YouTube "因為中東有石油！"美退役將軍揭美國製造戰爭真相
韦斯利·坎内·克拉克 Wesley Kanne Clark
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nMq0UNH3bC8&ab_channel=
About 10 days after 9 11, I went through the Pentagon and I saw secretary
thank you
韦斯利·克拉克 Wesley Kanne Clark
韦斯利·克拉克（1944-），毕业于校西点军校，美国四星上将，北约盟军最高司令，靠空袭赢得了1999年的科索沃战争，同时炸了中国驻南斯拉夫大使馆，第二年因和五角大楼关系不顺被解职，2004年以“艾森豪威尔第二”为口号参加美国总统大选，在初选中被淘汰，后来成为一名成功的商人。
生平简介编辑
韦斯利·克拉克1944年12月出生于美国芝加哥。父亲去世后随家人搬到阿肯色州小石城，以优异成绩毕业于美国西点军校。1966年获上尉军衔。曾获罗兹奖学金，留学英国牛津大学并获得哲学、政治及经济学硕士学位。参加过越南战争，曾3次负伤，先后获银星勋章、铜星勋章及紫心勋章。1994到1996年，他成为美军战略计划负责人，负责美军全球军事战略计划的制定。1996年4月，被克林顿总统提名为美国武装部队南方司令部司令，负责美军在拉丁美洲和加勒比海的军事行动。1997年3月，被提名为北约欧洲盟军最高司令兼美国驻欧洲部队总司令。1999年指挥了对南联盟的战争，但是由于在1999年北约空袭南联盟期间与五角大楼意见相左，而于2000年5月被解职，被迫以四星上将的军衔提前退役，但是同年他获得了美国文职人员最高荣誉——总统自由勋章。2000年退役后，他曾任史蒂芬斯集团公司顾问，2003年任“韦利斯·克拉克战略咨询公司”董事长兼首席执行官、CNN评论员和“美国领袖”组织董事长等职务。2004年宣布参选美国总统，但未能当选。
军人生涯
“穷小子”克拉克出生于1944年的芝加哥，父亲去世后，他随母亲移居美国南部的阿肯色州小石城。受到当时充斥美国社会的“崇拜英雄热”的影响，少年克拉克立志从戎报国当英雄。他考入了西点军校，并于1966年以第一名的成绩毕业，后进入英国牛津大学深造，获得了哲学、政治及经济学硕士学位，并学会了俄语。
不要等待下一场战争：美国增长和全球领导力的战略
作者：韦斯利·K·克拉克（Wesley K. Clark）（作者）2016 年 6 月 14 日
冷战的结束并不是历史的终结，而是美国对其世界战略目标意识的终结。 然后，经过十年的漂泊之后，美国又被猛烈地拖入国际冲突之中。 其武装部队做出了出色的反应，但其领导人的目标却存在重大缺陷。 我们打了一场错误的战争——两次——原因不透明，很少有美国公民理解他们的儿女为之战斗和死亡的原因。
战争并不能很好地替代战略愿景，在迫在眉睫的冲突中做出的决定往往会受到当时情绪的限制。 在《不要等待下一场战争》一书中，美国陆军退役四星将军、前民主党总统候选人韦斯利·K·克拉克 (Wesley K. Clark) 为美国继续保持全球领导地位及其成功的基础提出了令人信服的论据： - 新的美国战略。 美国既需要新的力量，也需要更深入的视角。 美国领导力的平台是利用美国的能源资源激发可持续的经济增长，建立新的力量来应对赤字等紧迫的国内问题以及美国安全面临的长期挑战——恐怖主义、网络威胁、下一次金融危机 、中国崛起的力量以及气候变化。
这样的战略不仅是可以实现的，而且是必要的、迫切需要的。 这是未来二十年对美国领导力的真正考验，但必须从现在开始，这样美国才有能力和远见来应对中东、欧洲或亚洲不可避免的严重危机。
Don't Wait for the Next War: A Strategy for American Growth and Global Leadership
by Wesley K. Clark (Author) June 14 2016
With the end of the Cold War came not the end of history, but the end of America's sense of its strategic purpose in the world. Then, after a decade of drift, the US was violently dragged back into international conflict. Its armed forces responded magnificently but its leaders' objectives were substantially flawed. We fought the wrong war -- twice -- for reasons that were opaque, and few American citizens understood the cause for which their sons and daughters were fighting and dying.
