济发展。
中国人本质上是把自己的经济发展战略与北约的一切安全化战略对立起来，本质上把一切都变成军事冲突或军事联盟。 我们将看到这两种愿景在该地区的争论。
我想说，基本上，每个人都开始意识到美国在亚洲所做的事情，美国在世界各地所做的事情，至少自第二次世界大战以来，如果不是之前的话，只是时间问题， 本质上，美国说它正在为世界提供保护； 事实上，美国一直在收取保护费。
什么是保护球拍？ 保护费是承诺提供安全保障，防止你自己制造的危险，这样你提供安全的承诺就显得可信和有吸引力。
例如，美国继续在朝鲜半岛制造不团结。 事实是，绝大多数韩国人，无论南北，都深深渴望某种形式的统一。 毫无疑问。
事实证明了这一点：周期性地，政府上台推动统一进程，但随后美国介入并扰乱统一进程。
只有当韩国人意识到这一点时，他们才会停止投票给这些势力。 我认为这只是时间问题。
同样，就台湾而言，我们已经看到，在即将举行的选举前夕，我想，几个月后，你们就会与希望促进和平和解的国民党并肩出现。 对于中国来说，一个新政党的出现也将做同样的事情。
这将从根本上将民进党排除在外。 所以他们不会赢。
同样，你也在报纸上看到，虽然日本近年来签署、宣布了新的军事政策，人们说这对于一个和平宪法的国家来说是不可想象的，但实际上你看到绝大多数日本人是 不会加入任何由美国领导的针对台湾问题针对中国的战争。
最后，我真正想说的是，你给出的有关朝鲜问题可能发生的情况的精彩细节，是更广泛压力的一部分，我喜欢将其视为施加的压力。 经济磁力，中国的经济引力。
任何国家都不能不对此做出回应。 因此，我们将看到一种转变，但与此同时，就我们可以预期在新时期发生的情况而言
美国试图在未来几年，甚至几十年内阻止这种不可阻挡的发展发生。
迈克尔，你说我同意你的观点，在某种程度上，美国似乎正在考虑一场长达数十年的战争。 但我们也在报纸上读到，美国觉得现在有必要做点什么，因为他们认为，到2027年，中国才有能力真正抵抗美国的军队。
但是，是的，我的意思是，这是对下一个问题的一种延续，基本上是，美国可以从其盟友那里得到什么？
迈克尔·赫德森：日本有点斯德哥尔摩综合症，它认同美国，因为美国轰炸了它。 尽管拥有与中国的出口贸易机会，但其右翼政府仍然愿意失去这个市场，并再次为美国牺牲其经济，就像它在《广场协议》和《卢浮宫协议》中所做的那样。
韩国确实是这一切的关键，部分原因是它在船舶制造方面非常重要，而且它面临着继续削减向中国出口先进船舶的压力。 《华尔街日报》刚刚对此进行了长篇报道。
但如果它看到了中国市场的前景 — — 正如佩佩所解释的，整个欧亚市场，由于铁路 — — 它将决定它将选择什么：出口市场来解决军事开销和威胁 朝鲜，还是会继续支持美国？
它可能不得不告诉美国撤走其占领军，因为我认为朝鲜战争仍然在合法地进行。 因此，我们最终可能会看到 1950 年开始的朝鲜战争结束。
佩佩·埃斯科巴：你的问题是美国将做什么。 只要环顾四周，看看他们在南半球或全球多数地区的某些地区无法做到的事情。
例如东南亚。 嗯，我住在【东南亚】； 这是我的家。 很久以前，94 年我搬到了东南亚。
所以我现场关注东盟十国、东南亚十国、俄罗斯、中国、印度、美国的关系。
如今，大家都知道，整个东盟的第一大贸易伙伴是中国。
我们还知道，美国在一些东南亚国家比在其他国家拥有更大的回旋余地。
比如新加坡，我们平时开玩笑说新加坡是美国在东南亚的航母驻地，与印度尼西亚、马来西亚并列。
印度尼西亚和中国之间的关系越来越密切，最后，当然，在苏哈托时代以及之后不久，双方都存在很多相互猜疑。
中国人非常非常聪明地向印度尼西亚解释，“看，我们对你们的岛屿，即南海的纳土纳群岛没有任何设计”。 所以印尼人比较放松。
所以现在他们正在谈论生意，例如，你知道，中国的投资，这是印度尼西亚“一带一路”倡议的一部分。
众所周知，菲律宾仍然是时断时续的美国殖民地。
但例如，美国人在缅甸、老挝和柬埔寨的渗透率绝对为零。 这是中国的领土。 这些地区都有一带一路倡议项目，比如中国人建造的从云南到万象的绝对非凡的高铁。
我看到它建在湄公河对面的森林中央。 这是只有中国人才能做到的事情。 除此之外，他们在创纪录的时间内做到了这一点，因为老挝政府说，“好吧，来这里，做一切”，这就是要走的路。
在泰国，将会有一个延期，因为，当然，由于外国干涉，由于泰国游说集团内部的斗争，泰国人甚至还没有开始完成他们自己的延期，你看。
但这证明东南亚对于中美关系而言 关系，这是一个平衡的行为。 但这些国家中的大多数都清楚地知道从现在开始会发生什么。
他们的第一大贸易伙伴是中国。 中国对所有这些国家的影响力将继续非常非常强大，无论是直接还是间接，通过所有这些国家的华人侨民，我们称之为“竹子互联网”，它在所有这些国家都很强大。
南美：南美，他们基本上是对阵阿根廷和巴西，当然，美国人有战术上的胜利。
以阿根廷为例，他们强迫阿根廷获得一笔贷款来支付国际货币基金组织的另一笔贷款。
所以基本上，该计划是让阿根廷无限期地乞求国际货币基金组织贷款。 所以这是 A 计划。没有 B 计划。
巴西的情况要复杂得多。 但就目前而言，这是一次战术上的胜利，因为卢拉政府的回旋余地非常非常小。
我们有一份著名的你要做的事情清单，杰克·沙利文亲自前往巴西利亚分发给巴西新政府。
很明显，
金砖国家内部的卢拉必须非常非常小心。 每次他一开口谈论去美元化，我们都会看到环城公路上的人在减少。 所以非常复杂。
当然，在整个非洲，我确信我们将讨论这一点，我们基本上正在观察第二波非殖民化浪潮。
现在，最后，在布基纳法索、马里、尼日尔、冈比亚，新一代年轻的非洲爱国者们终于迎来了真正的机会。
当然，还有非常非常重要的盟友，不仅是俄罗斯和中国，还有马格里布的阿尔及利亚，后者明确支持萨赫勒地区的所有新政府。
因此，不仅对美国而言，而且对整个西方集体来说，无论有没有非洲司令部，他们都在一点一点地被驱逐出非洲。
当然，在西亚，他们仍然坚持叙利亚等国家。
如今，随着乌克兰战争的发生，每个人似乎都忘记了叙利亚的三分之一仍然被美国人占领。 他们几乎每天或每周都在掠夺石油和小麦。 这完全从任何地方的叙述中消失了。
即使在西亚，叙利亚战争也还没有结束。 叙利亚战事仍在继续，叙利亚三分之一的领土被非法占领。
所以我们取得了战术上的胜利。 与此同时，真主党日益强大。
所以美洲到处都在失去地形。
当然，[美国]在欧洲取得了战术胜利。 他们设法使德国和欧盟与俄罗斯分离。 但这并不是永恒的。 这是目前的战术胜利。 这种情况可能会在几年内发生改变。
当然，在整个欧亚大陆，我们都知道正在发生什么。 上海合作组织、金砖国家+、俄罗斯大欧亚伙伴关系、一带一路倡议。 我们十月份将在北京举办一个论坛。
就是这个。 现在的欧亚大陆是欧亚人控制的欧亚大陆，没有外国干涉。
当然，我们仍然有颜色革命的尝试。
我很快就要回中亚了。 我现在要去看看哈萨克斯坦正在发生什么。 哈萨克斯坦，他们太难受了； 考虑到一年半前他们遭遇了颜色革命，他们正试图对冲自己的赌注。 并且还有续集。 这件事还没有被控制。
所以，伙计们，这是一个非常复杂的情况。 我想我们都同意，就战术胜利而言，美国人取得了一些重大胜利。 但就整体战略而言，他们几乎在每个大陆都在失败。
拉迪卡·德赛：哈萨克斯坦对此重新考虑这一事实是一件非常重要的事情。 因为据我了解，在所有中亚共和国中，它是最亲西方的。 它是美国资本渗透最多的地方，等等。
这真的很有趣。 你说得对，情况非常复杂。
但我们可以看到历史的暗流流向何方。 它正在从美国转向中国和俄罗斯等。
但与此同时，暗流也是一回事。 但从表面上看，美国将继续尝试并做出尝试来阻止这种情况的发生。 会有一些徒劳的尝试，但它们将会实现。 人们会为此付出代价等等。
但是，如果你尝试这样做，你就会知道，正如你所说，美国实施这一切的能力正处于危险之中。
正如我们过去所讨论的，这方面的一个迹象是，你知道，美国不能——今天有新闻称，美国将利用为乌克兰设立的削减设施向台湾运送武器。
但事实是，美国媒体本身（更不用说其他地方）也报道称，美国生产当今战区行动所需武器的能力实际上非常薄弱。 是无法生产的。
美国向其娇生惯养的军工联合体提供了大量资金来生产无用的武器 — — 或者这些武器还不够。
要知道，他们非常擅长生产那些无法在战场上使用的高价大件物品。
现在，这确实是对资本主义、对美国式垄断资本主义的一个令人着迷的评论，你拥有一个娇生惯养的军工联合体，无法生产你需要的东西，但你仍然继续支持他们。 所以这是一个矛盾。
当然，你知道，在美国即将进入紧锣密鼓的竞选活动中，还有许多其他人。 即使在美国，[乌克兰]战争也不受欢迎，这是显而易见的。
每隔一天，一些报纸上就会有一些文章说，“你知道，当我们可以在美国投资时，为什么我们要向乌克兰发送这么多钱？”等等。
那么美国有什么选择呢？
我的意思是，迈克尔，你最近写了一篇论文，其中你说美国已经失去了理性计算它应该做什么的能力。
做什么，什么策略就会获胜。 也许你可以对此说些什么。
迈克尔·赫德森：英特尔等美国芯片制造商正在强烈抗议中国占其市场的三分之一。
因此，如果拜登政府告诉他们停止向中国出售先进芯片，那么政府就会被告知，好吧，你可能必须向我们提供 500 亿美元的补贴。
美国财政部真的会被要求取代中国市场吗？ 这就是国会已经在争论的问题。
那么，如果真的如此，这种赠品将如何影响明年的美国总统和国会选举呢？ 这已经是一个问题了。
商业捐助者不会向拜登政府和民主党提供资金，因为他们不知道该怎么办。
另一方面，唐纳德·特朗普试图通过比民主党更加反华来获得选票。
因此，最大的未知数是，中国将如何应对美国搬起石头砸自己的脚的行为。 它是否愿意扭转局势并通过实施制裁进行报复？
而且它对美国实施制裁的能力比美国对中国实施制裁的能力要强得多。
一周前，中国发出了警告，停止了镓（占世界供应量的 80%）和锗（占世界供应量的 60%）的出口。
而8月1日，中国刚刚宣布限制稀土出口。 稀土是制造复杂芯片技术所需的磁性特性的关键。
因此，中国可以简单地对没有太多货币价值但具有关键技术价值的贸易实施制裁，并且可以将原材料贸易限制在上海合作组织的盟友之间，然后说：“好吧，看，我会 为你提供所有材料，你就可以制造美国和西欧不再能够制造的东西，因为他们没有只有我们可以提供的东西”。
那么问题是，中国的政治心态何时会决定真正打美国式的制裁消极战争，而不是经济贸易应该打的竞争性成本削减、高科技战争？ 这就是问题所在。
拉迪卡·德赛：当然。 而且，你知道，迈克尔，当你说话时，我想起了这样一个事实：当然，对俄罗斯的制裁应该是“将卢布贬为瓦砾”，并且推动俄罗斯经济倒退。 进入石器时代等等。
当然，如果他们没有战胜俄罗斯，他们也不会战胜中国。 我们知道，正如您所说，也许中国应该更多地参与其刚刚采取的行动，以拒绝向西方提供其所需的重要投入、其所需的重要原材料。
但即使没有这样的限制，中国也已经让美国的制裁变得毫无用处，因为它在芯片技术等方面迅速加速了创新。
你知道，如果中国人真的卷起袖子说我们要解决这个问题，那么这个问题将在相对较短的时间内得到解决。
台湾人能做到，中国人为什么不能？ 你不知道，中国人很乐意依赖进口，因为它们很容易获得。 但如果他们不这样做，他们就会开发自己的。
因此，制裁对于中国来说也将产生巨大的反作用。 事实上，以更大的方式。
