【1】
党媒宣传的拜登大政府新政宏图：
为了支付大政府的征税计划：
大政府：参见 没招？美国赶紧向中国学招
【2】为了对抗中国的一带一路，拜登建议（英国总理）庄生也来一个：
这就是拜登唯一的一句话，可笑。英国的财政开支自己还缓不过来，庄生又要第二艘航母，拜登自己还要新的3万亿大政府，“民主阵营”，美国英国自己不带头？
BCI良好棉花上海办公室终于发话，就看总部敢不敢与中国断交
【3】美中在巴西的较量：华为
《纽时》一周前在报道巴西疫情的时候，把巴西从中国拿到疫苗和巴西重新允许华为竞投5G项目放到同一个句子里，暗示中国用疫苗威逼巴西让步（参见：美国一手疫苗好牌，给拜登活生生打臭），巴西媒体揭露这整个是《纽时》的惯用伎俩，用以诋毁中国：
实际情况是华为一直没有出局，中国与巴西在疫苗上一直有合作，但这都不在中央政府层次发生，因为总统反华，为了讨好美国，为了选票不惜牺牲本国的利益，华为是政府批准的符合安全标准的商户，总统在国内很孤立，地方政府和商界都反对，到了巴西死人成山的时候，总统终于老实，对中国开始友善起来。
【4】华尔街和西方的资本抵挡不住中国的吸引力：
【5】战略考虑
America's Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of '69 - Texas National Security Review (tnsr.org)【这个分析很能见到美国的出发点：“美国”是一个代表正义的势力，“中国”是一个危害和平、讹诈邻国的反动势力】
If there is going to be a grand strategy focused on China ... - The Washington Post是对The U.S. and China Finally Get Real With Each Other - The Atlantic一文的延伸想法，原文是说撕下面子反而是好，没有幻想，本作者则没那么乐观，“The United States excels at shooting itself in the foot — and also at recovering from shooting itself in the foot far more quickly than foreigners expect”
内斗？
东欧人（罗马尼亚）：
（新加坡）马凯硕 （Kishore Mahbubani）
most Chinese thought that their policymakers won the public argument in Alaska. So too, did many other Asians
@mahbubani_k
战狼：
But when Merkel and Xi spoke on Wednesday, China’s official account of the call did not mention the trade deal or Xinjiang
“We had seven years of negotiations for the deal,” said Joerg Wuttke, head of the European Chamber of Commerce in China. “Now it looks like it will take another seven years.”
【6】台湾
China iterates twice as fast through military development and fielding cycles | Acquisition Talk〔 资料：Competing in Time〕
台湾的“民主”是民主专制，任何不同声音被打击成有位民意而被拒绝，而且台湾的民主斗士（boba liberals），西方的反应：
台湾《联合报》在官网发起的一项民意调查显示，在投票的3.3万余名网友中，有超过78%的网友表示“不赞同，感觉有政治力介入”，仅有20%选择“赞同，累计多项违规记录，早该下架”。
中情局老分析员：中国压根儿没准备武统台湾
人口老化，剩男，经济增长低于社会需求
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.
The U.S. government does not have such a concise rendering of its One-China policy as Beijing does. When American officials say that “we have a One-China policy,” they usually elaborate by listing several defining elements: adherence to the three U.S.-PRC communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982; implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in April 1979; an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides; opposition to either side unilaterally changing the status quo and non-support for de jure independence of Taiwan; the “six assurances”conveyed to Taiwan in August 1982; and a preference for continuing dialogue and cooperation between Beijing and Taipei, among others
对中国最关键的，大概是美国不支持台湾独立。不支持独立，还要武力支持台湾，是因为美国许诺“双方都不应改变现状”
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”
The United States takes no position on how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should resolve their differences on substantive issues. It does, however, consistently state an “abiding interest”in peace and security in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act conveys a political commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense if the PRC were to attack the island militarily. Taiwan’s democratization complicated how the United States should act on its interest in preserving peace and security, and it has, at times, employed an approach of “dual deterrence.”
美国所说的：美国不当两岸将来的仲裁者，但却不得不当仲裁者，因为你们不能以诉诸武力
台海一战将无法避免，因为中国对“时间在我们一边”的判断因时而变，未必会
卜睿哲（Richard Bush），何瑞恩（Ryan Hass），葛来仪（Bonnie Glaser）
China has drawn blood along the contested Indian border, threatened Vietnam, expanded its military presence in the South China Sea, increased the tempo of its operations near the Senkaku Islands and trampled Hong Kong's autonomy — to say nothing of the atrocities it is perpetrating against its own citizens in Xinjiang and elsewhere
解放军在台湾全方位演习
to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification
While it is true that some in China have concluded that time is no longer on China's side and Beijing should use force to compel unification, Xi has resisted such pressure. In the latest five-year plan, launched this year, Beijing reaffirmed the policy guideline of pursuing "peaceful development of cross-strait relations,"
五年计划说“和平发展”并不排除和统或武统，主要看是不是时势所迫，如果美国承认台湾，或台湾宣布独立，这都将是不可扭钻的事件
Beijing has its own incentives to avoid war. Foremost among them is that any attempt to take Taiwan by force would very likely invite a military conflict with the United States. Such a conflict would be difficult to limit from escalating or spreading beyond the Taiwan Strait三人觉得美国占上风，并不一定是指美国在局部一定会胜，只是当两国交战后，双方就进入一种战争对峙状态，那么任何手段都可以在使用的范围之内
“中国的目的是要把台湾吓死，主动投降，宣扬中国军事实力就是帮了中国”
注：如果台湾民意已经不可逆转地走向独立，那么中国还有什么可能和平统一？香港2019暴动的影响：蔡英文当时未必有连任的绝对胜算，蔡抓住了香港暴动，积极扇风，使得局势发展是一国两制
还是有两个可能：一是十几年后中国发展，自己制度有所有所改善，二是经济地位稳定到不惧美国捣乱，实力强大到足以逼敌接受城下之盟
中国没招，因为中国自身问题多，另外还有更多更大的目标，完成建设之前，中国也没用十分把握，
本文根本没提执意性含糊，因为不需要，并没有讨论风险、价值、后果
“No other country in the world – not Taiwan, Japan or South Korea – are talking about the likelihood of war on a day-to-day basis. In Australia we seem to be focused on the distant threat of war rather than the very real support that the Taiwanese people need today.”
同意：
但是可能要让日本和菲律宾失望了，南海南沙群岛本身就是中国的领土，与菲律宾没有什么关系，所以并不存在侵犯主权这一说，所以我们也没有必要撤离。
不过，也有可能是我国渔民的一次的集合活动，中美高层战略对话已经落幕，中国在阿拉斯加的表现让中国人热血沸腾，对于中国的实力更加有自信，对于捍卫中国主权的决心也更加坚定。捍卫我们的权益，本身就是所有中国人的事情，所以，在我们看来，即便是渔民自发组织的宣示主权行动，也没有什么意外的。
什么话？
Money to deter China, Russia: The plan falls short of the 3 to 5 percent boost GOP lawmakers are pressuring the White House to endorse. They argue the range, laid out by Pentagon leaders during the Trump administration, is what’s needed to adequately fund a military transformation to counter threats from China and Russia
"The May 1 deadline gives Biden a way out, and it is bizarre that he doesn’t want to take it."