美国将军：是时候对中国动真格的了
2014年10月17日 凤凰卫视
核心提示：曾经担任北约盟军最高司令官的美军退役将军韦斯利克拉克，10月13号在纽约时报上发表了一篇文章，文章的标题是《是时候对中国动真格的》，这篇文章显示美国已经承认中国将成为一个与美国同等地位的世界领导者。
凤凰卫视10月16日《总编辑时间》，以下为文字实录：
吕宁思：美国政界、军界如何看待中国的崛起呢？曾经担任北约盟军最高司令官的美军退役将军韦斯利克拉克，10月13号在纽约时报上发表的文章，这篇文章显示美国已经承认中国将成为一个与美国同等地位的世界领导者。但是美国还要保持他的全球领导地位，并且想在制约中国的过程当中力图，极力的使中国变成一种美式的民主国家，这篇文章的标题是《是时候对中国动真格的》Getting real of China，摘编自克拉克将军最近撰写的一本书，题目是《不要等待下一次战争，美国增长和全球领导力策略》，克拉克将军写道中国让许多西方领导人从上世纪90年代就怀有的一个梦想破灭了，他们本以为建设性的接触最终会不可避免的使中国更开放更民主，上世纪70年代末，美国与中国的关系实现全面正常化的时候，北京寻求与华盛顿建立一种战略伙伴关系，从而遏制其感受到的苏联的威胁。
到了80年代末，中国不再担心苏联，不过仍然愿意倾听，也愿意学习美国军队的经验，在1991年的海湾战争中，中国对美国的军事势力尤其感到赞赏，如果说中国对美国的评估有一个转捩点的话，那可能就是2008年的金融 危机以及后续的事件，尽管仍然尊重我们的军事实力，但是中国开始认为美国是一个陷入颓败的体制，它的经济债务负担沉重，其政府无法正常运行，世界领导者的地位也很容易会被取代。
文章说中国不寻求发起冲突，他通过灵巧的运用传统外交手段，并配合以巨大的经济实力就能达到大部分的目标。但中国也不会回避冲突，他过去就曾先发制人，而不是防御性的运用军事力量，危险在于正在崛起的中国在寻求让外界承认其实力和权力的时候，无论是蓄意为之还是出于误判，都可能掀起冲突，然而美国面临的更深层的战略问题在于中国对贸易法律，及和平解决争端的全球机制所构成的更为根本的挑战，这套机制是美国及其盟友在二战之后建立起来的，中国的战略崛起耐心、细心，有远见，对于上述机制全都造成了威胁，就像美国寻求让全世界采纳民主价值观，在国际行为中遵从美国的规范一样，中国也会寻求推行一些机制，建立一些关系，来支持共产党在国内的管制，推动各国不应干涉别国事务的政策，在剖析中国的时候，美国必须超越简单的历史类比，在规模上中国的经济增长极其代表的挑战要远远大于上世纪80年代的日本，一个世纪前的德国，虽然是一个有战争意愿的崛起中的强国，但它从未在人口和工业规模上匹敌美国，而且30年代以前没有形成凌驾于法治之上的单一政党统治，中国也不像经济上隔绝于世的苏联，历史上并不存在先例。
克拉克写道，如果我们要保持美国的全球领导地位，并在中国的崛起过程中成为一支建设性的制衡性的力量，美国就需要为自己制定一个长期的战略愿景，就是基于能源独立的强大的不断增长的经济实力，充满活力的行之有效的民主，坚定自信的有耐心的有盟友支持的外交，还有能在危机中与中国对峙的军事实力。随着这些方面的到位，我们就可以以一种促进全球繁荣和稳定的方式说明中国获得其应有的一个全球领导者的位置，成为一个可能与美国同等地位的国家。
是时候对中国动真格的了
韦斯利·K·克拉克 2014年10月13日
从香港到新疆，中国都在严厉地压制政治异议，而且它和俄罗斯、伊朗、朝鲜关系紧密。这让许多西方领导人从上世纪90年代就怀有的一个梦想破灭了——他们本以为，“建设性接触”最终会不可避免地使中国更开放、更民主。
然而事实却恰恰相反：中国变得更自信、更强硬，也更封闭。邓小平启动经济自由化35年后的今天，共产党面对着剧烈的社会矛盾，正在运用物质上的繁荣和民族主义的意识形态，来维持其合法性。它既抛弃了走向民主的转变，也没有承认人权和公民权——美国原本希望，中国取得惊人的经济崛起后，就能产生这些转变。更加令人担忧的是，中国制定外交政策的依据是精心计算的自身利益，罔顾美国努力推动的国际制度、标准和义务。中国越来越多地将美国看做竞争者，以及潜在的对手。
究竟哪里出错了？
