美国对华新大战略
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616
很简单，美中关系的根本问题涉及亚洲的力量平衡。
作者：罗伯特·D·布莱克威尔 阿什利·J·泰利斯 2015 年 4 月 13 日
美国需要从根本上改变对华大战略。
只要看看最近的亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）的惨败，我们就能明白中国的崛起是如何挑战美国的全球影响力的。中国领导的国际金融机构准备削弱美国领导的世界银行和国际货币基金组织的影响力，同时将中国在亚太地区的地缘经济胁迫制度化。意大利、法国、英国、德国、韩国、丹麦和澳大利亚已签约成为亚投行成员，泰国甚至台湾也计划加入。 与此同时，美国仍处于局外观望状态，因为其影响力受到中国崛起的直接挑战。
除了亚投行之外，中国还在推行一系列其他举措，以扩大其在亚洲及其他地区的战略影响力。 中国宣布了推进亚太自由贸易区（FTAAP）和区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP）的计划，这些贸易协定将中国、日本、印度和东南亚国家的经济联系起来。
北京同时正在推动建设新丝绸之路，该道路将开辟穿越中亚的贸易路线以及环绕东南亚和南亚的海上路线，更好地将中国与不断增长的亚洲经济体在地缘政治上连接起来，并通过它们与中东和欧洲连接起来。 除了这些项目之外，巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非之间正在讨论建立新的金砖国家开发银行。
中国三十多年来经济的持续成功，使其积聚了强大的实力，成为最有能力称霸亚洲大陆的国家。 北京的经济崛起令人震惊；35年来，其经济每年以10%的速度增长，国内生产总值 (GDP) 从1979年的1,470亿美元猛增到2013年的9.24万亿美元。
尽管中国的人均收入仍然落后于美国，中国经济的飞速增长已经为北京提供了挑战亚洲邻国安全和华盛顿在亚洲影响力所需的资源，并带来潜在的危险后果。尽管中国GDP总体增长大幅放缓，但在可预见的未来，其相对增长率可能会高于美国。
在强劲经济的支持下，北京开始对中国人民解放军进行协调一致的现代化，目的是积聚军事力量，既能够击败当地对手，又能够阻止美国在危机中出手防御。1997年中国的军事预算仅为100亿美元，1998年至2007年间年均增长15.9%。
今年，中国宣布将国防预算增加10.1%，即军费开支约1450亿美元。然而，这个总数并不能说明全部情况。 如果算上武器进口、军事研发以及解放军战略力量的支出，中国的军费开支可能比去年增长40%至55%。中国新兴的军事能力增强了其在亚太地区投射力量的能力，旨在限制美国进入该地区。
很简单，美中关系的根本问题涉及亚洲的力量平衡。正如亨利·基辛格所说：“最终，和平只能通过霸权或均势才能实现。”由于历史、意识形态、战略文化、国内政治等方面的巨大差异，中美两国对亚洲未来力量平衡的认知截然相反、互不相容。
中国对美大战略很明确：取代美国成为亚洲主要战略参与者； 削弱美国在该地区的联盟体系； 削弱亚洲国家对美国信誉、可靠性和持久力的信心； 利用中国的经济实力让亚洲国家更接近北京的地缘政治政策偏好； 提高中国军事能力，加强对美国军事干预的威慑； 对美国经济模式提出质疑； 确保美国的民主价值观不会削弱中国共产党对国内权力的控制； 并避免在未来十年与美国发生重大对抗。
在第二次世界大战最激烈时期出版的经典著作《现代战略的制定者：从马基雅维利到希特勒的军事思想》中，编辑爱德华·米德·厄尔定义了大战略
作为“控制和利用一个国家资源的艺术……以有效促进和保护其切身利益，对抗实际的、潜在的或仅仅是假定的敌人。”
对于美国来说，大战略长期以来一直专注于获取并保持对各种竞争对手的卓越实力。 然而，面对崛起的中国，美国未能将这一长达数百年的国家安全方针付诸实施。
相反，在与中国打交道时，华盛顿决策者可以采用一系列的政策选择和言辞。 人们谈论华盛顿和北京之间的二国集团（G2）关系，鼓励中国成为“负责任的利益相关者”，以及最近在北京出现的“新型大国关系”概念。
这些政策选择都不足以强化21世纪美国对华大战略的主旨——维持美国在亚洲的战略主导地位。 因此，华盛顿迫切需要在该地区采取一系列新的行动，重点是平衡中国实力的崛起，而不是继续协助其崛起。
由于全球化的现实，美国新的对华大战略不能像之前限制苏联实力的努力那样建立在遏制的基础上。 它也不意味着突然放弃美国长期以来将中国融入国际体系的努力。 相反，它必须对华盛顿现行政策进行重大改变，以限制中国的地缘经济、军事和外交扩张对美国在亚洲和全球的国家利益构成的危险。
美国需要将其政策集中在五个不同的目标上：振兴美国经济以维持不对称的经济优势； 在美国朋友之间创造新的、有意识地将中国排除在外的优惠贸易安排； 与美国盟友重建技术控制制度，阻止中国获得先进的军事和战略能力； 共同增强美国在中国周边的盟友和朋友的能力； 提高美国军队在亚太地区有效投送力量的能力。 所有这些目标必须在继续以符合美国国家利益的多种方式与中国合作的同时实现。
在所有国家中—在大多数可以想象的情况下—中国现在是、未来几十年仍将是美国最重要的竞争对手。 中国的崛起正在给美国的力量投射、美国的亚洲盟友和朋友以及美国领导的国际秩序带来越来越多的地缘政治、军事、经济和意识形态挑战。
华盛顿目前对北京的态度，有利于中国在经济和政治上融入自由国际体系，而牺牲美国的全球主导地位和亚洲主导地位，正在削弱美国在整个亚洲及其他地区的影响力。
罗伯特·布莱克威尔 (Robert D. Blackwill) 是外交关系委员会美国外交政策亨利·基辛格高级研究员。 阿什利·J·泰利斯 (Ashley J. Tellis) 是卡内基国际和平基金会南亚项目的高级研究员。 他们是外交关系委员会新报告《修订美国对华大战略》的合著者，该报告可在 CFR.org 上在线获取。
A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616
The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia.