因此，非常清楚的是，不太可能出现像亚洲北约这样的东西。
事实上，正如我之前所说，鉴于乌克兰战争的失败，真正的问题将是欧洲北约能否生存。
PEPE ESCOBAR： Radhika，我可以稍微改变一下话题吗？ 谈到迈克尔刚才所说的，我突然意识到，对帝国的制裁的最终形式是去美元化。
因为如果不改变地缘经济范式，多极一体化就不会发生。
所以我想先做一些介绍，然后我将直接问迈克尔一个问题。 因为他可能是世界上第一的专家，可以在不参与谈判的情况下为我们提供信息，好吧，他们计划做什么？
这是关于所谓的金砖国家新货币。 我从金砖国家夏尔巴人那里了解到，由于许多非常复杂的原因，南非不会在三周内宣布金砖国家新货币。
首先，他们没有时间。 其次，他们的谈判几个月前才开始。 这是我在莫斯科讨论过的事情； 你需要五年、六年、七年的时间来设计一个这样的系统，如果不是十年的话，然后开始实施它并首先在企业中进行测试，然后在民族国家中进行测试。
南非将要宣布增加以本国货币计价的双边贸易，这
是他们已经在做的事情。 他们已经在研究替代解决方案。
所以基本上，从五种金砖国家货币开始——值得注意的是，[它们的名字]都以“R”开头。 这非常非常奇怪，不是吗？ 显然，如果我们用人民币代替人民币，那么我们就有人民币、雷亚尔、兰特、卢比和卢布。
因此，我们将把 R5 结合起来，组织一个替代的支付结算系统。 这将是迈向以五国货币进行多边贸易的第一步。
不要忘记我们将迎来“金砖五国+”。 所以我们不会有五个； 我们可能会有七个、八个、九个甚至十个，具体取决于成为金砖国家+成员的第一波和第二波候选人。
然后扩大与这些国家货币的多边贸易。 当然，构建，好吧，让我们开始设计一个系统，然后尝试将其出售给我们各个国家的企业，然后也出售给其他国家。 这将意味着上海合作组织、欧亚经济联盟等。
欧亚经济联盟，他们至少在三年前就已经开始讨论替代货币了。 他们仍在讨论它。 就像，你知道，两个月前，[著名俄罗斯经济学家]谢尔盖·格拉济耶夫(Sergey Glazyev)前往北京与中国人讨论这个问题。
从本质上讲，这是一件极其复杂的事情。 当然，考虑到中国人尤其害怕美国的二级制裁。 所以这一切都极其复杂。
因此，我向迈克尔提出的问题是，考虑到中国拥有自己的支付系统，首先在金砖国家内部制定替代支付系统，然后扩展到金砖国家+，然后出售该支付系统，理想的路径是什么？ 俄罗斯人有自己的支付系统； 伊朗有自己的支付系统。
因此，将这些整合在一起，您就可以在这个新框架内绕过美元来结算贸易。 然后你会让你的大企业、大公司、个别国家说，“嗯，这是一笔很棒的交易，太棒了”。
因此，现在如果我们是土耳其的一家公司，我们可以与俄罗斯公司开展业务，并且我们使用替代支付系统。
继续前进的最佳方式是什么？ 我们什么时候才能达到可以真正讨论绕过美元和欧元的替代货币的阶段？
迈克尔·赫德森：实际上，拉迪卡和我专门为此系列专门制作了两个节目来解决这个问题。 我们指出，当人们说金砖国家货币时，他们所想到的就是类似欧元的东西，你可以用它来买卖东西，无论是购买钢铁还是在杂货店消费。
你是绝对正确的。 那是遥远的，因为你需要政治一体化才能实现这一点。
但我们真正谈论的是什么，我们谈论的货币并不是真正的货币；而是货币。 它是一种银行信贷，一种银行结算系统，非常类似于国际货币基金组织的特别提款权，只不过它不受美国控制。
但最重要的是，这就是[约翰·梅纳德]凯恩斯在 1944 年[布雷顿森林会议]中通过 Bancor 所支持的。 它只是央行之间支出的一种结算手段。
所以它不是通用货币。 这是央行之间结算信贷的一种手段。 信贷显然将基于人造银行货币，与成员国都支持的原材料价格挂钩。
它将非常像纸黄金。 目前，持有彼此货币或美元的替代方案是黄金，因为黄金是一种没有负债的资产。 这只是你可以投资的东西。但你必须以某种方式赚到钱来购买黄金。
自 1991 年之前的贬值运动以来，许多国家都放弃了黄金。 各国过去常常将黄金交给美联储，在黄金市场上进行结算、买卖，以稳定汇率。 他们从未要求归还他们的黄金。
最后，几年前德国问了，美联储说，对不起，你的黄金都没有了。 我们压低了黄金价格，以防止人们通过向大宗商品交易商抵押美元而放弃美元。 我们没有任何黄金可以给你。
世界上还有多少黄金留在美联储？ 我们不知道。
因此，为了避免如何真正结算新黄金的问题，金砖国家银行将创建一个信用体系，所有国家都有信用相互买卖，并以本国货币结算，这样，例如中国，就赢得了 不要持有太多阿根廷货币——特别是因为阿根廷刚刚完成了货币互换，以向国际货币基金组织支付其本应清偿的外债。
所以我们谈论的是央行特殊货币，而不是一般支出货币。 有两件事不同
在公众讨论中，人们常常感到困惑。
RADHIKA DESAI：是的，如果我可以补充一点，因为 – 你知道，迈克尔和我在我们的项目中共同完成了这方面的工作，在我们共同撰写的一篇论文中； 然后，迈克尔也独立地完成了《超级帝国主义》等方面的工作； 我自己在地缘政治经济方面的工作实际上主要是——在《地缘政治经济》一书中——它主要是对美元体系的批评，我认为美元体系从未稳定运行。
所以它总是陷入危机。 为了看起来能发挥作用，[美元体系]需要通货膨胀，特别是在 1971 年之后，非常危险的金融活动泡沫。
原因很简单。 你知道，散漫的言论——顺便说一句，其中包括很多从事散漫言论的学者——对英镑体系自然性的散漫言论，然后美元体系以某种方式让每个人都明白了这一点，是的，当然 ，最强大国家的货币应该是世界货币。
但事实上，正如我们所表明的，这是一种极其不稳定的情况。 则无法获得。
这就是为什么凯恩斯在 1944 年代表他的国家发表讲话 — — 不愿意他的国家受到美元的外部权威的影响，因为他知道英镑无法再扮演它曾经扮演的角色，并且非常清楚为什么会这样 就是这样——提议了bancor。
从本质上讲，这将国际失衡问题的解决与社会内货币的普通需求完全分开。
因此，在一个社会中，必须运行货币才能创造充分就业，这是一种在国内发挥作用的具有生产活力、生态可持续的货币。
但这种要求往往可能与维持其国际价值的需要直接背道而驰。
顺便说一句，人们常常将黄金混淆：黄金不是货币。 当黄金被用作货币时，就表明没有货币。
黄金是一种商品。 你知道，迈克尔说这是一种没有负债的资产，但也许说它是一种商品更恰当。
所以这有点像，你知道，回到以物易物。 所以你给我钢铁，我给你黄金。 这就是两种商品的交换。 它恰好是一种被广泛接受的商品。 但人们提出了其他建议。
但从本质上讲，诉诸黄金、德国人和其他国家说我们希望收回黄金等等，这是美元体系不起作用的迹象之一——顺便说一句，这是众多迹象之一。
因此，从本质上讲，我想说的是，需要发生什么？ 你知道，你最初的问题是，你知道，这些货币计划将如何运作，等等？
所以我想说，第一步当然是在这些货币之间建立一个相对稳定的汇率体系——我们假设是 5 卢比。
那么，让我们说，你知道，五个卢比的相互汇率是多少，并试图稳定它们等等？
然后，从长远来看，这种系统可以发挥作用。 他们甚至可以创建一种基于 5 卢比的 Bancor——尽管凯恩斯最初说过，我们甚至不要使用任何货币； 让我们将 Bancor 的价值与一篮子几十种交易最广泛的商品联系起来，因为这才是国际贸易中最终重要的因素。
所以你可以这样做，也许你可以做到这一点，但你可以从稳定价值观开始。
但我认为重要的一步必须是，你必须尝试在所有贸易伙伴之间建立相对平衡的贸易。
这是为什么？ 因为，迈克尔说，我们必须确保，你知道，中国最终不会拥有太多的阿根廷货币或其他什么，或者五个国家中的任何一个最终不会拥有太多对方的货币。
因为它表明一个国家从另一个国家购买了很多东西，但是那个国家大量出口，其出口收入却没有任何用处。
现在，这需要五个卢比的持有者制定一个发展计划，例如，让我们假设中国和俄罗斯之间存在贸易关系。
那么，中国和俄罗斯必须确保每个人都愿意用从对方国家赚到的钱来购买东西。 因此，如果它不存在，那么也许应该有投资和机会来发展生产该东西的能力。
因为，你看，凯恩斯安排的天才之处在于它内部有机制来迫使人们、迫使国家走向平衡。 顺差国家和逆差国家同样有责任努力解决资本流动和贸易方面的失衡问题。
因此，一旦建立了这些机制，就会产生激励，比如说，如果中国有太多卢布，那么中国就会说，“好吧，俄罗斯人，我们将帮助你们发展这种生产能力，这样你们就可以出口更多的产品”。 X、Y、Z 给我们，等等”。
所以我认为这就是需要的
完毕。 最后一点，凯恩斯的天才在我们这个时代非常明显，因为正如凯恩斯所说，稳定的体系应该努力消除持续的失衡。
现在，将目光转向美元体系。 它主要依赖的一件事是持续失衡的产生，因为在持续的贸易赤字和与世界其他地区的经常账户赤字的基础上向世界提供货币，意味着整个体系都依赖于失衡 ，这意味着它是不稳定的。
所以，正如你所说，佩佩，这是一件非常复杂的事情，需要时间来解决。
但如果人们在误解下工作，那么事情就不会解决，比如，你知道，我们需要创造一种像欧元这样的货币，而不是像班科尔这样的货币。
迈克尔·赫德森：关于美元，只有一件事。 你刚才提到，每个讨论美元体系的人都会谈论美国是如何提供美元的。
在我的书《超级帝国主义》以及我多年前为阿瑟·安德森撰写的作品中，美国私营部门完全处于平衡状态。 1950年以来，年复一年，从朝鲜战争到越南战争，私营部门、贸易和投资都处于平衡状态； 它根本没有向世界提供任何额外的美元。
美国向世界提供美元的全部赤字都是军事赤字。 它曾经被称为美元过剩。 为了阻止这种情况，[法国]戴高乐将军不断用[美元兑换]黄金。
金砖国家和五卢比的新体系要解决的问题是，不能通过在其他国家周围建立800个军事基地来支付信用，将它们锁定在依赖体系中。
您将使国际支付结算系统非军事化。 这是这一切的基本目标。
美元体系是一个军事化体系。 美元是美国在海外的军费开支。
这是世界和平的首要原因，美元体系应该被取代。
拉迪卡·德赛：我同意就贸易而言，美国贸易在很长一段时间内保持平衡，比你想象的要长。
但当然从 20 世纪 80 年代开始，美国的贸易逆差也对当前的[账户赤字]做出了自己的贡献。 目前美国的贸易逆差占美国 GDP 的 3% 至 4%。
迈克尔·哈德森：不，这绝对是虚构的。 它基于虚构的统计数据。
大部分贸易逆差是石油。 当石油进入时，它被算作贸易赤字。 但只有大约 10% 的石油价格是用非美元支付的。 所有进口的石油均来自美国石油公司。
抵消的是，这方面的收入、支付的利息或生产这种石油的成本都是在美国制造的。
因此，资本账户和收入账户上都有投资流入，以抵消根本不涉及外汇的石油进口的虚构支付。
拉迪卡·德赛：好吧，我不太清楚你的意思，因为事实是，美国以美元支付石油费用。
但让我进一步指出一点，那就是，你知道，人们倾向于关注美国的贸易赤字，然后他们说，“看，中国人购买了这么多美国国债，所以他们本质上是在为贸易融资” 赤字，所以这是一种相互支持的体系”——“中美国”等等。
但实际上，人们忘记的是，真正维持美元体系运转的不是中国的融资，也不是中国购买美国国债；而是中国的融资。 维持美元体系运转的是金融活动的大规模扩张，这种扩张是双向的。
