今年最无耻： 胡温倒薄
根据纽约时报(4月26日)报导，重庆政法委书记刘光磊是胡锦涛安插到重庆的秘密特务，肩负监视和汇报薄熙来行动和动向的特务任务。不幸的是被反间的王立军发现，同时王立军搞窃听刘光磊与胡锦涛通话又被中央特务窃听发现。 这给王立军莫大的压力。 怪不得王立军要跑进美领事馆，狐瘟搞封建王朝特务治国治党，目无国法党纪。王立军掌握了狐瘟阴暗政治的切实证据， 可惜薄熙来治不了狐瘟。 王立军如果不跑进美人窝里， 而是跑向北京反水咬死薄熙来，最后下场还是要被狐瘟整死， 因为王立军就是狐瘟倒行逆施的活证据，阴毒的狐瘟党徒也会为主子销赃灭迹。
狐瘟倒薄就是党内权争，狐瘟官大，薄官小，所以被倒。狐瘟倒薄蓄谋已久，利用青帮党暗中调查，明桩暗坑，构陷基层一个干实事的干部。
狐瘟倒薄施行的手段没有最无耻，只有更无耻。 狐瘟勾结反华势力，里应外合，对内是强取”忠心“，高压水笼头，快刀“割喉”术，对外是屈膝退让投降，不惜以出卖中华民族的政治经济利益而换回狐瘟一点点可怜的面子。狐瘟之害，荼毒汪洋，祸害中华发展大业。
狐瘟治政是中国政治的大倒退，狐瘟封建余孽不除，中国党国难有安宁，老百姓难见青天。
狐瘟就是中国政坛上的萨斯病菌. 灭除狐瘟人人有责，狐瘟死有余辜。
今年最无耻： 胡温倒薄
枫叶老李 发表评论于
【五律】狐瘟紫禁绕
来源: up7 于 2012-04-26 07:51:23
http://bbs.wenxuecity.com/currentevent/479682.html
【五律】狐瘟紫禁绕
狐瘟紫禁绕，鬼火扰苍天。
权高九州鼎，业达百姓钱。
真伪筑高台，是非凭烈焰.
秦朝复古梦，魂断汉宫前。
来源: up7 于 2012-04-26 07:51:23
http://bbs.wenxuecity.com/currentevent/479682.html
【五律】狐瘟紫禁绕
狐瘟紫禁绕，鬼火扰苍天。
权高九州鼎，业达百姓钱。
真伪筑高台，是非凭烈焰.
秦朝复古梦，魂断汉宫前。
枫叶老李 发表评论于
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/asia/bo-xilai-said-to-have-spied-on-top-china-officials.html
Ousted Chinese Leader Is Said to Have Spied on Other Top Officials
BEIJING — When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.
The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.
Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.
The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.
“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”
Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.
The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.
The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.
“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”
According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.
The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.
One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.
Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.
“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.
Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.
“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”
Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.
One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.
“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.
In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.
Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.
Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.
But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.
“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”
Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.
Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.
Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.
But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.
Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.
Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”
Ousted Chinese Leader Is Said to Have Spied on Other Top Officials
BEIJING — When Hu Jintao, China’s top leader, picked up the telephone last August to talk to a senior anticorruption official visiting Chongqing, special devices detected that he was being wiretapped — by local officials in that southwestern metropolis.
The discovery of that and other wiretapping led to an official investigation that helped topple Chongqing’s charismatic leader, Bo Xilai, in a political cataclysm that has yet to reach a conclusion.
Until now, the downfall of Mr. Bo has been cast largely as a tale of a populist who pursued his own agenda too aggressively for some top leaders in Beijing and was brought down by accusations that his wife had arranged the murder of Neil Heywood, a British consultant, after a business dispute. But the hidden wiretapping, previously alluded to only in internal Communist Party accounts of the scandal, appears to have provided another compelling reason for party leaders to turn on Mr. Bo.
The story of how China’s president was monitored also shows the level of mistrust among leaders in the one-party state. To maintain control over society, leaders have embraced enhanced surveillance technology. But some have turned it on one another — repeating patterns of intrigue that go back to the beginnings of Communist rule.
“This society has bred mistrust and violence,” said Roderick MacFarquhar, a historian of Communist China’s elite-level machinations over the past half century. “Leaders know you have to watch your back because you never know who will put a knife in it.”
Nearly a dozen people with party ties, speaking anonymously for fear of retribution, confirmed the wiretapping, as well as a widespread program of bugging across Chongqing. But the party’s public version of Mr. Bo’s fall omits it.
The official narrative and much foreign attention has focused on the more easily grasped death of Mr. Heywood in November. When Mr. Bo’s police chief, Wang Lijun, was stripped of his job and feared being implicated in Bo family affairs, he fled to the United States Consulate in Chengdu, where he spoke mostly about Mr. Heywood’s death.