"There is no excuse for Biden’s apparent backtracking on yet another promise, and he should move quickly to correct this serious and unforced error."
"His conceit that Russia, China, and Iran all belong to the same enemy camp is similarly wrongheaded and harmful."
拜登当局“怕软症”
还尤其怕在国内被人指责自己软，一软就不是男子汉
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and a force for good in the world. Today we issued guidelines to encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan and strengthen our relationship in accordance with our “one China” policy. https://t.co/01TxaArdKz
— Ned Price (@StateDeptSpox) April 9, 2021
Washington can make this change in a manner that is consistent with its one-China policy and that minimizes the risk to U.S.-Chinese relations
为什么呢？因为美国说美国？？
的台湾关系法（Taiwan Relations Act）里美国
Maintaining this policy of ambiguity, however, will not keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for the next four decades. China now has the capability to threaten U.S. interests and Taiwan’s future 美国第一
he trend lines continue to move in China’s favor时间不在我们这一边
习近平四处出击，到处冒险，就是武力侵犯
不用担心台湾独立，因为台湾意识到独立就是武统，所以不会贸然，
One thing, however, has not changed over these four decades: an imposed Chinese takeover of Taiwan remains antithetical to U.S. interests. If the United States fails to respond to such a Chinese use of force, regional U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, will conclude that the United States cannot be relied upon and that it is pulling back from the region
美国信誉论
leading to the dissolution of U.S. alliances and the crumbling of the balance of power, or they would seek nuclear weapons
Why ambiguity: Kissinger understood that settling this issue on terms acceptable to all sides was out of reach.
But ambiguity is now unlikely to preserve the status quo.
哈斯的出发点是，如果美国明确表示一旦中国用武，美国亦将以武力介入，那么中国就会谨慎得多，不至于误算，但哈斯还是不能理解中国人的决心，中国不误算，但并不意味着放弃，不会因为美国军事威慑就会放弃统一台湾，其实我觉得这整个瞎扯，如果中国用武的军事计划是建立在“估计美国害怕，不会出兵”这一假设之上，那么如果中国惨败就是活该。
The White House could articulate this new policy through a presidential statement and accompanying executive order that reiterates U.S. support for its one-China policy but also unequivocally states that the United States would respond should Taiwan come under Chinese armed attack. The statement would make clear that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, thus deterring Taiwan from attempting to capitalize on the new U.S. policy
对中国来说，维护现状就是事实独立，但然这也可以另一种理解，维护现状中国就有机会，等中国发展、壮大
How can you stated "Whether the United States could prevail in a Taiwan conflict is no longer certain, and the trend lines continue to move in China’s favor." w/o asking the question if the US will defend Taiwan regardless cost, as it does in NATO for Europe, is our commitment unwavered in the face of certain defeat
The CCP derives much of its legitimacy from its ability to provide sustained economic growth. Therefore, the United States should make clear that using force against Taiwan would put China’s continued growth at risk. Congress should pass a law that would impose severe sanctions on China should it attack Taiwan. The United States should coordinate with its Asian and European allies so they send similar signals.
Blatant interference of "sovereignty"
Similar points, diff conclusion
Those who argue that this new policy extends an additional U.S. commitment at a time when the country is already overextended should not delude themselves: U.S. allies in Asia already assume that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense完全避开回答，好像美国联盟系统必然代表美国利益
中国不行：
The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defense industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.
Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.此处中国强
半导体
Why a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a catastrophe for China and the world - doxa (substack.com)【台积电完全依赖美国技术，美国一封，台积电就死】
https://hullcitytigers.com/p/worldnews/comments/mqovx8/taiwan_says_its_chip_firms_will_adhere_to_new_us/
Strategic Ambiguity（执意性含糊）
Why Strategic Ambiguity Is No Longer Viable For U.S.-Taiwan Relations | The National Interest（香港、台湾人）
Eric Chan is a China/Korea strategist for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office，2020.09
China also had a policy of strategic ambiguity: a refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, but emphasizing the economic gains of cooperation. The viability of strategic ambiguity rests on an assumption: that time is on our side
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has taken concrete steps all but formally renouncing strategic ambiguity
2000 to 2008, China-Taiwan trade tripled
The U.S. strategy of promoting stability and long-term democratic influence has instead flipped to an embrace of greater risk to deter China.
For Beijing, the illusion of long-term advantage disappeared following the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower student movement in Taiwan
It has led to the collapse of the pro-engagement Kuomintang (KMT) at the national level. The KMT is now attempting a “redesign,” to include a realignment with the United States.
the KMT collapse has given Tsai political breathing room to continue diversifying Taiwan’s economy away from China, openly align Taiwan’s foreign policy with the U.S.
谴责中国、习近平冒险激进，武统，台湾、美国得给中国足够的警告，让中国知难而退，台湾美国爱和平（简单：事实独立，你咋办）
used to discuss slow “strangulation” methods such as a blockade or the seizure of outlying islands to intimidate Taiwan. However, PLA literature is now fixated on achieving a fait accompli
To achieve this, the PLA has developed aggressive operational concepts that are prone to miscalculation
美国明明就是挑战
A Tripwire to hasten to decline of the American Empire
It's not common to see such a poorly argued strategy to defend #Taiwan
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2021/03/26/taiwan-tripwire-a-new-role-for-the-us-army-in-deterring-chinese-aggression/?sh=68166968738c
According to the Domino Theory of American Credibitlity, Taiwan will set to end America's presence in the Pacific, perhaps the world. Why? B/c if you back off in face of war, you lose. But you can't win a war with China on *Taiwan* unless this escalates into a total war, whose outcome is unpredictable. You lose again.
So "strategists" try to outcompete one another with strongest "deternrance". But despite rehtorics from Taiwan, everyone knows its fate is sealed less direct US intervention.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-defence/taiwan-says-will-fight-to-the-end-if-china-attacks-idUSKBN2BU0HJ
The Biden regime is doing everything to show the world Taiwan is de facto independent. The only diff w the Trump regime is it maintains the facade of the status quote w/o provocation of declaring formal independence.
Of course this comes with a wave of recent claims that China "can invade at any moment". Can't see this is just coincidence.