因此，举例来说，如果你看一下统计数据，关于正在发生的所有国际资本流动的金融统计数据，其中大部分是在 2008 年金融危机爆发前以美元计价的资产，中国人在 几乎没有在其中发挥任何作用。
欧洲扮演了最大的角色，也是世界上最完全融入美国金融体系的地区，它产生了这些导致 2008 年金融危机的有毒证券。
因此，欧洲成为世界上受 2008 年危机影响最严重的地区也就不足为奇了。 2008年的危机为2010年的欧元区危机奠定了基础，等等。
这就是为什么当人们将 2008 年发生的事情称为全球金融危机时，我确实发现纠正他们很重要。 它没有什么全球性的。 这是一场北大西洋金融危机。
迈克尔·哈德森：没错。
PEPE ESCOBA： 我想向你们俩提一个问题。 因为我想起了中国人正在做的一些非常聪明的事情，也许他们正在为整个南方国家树立榜样。
你知道他们现在在上海交易所，特别是海湾合作委员会有石油期货交易。 这很有趣。
所以GCC去了上海证券交易所。 他们出售石油期货。
中国人买。 他们付人民币。
但随后海湾合作委员会说，看，我们不需要那么多人民币。 你知道，你要用这么多人民币做什么？
中国人说，没问题。 您可以通过上海交易所、清算所或香港（如果您愿意）用黄金交易人民币。
这绝对是精彩的。 您认为这是否可以扩展到其他金砖国家，从其他金砖国家开始，然后如果我们让伊朗和沙特阿拉伯成为金砖国家+的一部分，采用相同的机制？
RADHIKA DESAI：我认为这可行。 我想说的是，正如我所见，黄金的作用始终是残余的。
如果世界上所有的货币实际上都是由黄金支持的，我们将遭受大规模的通货紧缩，因为世界上没有足够的货币，因为世界上没有足够的黄金。
迈克尔·赫德森：黄金只为国际收支提供资金，而不是一般活动，作为黄金汇兑本位，而不是金本位。
再说一次，黄金是一种替代品，是美元最简单的替代品，因为每个人都接受它。
花了几千年的时间，但他们最终决定了一些他们可以接受的替代方案。
这是向金砖国家人造货币的过渡。 这是向远离黄金的过渡——国际货币的理念不是美国贸易赤字的体现，而是美国军费开支的体现。
RADHIKA DESAI：那么，进一步补充一点，我想说，本质上，当人们购买黄金时，他们所说的是他们不想要钱；他们想要钱。 他们想要一种商品； 他们想要那种商品，等等，一种容易交易的商品，所以某种资产。
所以从这个意义上来说，这是一个好主意。 你知道，黄金的作用，我经常喜欢说英镑本位制，在19世纪末20世纪初，英镑汇兑本位制经常被称为金本位制，你知道，因为英镑是有黄金支持的。
但有两件事。 第一，该体系的天才实际上在于为英镑创造了如此广泛的国际接受度，以至于它很少能兑换成黄金。 至于这样做的原因和机制，我们可以谈谈。
但关键是，它很少能兑换成黄金。 凯恩斯在他的《印度货币与金融》一书中写道，这实际上是国际金本位（英镑本位）运作的入门读本。 稍后我将解释为什么一本关于印度货币和金融的书应该作为金本位的入门读本。 但让我先结束这一点。
他指出，英格兰银行的黄金数量少于阿根廷储蓄银行。 他为此感到自豪。 他还曾斥责法国人持有黄金。 他说，看，你不需要，等等。 但这是另一组问题。
现在，让我来看看英国人是如何做到这一点的。 因为他们画的——我的意思是，所谓的金本位实际上和黄金没有什么关系，除了黄金是价值的基准之外； 黄金价格是英镑价值的基准，英镑偶尔也可以兑换成黄金。
而且，你知道，在那些日子里，确实有一些金币流通。 但这确实是一个非常有限的角色。
英镑本位制的真正基础是英国从其殖民地（主要是英属印度）获取的盈余，这就是为什么要写一本关于印度货币和金融的书，这本书实际上描述了盈余如何从印度转移到英国。 为了做到这一点采用了哪些机制？
所以我的观点是，这就是为什么这本书是金本位的入门读本。 金本位制的真正基础是英国从殖民地提取的盈余，然后作为资本出口输出。
去哪里？ 到欧洲、北美和大洋洲，在某种程度上还到南非——也就是说，到它的所有定居者殖民地。
因此，如果你以不同的方式思考的话，英国会从其非殖民殖民地——英属印度、非洲、加勒比地区——获取盈余，并将其作为资本出口出口到其殖民殖民地。
这确实是一件非常种族化的事情，但事实就是如此。 这主要是钱的去向。
因此，英国通过输出资本为世界提供流动性，而不是像美国后来那样通过赤字。
美国别无选择。 美国没有可以挤压的殖民地来提供盈余以出口到世界其他地区。 因此美国必须扮演不同的角色。
回到你的问题，我认为中国的“以物换金”战略是一个很好的建立信任措施。
而且，你知道，目前交易量还足够少，因此它可以做到这一点。 我的意思是，最终，该系统应该运行良好，以至于不需要黄金。
现在，问题又来了，如果中国试图以美元的模式实现其货币国际化，它实际上会红色
让中国走向美国那样的经济，即去工业化和基础设施老化。 所以它不会这样做。
这就是为什么迈克尔和我，以及任何思考这个问题的人总是说，你不应该以这种方式使你的货币国际化，但不要达到任何显着的程度； 相反，你需要这种有助于解决国际失衡的人造货币。
佩佩·埃斯科巴： 所以你是对的，拉迪卡。 这是北京的官方立场。 他们希望人民币国际化进程非常非常缓慢。
拉迪卡·德赛： 是的，是的，完全正确。
所以，各位，我应该说，你们知道，我们像往常一样进行了非常广泛的讨论，非常棒。
我们大约一个小时，我们不想超过一个小时太多。 那么，我请你们两位说一下你们想说的结束语。
迈克尔·赫德森：嗯，你又回到了我们在本次讨论的第一部分中提出的观点，即美国的制裁旨在孤立俄罗斯的原材料以及中国的信息技术和造船业。
这些不符合美国盟友、中国亚洲邻国、甚至美国的经济利益。
欧洲被告知要从美国、韩国、日本和台湾购买石油和天然气——
基本上，我们回到了贸易本质上是经济还是国家安全的问题。 现在看来，考虑到美国的军事存在，两者都会出现。 这将具有经济性和国家安全性。
我认为，鉴于北约坦克、导弹和防空武器的失败，美国很难利用任何军事影响力。 这个想法基本上是美国正在拒绝美元。
乍一看，金砖国家和全球多数新兴国家的想法似乎令人难以容忍，但这并不比诺贝尔奖的想法更令人难以容忍——
我想提出一个建议，就像基辛格因摧毁老挝和柬埔寨、用橙剂覆盖越南森林而获得诺贝尔和平奖一样，或者奥巴马因卡扎菲所希望的摧毁利比亚、没收其黄金而获得和平奖一样。 用于非洲黄金货币并将其上交，以及奥巴马最后的法案以在乌克兰组织亲纳粹政变开始了今天的危机，我认为美国正试图迫使欧洲人相信战争也是和平 感觉塔西佗描述了一位英国酋长说罗马正在制造沙漠并称之为和平。
但鉴于我们过去一年半所看到的情况，我可以想象拜登总统获得今年的诺贝尔和平奖。 它会完美契合。 它符合摧毁一个国家乌克兰的传统资格。
但实际上，他能得到它还有一个原因。 拜登和布林肯以及他们的新保守派团队推动了全球多数派的大多数共同努力，创造了一种替代以美国为中心的世界的方案，而这个世界已经变得越来越一边倒。
在拜登政府的领导下，美国正在迫使除北约卫星国之外的世界其他国家建立新的经济秩序。 这就是我们一直在讨论的内容。
这种新的国际经济秩序与联合国在被美国接管之前最初应该建立的路线是一致的。
每个国家的粮食生产自给自足。 他们不必通过贸易逆差来进口粮食，因为就像俄罗斯能够在粮食方面实现独立并成为粮食出口国一样，其他国家在摆脱世界银行的影响后也可以做同样的事情 国际货币基金组织试图阻止它。
新的经济秩序将是社会主义路线的混合经济，以提升整个经济，至少是扩大后的金砖国家和上海合作组织的经济。
并且将更加关注和平一体化，而不是军事和金融一体化。
事实证明，北约在乌克兰的战争已成为这一新世界秩序的巨大催化剂。 仅仅因为这不是拜登和布林肯的初衷，并不意味着这不是实践中的效果。
请记住，18 世纪的法国官员 [Charles Maurice de] Talleyrand 在谈到一项政策时说：“这比犯罪更糟糕，这是一个错误”。 你可以说这完美地描述了美国的政策。
但让我们相信它犯了这个偶然的错误，正是这个错误促使全球多数群体团结起来，创造了世界银行的替代品、国际货币基金组织的替代品以及失败的以美国为中心的单极秩序的替代品。
佩佩·埃斯科巴：嗯，我与一群中国作家和学者保持着联系，他们总是非常着迷。 事实上，其中之一，迈克尔只是在谈论错误。
他们说，这是帝国历史上的第一大错误，他们将无法挽回。 和T
中国人有一点犯错误的经验，对吗？
好吧，我想说的是，三周后我们将举行金砖国家峰会。 因此，迈克尔刚才告诉我们的一切都将在金砖国家峰会上讨论。
这就是夏尔巴协作过去几周一直在做的事情。 夏尔巴协作实际上是在组织和设计金砖五国+（金砖国家+）扩张的程序、将要发生的事情、议程和程序。
因此，三周后，我们将发生地缘政治、地缘经济地震。 毫无疑问。 谨提醒大家，有一份 BRICS+ 潜在成员名单。
这很有趣，因为它们是与金砖国家平行的组织的一部分，称为金砖国家之友。 只要有金砖国家峰会，就有金砖之友峰会。 他们互动，也有自己的迷你峰会。
这正是两周前在南非发生的最多的事情。 我会给你清单。 伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、古巴、刚果民主共和国、科摩罗、加蓬和哈萨克斯坦。
因此，第一层，第一波金砖国家+可能会来自这些人，其中一个、两个、三个或四个。 还有白俄罗斯，虽然不在金砖国家之友之列，但与俄罗斯关系非常密切。 而白俄罗斯也申请加入金砖国家。
不幸的是，您会注意到，在此列表中没有阿根廷。 我想我们在之前讨论过这个问题，因为我想说，阿根廷基本上被迫撤回了对金砖国家的申请。 而这一点，他们不知道如何在布宜诺斯艾利斯解释。 但这就是目前的情况。
那么你能想象我们是否拥有一个全新的世界吗？ 伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、阿联酋同为金砖国家成员。
因此，我们将把金砖国家+与欧佩克+直接联系起来，与中国的主要能源来源直接联系起来，与海湾合作委员会上海交易所出售石油的机制直接联系起来。 如果你想要黄金，你也可以获得黄金。
那么你能想象在两三天内完成这一切吗？ 我们将会把这件事颠倒过来。 也许这就是世界经济新秩序的开始。 瞧。
拉迪卡·德赛： 是的，当然，各位。 所以，是的，让我简单说几句话来结束这个话题。
第一，我认为，你知道，你正在谈论错误。
但如果从长远的历史角度来看，美国霸权的整个计划就是一个错误。 我们只是看到美国在试图维持其发展的过程中犯下了最新的、越来越绝望的错误。
这是我很长一段时间以来的论点。 把问题带回北约，这至少在形式上是我们的主题，当然，北约一直是美国霸权的工具。
但如果你回想几十年前，你会发现人们，很少有人真正谈论北约。 因为美国的霸权范围要广泛得多。 北约是美国霸权更大结构的一部分。
现在已经到了美国在世界大事上对北约的依赖程度已经达到了美国力量的中流砥柱的地步。
你知道，美国权力的支柱是——人们不太谈论它的部分原因是它总是脾气暴躁。 欧洲人和美国人之间总是存在紧张关系等等。 因此，就美国霸权而言，那里并没有什么可看的。
现在，所谓的美国霸权已经变得依赖于这个机构，这确实说明了美国的实力已经下降了多远、有多低。
所以也许到此为止，我想我们应该结束今天的节目了。 敬请期待我们更多的节目。 希望佩佩，在即将举行的峰会或类似活动之后，我们会再次邀请您回来评估它们。