The United States needs to fundamentally change its grand strategy toward China.
One need look no further than the recent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) debacle to understand how China's ascent is aimed at challenging American global reach. The China-led international financial institution is poised to undermine the influence of the U.S.-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund while institutionalizing China’s geoeconomic coercion in the Asia-Pacific. Italy, France, Britain, Germany, South Korea, Denmark, and Australia have signed on as members of the AIIB, with Thailand and even Taiwan eyeing imminent entry. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains on the outside looking in as its influence is directly challenged by China’s rise.
Along with the AIIB, China is also pursuing a number of additional initiatives to expand its strategic reach in Asia and beyond. China has announced plans to advance a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—trade agreements that link the economies of China, Japan, and India along with Southeast Asian countries.
Beijing is simultaneously promoting the creation of a New Silk Road, which would open trade routes through Central Asia and maritime routes around Southeast and South Asia, better connecting China geopolitically to growing Asian economies and, through them, to the Middle East and Europe. Add to these projects the ongoing discussions over the creation of a new BRICS Development Bank between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
China’s sustained economic success over the last thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent. Beijing’s economic rise has been staggering; its economy has grown at 10 percent annually for 35 years, and overall gross domestic product (GDP) has exploded from just $147 billion in 1979 to $9.24 trillion in 2013.
The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even if PRC per capita income remains behind that of the United States, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with potentially dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall GDP growth slows considerably, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future.
Backed by this robust economy, Beijing has embarked on a concerted modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the intention to amass military power capable of both defeating local adversaries and deterring the United States from coming to their defense in a crisis. China’s military budget, which was just $10 billion in 1997, saw an average annual increase of 15.9 percent between 1998 and 2007.
This year, China has announced that it will increase its defense budget by 10.1 percent, or roughly $145 billion in military spending. That total, however, doesn’t tell the full story; when weapons imports, military research and development, and spending on PLA strategic forces are included, China’s military spending could see an increase of 40 to 55 percent from last year. China’s emerging military capabilities enhance its ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific with the goal of limiting U.S. access to the region.
The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia. As Henry Kissinger has put it, “In the end, peace can be achieved only by hegemony or by balance of power.” Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically opposed and mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in Asia.
China’s grand strategy toward the United States is clear: to replace the United States as the primary strategic actor in Asia; to weaken the U.S. alliance system in the region; to undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power; to use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to Beijing’s geopolitical policy preferences; to increase Chinese military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention; to cast doubt on the U.S. economic model; to ensure American democratic values do not diminish the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on domestic power; and to avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade.
In a classic work published at the height of the Second World War, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, editor Edward Meade Earle defined grand strategy as “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation…to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”
For the United States, grand strategy has long focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals. In the face of a rising China, however, the United States has failed to apply this centuries long approach to its national security.
Instead, a gamut of policy options and rhetoric has emerged for Washington policymakers to employ when it comes to dealing with China. There’s talk of a Group of Two (G2) relationship between Washington and Beijing, of encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” and—most recently—the emergence in Beijing of the concept of “a new type of great power relations.”
None of these policy alternatives are adequate to reinforce what should be the main thrust of U.S. grand strategy toward China in the 21st century—to maintain American strategic primacy in Asia. Thus, Washington urgently needs a new set of actions in the region that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.
A new U.S. grand strategy toward China cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the previous effort to limit Soviet power had been, because of the realities of globalization. Nor can it involve abruptly jettisoning the long time U.S. effort of integrating China into the international system. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to current Washington policies in order to limit the dangers that China’s geoeconomic, military and diplomatic expansion pose to U.S. national interests in Asia and globally.
The United States needs to focus its policy on five distinct objectives: revitalizing the American economy to sustain asymmetric economic advantages; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime with U.S. allies to prevent China from acquiring advanced military and strategic capabilities; concertedly building up the capacities of U.S. allies and friends on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power in the Asia-Pacific region. All of these objectives must be accomplished while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that are consistent with U.S. national interests.
Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. China’s rise is producing increased geopolitical, military, economic and ideological challenges to U.S. power projection, to America’s Asian allies and friends, and to the U.S.-led international order.
Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that favors China’s economic and political integration into the liberal international system at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and Asian primacy, is weakening U.S. influence throughout Asia and beyond.
Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ashley J. Tellis is Senior Associate in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-authors of a new Council on Foreign Relations report, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” available online at CFR.org.