上世纪70年代末，美国与中国的关系实现全面正常化时，北京寻求与华盛顿建立一种战略伙伴关系，从而遏制其感受到的苏联威胁。到80年代末，中国不再担心苏联，不过仍然愿意倾听，也愿意学习美国军队的经验。在1991年的海湾战争中，中国对美国的军事实力尤其感到赞赏。在这期间，中国积累了农业、工业和技术实力，军事现代化一直是次要的任务。迟至2005年，在了解自身实力提升的同时，中国仍在羡慕美国。当时有一位人脉广泛的年轻共产党领导人对我说，“中国知道你们和英国是好朋友，是英国把世界的领导权交给了你们。中国希望成为美国的好朋友，这样你们就会把世界的领导权交给我们。”
如果说中国对美国的评估有一个转折点，那可能就是2008年的金融危机及后续事件。尽管仍然尊重我们的军事实力，但是中国开始认为美国是一个陷入颓败的体制，其经济债务负担沉重，其政府无法正常运行，世界领导者的地位也很容易会被取代。在2011年，一个位置显赫的中方人士告诉我，中国的新领导层希望主导南海；地区内的竞争者，如越南，要屈从于它的雄心，不然就会“受到教训”；而如果美国干涉，我们的资产也会成为目标。
到2013年，此人的警告显得更加险恶：“我们能看到你们的隐形飞机”；“我们有自己的GPS系统，而且能击落你们的”；“我们了解你们所有企业，甚至NASA的技术，因为这些都是中国科学家为你们研究的”；“你们没办法与菲律宾建立任何军事联系，除非我们允许，因为中国通过香港每个月向菲律宾汇款35亿美元”；“中国造船厂每天24小时，每周七天一直在不停工作”；“从2012年10月到2013年4月，有超过30艘船下水”；“到2019年，中国部署的航空母舰将达到四艘”。
中国不寻求发起冲突，它通过灵巧地运用传统外交手段，并配合以巨大的经济实力，就能达到大部分目标。但中国也不会回避冲突，它过去就曾“先发制人”，而不是防御性地运用军事力量。危险在于，正在崛起的中国，在寻求让外界承认其实力和权利时，无论是蓄意为之还是出于误判，都可能掀起冲突。
然而美国面临的更深层的战略问题在于，中国对贸易、法律及和平解决争端的全球机制所构成的更为根本的挑战。这套机制是美国及其盟友在二战后建立起来的。中国的战略崛起耐心、细心、有远见，对于上述机制全都造成了威胁。就像美国寻求让全世界采纳民主价值观，在国际行为中遵从美国的规范一样，中国也会寻求推行一些机制、建立一些关系，来支持共产党在国内的统治，推动各国不应干涉别国事务的政策。
如果直截了当、毫不掩饰的利己主义组织原则占了上风，那就意味着，包括法治在内的西方制度与价值观会遭到根本性动摇。这将是一种倒退，是回归到力量均势与势力圈的19世纪理念。按照亨利·A·基辛格(Henry A. Kissinger)的说法，问题在于，“中国能否与我们合作创建一个国际架构，从而让我们或许可以在历史上首次实现，一个崛起的大国能融入到国际体系中，并能促进和平与进步？”
在剖析中国的时候，美国必须超越简单的历史类比。在规模上，中国的经济增长及其代表的挑战，要远远大于上世纪80年代的日本。一个世纪前的德国，虽是一个有战争意愿的崛起中的强国，但它从未在人口与工业规模上匹敌美国，而且30年代以前没有形成凌驾于法治之上的单一政党统治。中国也不像经济上隔绝于世的苏联。历史上并不存在先例。
20多年来，美国的对华策略在“接触”与“遏制”之间走钢丝，与冷战期间美国的对苏政策如出一辙。奥巴马政府2011年底宣布的“转向”亚洲策略，被外界视作直接针对中国，是向遏制的一种转变。在转向亚洲的过程中，美国不仅调整了力量，还更新了与盟国的防务协议。美国正在进行《泛太平洋伙伴关系协定》(Trans-Pacific Partnership)的谈判，旨在建立一个包含其他11个国家的自由贸易区，但中国被排除在外。
随着中国在南海和东海更强势地推行其领土主张——包括一部分人甚至对冲绳提出了主张，而那里是美军的驻扎地——美国正被拖入地区争议之中。过去几年里，我们发现，该地区的日本、韩国、越南和菲律宾等国均有求于美国。面对中国新近摆出的强势姿态，这些国家急于寻求保障和支持，但同时也担心会激怒中国。积极迫使我们在每个议题上在中国和我们地区盟国利益之间做出选择，将符合中国的利益。
美国将强调，在多边论坛上通过国际法来解决争端，并履行对盟国的承诺。相比之下，中国却把这种国际秩序及正式责任视作对己方严重不利。
对于前路之坎坷，我们不应抱有任何幻想。中国在按照自己的长期规划行事，背后的动力是其自身的利益。按照某些估算方法，中国的国内生产总值可能会在未来10年里超越美国。到那个时候，中国的军事实力将颇为强大。这种实力包括航空母舰、陆基航空力量、潜艇和弹道导弹技术，均可用来对付美国部署在东海和南海的航母。就算没有任何军事冲突，西太平洋的力量均势也将影响中国到底是倾向于强势进取、威逼恫吓，还是做出妥协。