佩佩·埃斯科巴： 非常感谢。 我的荣幸。
拉迪卡·德赛： 非常感谢。 再次感谢我们的摄影师 Paul Graham。 当然，一如既往地感谢本·诺顿主持我们的节目。
再见了，大家。 下次再见。 再见。
Anti-China hawks' drive to expand NATO into Asia may destroy Western military alliance
https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2023/08/04/nato-expand-asia-china-russia/
Political economists Radhika Desai and Michael Hudson are joined by geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar to discuss how the war hawks’ drive to expand NATO into Asia to contain China may destroy the Western military alliance.
By 
You can find more episodes of Geopolitical Economy Hour here.
Transcript
RADHIKA DESAI: Hello everyone and welcome to the [15th] Geopolitical Economy Hour, a program that discusses the political and geopolitical economy of our time. I’m Radhika Desai.
MICHAEL HUDSON: And I’m Michael Hudson.
RADHIKA DESAI: And today we have once again Pepe Escobar, roving reporter extraordinaire. Welcome, Pepe.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Thank you. It’s an enormous pleasure to be with you guys again.
RADHIKA DESAI: And today we are going to continue the discussion we started in the last Geopolitical Economy Hour, entitled “NATO Out of Bounds: War Against Russia, War Against China”.
Last time we discussed where the Vilnius Summit had left NATO, and the divisions within the alliance that the summit had exposed; how the proxy war on Russia was faring; and how the Biden project of uniting so-called democracies against so-called autocracies relies so critically on the outcome of this war, which by present indications does not look good for Ukraine, and it does not look good for NATO.
We then went on to discuss how much longer Europe and other US allies could sustain the appearance of NATO unity, which is cracking as we speak, and ended with a discussion of how the grain deal [the Black Sea Grain Initiative] had broken down.
Now that discussion already permitted us to expand our frame out of Europe and to take in the world as a whole, because, as it became very clear in our discussion, you cannot understand the breakdown of the grain deal unless you put it in the larger context of how imperialism has a long and murderous history of attempting to deny food security to most of the world.
So now today we are going to continue that discussion by focusing on the danger of NATO being transformed from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization to a North and South Atlantic and Pacific Treaty Organization, as Biden leads to an ever-widening and deepening hybrid war on China with trade, technology, diplomatic, and military aspects, but which is coming ever closer to some kind of military war.
So once again, we framed our discussion around several questions, so I will just begin by posing the first one:
What is the United States’ wider intention and strategy vis-a-vis China in the so-called Indo-Pacific region?
What do recent events mean for the region? I’m thinking of events such as the visit of high-ranking Chinese and Russian officials to Pyongyang to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the armistice in the Korean War.
I’m thinking of Western hysteria over the recent agreement between China and the Solomon Islands, one of a very large number of Pacific island nations.
The recent announcement of a new package of military aid to Taiwan from the United States, which essentially is going to be done by a kind of presidential decree, using the same military drawdown program that President Biden has been using to fuel the war in Ukraine.
And generally, I’m thinking of rising tensions in the region, thanks to the announcement of AUKUS a couple of years ago, and the reactivation of the so-called Quad alliance, or incipient alliance, whatever you want to call it, between the United States, South Korea, Japan, and India.
And of course, there has been the recent NATO declaration that it considers China a threat.
U.S. strategy is not easy to understand, because, while on the one hand, there seems to be some effort to promote dialogue with the visits of recent high-ranking U.S. officials, such as Antony Blinken and Janet Yellen, while on the other hand, U.S. actions continue to ratchet up tensions across all the fronts.
So, Michael, why don’t you start us off with your views on this matter?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, today is just two years since America was driven out of Afghanistan, and we’re seeing a repeat of the defeat in Ukraine.
So the U.S. and NATO have lost Ukraine, but they want to keep the fighting going because Biden said this is a fight against China that’s going to take two decades, maybe three decades.
So it looks like the Pacific and even the Arctic may become the new U.S. disruption zone.