To be indenpendent w/o the formality of independence obvously runs into the irks Of China. What else can you expect? But that's the point. Taiwan is not a card Vis-à-vis Trump, but "Taiwan is the anchor of the so-called First Island Chain, which U.S. planners have identified as the most promising location from which to oppose Chinese naval moves"
In other words, fotress of Democracy
So how to start a war w China we are so eager to fight but don't want? Well ending the strategic ambigouity or formally recognnize Taiwan will seal the fate on all 3 sides, bluffing (threatening) China into submission is not, after all that's what military deterance is all about. Yes despite "The Economist warned on February 20 that “America is losing its ability to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan", we can achieve all, no formal indenpendence, no invasion, by simply
To avoid a blockade of Taiwan, we must "credibly threaten to sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours"
https://www.economist.com/china/2021/02/20/china-faces-fateful-choices-especially-involving-taiwan
Weaponize SMTC on the agenda
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-hypersonic-missiles-american-technology/2021/04/07/37a6b9be-96fd-11eb-b28d-bfa7bb5cb2a5_story.html
中国有可能近期内武统吗？我和大部分美国人想法一样，不太可能，原因是如果美国不正式承认台湾（如建交），台湾不正式宣布独立，中国就没有动武的借口，没有借口而动武则与世界为敌，那是如果美国号召全世界封锁中国，响应的可能不少，这对中国发展将会是个致命性的打击。台湾不形式上独立而事实独立，你怎么办？没办法，这是历史遗留下来的难题，当时你打不过去，现在长大了，短时间内误解。那么如果中国强大到足以能与美国海军一战，不是说战胜，而是有把握试试那时候，美国还会这么坚持吗？
不过台海一战也不是那么简单，美国不仅不会稳操胜券，而且不论中国有没有借口，失败的可能性极大，根据“美国信誉：的多米诺理论，失去台湾美国在亚洲太平洋的霸权，也许在世界的霸权都将会失去。尼尔• 弗格森（Niall Ferguson）
為什麼？因为如果你在战争面前退缩，你就输了。但你不可能在*台湾问题上赢得与中国的战争，除非这场战争升级为一场全面战争，其结果是不可预测的。你又输了。
其实如果美国公投问美国人民是不是要保卫台湾，这是很难通过的，但美国政府通常不需要征求民意,，正如地缘国际关系大师米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer）所言：“美国政府夸大敌人威胁和煽动民众打仗的本事天下莫及，政府要打，老百姓绝对傻乎乎跟着上。”
前几天美国将军，前国安委主任麦克马斯特（H.R. MCMASTER）在回顾川普当局早期制定对华政策转型的过程时透露【1】，当2017年习近平一行到达海湖庄园时，美方直接指责中方不对等贸易，中国使团有点猝不及防，但一直相信美中这“21世纪最主要的双边关系”的中国还是相信自己有能力说服维稳是美国的利益。美方的真实用意，中国花了两年多时间才弄清楚，由于一直以为糊弄就能过关，欠缺准备，中国仓卒采用了全面反击的策略，这一策略随着美国逐渐升级，最后到封杀华为，全面技术战才最终让中国转过弯来【2】，这不是谁退谁进多少的问题，而是你死我活的全面冷战，此刻中国对时局误判再也没有可以辩护的了。
【3】习近平的十万亿芯梦
【4】中国在诈唬，别被她懵了
去年中国开始重新制定美中对抗下的国策，为十四五定调，这包括双循环，把科技放在八项重点任务的第一项（参见【3】）和碳中和，随着拜登当选，中国更是把希望寄托在美国新政府为了扭转美国恶劣的国际形象将会有一个回调的过程，而这一过程恰恰是中国需要的和平稳定使得十四五能平稳展开，习近平那套“时与势在我们一边”，“‘东升西降’是趋势，国际格局发展态势对我有利”【4】也得有一个好的开头，所以中国一直放出风声，希望、“要求”美国重整美中关系（reset），包括撤销关税，还给美国一个台阶，一方面说“责任全在美国”，另一方面说“责任全在川普当局”，暗示对拜登既往不咎。大家老以为杨洁篪那一番宣言多厉害，但那是在中国向美国抛媚眼几个月后才似乎转过弯来，终于发现美国不但不会重新调整美中关系，而且会采用全方位、全社会战争来孤立、打击中国，美国官方媒体现在已经很少隐瞒美国的目的：摧毁中国挑战美国霸权地位的机会。
米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer）
可以说尽管中国意识到美国的战略目的是全方位扼杀中国，中国还是对美国的策略、手段的威胁依旧缺乏认识，这体现在中国还是依靠战狼、五毛大军这种快人心却得罪人，适得其反的策略【5，6】，而美国则到处打造民主人权阵营，这个阵营难以掩盖美国的意图，美国是利用其他国家来达到围剿中国的目的，然而中国的内政外交政策都强调维护自己的利益，那就很难赢得人心，虽然美国的这个阵营主要局限于发达国家和印度，但这个阵营是很威风的，还控制着世界经济和技术的绝大部分，还控制着舆论的制高点，对骂是解决不了问题的。
为什么美国有说服力？因为美国抓住了中国当前的两个策略失误：香港和新疆。说香港和新疆都有美国的黑手，我是信的，不是说中情局真的派了特务，而是整个西方官方媒体都主动站队诋毁中国，中国成了人类公敌，使得中国没有后退之路，可这就让美国有一个把中国描述成不合法政府（illegitimate）的借口，美国时时处处民主人权来威胁利诱盟友，让大家站队，在中国四处树敌
The Chinese embassy in Iceland on Friday announced sanctions against an Icelandic individual for spreading lies and disinformation on so-called human rights issues in China's Xinjiang without naming the person https://t.co/zPJj2URb4o
— CGTN (@CGTNOfficial) April 16, 2021
日本近来一直怕中国，因为在崛起，取代了日本在亚洲的地位，而且钓鱼岛
日本在美国新政府刚上任不久就能下决心与中国升级，中国政府也应当自省一下，
“the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait”
“oppose” coercion or force in the South and East China Seas
美国和西方已经迈向表明“一中”，实质上否认台湾是
We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We share serious concerns regarding the human rights situations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The United States and Japan recognized the importance of candid conversations with China, reiterated their intention to share concerns directly, and acknowledged the need to work with China on areas of common interest.
美国明明就是挑战
茂木敏充表示，日中互为近邻，日中关系保持稳定发展对两国和地区乃至世界都非常重要。日美同盟不针对特定第三方，日方高度重视对华关系，确保日中关系稳定发展的态度没有变化。日方愿同中方保持沟通，加强对话，增进互信，妥善管控分歧，为共同庆祝日中邦交正常化50周年营造良好氛围。日方愿同中方加强各领域交流合作，就互相支持办好东京奥运会和北京冬奥会保持沟通
Biden administration is cementing the position of Japan as an indispensable ally in tackling vexing regional and global challenges and reaffirming the high priority he attaches to the Indo-Pacific.