The murder account is pivotal to the scandal, providing Mr. Bo’s opponents with an unassailable reason to have him removed. But party insiders say the wiretapping was seen as a direct challenge to central authorities. It revealed to them just how far Mr. Bo, who is now being investigated for serious disciplinary violations, was prepared to go in his efforts to grasp greater power in China. That compounded suspicions that Mr. Bo could not be trusted with a top slot in the party, which is due to reshuffle its senior leadership positions this fall.
“Everyone across China is improving their systems for the purposes of maintaining stability,” said one official with a central government media outlet, referring to surveillance tactics. “But not everyone dares to monitor party central leaders.”
According to senior party members, including editors, academics and people with ties to the military, Mr. Bo’s eavesdropping operations began several years ago as part of a state-financed surveillance buildup, ostensibly for the purposes of fighting crime and maintaining local political stability.
The architect was Mr. Wang, a nationally decorated crime fighter who had worked under Mr. Bo in the northeast province of Liaoning. Together they installed “a comprehensive package bugging system covering telecommunications to the Internet,” according to the government media official.
One of several noted cybersecurity experts they enlisted was Fang Binxing, president of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, who is often called the father of China’s “Great Firewall,” the nation’s vast Internet censorship system. Most recently, Mr. Fang advised the city on a new police information center using cloud-based computing, according to state news media reports. Late last year, Mr. Wang was named a visiting professor at Mr. Fang’s university.
Together, Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang unleashed a drive to smash what they said were crime rings that controlled large portions of Chongqing’s economic life. In interviews, targets of the crackdown marveled at the scale and determination with which local police intercepted their communications.
“On the phone, we dared not mention Bo Xilai or Wang Lijun,” said Li Jun, a fugitive property developer who now lives in hiding abroad. Instead, he and fellow businessmen took to scribbling notes, removing their cellphone batteries and stocking up on unregistered SIM cards to thwart surveillance as the crackdown mounted, he said.
Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a powerfully connected Beijing law firm, recalled how some cousins of one client had presented him with a full stack of unregistered mobile phone SIM cards, warning him of local wiretapping. Despite these precautions, the Chongqing police ended up arresting Mr. Li on the outskirts of Beijing, about 900 miles away, after he called his client’s wife and arranged to visit her later that day at a hospital.
“They already were there lying in ambush,” Mr. Li said. He added that Wang Lijun, by reputation, was a “tapping freak.”
Political figures were targeted in addition to those suspected of being mobsters.
One political analyst with senior-level ties, citing information obtained from a colonel he recently dined with, said Mr. Bo had tried to tap the phones of virtually all high-ranking leaders who visited Chongqing in recent years, including Zhou Yongkang, the law-and-order czar who was said to have backed Mr. Bo as his potential successor.
“Bo wanted to be extremely clear about what leaders’ attitudes toward him were,” the analyst said.
In one other instance last year, two journalists said, operatives were caught intercepting a conversation between the office of Mr. Hu and Liu Guanglei, a top party law-and-order official whom Mr. Wang had replaced as police chief. Mr. Liu once served under Mr. Hu in the 1980s in Guizhou Province.
Perhaps more worrisome to Mr. Bo and Mr. Wang, however, was the increased scrutiny from the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which by the beginning of 2012 had stationed up to four separate teams in Chongqing, two undercover, according to the political analyst, who cited Discipline Inspection sources. One line of inquiry, according to several party academics, involved Mr. Wang’s possible role in a police bribery case that unfolded last year in a Liaoning city where he once was police chief.
Beyond making a routine inspection, it is not clear why the disciplinary official who telephoned Mr. Hu — Ma Wen, the minister of supervision — was in Chongqing. Her high-security land link to Mr. Hu from the state guesthouse in Chongqing was monitored on Mr. Bo’s orders. The topic of the call is unknown but was probably not vital. Most phones are so unsafe that important information is often conveyed only in person or in writing.
But Beijing was galled that Mr. Bo would wiretap Mr. Hu, whether intentionally or not, and turned central security and disciplinary investigators loose on his police chief, who bore the brunt of the scrutiny over the next couple of months.
“Bo wanted to push the responsibility onto Wang,” one senior party editor said. “Wang couldn’t dare say it was Bo’s doing.”
Yet at some point well before fleeing Chongqing, Mr. Wang filed a pair of complaints to the inspection commission, the first anonymously and the second under his own name, according to a party academic with ties to Mr. Bo.
Both complaints said Mr. Bo had “opposed party central” authorities, including ordering the wiretapping of central leaders. The requests to investigate Mr. Bo were turned down at the time. Mr. Bo, who learned of the charges at a later point, told the academic shortly before his dismissal that he thought he could withstand Mr. Wang’s charges.
Mr. Wang is not believed to have discussed wiretapping at the United States Consulate. Instead, he focused on the less self-incriminating allegations of Mr. Bo’s wife’s arranging the killing of Mr. Heywood.
But tensions between the two men crested, sources said, when Mr. Bo found that Mr. Wang had also wiretapped him and his wife. After Mr. Wang was arrested in February, Mr. Bo detained Mr. Wang’s wiretapping specialist from Liaoning, a district police chief named Wang Pengfei.