Now, especially since Russia and China are working with North Korea to develop ports for the new trade from the Pacific via the Arctic to Northern Europe. So the United States is losing militarily, but it looks like it’s going to lose Europe in a few years.
And the American strategic plan since the 1990s was to absorb the Warsaw Pact into NATO. And it’s done that, but now it looks like it’s overplaying its hand. And the cost ultimately may be to lose Western Europe, headed by Germany, France, and Italy.
And we’re already seeing, in the last few days, just since our last broadcast, we’re seeing riots throughout Europe as the economy and employment are declining.
And there’s discussion, where is the German chemical industry, led by the BASF company, going to go? They’ve announced they are not going to make any further capital investments in Germany. They say that they’re being pressured to move their facilities to the United States. And they already have facilities in China.
So where will the German industrial population go when it abandons the country, just like Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania’s population have fallen by about one-third since 1990?
When you look at how this all works out geopolitically, the Baltics and Central Europe are not important economically. Their population is declining.
And only Poland has a military value, because of its dreams of recovering where it was in the 16th century, when it controlled most of Scandinavia and the Baltics.
So the U.S. is pushing the insistence, either you’re with us or against us. And the break that’s coming may move Western Europe into the Russian and SCO – Shanghai Cooperation Organization – orbit.
When they finally make the decision, if they do decide, “Gee, we shouldn’t have lost the trade with Russia. And now we’re being told to stop trading with China. Maybe we shouldn’t have made that”. If they reverse their decision, this is going to be irreversible.
And you could say the same of the Global South countries that are being pressured – and indeed, most of the Global Majority – they’re being forced to choose, either you’re with the U.S., whose industrial economy is shrinking, or you’re with the expanding BRICS+, plus the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
So where are these countries going to realign over the next few years?
The U.S. can keep England as a dependency. And England’s fate is, I think, going to be a warning to what happens to countries that adopt U.S.-style finance capitalism instead of socialist industrialization and public services as a human right.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Michael gave us the big picture, right? I would like to focus on something that happened these past few days, which is enormous, and I would say, for most of the planet, quite unforeseen, which is Russia bringing back North Korea, the DPRK, to the rank of a very important Global South power with enormous reach.
So we have [Russian] Ministry of Defense Sergei Shoigu received like Mick Jagger in Pyongyang. He got a true rock star welcome, the whole thing, including a private audience with Kim Jong-un and obviously the whole leadership of the DPRK.
What leaked, of course, was the possibility of many military agreements and increasing their military collaboration.
What did not leak is the best part of them all, because it’s the geoeconomic part.
What do the Russians really want to do with Pyongyang? They want to integrate Pyongyang with South Korea, with Seoul. And of course, this will mean Russia developing a sort of go-between, diplomacy between both. And they have the possibility to do both, because they are also respected in Seoul.
And something that has already been discussed at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. These discussions, they started at least three or four years ago in Vladivostok. And what they’re all about basically is to build a trans-Korean railway, which is going to connect with the trans-Siberian and connect both Koreas to the Russian far east, and then all the way across Eurasia.
So imagine that you are a Samsung businessman in Seoul. You look at that and say, “Wow, I don’t need to use cargo tankers anymore; I can have direct access to the enormous developing market in the Russian far east, not to mention the whole of Eurasia via Russia, just by building a railway”. Very, very simple.
Which sooner or later, and I would say, with Chinese input, could become a high-speed rail. Considering that the Chinese are already investing in high-speed rail in Russia, and considering that if there is a duplication of the trans-Siberian into a trans-Siberian high-speed rail is going to be built by the Chinese, this trans-Korean railway could also be built with Chinese input, technical input as well.
And financed via a Chinese Silk Road Fund, the BRICS Development Bank, Russian banks, etc. It could be a reorganization of finance, East Eurasia style.
So they were discussing that, of course, and this is going to be re-discussed, and they’re going to get deeper into it at the next Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in early September. So it’s around the corner, literally.
So the fact that this is happening now, it’s very, very important, because this is a sort of a preamble to what they’re going to get into at the next Eastern Economic Forum. So everybody is happy with this arrangement.
North Korea, because they are brought back to the forefront of trade in the parts of Eurasia. The possibility of having some sort of geoeconomic deal between North Korea and South Korea.
Russia, developing the far east and integrating the far east with the Koreas.
And China, of course, because this also integrates this part of Eurasia, this Northern Eurasia framework.
And it’s part of BRICS. It’s part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And this opens, I would say, this leaves us with the possibility of North Korea sooner or later getting integrated into the Eurasia Economic Union.
And that’s fantastic, because I see that happening in at least two stages.
The first stage, the EAEU strikes a free trade agreement with North Korea, just like the ones they have with Cuba, or with Vietnam in Southeast Asia.
And they are also working with Indonesia to have an EAEU free trade deal with Indonesia. They could also do the same thing with North Korea.
And fantastic, this bypasses US sanctions, because it’s going to be – the EAEU basically, Russia is 80% of the firepower of the EAEU. They can devise a settlement mechanism involving North Korea that bypasses the US dollar completely.
You have expansion of EAEU to Northeast Asia, which is very important. The Chinese are going to love it as well, because they can also, even if they’re not part of the EAEU – don’t forget that Putin and Xi have already said, and the directives are already there – the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI and EAEU, they have to converge.
And this would be a perfect example of convergence between BRI and EAEU.
So that’s why, the way I see this visit by Shoigu as Mick Jagger, it extrapolates it everywhere, geoeconomically and geopolitically. And it’s no wonder that it was not even mentioned, I would say, or barely mentioned in Western mainstream media.
RADHIKA DESAI: That’s absolutely true.
And I mean, the more one thinks about it, the fact of the matter is that it is only a matter of time when the US’s strategy will stop working in the region.
So first of all, I mean, this idea that the United States can extend NATO to the Pacific is not going to wash, because the Pacific region has historically focused on its own economic development.
The Chinese are essentially pitting their own strategy of proposing economic development to the NATO strategy of securitizing everything, and essentially turning everything into a military conflict or a military alliance. We’re going to see the contestation of these two visions in the region.
And I would say, basically, it’s a matter of time before everybody begins to realize that what the United States is doing in Asia, what the United States has been doing around the world, at least since the Second World War, if not before, is essentially, well, the United States says it is providing protection to the world; in reality, the United States has been running a protection racket.
What is a protection racket? A protection racket is to promise to provide security against dangers that you have yourself created, so that your promise to provide security appears credible and attractive.
So, for example, the United States has continued to foment disunity on the Korean Peninsula. The fact of the matter is that the vast majority of Koreans, North and South, deeply yearn for some form of unification. There is absolutely no doubt.
And this is attested to by the fact that, periodically, governments come to power that have advanced progress towards unification, but the United States then comes in and disrupts it.
It’s only when Koreans realize this that they will stop voting for those forces. And I think it’s a matter of time.
Similarly, in the case of Taiwan, already we are seeing in the run-up to the elections that are due, I think, in a few months, you have in the appearance, side by side with the KMT that wishes to promote peaceful reconciliation with China, the emergence of a new party that is going to do the same.
This is going to essentially push the DPP out of the picture. So they’re not going to win.
Similarly, also you read in the papers, although Japan has signed, has pronounced a new military policy in recent years that people say should be unthinkable in a country with a pacifist constitution, but in reality you see that the overwhelming majority of the Japanese are not going to join any kind of US-led war against [China over] Taiwan.
And so finally, what I’m really driving at is that the wonderful specifics that you gave about what can happen just in the case of North Korea, this is part of a wider set of pressures that I like to think of as the exertion of the economic magnetism, the economic gravity of China.
And no country can afford not to respond to that. And so we are going to see a shift, but at the same time, in terms of what we can expect to happen in the next few years, maybe even few decades, is an attempt on the part of the United States to stop this inexorable development from occurring.
And you were saying, Michael, that I agree with you, that, at one level, it looks as the United States is looking at a multi-decade war. But we also read in the papers that the United States feels compelled to do something now, because they think that they have up to 2027 before China will become capable of really resisting US forces.
But yeah, I mean, this is a kind of a segue into the next question, which is basically, what can the US expect from its allies?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Japan has sort of a Stockholm Syndrome, and it identifies with the United States because the US bombed it. And despite its export trade opportunities with China, its right-wing government is still willing to lose this market and sacrifice its economy for the United States once again, just as it did in the Plaza and Louvre Accords.
And South Korea is really the key to all of this, partly because it’s so important in ship making, and it’s being pressured to continue cutting back its export of sophisticated ships to China. The Wall Street Journal just had a long report on that.
But if it sees the promise of the Chinese market – and as Pepe has explained, the whole Eurasian market, thanks to the railroad – it’s going to decide, what it is going to choose: the export markets to resolve the military overhead and the threat of North Korea, or is it just going to continue to back the US?
It’ll probably have to tell the US to remove its occupation troops, because I think the Korean War still is legally on. So we may finally see an end of the Korean War that began in 1950.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Your question is what America will do essentially. Just look around and see what they are incapable of doing in several parts of the Global South or the Global Majority.
For instance, Southeast Asia. Well, I lived in [Southeast Asia]; it’s my home. I moved to Southeast Asia in ’94, a long time ago.
So I followed the relationship between the ASEAN 10, the 10 members of Southeast Asia, with Russia, China, India, and the US on the spot.
And nowadays, everybody knows that the number one trade partner of all ASEAN is China.
We also know that the U.S. has more margin of maneuver in some of the Southeast Asian nations than in others.
For instance, Singapore, we usually joke that Singapore is an American aircraft carrier station in Southeast Asia, side by side with Indonesia and Malaysia.
More and more relations between Indonesia and China are being, finally, there was a lot of mutual suspicion during the times of Suharto, of course, and immediately afterwards.
And the Chinese have been very, very clever to explain to Indonesia, “Look, we don’t have any designs on your islands, the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea”. So the Indonesians are more relaxed.
So now they are talking business, for instance, like, you know, Chinese investments, part of the Belt and Road Initiative across Indonesia.
Philippines, we all know, it remains an on-off American colony.
But the Americans, for instance, have absolutely zero penetration in, for instance, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. This is Chinese territory. And these have Belt and Road Initiative projects all over the space, like the absolutely extraordinary high-speed rail that the Chinese built from Yunnan to Vientiane.
I saw that being built in the middle of the forest across the Mekong River. It’s something that only the Chinese are capable of pulling off. And they did in record time on top of it, because the Laos government said, “OK, come here, do everything”, and it’s the way to go.