There was greater convergence on the strategic framing of the China challenge. Tokyo surprised many with its joint statement from the 2+2 meeting to directly call out Chinese assertive behavior that destabilizes the international order
joint emphasis on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait did not go unnoticed
to deliver public goods to the region and beyond is an important repositioning. An alliance that embodies a “can-do” attitude can help the United States recover the lost ground from the past four years of defensive and narrow bilateralism
trusted supplier network
There is unease in some Japanese policy circles about being too forward-leaning in countering China and sacrificing the carefully orchestrated rapprochement initiated a few years ago纽时、华尔街日报
“中国”这个“敌人”存在的目的
【7】这个对那个
如果中国打的是经济牌，虽然中国不再泛太协定内，中国却在区域协定，美国、印度那个都不在，那这印太战略怎么打？
美国“民主阵营”的真正意义
美国已经有联盟了，而且和欧洲有历史、价值、利益攸关天然合作，但全球化后的经济合作关系让大家意识到无法把中国推到一边，可见联盟的局限性。但美国到处跟大家谈心是有后果的：一旦发生武装冲突（如台海），“盟友”们就可以借机制裁后冻结、没收中国资产，封锁（或拒绝）给中国提供资源，甚至给美国提供军事基地，彻底孤立中国。
【8】
【9】疫情与疫苗
To provide a backstop against regional Covid surges we need to pulse vaccine into these areas. Some excess portion of the large additional supply that's coming into the market should be pulsed into U.S. hot zones to quickly ring vaccinate around outbreaks. https://t.co/gH1KjFT87J
— Scott Gottlieb, MD (@ScottGottliebMD) March 28, 2021
As a wife, mother, daughter, physician & CDC Director, I ask you to hold on a little while longer. We are almost there, but not quite yet. Continue using #COVID19 prevention methods & get vaccinated when you can so that you and others will still be here once this pandemic ends.
— Rochelle Walensky, MD, MPH (@CDCDirector) March 29, 2021
2/
— Alexandre Bolze (@alexbolze) March 28, 2021
How did I pick these 7 states?
- Each had >50 positives (Cq N gene
- Alternative could be to use a threshold for % of positives in state coming from Helix
~5% of pos in these 7 states come from Helix
State Ns: https://t.co/3BeT7U2JKK
德国联邦制和美国相像，结果也可以比较
【10】
【11】伊核协议，中伊协定
【12】全球经济
印钱
【13】印度
新增案例：
死亡人数：
Many districts in the country are seeing clusters of cases emerging because of specific events and/or places where crowding happens, or where a large number of people are in close contact coupled with a lack of a COVID-appropriate behaviour.
rime Minister Narendra Modi himself have been addressing rallies and meetings of tens of thousands of people, sitting or standing shoulder-to-shoulder, with only a handful wearing masks
这就是民主，选举了
"The worst days are yet to come for India. Our models are showing astronomic projections that we did not see last year. This wave is intrinsically different. People have thrown caution to the wind. The next few weeks are so critical..." ht @BhramarBioStathttps://t.co/IFzf0XAs1y
— Albert Pinto (@70sBachchan) April 5, 2021
long india
https://twitter.com/70sBachchan/status/1378901038447652868
@AmyKazmin
https://twitter.com/AmyKazmin/status/1380886406264852489?s=20
变种，疫苗失效未被证实
印度自己居然相信已经群体免疫了
The truth is that India’s COVID-19 fight has been derailed by an irresponsible, arrogant, and opportunist leadership, supported by a pliant and spineless media.
Modi’s government has also been accused of failures of political leadership from the top, with lax attitudes emulated by state and local leaders from all parties and even health officials across the country, which led many to falsely believe in recent months that India had defeated Covid
与中国截然不同的态度，没法让中国人觉得自己有责任
“Victory was declared prematurely and that ebullient mood was communicated across the country, especially by politicians who wanted to get the economy going and wanted to get back to campaigning. And that gave the virus the chance to rise again.”
Thadhani said this time round the virus was “much more aggressive and much more infectious” and was now predominately affecting young people. “Now it is people in their 20s and 30s who are coming in with very severe symptoms and there is a lot of mortality among young people,” he said.
年轻人免疫？不怕？
Still, many fear that it is too little, too late.
The devastation has sparked outrage at the lack of preparation among officials who believed that the worst of the pandemic was over. Only two months ago, India was revelling in its success of reining in the spread of the virus.
India’s fatality rate remains relatively low,
the roots of the crisis ran much deeper, exposing years of neglect of public health infrastructure. India’s spending on healthcare has long lagged behind global peers
自然比中国还差
全面，但没细节
多些
这里：
Uttarakhand: Sadhus participate in the second 'shahi snan' of Maha Kumbh at Har Ki Pauri ghat in Haridwar
— The Times Of India (@timesofindia) April 12, 2021
(Pictures: ANI) pic.twitter.com/CSlQRNNxNF
无关：
【14】拜登加税要把你加死
抗疫经济纾困已经5万亿，基建2.3万亿，拜登还要2万亿
time for President Biden to follow through on his campaign promise to offer permanent federal help on issues of critical importance to working women, from paid parental leave, to more expansive federal child-care support, and permanent child tax credits
But the stalled drive for the $15 federal minimum wage
拜登表示在未来几周内还会提出另一项经济提案，称为“美国家庭计划”，重点放在医疗、育儿和教育方面的投资，可能会使刺激计划的总规模再增加2万亿美元，部分资金将来自于对美国最高收入者加税
为什么美国没人提？
President Joe Biden will separate his sprawling plan to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure into two separate pieces
芝大教授
Spending has been spurred by a belief that, as long as the federal government can borrow without a rise in low interest rates, no one really needs to pay. In case markets disagree, the rich can be taxed.
Past experience suggests it will be hard to make the rich pay — they will oppose new taxes vigorously and avoid them if implemented.
But in later spending packages, politicians arguably did not want the populist goodies they were targeting at their constituencies to be assessed in the sobering light of the need to pay for them.
the cost to future generations of our eating up their fiscal room could be substantial.
The request is separate from Biden’s $2 trillion-plus infrastructure and jobs plan, and it only covers discretionary spending, which amounts to about a third of the federal budget. A fuller White House budget release, which will include proposals for mandatory spending and tax reform, will be released later this spring and will tie everything together
可支配政府预算：国防7530，民用7690（亿）
亚马逊对工会的态度比曹德旺还狠，恐吓威胁，刁难打击直至解雇，亚马逊有自己的自干五团队，还监视监听，最大的丑闻是亚马逊底层员工不敢上厕所，只能用瓶子，想想那是怎么样的羞辱。
这是个人税，与这次基建无关
$2.4 trillion over the next decade，人均税增是1500（美元），但全部由最上20%承担
$330,000 and $790,000 would pay about $9,000 more on average in 2022
Those in the top 1 percent (who will make about $790,000 or more) would pay roughly $265,000 more in taxes on average, or 16 percent of after-tax income. Those in the top 0.1 percent (who will make $3.5 million or more) would pay $1.6 million more than under current law, a steep 22 percent reduction in their after-tax incomes.
拜登怎么打土豪？
拜登最新的美国家庭投资计划主要是靠向有钱人征税来支付，拜登已经许诺，年入40万（美元）的家庭不会多交一分钱税，据统计，这些家庭只占美国的1.8%【1】，这么做，据说是因为担心被别人戴帽，伤了“中产”，这真是发动全国打土豪，分钱银【2】，前几天提到过民主党的这一意图【3】，中期选举执政党肯定背锅，不如这次做大，赌一把。
这次征税一是把最高税率从从37&上调到39.6%，这是很小的增加，大头是资产增值税（long term capital gain tax），从现在的2% 大涨到39.6%，加上医保附加税3.8%，最后达43.4%。
【3】拜登的MAGA
最新
遗产税：从一千二百万下降到一百万，
As illustrated in Figure 2, only 0.7 percent of taxpayers would be affected by these two provisions and virtually all of the tax increase would fall on the richest 1 percent.