中国人必须明白，其不断扩张的军事实力会导致某些后果。例如，在中国不断夸耀其洲际弹道导弹的能力的同时，美国一定不会排除加强其导弹防御系统的需要。我们应该坦率地向中国解释这种情况。中国正在密切观察乌克兰发生的事件，以及我们在那里发表的声明和采取的行动对亚洲来说可能意味着什么。我们必须帮助中国了解，如果它坚定地与俄罗斯越走越近，只会激怒美国和我们的盟友。“转向亚洲”是合理的，但其代价绝不可以是牺牲我们对欧洲和其他地区盟友的义务。
更重要的是，美国必须努力说服中国，它的利益并不在于狭隘的自我膨胀，比如扩大领土范围等等，而在于分担与其财富和实力相称的全球领导责任。全球性的治理机构——联合国(United Nations)、国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)、世界银行(World Bank)——并非十全十美，但它们仍是确保全球和平与繁荣的最佳框架。中国无论有多强大的经济和军事实力，如果背离这些机制，也会落入孤立和防守的境地。
虽然从长远来说，美国人应该希望中国拥抱民主和人权，但在短期内，我们必须承认，中国有权建设自己的政府体系，对于政治合法性和社会公平，也有其自己的标准。美国应该坚持要求中国像联合国所有其他成员一样，遵守《世界人权宣言》(Universal Declaration of Human Rights)。我们必须帮助中国看到，“不干涉别国内政”的原则和尊重基本人权之间，存在着区别。（就我们自己而言，我们也必须证明自己接受了全球领导责任，例如，加入国际刑事法院[International Criminal Court]和《联合国海洋法公约》[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]。）但是，我们不能想当然地认为，中国的政治发展步伐会像美国人希望的那么快。
在中国越来越流行的一个看法是，它将不可避免地取代美国，成为全球的领导者，但这个愿景远远不算是板上钉钉。我们的自然资源、法治、创业文化，以及在高等教育和科学上的巨大领先优势，都是对我们有利的重大因素。世界各地的人都希望到美国生活和工作——富有的中国人也不例外。他们寻求美国法律的保护，推崇在美国找到的个人自由。中国就没有这些吸引力。
如果我们要保持美国的全球领导地位，并在中国的崛起过程中成为一支建设性的、制衡性的力量，美国就需要为自己制定一个长期战略愿景：基于能源独立的、强大的、不断增长的经济实力；充满活力的、行之有效的民主；坚定自信的、有耐心的、有盟友支持的外交；能在危机中与中国对峙的军事实力。随着这些方面的到位，我们就可以以一种促进全球繁荣和稳定的方式，帮助中国获得其应有的一个全球领导者的位置，成为一个可能与美国同等地位的国家。也许到那时，中国的领导人会觉得足够安全，能把真正的民主给予公众。不过，这将是一个漫长的旅程。
韦斯利·K·克拉克(Wesley K. Clark)是一名顾问，也是退役的美国将军，曾任北约欧洲盟军最高司令。本文摘编自他最近撰写的《不要等待下一次战争：美国增长和全球领导力策略》(Don’t Wait for the Next War: A Strategy for American Growth and Global Leadership)。
Getting Real About China
By Wesley K. Clark Oct. 10, 2014
China’s harsh suppression of political dissent, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, and its close ties to Russia, Iran and North Korea, have finally laid to rest the dream many Western leaders have had since the 1990s: that “constructive engagement” would eventually, inevitably lead to more openness and democracy.