In Thailand, there’s going to be an extension, because, of course, of foreign interference, because of Thai lobbies fighting among themselves, the Thais haven’t even started to finish their own stretch, you see.
But this proves that Southeast Asia, in terms of Chinese-U.S. relations, it’s a balancing act. But most of these nations know exactly what’s going to happen from now on.
Their number one trade partner is China. And Chinese influence in all of them will continue to be very, very strong, directly and indirectly, via the Chinese diaspora in all of them, what we call the “bamboo internet”, which is strong in all of these nations.
South America: South America, what they basically, against Argentina and Brazil, of course, the Americans have tactical victories.
In case of Argentina, for instance, they forced Argentina to get a loan to pay another IMF loan.
So basically, the plan is to get Argentina to keep begging for IMF loans ad infinitum. So this is plan A. There’s no plan B.
Brazil is much more complicated. But for the moment, it’s a tactical victory, because the margin of maneuver of the Lula government is very, very slim.
And we have the famous list of what you’re going to do, that Jake Sullivan went personally to Brasilia to hand out to the new Brazilian government.
So obviously, Lula inside BRICS has to be very, very careful. Every time that he opens his mouth and he talks about de-dollarization, we see people shrinking in the beltway. So very complicated.
And across Africa, of course, which I’m sure we’re going to discuss, we are watching basically a second wave of decolonization.
And now, finally, the real thing with a new generation of young African patriots in Burkina Faso, in Mali, in Niger, in Gambia.
And of course, with very, very important allies, not only Russia and China outside, but Algeria in the Maghreb, who plainly supports all these new governments in the Sahel area.
So in terms of not only the U.S., but the collective West as a whole, they’re being expelled little by little, with or without AFRICOM, from Africa.
And of course, in West Asia, they still cling to, for instance, Syria.
Everybody seems to forget nowadays, with the war in Ukraine, that one-third of Syria is still occupied by the Americans. And they are plundering oil virtually on a daily or weekly basis, and wheat. And this disappeared completely from the narrative anywhere.
Even in West Asia, the war in Syria is not over. The war in Syria continues, and there is an illegal occupation of one-third of the Syrian territory.
So we have tactical victories. At the same time, we have Hezbollah growing stronger and stronger by the day.
So the Americas are losing terrain everywhere.
[The US has] tactical victories in Europe, of course. They managed to get Germany and the EU separated from Russia. But this is not eternal. This is a tactical victory for the moment. This could change in a matter of a few years only.
And of course, across Eurasia, we all know what’s happening. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS+, the Greater Eurasia Partnership conducted by Russia, Belt and Road Initiative. We’re going to have a forum in Beijing in October.
This is it. Eurasia now is Eurasia controlled by Eurasians, and without foreign interference.
Of course, we still have attempts at color revolutions.
I’m going back to Central Asia soon. I’m going to see what’s happening in Kazakhstan now. Kazakhstan, they are so uncomfortable; they’re trying to hedge their bets, considering that they suffered a color revolution a year and a half ago. And there are sequels. This thing is not controlled yet.
So it’s a very mixed picture, guys. I think we all agree that, in terms of tactical victories, the Americans have some serious ones. But in terms of the overall strategy, they are losing virtually in every continent.
RADHIKA DESAI: And the very fact that Kazakhstan would be having second thoughts about this is a very important thing. Because from what I understand, of all the Central Asian republics, it is the most pro-Western. It is the most penetrated by American capital, and so on and so forth.
So that’s really fascinating. And you’re absolutely right that the picture is very complex.
But we can see where the undercurrent of history is going. It’s going away from the United States and toward China and Russia and so on.
But at the same time, the undercurrent is one thing. But on the surface, the United States will continue to try and make attempts to block this from happening. There will be vain attempts, but they will be made. People will pay the price for it, et cetera.
But still, if you try to, you know, as you say, the United States’ ability to conduct all this is in danger.
One indication of this, as we’ve discussed in the past, is that the U.S. cannot, you know – today it’s in the news that the U.S. is going to use the drawdown facility that has been created for Ukraine to send weapons to Taiwan.
But the fact of the matter is, what’s also being reported in the U.S. media itself, let alone elsewhere, is that the U.S. ability to produce the sort of arms that are necessary for theater operations today is actually very weak. It is not able to produce.
The United States provides vast quantities of money to its pampered military-industrial complex to produce weapons that are of no use – or they are not sufficient.
You know, they’re very good at producing high-priced, big-ticket items that cannot be used on the battlefield.
Now, this is really a fascinating comment on capitalism, on American-style monopoly capitalism, that you have a pampered military-industrial complex that cannot produce what you need, and you still keep supporting them. So that’s one contradiction.
And of course, there are also many others, you know, within an election campaign about to go into high gear in the United States. The unpopularity of the [Ukraine] war, even in the U.S., will be clear.
Every other day, there is some item in some or the other newspaper saying, “You know, why are we sending so much money to Ukraine when we can invest in the U.S.?”, etc.
So what are the U.S.’s options?
I mean, Michael, you recently wrote a paper in which you said that the United States has lost any capacity to rationally calculate what it ought to do, what strategy will win. Perhaps you can say something about that.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, the U.S. chip makers like Intel are protesting very loudly that China represents one-third of their market.
And so if they’re told by the Biden administration to stop selling sophisticated chips to China, then the government is going to be told, well, you’ll have to make up maybe a $50 billion subsidy to us.
And will the U.S. Treasury really be asked to replace the China market? That’s what’s already being debated in Congress.
So if it does that, how is this kind of giveaway going to affect the U.S. presidential and the congressional elections just next year? This is already an issue.
And business donors are not giving money to the Biden administration and the Democratic Party, because they’re wondering what to do.
And on the other hand, you have Donald Trump trying to get votes by being even more anti-China than the Democrats.
So the great unknown is how China is going to respond to the U.S. shooting itself in the foot. Is it going to be willing to turn the tables and retaliate by imposing its own sanctions?
And it has a much stronger ability to impose sanctions on the U.S. than the U.S. has to impose sanctions on China.
And [China] fired a warning shot a week ago by stopping the exports of gallium – it produces 80 percent of the world’s supply – and germanium, which it does 60 percent.
And on August 1st, China just announced that it has limitations on rare earth exports. And rare earths are a key to making the magnetic characteristics that are required for sophisticated chip technology.
So China can simply impose sanctions on trade that doesn’t have much monetary value, but a key technology value, and can limit the trade in raw materials only to its Shanghai Cooperation Organization allies, and say, “Well, look, I’ll provide you with all the materials, and you can make what the United States and Western Europe are no longer able to make, because they don’t have what only we can supply”.
So the question is, when will China’s political mentality decide to actually fight the U.S. type of negative war with sanctions instead of the competitive cost-cutting, high-technology war that economic trade is supposed to fight? That’s the issue.
RADHIKA DESAI: Absolutely. And, you know, as you were talking, Michael, I was reminded of the fact that, of course, sanctions against Russia were supposed to, you know, “reduce the ruble to rubble” and, you know, push the Russian economy back into the stone age and whatnot.
And, of course, if they didn’t win against Russia, they are not going to win against China. We know that, as you say, rightly, that perhaps China should engage a little bit more in the kind of action that it has just undertaken to deny the West important inputs that it needs, important raw materials that it needs.
But even without such restrictions, China is already making U.S. sanctions useless, because it has rapidly accelerated its innovation in chip technology and so on.
And you know that if the Chinese really roll up their sleeves and say we are going to attack this problem, that problem will be solved in relatively short time.
If the Taiwanese can do it, why can’t the Chinese? It’s not you know, the Chinese have been happy to rely on imports since they were easily available. But if they are not, they will develop their own.
So the sanctions are going to boomerang big time vis-a-vis China as well. In fact, in a much bigger way.
And so the thing that becomes very clear is that it’s very unlikely that there’s going to be anything like an Asian NATO.
In fact, given the failure of the war, as I’ve argued before, in Ukraine, the real question will become whether even a European NATO can survive.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Radhika, can I change the subject a little bit? Touching on what Michael just said, it dawned on me that the ultimate form of sanctions against the empire is de-dollarization.
Because if you don’t change the geoeconomic paradigm, nothing’s going to happen in terms of multipolar integration.
So I’d like a little introduction and then I’m going to ask Michael a direct question. Because he’s probably the number one specialist in the world that can give us, without being part of the negotiations, that can give us, OK, what are they planning to do?
It’s about the so-called BRICS new currency. What I learned from BRICS Sherpas is that there won’t be an announcement of a BRICS new currency in South Africa in three weeks, for a number of very complex reasons.
First of all, they don’t have time. Second, their negotiations started only a few months ago. And this is something that I discussed in Moscow; you need five, six, seven years to design a system like that, if not 10 years, and start to implement it and test it with businesses first, and then with nation states.
What is going to happen in South Africa is they’re going to announce an increase in bilateral trade in their own currencies, which is something that they already do. And they are already working on alternative settlements.
So basically, starting with the five BRICS currencies – which significantly, [their names] all start with an “R”. That’s very, very quirky, isn’t it? Obviously, if we use renminbi instead of yuan, so we have renminbi, real, rand, rupee, and ruble.
So we’re going to have the R5 together, organizing an alternative settlement system of payments. And this will be the first step towards multilateral trade in their own currencies, the five.
Don’t forget that we’re going to have BRICS+. So we’re not going to have five; we’re going to have maybe seven, eight, nine, or even 10, depending on the first wave and the second wave of candidates to become parts of BRICS+.
And then expanding multilateral trade with these national currencies. And, of course, building, okay, let’s start designing a system, and let’s try to sell this to our businesses in our individual nations, and then to other ones as well. And that will mean the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasia Economic Union, etc.
The Eurasia Economic Union, they have already started discussing an alternative currency three years ago, at least. And they’re still discussing it. Like, you know, two months ago, [Prominent Russian economist] Sergey Glazyev went to Beijing to discuss this with the Chinese.
Essentially, it’s an extremely complex thing. And, of course, taking into consideration that the Chinese are terrified of American secondary sanctions, especially. So this is all extremely complicated.
So my question to Michael would be, what would be the ideal path in terms of elaborating an alternative payment system inside BRICS first, then expanding to BRICS+, and then selling this system of payments, considering that the Chinese have their own payment system; the Russians have their own payment system; Iran have their own payment system.