【15】“债务陷阱”是如何出笼的？
中国的一带一路，按英国智库漆咸楼（Chatham House，正式名称为皇家国际事务研究所，The Royal Institute of International Affairs）综合西方的解释， 是中国的一个地缘政治战略，其目的是在欧亚大陆甚至整个世界建立以中国为中心的新秩序，包含了 “深思熟虑的中国大战略”，旨在“重新夺回亚洲的地缘政治主导权，挑战]美国的主导权，建立以中国为中心的秩序”，是一个“地缘政治和外交攻势”，其目的“无异于改写当前的地缘政治格局，建立世界主导权”，这些观点也成为美国政府的看法，将之视为。漆咸楼很权威
As the BRI has developed over the years, projects have been largely scaled back, and the ones we’ve seen in the last few years tend to be more in touch with local conditions.
The PRC has learned these lessons, and is getting better at this kind of work. The BRI isn’t going anywhere (it’s Xi’s signature FP and is in the CCP constitution) and the liberal world would do well not to write it off due to a few early failures
注：《2018年度中国对外直接投资统计公报》显示，2018年末，中国对外直接投资存量达1.98万亿美元。）中国金融机构以及中国发起成立的多边开发机构亚投行在“一带一路”沿线国家的贷款余额约为3500亿美元，其中绝大部分是贷给外国的主权机构
Bruno Maçães
China pulled its most brilliant coup when it convinced everyone in the West that the Belt and Road was about infrastructure
China pulled its most brilliant coup when it convinced everyone in the West that the Belt and Road was about infrastructure
Joke
Loans are not obviously predatory; secrecy is sometimes a condition
These include confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from revealing the terms of the loans, informal collateral arrangements that benefit Chinese lenders over other creditors and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructurings - dubbed by the authors as “no Paris Club” clauses, the report said. The contracts also give substantial leeway for China to cancel loans or accelerate repayment, it added.
Maria Adele Carrai is an assistant professor in global China studies at New York University Shanghai
肯尼亚铁路，To critics, Kenya’s railway project represents another example of Chinese-owed debt and China’s growing influence in Africa. Indeed, many commentators point out that Kenya has an estimated $9 billion in China-financed debt — and note their concerns that a growing number of projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
My research on two Chinese railway megaprojects in East Africa — the Nairobi-Mombasa line and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti project — suggests the fears that China is upending development guidelines might be misplaced
I analyzed primary sources like Chinese government corporate social responsibility
Chinese government and state-owned enterprises have made CSR a priority, yet these two railway megaprojects show that implementation largely depends on local conditions, suggests insufficient Chinese government enforcement of CSR policies encourages Chinese organizations and enterprises to follow host-government guidelines. At times, this means Chinese companies resort to what I call “adaptive governance” 主要的问题是中企【如果发现东道主国的法律要求低过中国政府的，就】采用东道主国的，这是
Beijing has actively worked to increase CSR within Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks since the early 2000s. The central government, ever cognizant of its international reputation, has vigorously promoted higher standards for state-owned and private Chinese enterprises operating abroad. Hundreds of Chinese regulations and codes require Chinese companies to respect local customs and cultures, honor social responsibilities and protect labor and the environment. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, however, the impact of China’s national directives appears to be limited. Here’s what I found
肯尼亚由中交承包，埃塞俄比亚由中铁承包
中交在肯尼亚做的不错，群众反应好，中铁施工周期是两倍，经营、财政都有问题
埃塞俄比的规矩就比较差，中铁按照当地政府的要求，结果欠缺考虑，商业上也不成功。
That is part of a proposed $300 million "countering China's influence fund" pic.twitter.com/oQooWDG0mZ
— Tom Hancock (@hancocktom) April 11, 2021
Brussels responds to Podgorica’s request — and whether it will bail the country out of a project long deemed unviable — will help to shape the bloc’s relationship with the region.
“This is the first time that Montenegro or any other country from the western Balkans has made this type of outreach towards Brussels to combat rising Chinese influence."
Montenegro raised eyebrows in 2014 when it signed a deal with China’s ExIm Bank to finance 85 per cent of the cost of a road with a dollar-denominated loan worth almost $1bn. The first 41km section, a quarter of the total length, cost €20m per km, making it one of the most expensive highways per km in the world, said Spajic.
黑山共和国受惑，中国国企推销，结果背上巨债，现在成了国际事件
Its decision has been scrutinised given that two separate feasibility studies, in 2006 and 2012, concluded that the highway was economically unviable. The government also signed a €54m contract with a Montenegrin-Chinese consortium for a thermal power plant just before it was ejected from office.
signed by the previous Montenegro government led by the Democratic Party of Socialists, which was ousted in August after 30 years in power.
胡说：
Observers said Montenegro’s plea was an opportunity for Brussels. “The EU should step in,” said Tena Prelec, a scholar at the University of Oxford who studies the region. “Montenegro is in the EU’s backyard: it would be, finally, a concrete way to show that the EU is indeed a player, a true geostrategic actor.”
Bruno Maçães, Dec 27, 2020
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
Boston University interactive
推动各国加强政治互信、经济互融、人文互通
坚持对话协商、共建共享、合作共赢、交流互鉴，同沿线国家谋求合作的最大公约数
中国国内也很混乱
Based on the observation of its implementation, Beijing’s official statements, and my own research, I would argue it is a constantly changing group of policy settings, which encompasses almost all the various clarifications
In practice, the piecemeal realization of BRI projects is determined by local governments and their related political and economic interests via diverse and time-consuming bilateral interaction with Beijing
Yufan Huang is a PhD candidate in the government department of Cornell University
Chinese banks offered African countries significant debt restructuring before the pandemic and have continued to do so
中国主动与债务国协商远超出西方报道
The G-20 effort marks the first time China is participating in multilateral debt relief. As Africa’s largest bilateral creditor, China holds at least 21 percent of African debt — and payments to China account for nearly 30 percent of 2021’s debt service, as shown in the figure below.
西方： they are not relaxing repayment requirements. Likewise, bondholders, who are responsible for 19 percent of 2021’s debt service, have held back from providing any debt relief.
Our research at the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) suggests that China has played a significant role in helping African countries to manage their debt. We documented 16 cases of debt restructuring worth $7.5 billion in 10 African countries between 2000 and 2019
Our research found that Chinese lenders have not pursued lawsuits in cases of debt default. We also found no asset seizures.
中国不总是让步，“国家机构”和“商业机构”的手段也不一样，但会针对特殊情况，松动、灵活
标准：
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests
China has not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific, although a continuation of business as usual would risk future debt problems in several countries.
There is scope for a new Australian infrastructure financing facility to provide loans to the Pacific without causing debt problems, particularly as it has adopted key sustainable lending rules.
Pacific nations have an opportunity to obtain more favourable financing from official development partners but care must be taken to avoid overly geopolitical aid.