Instead, the opposite has occurred: China is more confident, more assertive, and also more closed. Thirty-five years after Deng Xiaoping freed up the economy, the Communist Party is using material prosperity and nationalist ideology to maintain its legitimacy in the face of the wrenching social tensions. It has rejected both the move toward democracy and the acceptance of human and civil rights that Americans had hoped would emerge from China’s astonishing economic rise. Even more worrisome, China’s foreign policy relies on keenly calculated self-interest, at the expense of the international institutions, standards and obligations the United States has sought to champion. It increasingly views the United States as a rival and potential adversary.
What went wrong?
In the late 1970s, when the United States and China fully normalized relations, Beijing sought a strategic partnership with Washington, to deter a perceived Soviet threat. By the late 1980s, China was unconcerned about the Soviets, though willing to listen and learn from the United States military. The Chinese were especially impressed by our prowess in the 1991 Persian Gulf war. All the while, China built its agricultural, industrial and technological strength; military modernization was a second-tier priority. As late as 2005, China’s admiration for the United States — and awareness of its own rising power — were such that a young, well-connected Communist Party leader told me, “China knows that you and Britain were best friends, and Britain gave you leadership of the world; China wants to be America’s best friend, so you will give us leadership of the world.”
If there was a turning point in China’s assessment of America, it could be found in the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. While still respectful of our military might, China began to see the United States as a failing system, with a debt-saddled economy and a dysfunctional government, vulnerable to being replaced as the world’s leader. In 2011, a well-placed Chinese associate told me that the country’s new leadership intended to dominate the South China Sea; that its regional rivals, like Vietnam, would bow to its ambitions or “be taught a lesson”; and that if the United States interfered, our assets would be targeted.
By 2013, this associate’s warnings had become even more ominous: “We can see your stealth aircraft”; “we have our own GPS and can shoot down yours”; “we know your technologies from all your companies and from NASA, because Chinese scientists work these for you”; “you will not have any military relations with the Philippines unless we allow it, because China provides them $3.5 billion per month in remittances through Hong Kong”; “Chinese shipyards are working 24 hours a day, seven days a week”; “more than 30 ships were launched between October 2012 and April 2013”; “by 2019 China will have four aircraft carriers deployed.”
China doesn’t seek conflict — it can achieve most of its goals by adroitly combining traditional diplomacy with its vast economic power. But neither will it avoid conflict. It has in the past used its military “pre-emptively” rather than defensively. A danger is that an ascendant China seeking recognition of its power and rights, will, whether deliberately or through miscalculation, spark conflict.
But the deeper strategic problem for America is China’s more fundamental challenge to the global architecture of trade, law and peaceful resolution of disputes that the United States and its allies created after World War II. China’s strategic rise — patient, nuanced and farsighted — threatens all of this. Just as the United States has sought the worldwide adoption of democratic values and American norms for international behavior, China will seek structures and relationships that support Communist Party rule at home, and its policy that countries should not intervene in one another’s affairs.
The ascendancy of naked and direct self-interest as an organizing principle would mean a fundamental weakening of Western institutions and values, including the rule of law. This would be a step backward, toward 19th-century ideas of the balance of power and spheres of influence. The question, as Henry A. Kissinger has framed it, is “whether China can work with us to create an international structure in which, perhaps for the first time in history, a rising state has been incorporated into an international system and strengthened peace and progress.”