Internal party accounts suggest that the party views the wiretapping as one of Mr. Bo’s most serious crimes. One preliminary indictment in mid-March accused Bo of damaging party unity by collecting evidence on other leaders.
Party officials, however, say it would be far too damaging to make the wiretapping public. When Mr. Bo is finally charged, wiretapping is not expected to be mentioned. “The things that can be publicized are the economic problems and the killing,” according to the senior official at the government media outlet. “That’s enough to decide the matter in public.”
枫叶老李 发表评论于
春秋戈: 王力军破获胡办利用刘光磊“热线”从事非法特务活动，为党立功，功不可没！
http://bbs.wenxuecity.com/currentevent/479704.html
春秋戈
中央调查部（国家安全部前身）与中纪委是党内专责地方党委监督，侦查和调查的专门机构，所有与对党员干部和各级党的组织实施监督，侦查和调查的一切活动，都必须由党章认可的中央调查部和中纪委实施，除此之外，任何组织与个人从事对党员和党的一级组织实施监督，侦查和调查都是党章，党纪所绝对不能允许的，更不能因为胡锦涛是总书记，就可以抛开党章，党纪，对地方一级党委和党的干部实施阴谋特务活动。
否则，既然胡办可以对重庆市委实施阴谋特务活动，温办，习办为什么不可以对广东省委，对内蒙古自治区党委采取同样的阴谋特务活动？如果党中央领导人的办公室都可以在党内任意使用这种超越中央领导人个人权限，超越中央领导人办公室职能范围，绕过中央调查部和中纪委，肆意对有不同意见的党员干部和自己不满意的地方党委或党的一级组织，滥用这种非法的阴谋手段，最后包括胡办在内，都将被笼罩在阴谋与恐怖的阴影之下，哪里还有什么共产党？这就是为什么党章所规定的领导人个人权限和党的各级组织的职能范围绝对不允许被超越的根本性原因。就是作为党的总书记，胡锦涛的一切活动都必须受其个人权限的制约，胡锦涛也根本没有通过刘光磊背着重庆市委，对党的一级地方组织实施阴谋特务活动的权力。
既然胡办可以背着重庆市一级党委，通过所谓与刘光磊个人之间的“热线”从事非法秘密活动，重庆市委为什么不可以对这种违法，违纪行为进行侦查，调查和制止？王力军破获了胡办的阴谋活动，是维护中国共产党党章和党纪，维护中国共产党的尊严，维护重庆市地方党委的安全的英雄行为。王力军对胡办的阴谋活动实施窃听，对秘密犯罪活动所实施的一切刑事和技术侦查措施是在宪法和法律保护下的公安机关的正常的业务活动，也是王力军维护党的一级地方组织的安全，捍卫法律尊严的职责所在。王力军破获胡锦涛办公室利用与刘光磊个人“热线”从事非法特务活动，为党立功，功不可没！
http://bbs.wenxuecity.com/currentevent/479704.html
春秋戈
中央调查部（国家安全部前身）与中纪委是党内专责地方党委监督，侦查和调查的专门机构，所有与对党员干部和各级党的组织实施监督，侦查和调查的一切活动，都必须由党章认可的中央调查部和中纪委实施，除此之外，任何组织与个人从事对党员和党的一级组织实施监督，侦查和调查都是党章，党纪所绝对不能允许的，更不能因为胡锦涛是总书记，就可以抛开党章，党纪，对地方一级党委和党的干部实施阴谋特务活动。
否则，既然胡办可以对重庆市委实施阴谋特务活动，温办，习办为什么不可以对广东省委，对内蒙古自治区党委采取同样的阴谋特务活动？如果党中央领导人的办公室都可以在党内任意使用这种超越中央领导人个人权限，超越中央领导人办公室职能范围，绕过中央调查部和中纪委，肆意对有不同意见的党员干部和自己不满意的地方党委或党的一级组织，滥用这种非法的阴谋手段，最后包括胡办在内，都将被笼罩在阴谋与恐怖的阴影之下，哪里还有什么共产党？这就是为什么党章所规定的领导人个人权限和党的各级组织的职能范围绝对不允许被超越的根本性原因。就是作为党的总书记，胡锦涛的一切活动都必须受其个人权限的制约，胡锦涛也根本没有通过刘光磊背着重庆市委，对党的一级地方组织实施阴谋特务活动的权力。
既然胡办可以背着重庆市一级党委，通过所谓与刘光磊个人之间的“热线”从事非法秘密活动，重庆市委为什么不可以对这种违法，违纪行为进行侦查，调查和制止？王力军破获了胡办的阴谋活动，是维护中国共产党党章和党纪，维护中国共产党的尊严，维护重庆市地方党委的安全的英雄行为。王力军对胡办的阴谋活动实施窃听，对秘密犯罪活动所实施的一切刑事和技术侦查措施是在宪法和法律保护下的公安机关的正常的业务活动，也是王力军维护党的一级地方组织的安全，捍卫法律尊严的职责所在。王力军破获胡锦涛办公室利用与刘光磊个人“热线”从事非法特务活动，为党立功，功不可没！
登录后才可评论.