台湾凶：
“一带一路”项目受到一些关于债务偿还方面的质疑，您如何看待“一带一路”项目中的风险与质疑？”
海南大学“一带一路”研究院院长梁海明
史志钦清华大学“一带一路”战略研究院执行院长
How to frame something for what it is not
Trash #China is the thing. It works. It pays. It's a sport
https://theprint.in/economy/has-india-become-chinas-colony-seems-like-going-by-what-we-import-and-what-we-export/631656/
If this is to insult China, it will work. But it also insults @narendramodi
Great power competition doesn't have to be mean. But if one recalles
@PMOIndia
为什么中国精英权贵都挺支持政府和习近平？因为精英权贵按定义就是既得利益者，既得利益就是在现有体制下得利，只有极其理想主义者，近乎殉道那般执着的人才会对权利说不，结果正能量充斥一切舆论渠道，这跟美国的运作机制是一样的，总统大肆吹捧减税“给经济带来的好处”，而他自己阵营的只盯着眼前的义愤，有意无意对减税实质上损害自己的利益熟视无睹，
How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Chatham House expose
This whole narrative misunderstands China and ignores the interests and agency of recipient countries
Sinologists have documented the reality of what they term fragmented authoritarianism, recounting fierce inter-agency rivalries and factionalism, which top leaders struggle to manage, even under Xi,
In reality, the idea of aggregating China’s long-standing infrastructure connectivity projects beneath a broad banner originated with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
as party-state agencies jostled for resources.
Disbursements start with requests from abroad, not Chinese planners. The whole edifice—especially today, with growth slowing, profitability collapsing, and surplus capacity endemic—is skewed towards helping Chinese businesses expand overseas
* Asia Society report warns that Chinese officials’ ‘laissez-faire’ attitudes mean projects are not being properly vetted in Southeast Asia
Letter to the Editor: Why China Will NOT Seize the Port of Mombasa if Kenya Defaults on SGR Debt - The China Africa Project
首先关于“战狼外交”，各方议论较多。给我们贴这个标签，至少是对中国外交的误解。要知道，中国从来就是礼仪之邦，以和为贵，从没有主动挑衅别人，也没有跑到别人家门口更没有到别人家里去挑事。现在恰恰是别人到我们家门口耀武扬威，对我们的家务事横加干涉，还喋喋不休地对我们进行辱骂抹黑，我们无路可退，不得不奋起自卫，坚定捍卫国家利益和尊严。显而易见，“战狼外交”实际上是“中国威胁论”的又一翻版，是又一个“话语陷阱”，目的就是要让我们打不还手，骂不还口，放弃抗争
中国在世界显得很孤立，尤其是在发达国家圈子内显得很孤立，日韩在地理上离中国这么近，经济极其密切，但在国际关系和文化上和中国的抵触是很大的，民意对中国也不佳，可是中国并不这么觉得：
有人说中国在国际上四面树敌。这不是事实。我们从来都是广交朋友、广结善缘，恰恰是个别大国为了打压遏制中国，胁迫他国选边站队，制造非友即敌的“寒蝉效应”。但即使在这样的情况下，中国的“朋友圈”并没有变小，而是越来越大。许多发展中国家和友好人士顶住压力同中国开展合作，在国际场合为我仗义执言。截至目前，有近170个国家和国际组织参与共建“一带一路”，中方倡议的“亚投行”成员国已增加到103个。在今年的联大三委会上，70多个国家以单独或共同发言等方式支持我们，有力挫败了个别国家借涉港、涉疆问题搞反华行动的图谋。中国候选人高票当选国际法院法官和国际海洋法法庭法官。中国支持的联合国新冠疫情决议以169比2高票通过。这些数字和事实都表明，中国站在历史正确的一边，合民心，顺潮流，朋友遍天下
一带一路债务陷阱和Iraq Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
老的一带一路
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/26/china-has-a-vastly-ambitious-plan-to-connect-the-world
一带一路
一带一路评估
还有这么极端的
Brazilian vice-president: Embraer should now look to China
Nigerians living near a major Belt and Road project grew more positive toward China after it was completed
【16】
2020年2月，北大方正被北京法院裁定进行破产重组，集团总资产超3600亿，一共负债3029.51亿元
一、疯狂举债，不断跨界收购，企业资产负债率甚至高于地产行业
二、内斗不断，“IT企业中内斗最激烈的地方”
【17】
只有中国阿Q才不在乎
民主：
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-16/yields-have-a-long-way-to-go-before-they-sting-yellen-s-treasury
中国阴谋论
战狼是为了国内爱国情绪
Quantity has not meant quality. The narratives Beijing is pushing are a web of contradictions. One line seeks to justify government actions by citing terrorism in the region. Another spouts a clumsy moral equivalence with the west’s human rights record. At the same time, diplomats and state media push the “nothing to see here” narrative, churning out images of the sweeping landscapes of “#AmazingXinjiang” as if to say: “How could something so beautiful be bad?”
【18】
英国在想什么？
英国难以解释的怪象：
英脱欧后双边贸易受到巨大打击
德国尤其严重
【19】
新加坡、南韩：不会在美中之间站队
东盟
【20】伊朗作为例子。阿富汗
除了伊朗，中国还要主持以巴谈判，土耳其-伊朗-巴基斯坦战线，防美、印
https://twitter.com/yarbatman/status/1380135419464015872
【21】
对于强调价值的人来说，自由是人类最关键的价值，高于爱情生命。研究政治哲学的人很清楚，自由与资本主义结合起来就意味着对资本家来说自由就必须是个普世价值，普世价值的潜台词是不仅我觉得这是最高价值，你也觉得这是最高价值，如果你不同意，那你也必须接受这是最高价值，这样西方才能强迫其他国家开口通商，不幸的是对于被殖民的国家地区，所谓“讲规则的国际秩序”真如杨洁篪所说的是“由少数人制定规则的国际秩序”，双重标准是这规则的一部分，自由并不是伦理学的原则，而是一个政治概念，什么是自由，怎么自由，谁自由谁不自由，自然是指定规则的人说了算。
人爱自由这个出发点其实没有错，谁不爱？在中国除了官媒的观点别人不能说话，这就难受，毁了十几亿大脑。问题是，一个自由的人有没有责任去保证世界上所有的人都有自由，这是理解西方自由这一普世价值的关键，对西方来说，一个没有自由的国家最终要威胁另一个自由的国家，所以只要世界上只有有不自由的国家，全人类就没有解放，这种逻辑就是普世价值的威力，用自由武装起来的资本界就有驾驭者带有利炮的尖船把自由带到五湖四海的动力，至于他们成了殖民者，倒是个意外，这种心态和基督徒布道引渡芸芸众生皈依基督一模一样。世界上还真难找到比白人更为你的灵魂操心的人。
当殖民殖到无地可殖之后，炮舰政策就不知道怎么使了，但此时世界已经买入现代化，观念成为主宰世界的机制，虽然民主与自由不总是兼容，推崇民主以保护自由成了新的使命，不过虽然威尔逊说这已经过百年了（Make the world safe for democracies）【1】，推行民主真正是在二战后才开始的，那是美国确实是有实力了，而且二战过程中美国精英届达成一个共识，那就是美国必须以其强大的军力控制全球，限制一切邪恶势力的更生，如纳粹主义，军国主义，后来加上共产主义，来推行自己的体制，因为自己的体制代表自由和和平，从此，美帝国世界秩序（Pax Americana）就成了自由，平等，和平，繁荣的同义词，加上联合国在美国指导下通过的人权宣言，美国精神传遍世界，只是后来苏联太邪恶，玷污的纯洁的美国人，使得美国不得不使用政变、暗杀、酷刑、镇压、干预内政，战争这种人类最野蛮、残酷的手段，慢慢也堕落了。
【1】其实威尔逊的动机远没那么高尚，只是觉得民主国之间不打仗，所以民主好，只是
【22】
【23】美国的朝贡体系（论文）
【24】记录
https://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/66653/202101/4758.html
https://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/66653/202103/16552.html
（此图是复合图）
中国政府对新一代是用了洗脑教育，也管制信息流通，尤其是来自国外、西方的，但如果他们想“里通国外”，还是能爬墙的，可爬出来发现西方“正值、进步”的媒体都是诋毁中国的言论，他们还有什么选择？
【26】股市泡沫
【27】中国债务
【28】香港，颜色革命
Support the Tropes — FAIR How media language encourages the left to support wars, coups and intervention
【中国人】
To come to America to become a "Chinese American" is meant to break with the past (China), embrace the present (America) & hope for (a better) future. To have come from a civilization is antithesis to being a free & cosmopolitan individual, or being American, where history means little, choice everything. The fantasy of entertainment and consumption is the new realism you settle on.