In analyzing China, the United States must look beyond historical parallels. In scale, China’s economic growth, and the challenge it presents, is vastly greater than that of Japan in the 1980s. A century ago, Germany was an ascending power willing to wage war, but it never had the population or industrial capacity of the United States, or, until the 1930s, the leadership of a single political party, above the rule of law. Nor is China like the Soviet Union, economically isolated from the larger world. There is no historical precedent.
A People’s Liberation Army officer practiced conducting the military band before the opening of the 12th National People’s Congress, on March 5 in Beijing.Credit...Wang Zhao/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images For over two decades, the American strategy toward China has balanced between “engagement” and “containment,” a version of American policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, announced in late 2011, was perceived as being directed against China, a shift toward containment. The United States has not only shifted forces but also updated defense treaties as part of this pivot. The United States is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an effort to create a large free-trade zone encompassing 11 other countries, but not China.
As China presses its territorial claims on the South China Sea and East China Sea more forcefully — including even a claim, in some quarters, of jurisdiction over Okinawa, where American forces are based — the United States is being drawn into regional controversies. In the past few years we have found ourselves courted by Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries in the region, which are anxious for reassurance and support against China’s new assertiveness, but also wary of provoking it. It will be in China’s interest to force us progressively to choose, on issue after issue, between China and the interests of our allies in the region.
The United States will emphasize multilateral forums for resolving disputes through international law, and fulfill our commitments to allies. China, in contrast, views this international order and these formalized obligations as being heavily tilted against it.
We should be under no illusions about the difficult road ahead. China operates on a long-term vision, driven by its own interests. By some estimates, China’s gross domestic product could surpass that of the United States sometime in the next decade. By then, Chinese military strength — including aircraft carriers, land-based aviation, submarines, and ballistic missile technologies, all of which could be directed against American aircraft carriers in the East and South China Seas — will be formidable. Even without any military confrontation, the balance of power in the western Pacific will shape the Chinese predisposition to push, threaten or compromise.
The Chinese must understand that their expanding military capabilities have consequences. For example, the United States must not rule out the need to strengthen its ballistic missile defense system, as China rattles its intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. We should be very candid in explaining this to the Chinese. China is closely observing events in Ukraine, and what our statements and actions there may mean for Asia. We must help China understand that a closer, more assertive alignment with Russia will only provoke the United States and our allies. The pivot to Asia makes sense, but must not come at the expense of our obligations to our allies in Europe and elsewhere.
Even more important, America must work to persuade China that its interests lie not in narrow self-aggrandizement, like expanding its territorial reach, but in assuming shared responsibility for global leadership, commensurate with its wealth and power. The institutions of global governance — the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the like — have not been perfect, but they remain the best framework for securing peace and prosperity around the world. A China that turns its back on these institutions will find itself isolated and defensive, no matter how great its economic and military might.
While Americans should hope that China embraces democracy and human rights in the long term, in the short run, we must accept that China has a right to its own system of government and its own standards for political legitimacy and social justice. The United States should insist that China, like every other member of the United Nations, abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We must help China see a distinction between its principle of “noninterference in internal matters of other states” and respect for basic human rights and dignity. (For our part, we must also demonstrate our own acceptance of the responsibilities of global leadership by, for example, joining the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.) But we cannot assume that political development in China will happen as quickly as Americans would like.
The view, increasingly prevalent in China, that it will inevitably replace the United States as the world’s leading power is far from assured. Our natural resources, the rule of law, our entrepreneurial culture, and our vast head start in higher education and science are strong factors in our favor. People from all over the world want to live and work in the United States — including wealthy Chinese. They seek the protection of our laws and the individual freedoms they find here. China does not provide these attractions.
If we are to retain our global leadership, and be a constructive, countervailing force as China rises, America needs a long-term strategic vision of our own: a strong, growing economy built on a foundation of energy independence; a vibrant, effective democracy; assertive, patient diplomacy backed by supportive allies; and a military capable of standing toe to toe with China in a crisis. With these pieces in place, we can succeed in helping China assume its rightful place as a global leader, and perhaps an equal of the United States, in a manner that promotes global prosperity and stability. Perhaps then China’s leaders will feel secure enough to grant real democracy to its people. But it will be a long journey.
Wesley K. Clark is a retired United States Army general, a former NATO supreme Allied commander in Europe and a consultant . He is the author, most recently, of “Don’t Wait for the Next War: A Strategy for American Growth and Global Leadership,” from which this essay is adapted.
