武装起来：军事援助如何稳定和破坏外国独裁政权
https://www.amazon.com/Up-Arms-Stabilizes_and-Destabilizes_Foreign-Autocrats/dp/1541604016
作者：Adam E Casey (Author)，2024 年 4 月 2 日
这是一本“非凡的……必读”书籍（史蒂文·列维茨基，纽约时报畅销书《民主如何消亡》的合著者），探讨了冷战期间外国超级大国的支持如何支撑和推翻独裁政权，为当今的大国竞争提供了教训
在整个冷战期间，美国和苏联竞相支持国外的友好独裁政权。今天，人们普遍认为，这种军事援助使盟国独裁者得以生存，从台湾的蒋介石到埃塞俄比亚的门格斯图·海尔·马里亚姆。
在《武装起来》一书中，政治学家亚当·E·凯西驳斥了普遍接受的观点：在冷战期间，对独裁政权的援助往往会适得其反。凯西利用大量原创研究来表明，尽管向友好政权投入了数十亿美元，但美国支持的独裁者的执政时间并不比没有外部援助的独裁者长。
事实上，美国的援助往往无意中破坏了独裁政权的稳定。美国鼓励外国政权建立像美国一样强大、独立的军队，但这些军队往往会自己发动政变。相比之下，苏联提倡军队服从执政政权，消除了军事接管的威胁。凯西总结说，最终，是屈从的军队——而不是外部援助——帮助独裁者维持权力。
在大国竞争再度升温的时代，《武装起来》对海外干预的不可预见的后果提供了宝贵的见解，揭示了军事援助如何既能帮助独裁者倒台，也能帮助他们崛起。
Up in Arms: How Military Aid Stabilizes―and Destabilizes―Foreign Autocrats
https://www.amazon.com/Up-Arms-Stabilizes_and-Destabilizes_Foreign-Autocrats/dp/1541604016
by Adam E Casey (Author) April 2, 2024
An “extraordinary…must-read” (Steven Levitsky, New York Times–bestselling coauthor of How Democracies Die) look at how support from foreign superpowers propped up—and pulled down—authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, offering lessons for today’s great power competition
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union competed to prop up friendly dictatorships abroad. Today, it is commonly assumed that this military aid enabled the survival of allied autocrats, from Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek to Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam.
In Up in Arms, political scientist Adam E. Casey rebuts the received wisdom: aid to autocracies often backfired during the Cold War. Casey draws on extensive original research to show that, despite billions poured into friendly regimes, US-backed dictators lasted in power no longer than those without outside help. In fact, American aid often unintentionally destabilized autocratic regimes. The United States encouraged foreign regimes to establish strong, independent armies like its own, but those armies often went on to lead coups themselves. By contrast, the Soviets promoted the subordination of the army to the ruling regime, neutralizing the threat of military takeover. Ultimately, Casey concludes, it is subservient militaries—not outside aid—that help autocrats maintain power.
In an era of renewed great power competition, Up in Arms offers invaluable insights into the unforeseen consequences of overseas meddling, revealing how military aid can help pull down dictators as often as it props them up.