"This loss of history and crisis of civilization is not small", to cling to history is the rejection of the present, and as recognition the choice has been wrong
【Multiculturalism is just a word, "America" a dream. Such is the contradiction】
【新疆】光伏产业
【28】美国的永久战
【29】霸权
【30】
美国被盗，间谍
【31】
看来美国维稳费用远高于中国（incarceration $81.3 billion, FBI $9.9 billion, DHS $52 billion）
习近平内循环的馊主意：维稳1.5万亿
【32】疫苗
【33】月光族
【34】新疆种族灭绝
The US has applied the label "genocide" to both the Ottoman massacre of Armenians during WWI & China's repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
— Fareed Zakaria (@FareedZakaria) April 25, 2021
Is the term being used correctly?
My conversation today w/ @philippesands, a leading authority on the concept: pic.twitter.com/zkEEwarfV0
人口
人才争夺战：很多极其有才的人愿意留在西方
“The solution to have more American students pursue STEM studies is magical thinking,” says Peter Cowhey
Cotton, Hawly, Carlson
人口不会对中国增长带来巨大的打击
美国
【35】2020军费
【美国经济】
【】未分
中国的电动汽车行业和战略，电池
the government told auto makers they would only qualify for subsidies if they used batteries from a list of approved suppliers, which included dozens of Chinese firms but excluded foreign ones
“The price is high, and the service is slow”
In June, Beijing announced plans to scrap its controversial restrictions on foreign EV batteries and reopen its market to the big Korean and Japanese players
为什么香港暴动不是串通国外的颠覆罪？（Nury Vittachi）
美国三大媒体评论武汉封城周年
武汉封城周年，美国三大媒体这么说
六人采访
送货小哥
没想到这突如其来的疫情，竟然造成了大家都说谢谢的局面。我当时就震惊了。对专家、学者、名人等人不是很尊重吗？怎么会去找一个送餐员呢？这让我很高兴。现在，一切又回到了去年的样子。这就是人性。
对很多人来说，武汉基本恢复了正常，大部分居民都想继续前进。20多岁的宋飞飞在武汉著名的江汉长廊边的一家小吃店工作，她认为封锁是值得的。
"禁闭也没那么糟，除了没有自由。只要给我们上网，我们这些年轻人就可以永远呆在家里了。"她暗暗开玩笑说。
不过，这一切都取决于问谁。对于数以千计的居民来说，封锁带来的身体和情感上的痕迹依然存在。
"我最大的遗憾就是把他送进了医院。至少在家里，他可以有东西吃，有人照顾他。"钟先生对NPR说。"现在一想到他，我的心就疼得受不了。"
钟要求只用她的姓氏，因为当局已经逮捕了记录地方政府如何在疫情发生时努力提供护理的人。
其他说出什么的人也被关进了监狱。律师转为博客的张展，上个月因 "编造谎言 "被判处4年监禁。
"一开始我觉得，这个病毒有什么严重的？为什么要锁城？看了这个方斌的视频，才知道事情有多严重！"一位在封锁期间送医疗用品和食品的武汉志愿者回忆说。他还要求匿名。
很多健康专家表示，武汉封锁应该更早开始，会减缓病毒的传播。这位志愿者说，尽管如此，他还是不能原谅它给城市居民带来的代价--他认为其他中国公民没有把握住这种代价："封锁造成了医疗资源的枯竭和恐慌感。许多患有冠状病毒以外疾病的人因此无法得到治疗，在封锁期间死亡。"
当然不能说它们一点正面的都没有，也不能说这只是西方片面，“责任全在对方”。
【后记】
谨防中国版本的“欧债危机” ——中国地方政府债务风险分析及化解之道
殷剑峰 王蒋姜 国家金融与发展实验室
殷剑峰 王蒋姜 国家金融与发展实验室
台湾对大陆的出口顺差占台湾总产值的近三分之一
中非自贸先例？
揭黑
China clamps down in hidden hunt for coronavirus origins (apnews.com)（Dake Kang on Twitter: "NEW: After Beijing announced the virus was spreading in Jan, Chinese scientists rushed to publish papers. Then, the tide slowed to a trickle. Now, documents obtained by @AP show this happened b/c President Xi ordered new restrictions on COVID-19 research. https://t.co/k0lUaQjKmZ" / Twitter）
《经济学人》
Year in review: China - How the pandemic strengthened the Chinese Communist party | China | The Economist【绝对是所有描述中国，尤其是中国政府（共产党）的，必须用贬义，否定的词汇和语气】
The great mall of China - Why retailers everywhere should look to China | Leaders | The Economist【相对正面，也许事实太难否定了】
矛盾的
一读
US President Joe Biden's administration has doubled down on the claim that China is mounting a genocide against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. But it has offered no proof, and unless it can, the State Department should withdraw the charge and support a UN-based investigation of the situation in Xinjiang.