So getting these all together, so you can settle trade within this new framework, bypassing the U.S. dollar. And then you’re going to have your big enterprises, your big companies, individual nations say, “Well, this is an excellent deal, fantastic”.
So now if we’re a company in Turkey, we can do business with a Russian company and we use an alternative payment system.
What would be the best way to proceed ahead? And when would we reach a stage where we can actually discuss an alternative currency in terms of bypassing the U.S. dollar and the euro?
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, actually, Radhika and I have devoted two programs of this series to just that question. And we pointed out that what people think of when they say BRICS currency is something like a euro that you can use for buying and selling things, either buying steel or spending at the grocery store.
You’re absolutely right. That’s far away, because you need political integration to have that.
But what we’re really talking about, and what the kind of currency that’s being talked about isn’t really a currency; it’s a bank credit, a bank settlement system, very much like the SDRs [Special Drawing Rights] for the IMF, except it won’t be controlled by the U.S.
But most of all, this is what [John Maynard] Keynes supported in [the Bretton Woods Conference in] 1944 with the bancor. It’s a means of settlement only for spending among central banks.
So it’s not a general currency. It’s a means of settling credits among central banks. And the credits are apparently going to be based on the artificial bank currency, tied to the price of raw materials that the member countries all support.
And it’ll be very much like paper gold. Right now, the alternative to holding each other’s currencies or U.S. dollars is gold, because gold is an asset without a liability. It’s just something that you can invest in. But you have to somehow earn the money to buy the gold.
Many countries have left their gold, since the pre-1991 movement devaluation. Countries used to leave their gold with the U.S. Federal Reserve to settle, buy, and sell in the gold market to stabilize their exchange rates. They never asked for their gold back.
Finally, Germany asked a few years ago, and the Fed said, I’m sorry, all your gold is gone. We’ve kept down the price of gold to prevent people from moving away from the U.S. dollar by pledging it to commodity dealers. And we don’t have any gold to give you.
And how much of the world’s gold has been left with the Federal Reserve? We don’t know.
So to avoid the problem of how to really settle new gold, the BRICS bank will create a credit system where all the countries have credit to buy and sell with each other to be settled in their own currency, so that China, for instance, won’t hold too much Argentinian currency – especially since Argentina has just done the currency swap to pay the IMF for its foreign debt that it should have simply wiped out.
So we’re talking about a central bank special currency, not a general spending currency. There are two different things that are often confused in the public discussion.
RADHIKA DESAI: Yeah, and if I may add to that, because – you know, Michael and I have done work on this together in our programs, in a paper that we jointly wrote; and then also, independently, so Michael has done his work in Super Imperialism and so on; and my own work on geopolitical economy, is really, it’s primarily – in the book called Geopolitical Economy – it’s primarily a critique of the US dollar system, which I argue has never worked stably.
So it has always run into crisis. And in order to appear to function, [the dollar system] has required the inflation, particularly after 1971, of very dangerous bubbles of financial activity.
And the reason for that is very simple. You know, the loose talk – which, by the way, includes a lot of academics who engage in loose talk – loose talk of the naturalness of the sterling system and then the dollar system has given everybody to understand that somehow, yes, of course, the currency of the most powerful country should be the world’s currency.
But this is, in fact, as we’ve shown, an extremely unstable situation. It cannot obtain.
And that’s why Keynes in 1944, speaking on behalf of his country – not willing his country to be subject to the external authority of the dollar, knowing that the sterling can no longer perform the role it once used to perform, knowing intimately well why that was so – proposed the bancor.
And essentially this completely separates out the issue of international settlement of imbalances from the ordinary requirements of money within a society.
So within a society, money has to be run in order to create full employment, a productively dynamic, ecologically sustainable currency that will work domestically.
But often the requirements of that may go directly counter to the need to maintain its international value.
And gold, by the way, often people confuse it: gold is not money. When gold is used as money, it shows that there is no money.
Gold is a commodity. You know, Michael said it’s an asset without liabilities, but maybe it’s even more pertinent to say it’s a commodity.
So it’s a bit like, you know, going back to barter. So you give me steel and I’ll give you gold. That’s the exchange of two commodities. It just happens to be a widely accepted commodity. But people have proposed other things.
But essentially, the resort to gold, the Germans and others saying we want our gold back, etc., it’s one of the signs – one of the many signs, by the way – that the American dollar system is not working.
So essentially, the point that I’d like to make, therefore, is what would need to happen? You know, your original question was, you know, how will these currency plans work, etc.?
So I would say that the first step would be to, of course, create a relatively stable system of exchange rates between these – let’s just assume it’s the five Rs.
So let’s say, you know, what is the mutual exchange rate of the five Rs, and to try to stabilize them and so on?
And then, in the long run, you know, this kind of system can work. They can even create a sort of bancor based on the five Rs – although originally Keynes had said, let’s not even not use any currencies; let’s just tie the value of bancor to a basket of a few dozen, most widely traded commodities, because that’s what ultimately matters in international trade.
So you could do that, and maybe you can get there, but you can begin by stabilizing the values.
But then I think the big step would have to be, you would have to try and create relatively balanced trade among all the trading partners.
Why is that? Because, Michael said that we have to ensure that, you know, China does not end up with too much Argentinian currency or whatever, or any one of the five does not end up with too much of the currency of the other.
Because what it shows is that one country buys a lot from another country, but that country, which is exporting a lot, has no use for its export revenues.
Now, that would require a development plan among the holders of the five Rs so that, for example, let’s assume a trade relationship between China and Russia.
Well, China and Russia have to ensure that each would want to buy things with what it earns from the other country. So if it’s absent, then maybe there should be investment and opportunity to develop the capacity to produce the thing.
Because, you see, the genius of Keynes’s arrangement was that it had mechanisms within it to force people, force countries to move towards balance. Surplus countries were equally responsible, as were deficit countries, to try to address imbalances, both in terms of capital flows and in terms of trade.
So once you create those mechanisms, then you create an incentive for, say, if China has too many rubles, then China says, “OK, Russians, we are going to help you develop this productive capacity, so that you can export more of X, Y, Z to us, etc.”.
So I think that’s what needs to be done. And just one final point, Keynes’s genius is really apparent in our time because, just as Keynes said, a stable system should try to eliminate persistent imbalances.
Now, move your eyes to the dollar system. The one thing it primarily relies on is the generation of persistent imbalances, because to provide the world with money on the basis of your persistent trade deficits and the current account deficits with the rest of the world, means that the whole system is reliant on imbalances, which means it is volatile and unstable.
So, as you rightly say, Pepe, this is a very complex thing, and it’s going to take time to work out.
But it won’t be worked out if people are laboring under misapprehension, such as that, you know, we need to create a currency like the euro rather than a currency like bancor.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Just one thing about the dollar. You just mentioned, and everybody who discusses the dollar system talks about how the US has been providing dollars.
In [my book] Super Imperialism, and my work for Arthur Anderson years ago, the US private sector is exactly in balance. Since 1950, year after year, from the Korean War to the Vietnam War, the private sector, trade and investment, is just in balance; it hasn’t provided any extra dollars at all to the world.
The entire US deficit supplying dollars to the world has been military. It used to be called the dollar glut. It was to stop that, that [French] General de Gaulle kept cashing in [dollars for] gold.
What the new system of the BRICS and the five Rs are going to cure is that the credit is not going to be paid by building 800 military bases around the other countries, to lock them into a dependency system.
You’ll have the international payment settlement system demilitarized. That’s the basic aim of all this.
The US dollar system is a militarized system. The dollars are US military spending abroad.
That’s the number one reason for world peace, that the dollar system should be superseded.
RADHIKA DESAI: I agree that in terms of trade, US trade was balanced for a long time, like longer than you might imagine.
But certainly starting in the 1980s, the US trade deficit also made its own contribution to the current [account deficit]. The US trade deficit is today between 3 and 4 percent of US GDP.
MICHAEL HUDSON: No, that’s absolutely fictitious. It’s based on fictitious statistics.
Much of the trade deficit is in oil. When the oil comes in, it’s counted as a trade deficit. But only about 10 percent of the price of this oil is paid in non-dollars. All the oil that’s imported is from US oil companies.
And the offset is the earnings on this, the interest paid, or the cost of producing this oil are all made in the United States.
So you have investment inflows on the capital account and on the income account to offset the fictitious payments of oil imports that don’t involve foreign currency at all.
RADHIKA DESAI: OK, I’m not quite sure what you mean, because the fact of the matter is that the whole point is that the United States pays for this oil in dollars.
But let me just make another further point, which is that, you know, people tend to focus on the US trade deficit, and then they say, “Look, the Chinese are buying so many US treasuries and so they are essentially financing the trade deficit, and so this is a kind of a mutually supportive system” – “Chimerica” and all that.
But in reality, what people forget is that what’s really keeping the dollar system going is not Chinese financing, not Chinese purchases of US treasury securities; what keeps the dollar system going is the vast expansion of financial activity, which goes in both directions.
And so, for example, if you look at the statistics, the financial statistics about all the international capital flows that were going on, the bulk of them being in dollar-denominated assets in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese played hardly any role in it.
The biggest role that was played, the part of the world that was most fully integrated into the US financial system, which was producing these toxic securities that led to the 2008 financial crisis, was Europe.
And therefore, it is no wonder that Europe was the part of the world that suffered the most from the 2008 crisis. The 2008 crisis set the foundation for the 2010 Eurozone crisis, and so on and so forth.
And that is why I really find it important to correct people when they term what happened in 2008 a global financial crisis; there was nothing global about it. It was a North Atlantic financial crisis.
MICHAEL HUDSON: That’s right.
PEPE ESCOBAR: I want to pose a question to both of you. Because I was reminded of something very clever that the Chinese are doing and maybe they are setting an example for the whole Global South.
You know that they have now oil futures being traded at the Shanghai bourse, especially the GCC. It’s fascinating.
So the GCC goes to the Shanghai bourse. They sell their oil futures. The Chinese buy it. They pay yuan.
But then the GCC says, look, we don’t want all that yuan. You know, what are you going to do with so much yuan?
The Chinese said, no problem. You can trade your yuan with gold using the Shanghai exchange, a clearing house, or in Hong Kong if you want.
This is absolutely brilliant. Do you think that this could be expanded to the other BRICS, starting with the other BRICS, and then if we have, for instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia being part of BRICS+, adopting the same mechanism?
RADHIKA DESAI: I think that can work. I would say that, you know, the role of gold, as I see, is always residual.