今昨天美国四月就业报告公布之前，美国的预测是这次一定火爆，过百万个新岗位，但结果却大失所望，只有26万：
过去一年新岗位数目
过去一年因为房产和装修让木材价格冲天而去，大家一直以为建筑业很火：
结果房产业毫无起色，而制造业还收缩了：
餐饮旅游业尽管有不少新的岗位，但远远未能恢复到疫情前的水平：
到此离疫情前还有一千万（官方数字略低，八百万左右）岗位尚未恢复：
官方失业率是6.1%，实际大约7.6%：
虽然男女总的失业率大体一致：
但投入到劳工大军的妇女则远低于男子，这个月岗位又少了64000人：
注：劳工参与率与适龄（priem age）劳工参与率不同
什么原因让大家大跌眼镜？
首先这不是因为没岗位，招工已经恢复到疫情前水平，大家的信心也恢复了：
领取失业救济的人数也大幅降低：
工资也日趋稳定：
代表资方和市场经济把矛头直指政府，不就是你们福利太好了，大家呆在家里跟找工作待遇一样，干嘛上班，美国商会还专门发表声明，让政府把每周300元补助给撤了【6】，这是在每人到手的1400元疫情救济和正常失业金之外额外的，这么多钱，最低工资又没变，难怪大家不愿意干脏活累活险活。这么多钱也是美国贸易赤字又创新高的原因【8】。不过政府党媒的说法就不同，政府说目前有三个难题，一是照顾孩子，主要落在妇女头上（所以那么多妇女干脆不找了），二是担心冠疫，三是冠疫打击下不知道下辈子是不是还接着干同样的活。《纽时》【9】《华邮》【10】提到雇主等着招人，就是招不到，但这些雇主都不愿意涨工资，这里说的是社会底层，美国平均工资是每小时30（美元），不低，但售货员服务员参观招待那些则低得多，但总的说一场“百年不遇大变局”对资方并没有什么影响，资方对拜登上台后带动的社会主义（国家资本主义）变革也不以为然，可是大家真的愿意拿着最低工资去干那些挨骂受气的脏活累活险活吗？
在美国，教育、育儿和医疗成了大家最大的负担【11】，刨去通胀，过去25年居住飞鹰增加了14%，育儿增加了49%：
大家记得基本工资基本上没涨，所以育儿成了家庭一个大负担，尤其是低收入家庭：
美国的这种负担，源于政府一直不愿意提供这类福利，在发达国家中，美国政府对家庭提供的援助几乎是最低的【12】：
总育儿费用：
这种负担绝大部分是落在妈妈身上。育儿教育的负担，给美国人口带来的压力与中国无异，美国的出生率达到二战后的新低【13】：
《华邮》引用皮尤的一项民调，三分之二的人觉得人生不易，不再想干同样的工作了，更不想拿最低工资，而美国的大企业，尤其是制造业，则在加速自动化，可见冠疫让大家都有新的，各自的打算，而拜登当局“重新伟大”的宏图显然打动了低收入的群体，如果政府能提供基本福利，那真的，为什么去干脏活累活险活？拜登希望改变劳工的地位，却无法通过最低工资法，只能给大家提供福利，这又促使大家加大对政府的期望，最终对美国经济的影响和政治的影响，还很难预料。
【资料】
NEW YORK/LONDON – The US government needlessly escalated its rhetoric against China by claiming that a genocide is being mounted against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. Such a grave charge matters, as genocide is rightly considered “the crime of crimes.” Many pundits are now calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, dubbing them the “Genocide Olympics.”
The genocide charge was made on the final day of Donald Trump’s administration by then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, who made no secret of his belief in lying as a tool of US foreign policy. Now President Joe Biden’s administration has doubled down on Pompeo’s flimsy claim, even though the State Department’s own top lawyers reportedly share our skepticism regarding the charge.
This year’s State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (HRP) follows Pompeo in accusing China of genocide in Xinjiang. Because the HRP never uses the term other than once in the report’s preface and again in the executive summary of the China chapter, readers are left to guess about the evidence. Much of the report deals with issues like freedom of expression, refugee protection, and free elections, which have scant bearing on the genocide charge.
There are credible charges of human rights abuses against Uighurs, but those do not per se constitute genocide. And we must understand the context of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang, which had essentially the same motivation as America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.
As the Hong Kong-based businessman and writer Weijian Shan has recounted, China experienced repeated terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the same years that America’s flawed response to 9/11 led to repeated US violations of international law and massive bloodshed. Indeed, until late 2020, the US classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan, and held many as prisoners. In July 2020, the United Nations noted the presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria.
The charge of genocide should never be made lightly. Inappropriate use of the term may escalate geopolitical and military tensions and devalue the historical memory of genocides such as the Holocaust, thereby hindering the ability to prevent future genocides. It behooves the US government to make any charge of genocide responsibly, which it has failed to do here.
Genocide is defined under international law by the UN Genocide Convention (1948). Subsequent judicial decisions have clarified its meaning. Most countries, including the United States, have incorporated the Convention’s definition into their domestic legislation without any significant alteration. In the past few decades, the leading UN courts have confirmed that the definition requires proof to a very high standard of the intentional physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
The definition specifies that one of five acts must be perpetrated. Obviously, killing tops the list. The State Department’s report on China says there were “numerous reports” of killings, but that “few or no details were available,” and cites only one case – that of a Uighur man detained since 2017 who died of natural causes, according to the authorities. The report doesn’t even explain why the official explanation should be questioned.
Technically, genocide can be proven even without evidence that people were killed. But because courts require proof of intent to destroy the group physically, it is hard to make the case in the absence of proof of large-scale killings. This is especially true when there is no direct evidence of genocidal intent, for example in the form of policy statements, but merely circumstantial evidence, what international courts refer to as a “pattern of conduct.”
International courts have repeatedly said that where genocide charges are based only upon inferences drawn from a pattern of conduct, alternative explanations must be ruled out definitively. That’s why the International Court of Justice rejected in 2015 the genocide charge against Serbia and the counter-charge against Croatia, despite evidence of brutal ethnic cleansing in Croatia.
So, what else might constitute evidence of genocide in China? The State Department report refers to mass internment of perhaps one million Uighurs. If proven, that would constitute a gross violation of human rights; but, again, it is not evidence, per se, of intent to exterminate.
Another of the five recognized acts of genocide is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The State Department report refers to China’s notoriously aggressive birth-control policies. Until recently, China strictly enforced its one-child policy on the majority of its population but was more liberal toward ethnic minorities, including the Uighur.
Today, the one-child policy is no longer applied to the majority Han Chinese, but stricter measures have been imposed on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, whose families are traditionally larger than China’s average. Still, Xinjiang records a positive overall population growth rate, with the Uighur population growing faster than the non-Uighur population in Xinjiang during 2010-18.
The genocide charge is being fueled by “studies” like the Newlines Institute report that recently made global headlines. Newlines is described as a “non-partisan” Washington, DC-based think tank. On closer inspection, it appears to be a project of a tiny Virginia-based university with 153 students, eight full-time faculty, and an apparently conservative policy agenda. Other leading human rights organizations have refrained from using the term.
UN experts are rightly calling for the UN to investigate the situation in Xinjiang. China’s government, for its part, has recently stated that it would welcome a UN mission to Xinjiang based on “exchanges and cooperation,” not on “guilty before proven.”
Unless the State Department can substantiate the genocide accusation, it should withdraw the charge. It should also support a UN-led investigation of the situation in Xinjiang. The work of the UN, and notably of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, is essential to promote the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.