If all the money in the world were actually backed by gold, we would suffer massive deflation, because there wouldn’t be enough money in the world, because there isn’t enough gold in the world.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Gold only finances international balances, not general activity, as the gold exchange standard, not the gold standard.
And again, the gold is an alternative, the easiest alternative to the dollar, because everybody accepts it.
It’s taken a couple of thousand years, but they finally decided something that they can accept as an alternative.
It’s a transition to the BRICS artificial currency. It’s a transition to something away from gold – the idea of an international currency that is not the embodiment of not the U.S. trade deficit, but U.S. military spending.
RADHIKA DESAI: So then to further add to that, so I would say that essentially, when people buy gold, what they’re saying is they don’t want money; they want a commodity; they want that commodity, etc., an easily tradable commodity, so some kind of asset.
So in that sense, it’s a good idea. You know, the function of gold, I often like to say that the sterling standard in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the sterling exchange standard was often called the gold standard, you know, because sterling was backed by gold.
But two things. Number one, the genius of the system actually lay in creating such wide international acceptability for the sterling that it was rarely exchanged for gold. And the reason and the mechanisms by which this was done, we can talk about it.
But the point is, it was rarely exchanged for gold. Keynes writes in his [book] Indian Currency and Finance, which is actually a primer on the functioning of the international gold standard, the sterling standard. And I’ll come in a minute to why a book on Indian currency and finance should serve as the primer on the gold standard. But let me just finish this point.
He makes the point that the Bank of England had less gold than the Caja of Argentina. And he prided himself on that. And he also used to berate the French for holding gold. He says, look, you don’t need to, et cetera. But that’s a whole other set of questions.
Now, let me come to how the British were able to do this. It’s because they drew – I mean, the so-called gold standard actually had very little to do with gold, except for the fact that gold was the benchmark of the value; the price of gold was the benchmark of the value of sterling, and sterling was occasionally exchanged into gold.
And, you know, in those days, some gold coins did circulate. But that was really a very limited role.
The real foundation of the sterling standard was the surpluses that the British drew from their colonies, chiefly British India, which is why a book on Indian currency and finance, which is really a description of how surpluses were transferred from India to the UK. What were the mechanisms employed in order to do this?
So my point being that that is why this book is a primer on the gold standard. And the real foundation of the gold standard was the surpluses Britain extracted from its colonies, and then exported as capital exports.
To where? To Europe, to North America and Oceania, and to some extent to South Africa – that is to say, to all its settler colonies.
So if you think about it in a different way, Britain drew surpluses from her non-settler colonies – British India, Africa, the Caribbean – and exported them as capital exports to her settler colonies.
This is really, it’s quite a racialized thing, but that is the way it was. It is primarily where the money went.
And so Britain provided the world with liquidity by exporting capital, not by running deficits as the US would do later.
The US had no choice. The US didn’t have colonies which it could squeeze to provide surpluses to export to the rest of the world. So the US had to take a different role.
So to come back to your question, I think that the Chinese strategy of allowing things to be exchanged for gold is a good confidence-building measure.
And, you know, at the moment, the transactions are few enough that it can do so. I mean, ultimately, the system should work so well that it does not need gold.
Now, there again, the question is, if China tried to internationalize its currency on the model of the dollar, it would actually reduce China to the sort of economy the US has, of de-industrializing and aging infrastructure. So it will not do so.
That is why Michael and I, and anyone who thinks about it, always says you should not internationalize your currency in that way, not to any significant extent; instead, you need this kind of artificial currency that will help settle international imbalances.
PEPE ESCOBAR: So you’re right, Radhika. And this is the official position in Beijing. They want to go very, very slow with the internationalization of yuan.
RADHIKA DESAI: Yes, yes, exactly.
So, folks, I should say, you know, we’ve had a really wide-ranging discussion, as usual, absolutely fantastic.
We’re about an hour and we’d like not to go too much over an hour. So let me ask you both to say any closing remarks you want to say.
MICHAEL HUDSON: Well, you’ve been brought back to the point that we’ve been making in part one of this discussion, which is the U.S. sanctions were designed to isolate Russia’s raw materials and China’s information technology and shipmaking.
These are not in the economic interest of America’s allies, or of China’s Asian neighbors, or even the United States.
Europe is being told to buy its oil and gas from the U.S. Korea, and Japan, and Taiwan –
Basically we’re back to the issue of whether trade is going to be economic or national security in nature. And it seems now, given the U.S. military presence, it’s going to be both. It’s going to be economic with national security.
And I think it’s hard to see getting the U.S. using any military leverage at all, given the failure of the NATO tanks and the missiles and the anti-aircraft. And the idea is that basically the U.S. is, the dollar is being rejected.
And at first glance, the thought of the BRICS and the Global Majority emerging may seem outrageous, but it’s no more outrageous than the thought that the Nobel —
I want to make a suggestion that, just as the Nobel Peace Prize was given to Henry Kissinger for destroying Laos and Cambodia and covering Vietnam’s forest with Agent Orange, or Obama was given the Peace Prize for destroying Libya and confiscating its gold that Gaddafi had hoped to use for an African gold-based currency and turning it over, and the final Obama act starting today’s crisis with organizing the pro-Nazi coup in Ukraine, I think that America is trying to force Europeans to believe that war is peace in the same sense that Tacitus described a British chieftain of saying that Rome was making a desert and calling it peace.
But in view of what we’re seeing in the last year and a half, I could imagine President Biden getting this year’s Nobel Peace Prize. It would fit in perfectly. It meets the traditional qualifications of destroying a country, Ukraine.
But actually, there’s another reason which he can get it. Biden and Blinken and their neocon team have driven most of the entire Global Majority together to create an alternative to the U.S.-centered world that has become increasingly one-sided.
And under the Biden administration, the United States is forcing the entire rest of the world, except for its NATO satellites, to create a new economic order. And that’s what we’ve been discussing.
And this new international economic order is on the lines that the United Nations was supposed to be created in the first place, before it was taken over by the U.S.
Self-sufficiency in food production for each country. They won’t have to run a trade deficit to import food, because, just like Russia was able to make itself independent in grain and become a grain exporter, other countries can do the same thing, when they’re freed from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund trying to block it.
The new economic order will be a mixed economy along socialist lines, to uplift the entire economy, at least of the expanded BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
And there will be a focus more on peaceful integration instead of military and financial integration.
So it turns out that the NATO war in Ukraine has turned out to be this grand catalyst for this new world order. And just because this wasn’t Biden’s and Blinken’s original intention doesn’t mean that it’s not the effect in practice.
And remember, [Charles Maurice de] Talleyrand, the French official in the 18th century, said of one policy, “It’s worse than a crime, it’s a blunder”. And you could say that that describes American policy perfectly.
But let’s give it credit for this fortuitous blunder that has driven the whole Global Majority together, to make an alternative to the World Bank, an alternative to the IMF, and an alternative to the failed U.S.-centered unipolar order.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Well, I am in touch with a group of Chinese writers and scholars, and they are always absolutely fascinated. And one of them, in fact, Michael was just talking about blunders.
They said, this is the number one blunder in the history of the empire, and they won’t be able to recover. And the Chinese have a little bit of experience with blunders, right?
Well, I would like to finish basically saying that in three weeks we’re going to have the BRICS Summit. So everything that Michael was telling us a little while ago is going to be discussed at the BRICS Summit.
And this is what the Sherpas have been doing these past few weeks. The Sherpas were actually organizing and designing the proceedings, what’s going to happen, the agenda, and the procedures for BRICS Plus, the expansion.
So in three weeks, we’re going to have a geopolitical, geoeconomic earthquake. There’s no question about that. Just to remind all of you, there is a list of potential members of BRICS+.
This is fascinating because these are part of an organization parallel to BRICS called Friends of BRICS. Whenever there is a BRICS Summit, you have Friends of BRICS Summit as well. They interact and they also have their own mini summit.
And this is exactly what happened in South Africa, what, two weeks ago, maximum. I’ll give you the list. Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Gabon, and Kazakhstan.
So probably the first tier, the first wave of BRICS+ is going to come from these guys to one, two, three, or four of these. And there’s also Belarus, which was not in Friends of BRICS, but it’s very close to Russia. And Belarus also applied for BRICS.
You will notice that in this list, there’s no Argentina, unfortunately. And this, I think we discussed this in our previous, because Argentina, basically, they were, I would say, forced to withdraw their application toward BRICS. And this, they didn’t know how to explain that in Buenos Aires. But this is what it is at the moment.
So can you imagine if we have just in terms of the brand new world ahead? Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as a member of BRICS.
So we’re going to have BRICS+ directly linked to OPEC+, directly linked to major sources of energy to China, directly linked to that mechanism at the Shanghai bourse of the GCC selling oil. And if you want gold, you can have your gold as well.
So can you imagine this in a matter of two or three days? We’re going to have this thing turning upside down. And then maybe this is the beginning of the new world economic order. Voila.
RADHIKA DESAI: Yeah, absolutely, folks. And so, yeah, let me just wind this down by making just a couple of remarks.
Number one, I think that, you know, you were talking about blunders.
But if you look at the long term historical point of view, the whole project of American hegemony has been a blunder. We are just seeing the latest and ever more desperate blunders of the United States in trying to keep it going.
This has been my argument for a very, very long time. And bringing the matter back to NATO, which was at least formally the subject of our thing, NATO has always, of course, been an instrument of U.S. hegemony.
But if you cast your mind back a couple of decades, you will see that people, very few people really talked about NATO very much. Because U.S. hegemony was much more extensive. NATO was one part of a larger structure of U.S. hegemony.
Now we’ve come to a point where the U.S.’s purchase on world events relies on NATO to such an extent that it has become the mainstay of U.S. power.
And this mainstay of U.S. power was, you know – part of the reason people didn’t talk about it very much is because it was always fractious. There were always tensions between the Europeans and the Americans and so on. So there was not much to see there in terms of U.S. hegemony.
And now that so-called U.S. hegemony has become reliant on reliance on this outfit is really telling, is really telling about how far, how low U.S. power has sunk.
So perhaps with that, I think we should end today’s today’s show. Please look forward to more shows with us. Hopefully, Pepe, we will have you back another time, after these upcoming summits, or something like that, to assess them.
PEPE ESCOBAR: Thank you so much. My pleasure.
RADHIKA DESAI: Thanks very much. And thanks again to our videographer, Paul Graham. And of course, as always, to Ben Norton for hosting our show.
Goodbye, everyone. And see you next time. Bye bye.
